Public policy and strategies to support institutional and technological innovations in the new water economy: the example of innovation technology clusters in developing and diffusing water technologies. by Barham, Craig Francis
University of Louisville 
ThinkIR: The University of Louisville's Institutional Repository 
Electronic Theses and Dissertations 
12-2018 
Public policy and strategies to support institutional and 
technological innovations in the new water economy: the example 
of innovation technology clusters in developing and diffusing 
water technologies. 
Craig Francis Barham 
University of Louisville 
Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.library.louisville.edu/etd 
 Part of the Policy Design, Analysis, and Evaluation Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Barham, Craig Francis, "Public policy and strategies to support institutional and technological innovations 
in the new water economy: the example of innovation technology clusters in developing and diffusing 
water technologies." (2018). Electronic Theses and Dissertations. Paper 3099. 
https://doi.org/10.18297/etd/3099 
This Doctoral Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by ThinkIR: The University of Louisville's 
Institutional Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Electronic Theses and Dissertations by an authorized 
administrator of ThinkIR: The University of Louisville's Institutional Repository. This title appears here courtesy of the 
author, who has retained all other copyrights. For more information, please contact thinkir@louisville.edu. 
 
 
PUBLIC POLICY AND STRATEGIES TO SUPPORT INSTITUTIONAL AND 
 TECHNOLOGICAL INNOVATION IN THE NEW WATER ECONOMY:   
THE EXAMPLE OF INNOVATION TECHNOLOGY CLUSTERS IN  






Craig Francis Barham 
BSc, University of the West Indies, 1996 






Submitted to the Faculty of the 
College of Arts and Sciences of the University of Louisville 
in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements                                                                               





Doctor of Philosophy 
in Urban and Public Affairs 
 
 
Department of Urban and Public Affairs 












Copyright 2018 by Craig Francis Barham 
 
 



































 ii   
  
PUBLIC POLICY AND STRATEGIES TO SUPPORT INSTITUTIONAL AND 
 TECHNOLOGICAL INNOVATION IN THE NEW WATER ECONOMY:   
THE EXAMPLE OF INNOVATION TECHNOLOGY CLUSTERS IN  
DEVELOPING AND DIFFUSING WATER TECHNOLOGIES     
 
By 
Craig Francis Barham 
BSc, University of the West Indies, 1996 
MPA, University College of the Caribbean, 2010 
 




November 23, 2018 
 
 





Steven G. Koven, PhD 
 
______________________________________ 
Janet M. Kelly, PhD 
 
_______________________________________________ 
Charles E. Ziegler, PhD 
 
________________________________________________ 
Wei Song, PhD 
 
_________________________________________________ 








This dissertation is dedicated to my wife and children 
 










































I would like to thank my supervisor, Professor Steven G. Koven, for his guidance and 
patience. I would also like to thank the other committee members, Professor Janet M 
Kelly, Professor Charles E. Ziegler, Professor Wei Song, and Professor Craig ‘Tony’ 
Arnold, for their comments and assistance over the past four years. I would like to 
express my thanks to my wife, Collette, for her understanding, patience and 
encouragement during this challenging period; and my children for their patience and 















 v   
  
ABSTRACT 
PUBLIC POLICY AND STRATEGIES TO SUPPORT INSTITUTIONAL AND 
 TECHNOLOGICAL INNOVATION IN THE NEW WATER ECONOMY:   
THE EXAMPLE OF INNOVATION TECHNOLOGY CLUSTERS IN  
DEVELOPING AND DIFFUSING WATER TECHNOLOGIES     
Craig F. Barham 
November 27, 2018 
A long list of water technologies has been central to human development throughout 
history. From the well in ancient times to desalination in the contemporary period, water 
technologies are needed to produce, distribute and treat water to support human life, 
industry, agriculture, and environmental health. As human development puts intense 
pressure on the planet's limited fresh water supplies, society is turning to increasingly 
innovative water technologies to close the supply-demand gap. The water economy 
represents a significant share of total economic output it its own right, while at the same 
time water directly or indirectly underpins all other economic activity. The water 
technology sector within the water economy has emerged as one of the world’s biggest 
and most interdisciplinary industries employing scientists, engineers, information 
technology specialists, and a range of different management and policy professionals. 
The international market for water technology is large and growing.  This market 
represents a significant business opportunity for individual firms and a local economic 
development opportunity for regions seeking to develop dynamic industrial clusters that  
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provide high paying jobs. This opportunity has motivated governments around the world 
to pursue policies to support water technology firms in what has historically been a 
highly fragmented industry which was highly dependent on local investments in public 
water infrastructure. To understand the growth and development of water technology 
clusters, this study utilizes a nine-part cluster development strategy developed by the 
United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to support its own clean 
technology initiatives. The applicability of the model was tested using case studies of six 
clusters – three in the United States, and one each in The Netherlands, Singapore, and 
Israel. An analysis of the case studies shows a high correlation between the EPA strategy 
model and the policies and practices pursued in each cluster. This suggests that this 
strategy-model could be used by policy makers and planners in other regions as a 
framework for analyzing growing or mature water technology clusters, or a framework to 












 vii   
  
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
           PAGE 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS……………………………………………………………...iv 
ABSTRACT……………………………………………………………………………....v 
LIST OF TABLES……………………………………………………………………...viii 






METHODOLOGY & CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
 METHODOLOGY………………………………………………………………30 
 CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK………………………………………………..48 
 
THE EPA INITIATIVE TO PROMOTE WATER TECHNOLOGY                     
INNOVATION CLUSTERS IN USA…………………………………………………....82  
 
WATER TECHNOLOGY CLUSTERS IN CINCINNATI, USA………………………137 
 
WATER TECHNOLOGY CLUSTERS IN MILWAUKEE, USA……………...………178 
 
WATER TECHNOLOGY CLUSTERS IN TACOMA, USA…………………………..231 
 
WATER TECHNOLOGY CLUSTERS IN THE NETHERLANDS……………...……311 
 
WATER TECHNOLOGY CLUSTERS IN SINGAPORE……………………………..380 
 












 viii   
  
LIST OF TABLES 
 
TABLE          PAGE 
 
1. Conceptual framework for the water economy,                                                          
water technology innovation clusters and selected                                                      
sources of data that support these concepts……………………………………...81 
  
2. Sample of Policies, Regulations & Procedures to Support                                
Water Technology Clusters…………………………………………………….549 
 
3. Research & Development Partners in Water Technology Clusters…………….554 
 
4. Sample of Channels for Supporting the Transfer, Commercialization,                 
and Diffusion of Water Technologies…………………………………………..560 
 
5. Sample of Channels for Facilitating Diffusion of Knowledge &                          
Increasing Communication among Water Stakeholders………………………..566 
 
6. Examples of Water Technology Cluster Champions……………………...……574 
 
7. Sample of Public-Private Partnerships in Water and Wastewater……………...581 
 
8. Level of Contribution of Funds by Source for Water Technology……………..586 
 
9. Source and Level of Sponsorship of Incubators & Accelerators                              
in Water Technology Clusters………………………………………………….591 
 
10. Degree of Success by Clusters in Parterning with Universities and                            
Established Firms………………………………………………………………596 
 
11. Linking Cluster Development Strategy to the Conceptual                        
Framework……………………………………………………………………...600 
 








 ix   
  
 
LIST OF FIGURES 
 
FIGURE          PAGE 
 
 
1. Independent and Dependent Variables and their                                                   





































I.  Innovation, Entrepreneurship, and Clusters in the Water Economy  
A.  Background  
 A wide collection of water economy actors, which includes scientists, engineers, 
technologists, policy makers, economists and planners, are working both unilaterally and 
collaboratively to transform the global water economy to align its functioning with the 
needs of the 21st century. The goals sought by these water economy actors broadly 
include supporting economic development, protecting environment health, and improving 
the quality of lives of people through better sanitation and hygiene. The functioning of 
this emerging water economy, and its impact in terms of whose interests it serves and 
how well it serves those interests, is broadly determined by two overlapping domains: the 
governance framework that manages this sector and the technological capabilities that 
address issues of water quality, water quantity and availability, and production and 
distribution efficiency (Kiparsky et al., 2013). This dissertation focusses on the 
intersection of the governance and technological domains, the importance of achieving 
synchronicity where the domains overlap, and some of the public policies that are 
required to overcome the market and institutional failures that inhibit achieving 
synchronicity. In the emerging water economy several trends related to water technology 
can be identified: sophisticated technologies are increasingly being employed to improve 
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the management of scarce water resources and protect its quality; increasingly  
sophisticated entrepreneurial and innovative activities are being employed to develop 
these new technologies and bring them to market; and a more facilitative organizational 
and economic environment is being created in local and regional technology clusters to 
support this water-technology-focused entrepreneurship and innovation.  
Improving the performance of water institutions and deploying more innovative 
water technologies are necessary in the emerging water economy which is facing 
increasing gaps between supply and demand, and threats to water quality and ecological 
sustainability (When & Montalvo, 2017). Billions of people have increasing difficulty 
accessing a reliable supply of clean water which limits their economic productivity and 
their ability to meet basic hygiene needs. Growing demand for fresh water drives an 
excessive draw-down of water from diminishing reserves, and the return of polluted 
water to the natural environment is threating the health and proper functioning of nature’s 
ecosystems. These water resource challenges, while creating great risks for many regions 
and nations, and placing a burden on policy makers for solutions, offers huge business 
opportunities for the private sector. Water innovators and entrepreneurs who have the 
technology, knowledge, and skills to deliver clean water at affordable rates, and treat 
wastewater to protect the environment and sustain the water cycle, are positioned to 
potentially reap huge financial benefits for their firms. Equally, there are also 
opportunities for regions with globally competitive industrial clusters focused on water 
technology to also reap huge economic benefits for their local economies. According to 
Mitra (2013, p. 2) there is a relationship between entrepreneurship, innovation and 
economic development:   
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“It is in the creation of value that innovation and entrepreneurship find their meaning. 
Where innovation can be defined as the generation of new products, services and 
processes, entrepreneurship is associated with the identification of opportunity in society 
for such products and services, and in the realization or exploitation of that opportunity 
through the organization of resources with which to make the products available to the 
market. They enjoy a symbiotic connection and together they create value. The value 
creation process takes the form of organizing resources with which to develop 
new products and services for the market and for society.” 
 B. Social, Economic, and Environmental Aspects of Water 
Water possesses important social, economic, and environmental characteristics. 
Clean water is vital for sustaining all life on earth and is also essential for supporting, 
directly or indirectly, all economic activity. The social, economic and ecological 
importance of water can be gleaned from the importance the global community places on 
having predictable and reliable access to fresh water of sufficient quality and quantity to 
sustain human life, support economic activity, and renew natural ecological processes. 
The central importance of water has also been articulated and agreed upon by members of 
the global community at many international forums, and in many important documents, 
which together helps to shape the global agenda in relation to sustainable development. In 
respect of the Millennium Development Goals (MDG), water is the most widely reported 
target of MDG 7 (UNDP, 2006, 2015); and in respect of The Global Risk Report 2015, 
water was identified as facing an emerging global crisis that represents the most 
significant risk the world will face over the next several decades (World Economic 
Forum, 2015).  
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 The relationship between water and human society, the economy, and the natural 
environment is complex and systemic; however, for conceptual simplicity, this 
relationship is often considered along the dimensions of quantity, quality, time and space 
that constrain availability of and accessibility to water. From a natural resource 
conservation perspective water of the desired quantity and quality is unevenly distributed 
across time and space: only about 2.5% of all water is fresh, and three-quarters of this is 
stored as ice and glaciers; about one-quarter of fresh water is stored as ground water; and 
1% is stored in lakes, rivers and soils. Worldwide there are threats to biodiversity and to 
hydrogeologic and hydrologic processes in watersheds that threaten both the quantity and 
quality of water supply.  
These increasing risks to water resources are primarily driven by population 
growth, agriculture, urbanization and land-use changes, increased material affluence, and 
modern lifestyles that are very water intensive. In the 20th Century there was a three-fold 
increase in the global population, a more than three-fold increase in the level of 
urbanization, and a six-fold increase in water use (Bogardi et al., 2012). On a global scale 
about 1.2 billion people face conditions of water scarcity, defined by the UN as less than 
1000 m3 per capita per year (UN-Water & FAO, 2007). On a regional scale around half 
of the countries in relatively water secure Europe, representing almost 70% of the 
population, are in a state of water stress, which occurs when the demand for water 
exceeds the available amount during a certain period or when poor quality restricts its use 
(European Environment Agency, 2016, 2018).  
There are also increasing risks to water quantity and quality due to the absorptive 
capacity of ecosystems being overwhelmed by pollution, the increasing frequency of 
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natural disasters, and the over-exploitation of both ground and surface water beyond 
nature’s capacity to regenerate this resource (Vörösmarty et al., 2010). Climate change is 
also likely to affect water temperatures and salinity which will affect water quality and 
impact aquatic wildlife, exacerbating the direct effects of pollution; and it will also affect 
the patterns of rainfall which determines the timing, location and severity of drought and 
flooding, (Bates et al., 2008; Bogardi et al., 2012). The pollution of water from domestic, 
agricultural and industrial sources presents a substantial threat to human health with at 
least half the world’s population exposed to risks from polluted water. Water is critical to 
carrying away, absorbing, and neutralizing the wastes human society produces while 
maintaining at all planetary scales the natural ecological functions without which life 
would not be possible. 
After a decade of increased focus on water, the United Nations estimated that as 
of 2011 about 800 million people worldwide remained without access to an improved 
source of drinking water, about 2.5 billion people worldwide remained without access to 
improved sanitation, and about 1.5 million children die each year due to diarrhea, 
primarily caused by unsafe drinking water and inadequate hygiene and sanitation 
(WHO/UNICEF, 2008, 2014). In many countries most illness, and the resultant burden 
on the health care system, is the result of poor water supply and sanitation. Despite the 
lack of access to fresh water the poor often pay more for water, both directly and 
indirectly, than the rich (WHO/UNICEF, 2008, 2014). Only about 10% of all water 
consumed is used for private consumption as drinking water and to support sanitation and 
hygiene; while the remaining 90% is used to support agriculture and industry.  
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To safeguard water in enough quantity and quality for both human activity and 
natural ecosystems, society must develop governance regimes to carefully manage water, 
and technology diffusion processes to facilitate the development and commercialization 
of technologies to economically collect, treat, convey and store this precious resource. 
Water governance regimes and water technologies diffusion processes must be adapted 
and upgraded to face new water resource challenges driven by climate change, as well as 
long-standing water resource challenges driven by population growth, urbanization, 
economic growth, and pollution. Good water governance facilitates coordination and 
cooperation between stakeholders, supports forward-looking public and private 
entrepreneurs who seeks out and exploit business and policy opportunities, drives and 
incentivizes innovation that promotes technological advancements, and transforms 
organizational structures and institutional processes that together make the water 
economy function more efficiently and effectively. Better water technologies ensure that 
water can be collected, moved, treated and stored at a lower financial cost, and with a 
lower or even neutral impact on the natural environment. Governance regimes will be 
required to change human behavior to consume water more responsibly and incentivize 
innovators and entrepreneurs to find solutions to better manage water resources; 
sophisticated water technologies will be required to recharge aquifers, treat and reuse 
wastewater, desalinate seawater, and ultimately close the water loop with minimum 
energy requirements. 
None of these various social, economic and ecological aspects of water can be 
considered in total isolation from the others because they are all interrelated. These water 
issues present challenges which require concerted public action by public policy 
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entrepreneurs and innovators. These water issues also present opportunities for both 
private entrepreneurs and innovators to offer commercial solutions which could be highly 
profitable. Joint and coordinated public and private action could also address climatic and 
ecological concerns while supporting sustainable economic development. At the highest 
conceptual level, this complex water challenge can be described as a careful balancing 
act. On one hand is the need to ensure that fresh water, in an acceptable quantity and of 
an acceptable quality, is consistently and predictably available across time and space to 
maintain human health and support economic livelihoods; while on the other hand fresh 
water is required to ensure that the natural environment and the hydrologic cycle is 
protected from pollution and overexploitation of water resources. 
C.  The Case Studies  
This dissertation contains six case studies that focus on identifying the public 
policies and strategies designed to create economically competitive water technology 
clusters along three dimensions: strategies that stimulate and nurture technological 
innovation and entrepreneurship at the firm level, strategies that foster innovative 
governance and institutions at the cluster level that supports firms, and strategies that 
foster the diffusion of water technologies through commercialization and adoption by 
users. Water technology clusters are emerging worldwide and have become the focus of 
public policy attention as governments attempt to address existing and emerging 
challenges within their national water economies. Three of the case studies look at water 
technology clusters in the United States and the efforts of the US Environmental 
Protection Agency (EPA), under its Clean Technology Initiative, to support the growth of 
these clusters. The goal is for them to become global leaders in water technology and 
water management solutions. Three of the case studies look at water technology clusters 
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outside the United States, namely The Netherlands, Singapore and Israel. The concluding 
discussion and analysis compare all six clusters to a generic set of nine strategies 
developed by the EPA for the development and support of clean technology clusters. The 
generic strategies are critically examined within the context of a conceptual framework 
built around the three complementary theories: international competitiveness by Michael 
Porter, for the building of competitive firms through the strengthening of industrial 
clusters; institutional strengthening by Douglass North, for the improving of economic 
performance of industries and regions; and the diffusion of innovation by Everett Rogers, 
for the improving of processes through which innovative policies, practices, and 
technologies are adopted.     
D.  Research Questions 
Although empirically difficult to prove it is widely accepted that when innovative, 
technology-based firms geographically cluster - and engage in synergistic relationships 
that involve a combination of coordination, cooperation and competition - they 
collectively have a capacity to transform and revitalize local economies, create and 
sustain international competitive advantage out of local advantage, create wealth and 
jobs, and deliver scientific, technical, and managerial solution to social, economic and 
ecological challenges (Porter, 1990; OECD 1999, 2003; Tether & Storey, 1998). This 
proposition has been extended to water technology clusters and public policy makers in 
several countries have taken up the challenge of strengthening their water innovation 
ecosystem through attempts to accelerate the creation, assessment and adoption of 
innovations in technology, finance, organizational structures, contractual relations, and 
regulation (EPA, n.d.; Fieldsteel, 2013). This policy of public intervention reflects the 
widely accepted position that institutional failure inhibits coordination and collaboration 
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in a highly regulated and fragmented water sector; and that market failure produces 
information deficits and asymmetries which increase innovation risk for a traditionally 
risk averse industry, channel insufficient funds for innovation, and lengthen the time for 
technology commercialization beyond a socially desirable period (EPA, n.d.; Fieldsteel, 
2013; Bartlett et al., 2017). 
 This dissertation will thus seek to answer the following questions: 
• Do governments intervene to promote the development of industrial clusters for 
water technology firms?  
• What public policies and strategies do governments employ to support the 
development or expansion of water technology innovation clusters? 
• What are examples of successful clusters in which specific strategies of 
government intervention can be used as good practices?  
• What are the roles and responsibilities – or the division of labor – between public 
and private partners in developing or expanding water technology innovation 
clusters? 
• Do individual or organizational champions facilitate the development and 
diffusion of water-related technologies and enhance the competitiveness of water 
technology innovation clusters? 
• Does the institutional setting of a jurisdiction affect the development and 
diffusion of innovative water-related technologies? 
E. Significance  
 Water underpins and touches on every aspect of social and economic life and is 
critical for the functioning of all types of natural ecosystems. Water is life itself but the 
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water economy in many parts of the world is either in crisis, or will soon face crisis, and 
is failing to deliver critical benefits to large segments of the global population. This study 
reinforces the important and integrated role that governance, institutions, and technology 
play in the water economy and seeks an understanding of some of the key challenges this 
sector faces as public and private innovators and entrepreneurs seek solutions to water 
challenges.  
In understanding the relationship between governance, institutions, and 
technology in the water economy, this study will address three specific issues. First, this 
study will seek to more clearly define the term ‘water economy,’ which is currently 
poorly defined in the literature although it is coming into increasing use (Kislev, 2001; 
Gleick et al., 2002; Briscoe & Malik, 2006). A clear understanding of what represents the 
‘water economy’ is important for any examination of the relationship between the 
governance, institutions, and technologies employed in this sector. Water and sanitation 
have been extensively studied by academics and policymakers, but this has not been 
reflected in a thorough theoretical examination of the ‘new water economy’ that is 
emerging. This study seeks to help fill that gap by providing a conceptual framework and 
a working definition for the ‘new water economy.’ The ‘new water economy’ which is 
emerging represents a transition from one dominated by the public sector - where water 
was treated primarily as a public good and not priced to reflect scarcity or environmental 
health – to a water economy with a greater role for the private sector and market forces - 
where water is priced at full-cost to ensure that it is allocated it to the highest value uses 
and managed in an environmentally sustainable manner.  
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Second, this study also examines the emerging phenomenon of water technology 
innovations clusters, which is one means of addressing key challenges to the water 
economy, especially as it relates to the supply of fresh water and treatment of wastewater. 
While clusters have also been extensively studied in the literature on economic 
development, its specific application to the water economy has not been extensively 
examined. This study will present a conceptual framework for understanding the 
development of water technology innovation clusters by situating it in the literature of 
industrial clusters, institutions and economic development, and diffusion of innovations, 
both technological and policy.  
Finally, this study will examine in detail the efforts of the United States 
Environmental Protection Agency to foster the development of water technology 
innovation clusters and compare the policy instruments and strategies of the agency to the 
theoretical framework that has been developed for this study. This is intended to guide 
future researchers and policymakers as they examine the performance of water 
technology clusters and employ this policy approach to influence outcomes in the water 













I. The New Water Economy: Governance and Technological Trends 
The collection, treatment, storage, and distribution of fresh and wastewater are the 
key dimensions of a complex social, economic, political and ecological system called the 
‘water economy.’ The water economy is a framework in which institutions and actors, 
both public and private, and in different spatial and temporal contexts, engage in a mix of 
collaborative, cooperative and competitive activities to produce, consume and exchange 
water and sanitation goods and services, and exploit or conserve water resources (FAO, 
1993; Maxwell, 2009; Boccaletti et al., 2009; Libecap, 2010). A well-functioning water 
economy must balance the often-conflicting demands that arise in the key dimensions 
while meeting a triple performance criterion of efficiency, effectiveness and equity. The 
existence of these multiple and interrelated dimensions and performance criteria mean 
that water exhibits characteristics of both a public and a private good (Ostrom, 1962; 
Gleick et al, 2002; Hanemann, 2006; Maxwell, 2009; Adams et al., 2009; Libecap, 2010); 
and the structure of the water economy and the functioning of the institutions that 
constrain and enable interactions between agents means that it is subject to both market 
and government failure (Stiglitz, 1989; North, 1991).  
Water has been recognized as an ‘economic good’ for many centuries; however, 
the public-good nature of water was emphasized for much of the 20th Century resulting 
in a dominant tradition of public ownership and management, and heavy public subsidy, 
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which led to the fundamental challenge of water not being treated as a scarce resource 
(Rodgers et al., 2002; Rosegant & Cline, 2002). Some of the key results of this 
conceptualization of water has been overexploitation and waste of the resource, because 
it was underpriced; an underinvestment in infrastructure, because revenue streams did not 
align with capital, operation and maintenance costs; and a failure to cost the ecological 
services which are provided by the regenerative processes of the water cycle, which 
resulted in greater pollution. The employment of the term ‘water economy’ signifies a 
shift in public policy and institutional arrangements toward water and sanitation with 
both primarily seen as an ‘economic good’ where price mechanisms and the market will 
primarily determine its value and govern its production, allocation, distribution. This does 
not imply that public action and oversight has been removed from the institutional 
framework: it is widely accepted that unregulated market forces can never completely 
and equitably satisfy social and ecological objectives; and the presence of market failure 
and the public good nature of water and sanitation requires an active role for the state 
(Gleick et al., 2002). 
II. Actors and Sub-sectors in the Water Economy 
The water economy can broadly be divided into three parts: (1) public and private 
municipal water and sanitation providers; (2) commercial and industrial water technology 
firms; and (3) firms that are either water-intensive or water-enabled (Coy, 2002). 
Explicitly absent from this framework are those entities engaged primarily in water 
resource and environmental conservation, which should also be included in any 
conception of the water economy. Water resources management and environmental 
conservation are important and very much related to the water economy, despite being 
 
 14   
  
largely a public-sector responsibility and a public good, and these services not being 
produced, consumed nor exchanged in the traditional market-economy sense. Water 
resources management and environmental conservation are equally subject to the type of 
entrepreneurial and innovation actives which the dissertation seeks to explore. This 
broader, holistic and systemic conceptualization of the water economy fits in with the 
recognition that ecological services have a value that can and should be monetized, that 
both improved water governance and water technologies are required to address water 
challenges, and that the emerging paradigm is of ‘one water’ where water is valued and 
managed along the entire water cycle (Dyson, 2016; Feenstra, 2016).  
III. From Traditional to Emerging Water Economy 
The policies, institutions and practices that governed the water economy during 
the 20th Century were laid down in the reforms of the ‘Sanitary Revolution,’ which 
occurred during the latter decades of the 19th Century. Initially there was a significant 
role for the private sector, but the scale and scope of the investments required, and the 
social and public health challenges, led to a greater role for the state (Solomon, 2011; 
Smith 2013). The current state dominated delivery framework for fresh water and 
sanitation no longer delivers service of sufficient quantity and quality to the more than 
seven billion people on the planet (World Water Commission, 2000). Since at least the 
1970s governments and water-based non-governmental organizations have been 
exploring ways of transforming the water economy so that it simultaneously delivers 
social, economic and ecological benefits that satisfy human needs but in an 
environmentally sustainable manner. The consensus that has emerged is that this 
transformation is best achieved with a combination of better technology, management, 
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institutions and governance - combined in the correct proportions to reflect local water 
realities – and by having water and sanitation services organized and managed along 
economic principles, but with an economic model which recognizes that the unique 
nature of water causes it to be subject to multiple market failures (Gleick et al., 2002; 
Solomon, 2011; Feldman, 2017). This would mean that the new water economy would 
use market forces to more efficiently and effectively manage demand and encourage 
conservation through prices; incentivize private investment in building and rehabilitating 
infrastructure; and leverage the financial resources of capital markets in support of 
investment, research and development. The new water economy would also see a new 
role for the public sector which would increasingly move away from the direct provision 
of water and sanitation services to that of regulator, coordinator, and facilitator - with a 
focus on overcoming market failures - while ensuring that equity exists in the delivery of 
water services to poor and marginalized groups who may be underserved by market 
forces.   
This study highlights the fragmented institutional structure of the traditional water 
economy, which has put water resources on an unsustainable and inequitable path (World 
Water Commission, 2000; Conway et al., 2010).  The old water economy must be 
replaced by a system that is more adaptive to change, efficient in the use of resources, 
effective in delivering both quantity and quality, sustainable in financial and ecological 
terms, and equitable between competing demands among all users. Achieving these goals 
requires drastic changes in the way water is managed, how water institutions are 
structured, how it is governed to reconcile competing and conflicting demands, and how 
technology is brought to bear to address water quantity and quality issues.  
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The challenges facing the water economy are diverse and multi-dimensional – 
they include political, economic, social, ecological, scientific, technological and 
governance challenges (World Water Commission, 2000; Rogers & Hall, 2003; Conway 
et al., 2010).  Political challenges include water and sanitation not always being given a 
high priority in government against competing policy demands; responsibility for water, 
sanitation, resource conservation, and environmental protection are often spread among 
numerous ministries and agencies of government; and the work of donors and non-
governmental organizations is not always well coordinated (Conway et al., 2010). 
Economic challenges include a shift from water being treated as a free or heavily 
subsidized public good to being treated and managed as a scarce commodity. The full-
cost pricing of water services ensures that all costs – capital, operations and maintenance 
– are covered, water is allocated to its highest value uses, pollution is reduced, and 
conservation is encouraged (Conway et al., 2010). Social challenges include the 
continued recognition that water and sanitation have public good characteristics and that 
universal access is fundamental to physical and mental health, economic and social 
development, and public safety. Carefully targeted and transparent subsidies will be 
required for some groups of people; however, it is important to separate the welfare task, 
which is a government responsibility, from the business task, which is a utility 
responsibility, and to avoid water pricing and distribution being manipulated for political 
purposes (Conway et al., 2010). Scientific challenges include a long-standing split 
between ecologists and hydrologists, who address the generation and distribution of water 
resources arising from catchments, and engineers and public health specialists, who 
address the supply of fresh water and sanitation to communities (Conway et al., 2010). 
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Ecological challenges include government responsibility to protect the public goods 
nature of watersheds, wetlands and groundwater against pollution and over-extraction to 
ensure sustainable water resource management and intergenerational equity (Conway et 
al., 2010). Technological challenges include creating the incentives to mobilize 
entrepreneurship and innovation and overcoming impediments to promote the 
development, commercialization, diffusion, and adoption of new environmentally 
friendly and cost-effective technologies (Conway et al., 2010). Governance challenges 
involve creating the institutional mechanisms for mediating between competing values, 
norms and ideologies to ensure that the provision of water and wastewater services are 
equitable and economically sound, and that water resource management is carried out in 
an environmentally sustainable manner (Rogers & Hall, 2003).  
Coming out of this review of the literature, eight conceptual domains have been 
identified that can be used to analyze and understand the emerging water economy: (1) 
the nature of water as a natural resource, (2) the complex and systemic nature of the 
water economy, (3) the existence of multiple stakeholders with competing needs, (4) 
power relations between stakeholders with competing claims on water resources, (5) 
property rights related to water, (6) the fragmented structure of water economies, (7) the 
framing of ‘water economy problems,’ and (8) the relationship between the state and the 
market in the water economy (World Water Commission, 2000; Rogers & Hall, 2003; 
Conway et al., 2010). The domains underscore the importance of robust governance and 
institutional arrangements to the smooth functioning of all aspects of the water economy.   
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IV.  Water Technology Innovations Clusters: How Entrepreneurship & Innovation are 
Transforming the Water Economy. 
The scale and scope of the water economy, its cross-cutting nature and 
complexity, and the gaps between demand and supply all provide fertile ground for 
public and private entrepreneurship and for innovations in technology, management, 
institutions, and policy. One solution that has been offered has been the development of 
water technology innovation clusters, which foster, facilitate and leverage the 
entrepreneurship and innovation that the water economy is widely seen to need (Feldman 
& Francis, 2004, 2006; Feldman et al., 2005; Conway et al., 2010). An innovation cluster 
refers to agglomeration of firms within one specialized industry, concentrated within the 
same local geographical area, with a vertically and horizontally integrated infrastructure 
of related and supporting public and private firms and organizations, and proximity to a 
strong science and research base (Porter, 1990; OECD, 1999; Miranda & Potter, 2009; 
Feldman & Francis, 2004, 2006; Feldman et al., 2005). Water technology clusters are 
believed to create the organizational structure that facilitates the types of social and 
economic interactions between water stakeholders that overcomes barriers to the effective 
and efficient creation, commercialization, diffusion, and widespread adoption of technical 
and management solutions to water challenges.  
Clusters usually emerge naturally, however, the water economy is a highly 
fragmented sector, which makes it hard to organize a cluster and define its boundaries; 
and it is also subject to market failures, in the form of missing and incomplete markets 
and information failures (EPA, n.d.; Fieldsteel, 2013; Bartlett et al., 2017). These factors 
lead to calls for public intervention to support the development of water technology 
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clusters. The fragmented elements of the water economy include manufacturers of water 
devices and chemicals, major industrial and commercial users of water and water 
technologies, sources of finance for R&D, utilities and infrastructure, and centers of 
scientific and technological excellence in water R&D. These actors may all have an 
interest in the water economy but be unable to properly coordinate and collaborate their 
activities. Market failure may occur because the private sector may find it unprofitable, or 
too risky, to invest in the universal provision of water and sanitation; or investors may 
consider the sector too risky to channel financial capital to technologies and infrastructure 
with long periods for commercialization and payback. Public intervention could also be 
justified because key components of the water economy are often anchored around state 
owned utilities and infrastructure, while utilities, water resources, and the environment 
are heavily regulated by government.   
Business clusters and business ecosystems have received increasing public policy, 
academic and media attention in recent years, which has led to increased public resources 
being devoted to their creation or enlargement (OECD, 1999; Sallet et al., 2009; Miranda 
& Potter, 2009; Wessner, 2012). Despite their existence, their potential importance, and 
the public resources devoted to fostering, facilitating and studying them, policy makers 
and academics have a limited understanding of how innovation clusters emerge, grow 
into competitive industries, and transform the regional economies in which they are 
intimately imbedded (Feldman & Francis, 2004, 2006; Feldman et al., 2005). Public 
policy has attempted to replicate these features but a number of issues remain unclear: (1) 
are specific features of clusters - such as a local research university, the availability of 
venture capital or grants, and social networks and support services such as trade 
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associations and marketing agencies - drivers and enablers of cluster development, and 
do they lead or lag cluster formation; (2) what is the role of innovators and entrepreneurs 
– both public and private – as agents of change, in resource mobilization, and in 
institutional development; and (3) to what degree does local history and regional context 
influence the process (Feldman & Francis, 2004, 2006; Feldman et al., 2005). In addition, 
clusters are complex adaptive systems, and systems exhibit characteristics of path 
dependence, emergence and self-organizing which make them unpredictable and 
nondeterministic (Dooley, 1997; Feldman & Francis, 2002; Rogers et al., 2005). Public 
policy traditionally faces a challenge in understanding the drivers and enablers behind the 
emergence of clusters in a region or industry that previously would not be characterized 
as innovative; however, it is widely believed that the location of entrepreneurs with the 
skills and opportunity to capitalize on an emerging technology, and transform institutions 
in support of that technology, significantly affects the emergence of high technology 
innovation clusters (Schumpeter, 1939, 1942; Feldman & Francis, 2004, 2006; Feldman 
et al., 2005). 
Science, innovative technology and institutions, working together in a systematic 
framework, are the basis for solving problems created by human activity and underpin 
most improvements in human welfare and environmental protection. Science is the 
process of generating knowledge based on evidence; technology - which can involve both 
invention or the adaptation of novel products, processes or techniques - is the application 
of scientific knowledge to specific problems; innovation is the process by which science 
and technology are applied in novel ways, to specific situations, in specific contexts; and 
institutions are ways of organizing human activities to address specific problems  
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(Ostrom, 1990; North, 1990; Conway et al., 2010). Modern innovation usually takes 
place within a ‘science-innovation-diffusion system’ – which can be formal or informal – 
and one of the best science-innovation-diffusion systems is the technology innovation 
cluster (Feldman & Francis, 2004, 2006; Feldman et al., 2005; Conway et al., 2010). 
Modern science and innovation have evolved to be largely the result of teamwork - as 
opposed to the lone inventor of the past toiling away quietly in his or her laboratory - and 
modern R&D interactions usually involve a diverse system of players and institutions that 
influence its progress and success (Conway et al., 2010). Science and innovation now 
take place on different temporal and spatial scales and is increasingly regional, national 
and international with the pace of development from laboratory to market for many 
innovations greatly accelerated (Conway et al., 2010). There is a process in scientific 
innovation - basic research, to translational research, to product development – but this 
process is not always neatly linear, and it often involves a back-and-forth interplay 
between basic, translational and applied research stages (OECD, 1999; Rogers et al., 
2005; Conway et al., 2010). Where science does not lead to innovation and new products, 
key players and institutions may be absent, or some type of information failure may be 
blocking the two-way flow of ideas. 
The range of stakeholders in an innovation system is wide and includes private 
enterprise, universities, government and civil society: public and private research 
facilities and universities tend to be responsible for much of what we refer to as science, 
from basic through to applied research; private enterprise tends to be responsible for 
much what we refer to as innovation, through business investment, which provides 
security and capital for product development and marketing, which supports product 
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commercialization and diffusion; public policy makers tend to be responsible for a 
conducive policy and regulatory environment; and civil society tends to shape 
preferences and influence demand for goods and services (OECD, 1999; Rogers et al., 
2005; Conway et al., 2010). All of this demonstrates that a range of elements operating 
synergistically must be in place and functioning before locally valuable technologies can 
result from scientific innovation. Technology innovation clusters form the perfect 
enabling environment – of policies, regulation, institutions, finance, networking and 
information sharing, and protection of intellectual property rights – for the science-to-
technology-to-innovation diffusion pathway to turn out solutions to challenges faced by 
the water economy.  
Entrepreneurs are widely believed to be a critical element in the formation, 
growth, vibrancy and sustainability of firms in technology-intensive innovation clusters 
(Feldman & Francis, 2004, 2006; Feldman et al., 2005). Entrepreneurs can be defined as 
agents who are central to cluster formation, who in perceiving and responding to 
opportunities and incentives, act collectively by building relationships to re-define, 
combine and deploy resources to create new products, services, and organizations 
(Schumpeter, 1939, 1942; Knight, 1921; Kirzner, 1973; Drucker, 1985; Feldman & 
Francis, 2004, 2006; Feldman et al., 2005). This definition assumes that entrepreneurial 
decision-making and action is a complex mix of individual preferences and interests, 
prior experiences, knowledge and skills, opportunities, incentives, social networks, and 
access to capital markets and human resources (Feldman & Francis, 2004, 2006; Feldman 
et al., 2005). It also makes the further assumption that entrepreneurship is inherently a 
local phenomenon and that entrepreneurs are predominantly local actors who are shaped 
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by, and in turn reshape, their environment during the innovation process (Feldman & 
Francis, 2004, 2006; Feldman et al., 2005). The nature of entrepreneurship is one of 
interdependence between actors, government policy, available resources, and the local 
geographic and environmental context: this gives rise to a creative feedback loop between 
the entrepreneur and his or her environment that determines the nature, stability and 
uniqueness of technology-intensive innovation clusters, that helps to give clusters 
competitive advantage, but also means that clusters are path dependent and heavily 
influenced by history (Feldman & Francis, 2004, 2006; Feldman et al., 2005). These 
assumptions suggest that the entrepreneur can be influenced by exogenous forces - such 
as a response to public policy, a crisis, or an opportunity - that can either turn latent 
entrepreneurship into active entrepreneurship or redirect existing entrepreneurship to 
align with new policy (Schumpeter, 1939, 1942; Hébert & Link, 1988; Feldman & 
Francis, 2004, 2006; Feldman et al., 2005).   
The literature suggests that if technology innovation clusters are to help solve 
challenges within the water economy, there is a need for both robust institutions and 
advanced technologies to balance supply and demand and protect water quality. Despite 
the social, economic, and environmental importance of the water economy, less that 0.2% 
of all inventions patented worldwide in recent decades are water-related technologies; 
and although many countries are affected by water scarcity and pollution, absolute 
scarcity of water or severe pollution are not the prime drivers to create the institutions, 
nor develop the technologies, to address issues of water quantity or quality (Conway et 
al., 2015).  Most water stressed countries are in the developed world and these countries 
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have the weakest institutional regimes, and the least technological capacity, and are least 
likely to develop technologies to address local water problems (Conway et al., 2015).  
Robust water institutions and advanced water technologies generally arise in 
places where the correct governance and institutional framework, along with sufficient 
human, financial, and technological resources, have been purposively developed and put 
in place. Water technology innovation clusters develop when the following factors exist: 
(1) economic and financial incentives to make investments in water R&D and water 
technologies profitable; (2) institutional arrangements to ensure the timely diffusion and 
adoption of water technologies; (4) social capital and networks which encourage and 
facilitate cooperation and collaboration; (4) a legal framework to support and facilitate 
public-private partnerships for the appropriate allocation of roles and responsibilities; (5) 
an innovation-diffusion process which moves a technology from research through 
development to commercialization and facilitates the scaling of both technologies and 
business models; and (6) public and private procurement policies and practices that build 
a relationship with technology firms that increases the speed and encourages the direction 
of technology development and diffusion (Rogers & Hall, 2003; Bartlett, 2017). To test 
the applicability of these considerations this study will briefly examine water technology 
clusters in three US regions – Cincinnati, Milwaukee, and Tacoma - and of three small 
nations – The Netherlands, Israel, and Singapore to find evidence of their existence. 
V. Water Technology Innovation Clusters in the United States 
The United States is the global leader in the development, commercialization and 
consumption of water technologies; however, this is primarily related to the size of its 
economy and an across-the-board global leadership in R&D and patenting rather than a 
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focused commitment to water technologies (Conway et al., 2015; Bartlett, 2017). 
Beginning in 2012 the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) began assisting water 
technology innovation clusters because this sector is now recognized as vital to the 
economic, environmental and public health of the US, and because the current US water 
technology sector is perceived to be too fragmented to solve complex problems that 
require collective action on the part of both the private and public sectors (EPA, 2013, 
2014, 2015). Across the US water companies, universities and other organizations have 
established clusters in the field of water technology to seize opportunities for 
collaborations in scientific research and the development and commercialization of water 
technologies (Bosma, 2013; Picou, 2014). The strengthening of existing or nascent water 
technology innovation clusters through well-designed and carefully targeted public policy 
is believed to be critical to addressing water challenges and putting the US on a more 
sustainable economic and environmental path. The EPA believes a failure to upgrade 
water and sanitation infrastructure, improve service quality, safeguard water resources, 
and protect water ecosystems over the coming decades will risk reversing decades of 
environmental, public health, and economic gains; and sustainable solutions to challenges 
in the water economy are difficult to envision without technological innovations (EPA, 
2013, 2014, 2015).  
 The EPA aims to be a catalyst to promote and support technology innovation to 
protect and ensure the sustainability of US water resources (EPA, 2013, 2014, 2015). 
Innovative technologies, public policies, institutional arrangements, and management 
approaches are believed to offer the promise of addressing water challenges more quickly 
and more cost-effectively. Although the large size and varied geography of the US means 
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that challenges in the US water economy vary across time and space, the challenges 
which the US water economy faces can be summarized along the following four 
dimensions: (1) water scarcity, where many aquifers are being depleted at a much higher 
rate than can be replenished by natural precipitation and ground water recharge; (2) water 
quality, where many of the nation’s coastal waters, estuaries, rivers, streams and lakes 
remain impaired as a result of pollution and physical alterations to the land; (3) aging 
infrastructure, where much of the US water and wastewater infrastructure is aging and 
leaks, breaks down, or exposes users to harmful contaminants; and (4) climate change 
impacts, which exacerbates the challenge of protecting natural ecosystems, water 
resources, and water infrastructure. While these water resource challenges and market 
opportunities are traditionally framed as separate problems, they are best addressed in an 
integrated manner.  
 In 2013, the EPA put out its business case for using various water programs to 
advance technology and innovation in the water economy (EPA, 2013). The business 
case identifies opportunities where technology and innovation could help solve water and 
environmental challenges of providing a reliable supply of clean and safe water, while 
using less energy, and protecting water resources with a combination of new 
technologies, new management and institutional approaches, and increases in the 
efficiency and effectiveness of existing systems and technologies. Water technology 
innovation clusters will provide part of the foundation to a greener and more sustainable 
economy and society that conserves natural water resources, reuses and recycles waste 
water, recovers nutrients from waste water, produces clean water and handles waste water 
using less energy, reduces the cost and improves the effectiveness of water monitoring, 
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and develops more resilient water and sanitation infrastructure, especially in the face of 
the risks from climate change.  
 The EPA envisions itself as facilitating inventors, investors and entrepreneurs 
through the following strategies: (1) advocating for the water technology innovation 
sector in the public and private sectors, including efforts to support research and 
development, verify and certify emerging technologies, pilot promising technologies, and 
deploy proven technologies; (2) communicating actions, successes and best practices by 
showcasing and celebrating examples of technology, policy and management innovation; 
(3) maintaining an inventory of U.S. environmental technology clusters; (4) creating the 
regulatory space, and providing targeted incentives, to foster entrepreneurship and 
innovation; (5) encouraging collaboration between regional clusters; (6) connecting EPA 
programs to cluster needs; (7) providing funding for research and development, and 
financing opportunities for inventors and innovators; (8) encouraging and supporting 
partnerships that foster innovation and entrepreneurship in the water economy; (9) 
creating an environment where businesses and other organizations can easily share ideas 
and solutions; (10) connecting businesses and other end users to new technologies, 
startups to new markets, and researchers to commercial partners; and (11) working within 
and across states to overcome local policies and regulations that impedes innovation and 
entrepreneurship (EPA, 2013, 2014, 2015).   
 The EPA supports water technology innovation clusters through the 
Environmental Technology Innovation Clusters Program (EPA, 2013, 2014 & 2015). 
Environmental technology innovation clusters are regional groupings of businesses, 
government, research institutions, and other organizations focused on innovative 
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technologies for clean air or clean water. To date the EPA has identified 14 regional 
clusters spread across the lower 48 states, which represent the range of challenges faced 
by regional water economies because of geography, geology, local climates, local 
economic conditions, and local custom and law. The EPA is following a well-established 
principle guiding public support for clusters, which states that most successful cluster 
initiatives begin in regions where the targeted industry already has a strong presence 
(Muro & Katz, 2010; Wessner, 2012).  
 The services the EPA provides each cluster include assistance with planning and 
structuring the cluster, recruiting participants, building capacity, and securing the 
sustainability of institutions that will support the cluster (EPA, 2013, 2014, 2015). The 
EPA achieves this by employing the following approach before undertaking a cluster 
initiative: (1) survey and evaluate regions for their cluster potential; (2) meet with 
individual stakeholders with the eventual goal of convening a large group of interested 
stakeholders; (3) secure a commitment from stakeholders to proceed with the cluster 
initiative under the auspices of the EPA; and (4) form a steering committee and develop 
an operating framework which sets out objectives and outcomes for the cluster, 
establishes an organizational structure, and proposes an initial schedule of activities. The 
EPA cluster program is part of a wider federal approach to supporting local economic 
development through clusters, and the departments of Energy, Commerce, Defense, 
Agriculture, Labor, and Education now all have programs devoted to regional innovation 
clusters. A similar program, started in 2010 as the Regional Innovation Cluster (RIC) 
Initiative, exists within the US Small Business Administration (SBA) (Monnard et al, 
2014). Of 58 clusters currently receiving federal support through the SBA, two are water 
 
 29   
  
technology innovation clusters. There are three primary goals to all federal cluster 
initiatives: (1) to increase opportunities for small business participation in industry 
clusters, (2) to promote industry innovation, and (3) to enhance regional economic 
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CHAPTER 3 
PART A - METHODOLOGY 
I.  Overall Research Approach  
The goal of this study is to refine our understanding of the public policies and 
strategies that are employed to develop and strengthen water technology innovation 
clusters. Clusters with innovative firms led by entrepreneurs are assumed to have a far 
higher success rate in commercializing and diffusing innovative water technologies that 
are needed to address critical technical and environmental challenges in the water 
economy, namely the sustainable supply of sufficient clean water at the lowest cost, using 
the least energy, and with the smallest environmental footprint. The specific objectives of 
this research include (a) determining if governments intervene to facilitate the 
development and diffusion of water-related technologies and promote the development of 
industrial clusters for water technology firms; (b) determining what public policies and 
strategies governments employ to support the development or expansion of water 
technology innovation clusters; (c) identifying examples of successful clusters in which 
specific strategies of government intervention can be used as good practices; (d) 
determining the roles and responsibilities – or the division of labor – between public and 
private partners in developing or expanding water technology innovation clusters; (e) 
determining if individual or organizational champions facilitate the development and 
diffusion of water-related technologies and enhance the competitiveness of water 
technology innovation clusters; (f) determining if the institutional setting of a jurisdiction 
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affect water technology policy outcomes. These avenues of exploration take place 
with the realization that innovative water technologies face institutional deficiencies and 
market failures that raise hurdles to their successful development and diffusion. This 
constrains the degree to which market-based solutions can be exclusively relied upon to 
address challenges in the water economy generally, and water technology clusters 
specifically, and leaves a space for the active involvement of the government in this 
sector.   
The overall research design of this study will take a qualitative approach, which 
employs a formal, objective, systematic process of data collection and data analysis to 
test the research questions (Babbie, 2007; Schutt, 2009). Social life is complex in its 
range and variability, it operates at different levels and at different scales, and the same 
can be said of the water economy. Qualitative inquiry accepts the complex and dynamic 
quality of the social world, uses a naturalistic approach that seeks to understand 
phenomena in context-specific, real world settings, facilitates a deep and intimate 
involvement with a topic of investigation in its natural setting, and allows the researcher 
to uncover and lift its many layers of meaning (Babbie, 2007; Schutt, 2009).  Qualitative 
research is ideally suited for building theory, identifying themes and conceptual domains, 
and generating hypotheses for later testing (Babbie, 2007; Schutt, 2009).   
II.   Research Approach. 
 This study seeks to understand the emergence in four countries of water 
technology innovation clusters and the relationship between these cluster and the 
development and diffusion of water-related technologies. Clusters are geographic 
concentrations of interconnected businesses and associated public and private institutions 
in an economic sector. Water technology clusters can also be considered as local 
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networks interacting strategically through a combination of cooperation, collaboration 
and competition to leverage local capabilities to produce policy, management and 
technological solutions, which address specific challenges within the emerging water 
economy. While many of these water technology innovation clusters emerge to address 
local needs they often increase in size and capability until they have global impact. The 
discourse around clusters was popularized within the discipline of strategic management 
by Michael Porter (1990) and within geographical economics by Paul Krugman (1991). 
The development of clusters has since become a focus for many government economic 
development programs, to include in recent times the development of water technology 
innovation clusters.  Proceeding from this frame of reference the research approach will 
involve collecting information using systematic processes and procedures, which include 
the following qualitative approaches: 
A. Exploratory.  Exploratory research is often conducted under the following 
conditions: when there are few or no earlier studies to which references can be 
made for information; when the researcher needs to carry out an initial survey 
to establish areas of concern; when the research project seeks to identify 
patterns, ideas or hypotheses rather than testing or confirming a hypothesis; 
and when there is a desire to gain insights and familiarity with the subject area 
to set the foundation for more rigorous investigation later, thus facilitating a 
shift to explanatory research (Babbie, 2007). While there is extensive 
literature on the phenomenon of clusters – which will help to establish a 
theoretical framework for this study - there is very little literature on the 
specific phenomenon of water technology innovation clusters. It will therefore 
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be necessary to identify patterns and themes in the case studies that will form 
the empirical component of this study to allow a conceptual framework for 
water technology innovation clusters to be developed. 
B. Descriptive. Descriptive research seeks to identify and describes phenomena 
as they exist and thus goes further than exploratory research in examining a 
problem (Babbie, 2007). This study will seek to describe the characteristics of 
water technology innovation clusters - as they are found in the specific 
contexts of Cincinnati, Milwaukee, Tacoma, Singapore, Israel and The 
Netherlands – as well as the specific problems to which these clusters were a 
response.   
C. Explanatory. Explanatory research is a continuation of descriptive research 
but goes beyond merely describing the characteristics, to analyzing and 
explaining why or how something is happening (Babbie, 2007). Explanatory 
research aims to understand phenomena by discovering and measuring causal 
relations (Levy, 2008; Bennett, 2004). This study will seek to understand and 
explain how and why water technology innovation clusters arose in the six 
clusters under examination.  
D. Case study.  This study will employ the case study approach to gather 
empirical data on water technology innovation clusters. Six case studies will 
be included in the study. Case studies are a specific approach to ethnographic 
research, which may be defined as both a qualitative process or method, and a 
product or outcome of this process. A case can be defined as an instance of a 
spatially and temporally bounded and theoretically defined class of event of 
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interest to the researcher – such as a water technology innovation cluster; 
while a case study is a well-defined aspect of a historical happening that the 
investigator selects for analysis to test historical explanations that may be 
generalized to other events– such as the causes of the emergence of water 
technology innovation clusters (George, 1979; George & Bennett, 2005). Case 
studies are designed to collect extensive narrative or non-numerical data based 
on many variables over an extended time in a natural setting, and support 
interpretation of a phenomenon within a specific context (Levy, 2008; 
Bennett, 2004).  The researcher goes beyond reporting events and instead 
details the experience of one or more individuals, communities, organizations 
or institutions; and the researcher then analyzes the resulting data for patterns 
in relation to internal and external influences to provide a complete 
description and interpretation of a phenomena (Levy, 2008; Bennett, 2004). 
Given the close relationship of case studies with the case data, case study 
analysis provides the opportunity to identify new or omitted explanatory and 
contextual variables and hypotheses, develop historical explanations of 
particular cases, specify complex causal mechanisms, path dependencies, and 
multiple interaction effects, and set scope conditions which guide an iterative 
research process (Levy, 2008; Bennett, 2004). Case studies therefore aim to 
produce causal explanations based on a logically coherent theoretical or 
conceptual framework that can generate testable inferences; case study 
methods to refer to both within-case analysis of single cases and cross-case 
comparisons among a small number of cases; and many research projects 
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using case studies involve both kinds of analysis due to the limits of either 
method used alone (Levy, 2008; Bennett, 2004). The six cases in this study 
will be subject to both within-case and cross-case analysis to identify causal 
antecedent conditions and outcomes both within and between cases. Where 
two or more cases have the same causal antecedent conditions and same 
outcomes – referred to as method of agreement - these may turn out to be a 
necessary conditions; where two or more cases have the same causal 
antecedent conditions and different outcomes – referred to as method of 
difference – it would not be possible to claim to have identified necessary 
conditions and a causal relationship (Levy, 2008; Bennett, 2004).  
These six clusters have been chosen as case studies because they have a 
very special relationship to water and their very existence is dependent on 
how they have approached extreme challenges in water and sanitation. All six 
clusters are considered to have had some degree of success in addressing - 
through a combination of public policy, management, institutions, and 
technology – their respective water challenges: Tacoma has been very 
successful in managing storm- water and in cleaning and restoring parts of the 
Puget Sound estuary; both Israel and Singapore face a severe shortage of 
water, but for very different reasons, and both have successfully leveraged 
investments in science and technology to expand sources of water, conserve 
existing sources and reuse waste water; Singapore and The Netherlands have 
been very successful in developing a financially sustainable water economy; 
while The Netherlands, much of which is below sea level, has waged a long 
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battle to maintain water quality and to reduce or mitigate the risk of flooding 
(Tortajada et al., 2013; Vossestein, 2014; Siegal, 2015).      
E. Inductive. This study employs an inductive approach, which is common in 
many qualitative research projects, particularly case studies, where the 
researcher makes broad generalizations from specific observations (Levy, 
2008; Bennett, 2004). The review of the literature on institutions and 
economic growth, cluster development, and diffusion of innovation will 
provide a well-developed conceptual framework to guide the inductive 
examination of the development and diffusion of innovative water-related 
technologies from water technologies clusters. The conceptual framework will 
focus attention on specified aspects of each case that will facilitate 
development of a 'thicker' description of patterns that emerge. The inductive 
approach provides this study with the opportunity to use these discrete cases 
to provide more grounded interpretation and robust explanations that lead to a 
deeper understanding of the key aspects of the phenomena. The more 
structured the case analyses, the more case interpretations are guided by 
theory, the more explicit their underlying analytic assumptions, the fewer the 
logical contradictions, then the more explicit the causal propositions that can 
be derived, and the easier they are to empirically validate or invalidate (Levy, 
2008; Bennett, 2004). The analysis of the six case studies will allow for the 
generation of new insights, principles or themes that relate specifically to the 
development and diffusion of water-related technologies from water 
technology innovation clusters.  
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The inductive approach is also best suited to exploring new phenomena - 
or approaching previously researched phenomena from a different perspective 
– and may facilitate some generalization beyond the data in the discrete case 
(Levy, 2008; Bennett, 2004). An inductive approach will usually use research 
questions to narrow the scope of the study.  
F. Process tracing. There are several methods of within-case analysis, but the 
method employed in this study is process tracing, which has inductive 
elements. Qualitative researchers have long argued that the methodology of 
process tracing, which involves an intensive analysis of the development of a 
sequence of events over time, is particularly well-suited to the task of 
uncovering intervening causal mechanisms and exploring reciprocal causation 
and endogeneity effects (George, 1979). Process tracing focuses on whether 
the intervening variables between a hypothesized cause and an observed effect 
move as predicted by the theories used to analyses a case; and process tracing 
tries to establish which of several possible explanations for this relationship is 
consistent with an uninterrupted chain of evidence from the hypothesized 
cause to the observed effect (Bennett, 2004; Levy, 2008). Process tracing 
allows case study researchers to get inside the 'black box' of decision making 
and explore the perceptions and expectations of actors, both to explain 
individual historical episodes and to suggest more generalizable causal 
hypotheses (Brady et al. 2004). In essence, the focus of process tracing is on 
establishing the causal mechanism by examining the fit of a theory to the 
intervening causal steps. By emphasizing the causal process that leads to 
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certain outcomes, process tracing lends itself to validating theoretical 
predictions, hypotheses, and research questions.  
II. Research Questions 
The following research questions are used to guide this research project: 
• Research Question 1. Do governments intervene to facilitate the development 
and diffusion of water-related technologies and promote the development of 
industrial clusters for water technology firms? This is an exploratory research 
question, which seeks to identify and describe this phenomenon both within 
and between cases. 
• Research Question 2. What public policies and strategies do governments 
employ to support the development or expansion of water technology 
innovation clusters? This is an explanatory research question, which seeks to 
discover if there are differences within and between cases.  
• Research Question 3. What are examples of successful clusters from which 
specific strategies of government intervention can be used as good practices? 
This is a descriptive research question that seeks to discover if there are 
differences between cases.  
• Research Question 4. What are the roles and responsibilities – or the division 
of labor – within water technology innovation clusters? This is a descriptive 
question that seeks to discover if there are differences between cases. 
• Research Question 5. Do individual or organizational champions facilitate the 
development and diffusion of water-related technologies and enhance the 
competitiveness of water technology innovation clusters? This is an 
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explanatory research question that seeks to discover if there are differences 
between cases. 
• Research Question 6. Does the institutional setting of a jurisdiction affect 
water technology policy outcomes? This is an explanatory question that seeks 
to discover if there are differences between cases. 
III.  Variables  
Below are qualitative variables which will help identify specific and important inter-
relationships in the study. Where cases are addressed in a comprehensive manner, process 
tracing is a particularly useful technique in helping to ascertain the causal process linking 
an independent variable to the outcome of a dependent variable, particularly in small-n 
studies. The purpose of this study is to investigate the influence of public policies and 
strategies on the emergence of technological and institutional innovations that arise out of 
water technology clusters. Thus:  
• Independent variable.  The independent variable is that antecedent factor (cause) 
which is presumed to affect a dependent variable. The independent variable is 
selected by the researcher and is measured, manipulated, or simply observed to 
determine its relationship to an observed phenomenon (Jaeger, 1990; Creswell, 
2009). In this study independent variables are the specific public policies and 
strategies towards innovation, entrepreneurship and the development and 
diffusion of water-related technologies. The policies and strategies that form the 
independent variables (causes) fall into three broad categories: (1) those that 
foster innovation in institutions and governance at the cluster level (PS-IIGC); (2) 
those that foster technological innovation and entrepreneurship at the firm level 
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(PS-TI&EF); and (3) those that foster diffusion of water technologies through 
commercialization and adoption (PS-DCA).    
• Dependent variable. The dependent variable is the principal focus of research 
interest and the outcome factor which is observed and measured to determine the 
effect of the independent variable phenomenon (Jaeger, 1990; Creswell, 2009). In 
this study the dependent variables are the specific responses of the six study 
subjects to the public policies and strategies towards innovation, entrepreneurship 
and the development and diffusion of water-related technologies. The dependent 
variables (effect or outcome) that were identified to be of interest include firm-
level competitiveness (CF), cluster-level competitiveness (CC), cluster maturity 
(CM), and institutional development (ID).  
• Extraneous variable.  Extraneous variables are independent variables which 
cannot be controlled by the researcher which may influence the results (Jaeger, 
1990; Creswell, 2009). Extraneous variables were identified in the Literature 
Review and the Conceptual Framework. Examples of key extraneous variables in 
relation to the six subjects in this study include climate, geology, geography, and 
market failure.  
Figure 1 below provides a conceptual framework for the relationship between the 
independent and dependent variables in the study and the six subjects of the study. 
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Figure 3.1 Relationship between Independent and Dependent Variables and Water Technology Clusters 

































IV.  Research Sites/Population/Sampling/Subjects/Participants 
The research sites will be the water technology innovation clusters in Cincinnati, 
Milwaukee, Tacoma, The Netherlands, Israel, and Singapore.  This study will employ 
convenience sampling, purposive and stratified sampling techniques (Babbie, 2007; 
Schutt, 2009; Rubin & Babbie, 2009). The sample size for the documents selected will be 
set at 90 documents with the following weighted strata selected: 
a) Peer reviewed journal articles - at least 7 documents for each country for  
a total of 42 articles. 
b) Government public policy documents – at least 3 documents for each 
country/cluster for a total of 18 documents. 
c) Statements and reports from international organizations - at least 3 
documents for each country/cluster for a total of 18 documents. 
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d) Authoritative books on the water economy and water resource 
management - at least 2 books for each country/cluster for a total of 12 
books. 
V.  Instruments/Measures/Sources of Data 
 The primary instrument for sourcing data was the Internet and specifically the 
search engines Google and Google Scholar. Key words and phrases were entered into the 
search engines and the documents which were returned by the search were examined to 
determine how frequently they had been cited and if their own bibliographies include 
frequently cited documents within the field. The search is broken down by the following 
themes: 
a) Water, sanitation and hygiene organizations in Cincinnati, Milwaukee, 
Tacoma, Singapore, Israel and The Netherlands. 
b) Water, sanitation and hygiene policy in Cincinnati, Milwaukee, Tacoma, 
Singapore, Israel and The Netherlands. 
c) Water, sanitation and hygiene management in Cincinnati, Milwaukee, 
Tacoma, Singapore, Israel and The Netherlands. 
d) Water, sanitation and hygiene infrastructure in Cincinnati, Milwaukee, 
Tacoma, Singapore, Israel and The Netherlands. 
e) Water, sanitation and hygiene challenges in Cincinnati, Milwaukee, 
Tacoma, Singapore, Israel and The Netherlands 
f) Water technology innovation clusters in Cincinnati, Milwaukee, Tacoma, 
Singapore, Israel and The Netherlands. 
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VI.  Procedures  
 The following steps were followed according to guidelines in the literature 
(Bennett, 2004; Goodrick, 2014):  
(a) Identified and clarified research questions and the purpose of the study. The 
appropriateness of a comparative case study design was considered;  
(b) Chose categories of literature and identified their sources. Comparative case 
studies are strengthened when they are informed by theory which guided the 
selection of cases and the characteristics of the cases explored;  
(c) Chose main methods for research. Conceptual clarity is important in the 
selection of cases: cases were selected on objectives which were informed by 
the literature, the data collection strategy and the research questions;  
(d) Determined methods of documentation and categorization of data.  A clear 
protocol with systematic procedures was developed to outline the process of 
data collection, data analysis and data synthesis occurred within and across the 
cases;  
(e) Decided what literature to collect;  
(f) Clarified the role of the researcher in the collection of the research material 
and considered any ethical implications of the study or any issues of 
confidentiality and sensitivity;  
(g) Reviewed and refined research questions, identified goals and objectives, and 
selected variables for examination;  
(h) Reviewed literature;  
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(i) Interpreted data collected and identified concepts. If there were divergent 
outcomes across cases, used the observed patterns and relationships to seek 
out additional evidence and considered alternative explanations for those 
outcomes;  
(j) Revised the research questions;  
(k) Verified the validity and reliability of the data;  
(l)  Completed conceptual and theoretical work to make findings;  
(m) Presented the findings in an appropriate form to the intended audience. 
VII. Data Analysis 
 The study consists exclusively of the review and analysis of documentation and 
interviews related to the following: the general phenomenon of business clusters, and the 
specific phenomenon of water technology innovation clusters; and the related concepts of 
innovation and entrepreneurship which take place within cluster and which significantly 
shape the functioning of clusters. Documents reviewed and analyzed include journal 
articles, policy papers and official or public records. The document review and analysis 
process employed in this study follows the six steps adapted from Altheide’s ‘Process of 
Document Analysis’ (1996) as well as the four quality control criteria for handling 
documentary sources of authenticity, credibility, representativeness, and meaning (Platt, 
1981; Scott, 1990). Finally, to enhance reliability and the validity, ‘data triangulation’ 
was used to overcome threats from personal biases and intellectual myopia (Grix, 2001). 
Through data triangulation, the researcher can rise above the problems that stem from 
using a limited number of sources or avoid the problems that may arise from drawing 
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from one field or discipline. Using documentation from a combination of sources will 
offer the widest range of perspectives.  
 When case studies form the basis of a study Bennett (2004) suggests several 
issues that must be taken into consideration by the researcher. First, the researcher must 
define the research objective, including the class of events to be explained, the alternative 
hypotheses under consideration, and the kind of theory building to be undertaken. 
Second, the researcher must carefully examine multiple sources – to include histories, 
archival documents, interview transcripts, and other similar sources pertaining to their 
specific case - in order to determine whether a proposed theoretical hypothesis or 
conceptual framework is evident in the case. The researcher must also be alert for 
examples of deviant cases and determine the specific factors that lead these cases to 
diverge from expected trends, an issue for which process tracing can greatly assist in 
narrowing the range of possible explanations or disprove claims that a single variable is 
necessary or sufficient to produce an expected outcome.  Third, the researcher must 
specify the independent, dependent, and intervening variables and decide which of these 
are to be controlled for and which are to vary across cases or types of cases. Fourth, the 
researcher confirms the cases to be studied, assisted by the results from the specification 
of the variables and alternative hypotheses from previous steps. Fifth, the researcher 
should consider how to describe variance in the dependent variables, based on emerging 
data, considering not only individual variables but also types of cases, or combinations of 
variables, and the sequential pathways that characterize each type. Sixth, the researcher 
develops structured questions to be asked of each case in order to establish the values of 
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the independent, intervening, and dependent variables. Finally, the researcher completes 
an analysis of the cases and makes a report of findings and conclusions. 
VIII. Trustworthiness and Credibility  
 In this study validity – which determines whether the research truly measures 
what it was intended to measure (Lincoln & Guba, 1985) – was achieved by considering 
the following: (a) searching the literature on clusters and reporting in a balanced way on 
different aspects of the discourse around this subject; (b) looking within the literature to 
see if others asked or answered the research questions; (c) avoiding selection bias in 
selecting the case studies, which can lead confirmation bias, or to causal relationships 
being understated or overstated, or to deviant cases being overlooked; (d) managing the 
tension between parsimony and richness in selecting the number of variables and cases to 
be studied; (e) being cautious about making generalizations from case studies;  (f) 
avoiding the 'degrees of freedom problem' which arises when there are more independent 
variables than cases; and recognizing that cases are not always independent because of 
learning and diffusion of knowledge, which compounds the challenges that come with 
case studies being 'small-n' samples, and limits the amount of new information each 
additional case study provides (Bennett, 2004; Levy, 2008).  To ensure construct validity 
– which is the degree to which inferences can legitimately be made from the case study 
back to the theoretical framework on which the case is based– this study will employ 
multiple sources of evidence; to ensure internal validity – which is about inferences 
regarding cause-effect or causal relationships – this study will employ pattern-matching 
and explanation building; and to ensure external validity – which is the degree to which 
the conclusions in the case can be generalized to other persons, places or times – this 
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study will use replication logic (Rowley, 2002; Yin, 2003). Reliability - which can be 
thought of as consistency, and involves using research methods that are considered to be 
robust and using those methods consistently (Lincoln & Guba, 1985) - will be achieved 
by doing the following the following: (a) consistently following the steps laid out in the 
procedures developed for each case, which will be guided by an overall conceptual 
framework and the case study questions; and clear field procedures for data collection 
supported by a well-developed case study database (Bennett, 2004; Levy, 2008). In 
general, the execution of a good case study requires good data collection which in turn is 
highly dependent upon the competence of the researcher who is an active agent in the 
process (Rowley, 2002). With case studies, random sampling is generally not appropriate. 
Random selection will often generate serious biases in small-n research, and the selection 
of a small number of cases requires the careful, theory-guided selection of nonrandom 
cases (Bennett, 2004; Levy, 2008). The challenge of case studies providing such a small 
sample size can, however, be offset by their usefulness in helping to examine the kinds of 
path-dependent learning and diffusion processes which take place within and between 
case studies (Bennett, 2004; Levy, 2008).  
IX.  Limitations & Delimitations 
Limitations are shortcomings, conditions or influences that the researcher cannot 
control, that place restrictions on the methodology, and that might influence the 
conclusions or results (Babbie, 2007; Schutt, 2009; Rubin & Babbie, 2009). Limitations 
for this study include a time constraint to complete the case study, limits of knowledge of 
researcher of water technology innovation clusters, limited research on these clusters, a 
lack of representativeness of the sample, and a lack of independence between case studies 
(Bennett, 2004; Levy, 2008). Delimitations are choices made by the researcher which 
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describe the boundaries that you have set for the study, and which the researcher has an 
ethical and academic responsibility to mention (Babbie, 2007; Schutt, 2009; Rubin & 
Babbie, 2009). Delimitations for this study include the following: size of the sample of 
documents for analysis; possible non-representation in selecting the literature and the 
cases to be studied; subjectivity in assessing instances that appear to contradict the 
frameworks; and subjectivity which can affect the selection and interpretation of data 
within cases, and cause different conclusions to be drawn from the same data by different 
people (Bennett, 2004; Levy, 2008). 
PART B – CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK  
I. Overview of Conceptual Framework 
The conceptual framework which is employed in this study is built on several 
theories and concepts that are well established in the social sciences. The aim is to 
construct a framework in which the combined theories and concepts facilitates a 
comprehensive, interpretative explanation of the development and diffusion of water-
related technologies in the social, economic, and political phenomena that is a water 
technology innovation cluster (Jabareen, 2009). A conceptual framework possesses 
ontological, epistemological, and methodological assumptions which are brought together 
in a coherent manner to play an integral and integrative role (Jabareen, 2009); and if 
constructed coherently “lays out the key factors, constructs, or variables, and presumes 
relationships among them” (Miles & Huberman, 1994: p. 440). The conceptual 
framework also presents actual practices that are related to the phenomenon to facilitate 
an understanding of what takes place in the real world beyond the confines of theory.  
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An underlying premise of this study is that the processes related to the 
development and diffusion of water-related technologies, and the phenomena of water 
technology innovation clusters, are complex, systemic, and linked to multiple bodies of 
knowledge that belong to different disciplines; and for a more comprehensive 
understanding of such processes and phenomena it is best to employ a multidisciplinary 
approach (Jabareen, 2009). This study also employs a largely qualitative approach which 
is designed to provide a set of tools for investigating complex phenomena – of which the 
water technology innovation clusters is an excellent example (Jabareen, 2009). In this 
study several case studies of water technology innovation clusters are employed to 
investigate the relationship between institutions and the development and diffusion of 
water-related technologies and how these impacts finding solutions to issues of water 
quality, availability, and cost (Baxter & Jack, 2008). Finally, this conceptual framework 
is designed to provide an internal structure that gives a starting point for conducting 
observations in the field, for writing interview questions, and for analysis of the 
phenomenon.  
The conceptual framework for this dissertation is built around the theories of 
institutional economics – as advanced by Douglass North, Vincent Ostrom and Elinor 
Ostrom – theories of market and government failure – as advanced by Joseph Stiglitz – 
innovation and entrepreneurship – as advanced by Joseph Schumpeter and Peter Drucker 
– and competitiveness and clusters – as advanced by Michael Porter, Maryann Feldman 
and Johanna Francis – and diffusion of innovation – as advanced by Everett Rogers. A 
summary of the relevant ideas of each person is given below: 
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II. Market and Government Failure. 
The water economy is organized under a framework of private and public 
institutions. Both set of institutions are subject to failure and this requires that policy 
makers find the optimal distribution of roles and responsibilities between the private and 
public sectors. Modern economies are primarily organized under a set of institutions 
called ‘markets’ which under ideal conditions - conditions which do not always exist – 
primarily uses price signals to supply information to ensure that the economy is Pareto 
efficient. Pareto efficiency is an economic state where resources are allocated in the most 
efficient manner, which means an economic state or economic strategy of allocation 
where one party's situation cannot be improved without making another party's situation 
worse (Stiglitz, 1989; Stiglitz & Rosengard, 2015). Pareto efficiency is a minimal 
economic notion of efficiency: it does not necessarily result in a socially desirable 
distribution of resources, it makes no statement about equality or justice, nor does it 
reflect an acceptable or desirable condition for the overall well-being of a society (Sen, 
1993; Barr, 2012). Pareto efficient markets can only occur under stringent conditions: 
there must be perfect competition which requires that there must be a sufficiently large 
number of firms that each believes it has no effect on prices (Stiglitz, 1989; Stiglitz & 
Rosengard, 2015). The market economy is, however, dominated by a small number of 
large firms and most of these firms face downward-sloping demand and marginal revenue 
curves – thus actual competition generally deviates from the ideal of perfect competition 
- and much production and distribution is not mediated through markets, but occurs 
within large corporations (Stiglitz, 1989; Stiglitz & Rosengard, 2015). Markets therefore 
are not always Pareto optimal, nor socially optimal: markets often produce too much of 
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some goods - air and water pollution are two good examples - and too little of other 
goods – fresh water, sanitation, and environmental sustainability are three good examples 
– which means that markets often ‘fail’ in relation to the theoretical ‘ideal’ market form 
of perfect competition (Stiglitz, 1989; Barr, 2012; Stiglitz & Rosengard, 2015).   
The reality of how market economies actually function is therefore critical to 
understanding the circumstances under which markets yield efficient outcomes, and the 
circumstances in which they do not, so that appropriate government interventions can be 
designed to intervene in ‘economically inefficient’ markets to deliver higher levels of 
social and environmental outcomes while avoiding creating circumstances under which 
government failure arises (Stiglitz, 1989; Barr, 2012; Stiglitz & Rosengard, 2015). There 
is a widely accepted principle among economists that for modern markets to exist at all, 
and to work efficiently, there needs to be a government to provide the foundations upon 
which all market economies rest: the minimum necessary conditions would be of defining 
property rights and enforcing of contracts (Stiglitz, 1989; North, 1991; Barr, 2012; 
Stiglitz & Rosengard, 2015). Beyond this there are further possible justifications for 
governments to intervene in ‘economically efficient’ markets: one is to achieve a more 
equal or equitable distribution of income, which is not guaranteed by Pareto efficient 
markets, for example to ensure that everyone could afford a minimum supply of water in 
a situation where full-cost tariffs for water were applied; and another is because people 
may make sub-optimal judgments about their own welfare, such as not requiring 
everyone to connect to and pay for public sewerage (Barr, 2012; Stiglitz & Rosengard, 
2015).     
 
 52   
  
Stiglitz & Rosengard (2015) identify six conditions – or cases of market failure - 
under which markets are not Pareto efficient and which provide a rationale for 
government intervention:  
1. Imperfect competition. This is a recognition that most economic activity takes 
place under conditions of monopolistic competition, oligopoly, and monopoly, to 
include the protection of intellectual property, and not under conditions of perfect 
competition. Many water utilities are monopolies and many water-enabled or 
intensive users are oligopolies or operate under conditions of monopolistic 
competition. Many water innovators have a vested interest in protecting the 
intellectual property of their technologies to secure a fair return on their 
investment.  
2. Public goods. This is the recognition that some important goods, like 
environmental protection or drainage for storm water, will not be supplied by the 
market or, if supplied, will be supplied in insufficient quantity.  
3. Externalities. This is where the actions of one party affects another party, the 
costs and benefits of that interaction are not property allocated between the 
parties, and the output and consumption decisions of the parties become 
suboptimal, with air and water pollution and the spillover effects of research 
being typical examples. 
4. Incomplete markets. This is where private markets undersupply private goods 
because of high transaction costs and asymmetric information, leading to higher 
levels of risk, lower levels of innovation, the absence of complementary markets, 
and lower levels of investment. This is typical of water utilities that tend to be risk 
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averse, have high sunk infrastructure investment costs with long payback periods, 
and limited complementary markets.   
5. Imperfect information. This is the recognition that economic actors sometimes 
have a private economic incentive to withhold information - such as about water 
quality – despite the public good nature of information, which justifies 
governments requiring public disclosure or investing in research and investment 
to expand knowledge. 
6. Unemployment and other macroeconomic disturbances. This has become less 
dramatic under a managed economy but still helps to justify public investment in 
infrastructure for counter-cyclical macroeconomic benefits and to make the 
overall economy more efficient and productive. Private businesses are averse to 
investing in infrastructure which have investment-operational cycles measured in 
decades, without risk reducing institutional arrangements such as public-private 
partnerships,  
The greatest degree of market imperfection is that associated with the production, 
dissemination, unequal distribution, and underutilization of knowledge and information: 
(a) firms may have a difficult time appropriating their returns to knowledge, resulting in 
an under-supply or under-utilization; (b) the capacity to learn and change is highly 
localized, so the ability to employ new technologies and increase productivity limits the 
benefits of the ‘spillover effect’; (c) local events can have permanent effects that result in 
path-dependence, which creates the possibility of a ‘low-level equilibrium trap’; (d) path-
dependence prevents comparative advantages being the optimal basis for judgments 
about resource allocation and production; and (e) there may be too little entry of capital 
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and new industries into the affected market, firms may not be able to divest themselves of 
risk, and hence they act in a more risk-averse manner, leading to a smaller market size 
and to under-performance (Stiglitz, 1989; North, 1991; Barr, 2012; Stiglitz & Rosengard, 
2015). All these impediments to the efficient and effective development and diffusion of 
innovative water technologies are present in the water economy and prevent the 
emergence, or reduce the competitiveness, of water technology innovation clusters.  
In some cases, market failures may be ameliorated by nonmarket institutions; 
however, issues related to the organizational form employed, and the roles and 
responsibilities of the two main categories of actors – firms engaged in production and 
distribution, and private or public entities engaged in regulation, facilitation, and 
intermediation – becomes extremely important (Stiglitz, 1989). The determinants of 
success involve more than just differences in the endowments of factors of production, 
the rate of capital accumulation, the level of technology, or the size of the market; they 
also involve basic aspects of the organization of the economy, including the functioning 
of markets, which is related to the ability of firms to acquire information about 
technology, and about what products can and should be produced, and how they should 
be produced (Stiglitz, 1989). Also, conditions need to be created whereby firms can reap 
sufficient benefits from undertaking the production of knowledge that produce spillover 
effects, thus reducing welfare losses from a reluctance by firms to produce knowledge 
from which they cannot appropriate all the gains from the returns on their investment 
(Stiglitz, 1989). Government therefore can play an instrumental role in institutional 
development providing they do not produce policies that encourage rent seeking nor 
government failure; however, this needs a government that can recognize both the limits 
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and strengths of markets, as well as the strengths, and limits, of government interventions 
aimed at correcting market failures. Considering market and government failure in the 
case studies helps to answer the following research questions: Do governments intervene 
to facilitate the development and diffusion of water-related technologies and promote the 
development of industrial clusters for water technology firms? What public policies and 
strategies do governments employ to support the development or expansion of water 
technology innovation clusters? What are the roles and responsibilities – or the division 
of labor – between public and private partners in developing or expanding water 
technology innovation clusters? 
III. Innovation and Entrepreneurship 
Innovation and entrepreneurship are occupying an increasingly central role in 
facilitating change in socio-economic and socio-ecological systems as these systems 
become more complex, systemic and dynamic. This is especially true of the water 
economy generally and water technology innovation clusters specifically. Modern socio-
economic and socio-ecological systems are characterized by increasing rates of 
interaction and greater degrees of integration. This process of change is being driven by 
emerging knowledge-based economies and societies that are dependent on technological 
progress that is broad both in scale and scope. The entrepreneur is the agent of change at 
the center of this process and the tool of the entrepreneur is innovation. For Schumpeter 
(1912, 1934, 1942) innovation is the fundamental instrument for achieving important 
structural change in human history; but, it was the entrepreneur who - as the technician 
with the cognitive and perceptual capacity - employs this instrument at the right time and 
place to initiate and steer change and bring about a new state in society. According to 
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Schumpeter, most members of society are passive 'consumers' with relatively stable 
preferences, who play a relatively passive role, who are predisposed to the status quo, and 
are thus not the primary cause of the socio-economic change; while the dynamic 
entrepreneur was placed in the middle of his analysis of change. For Druker (1998, 
2014), entrepreneurs are agents committed to innovation who seek out and then seize 
opportunities and assemble resources to either produce new wealth creating resources, or 
enhancing existing wealth creating resources. Entrepreneurship can then be conceived as 
a purposeful and focused activity, that begins with a purposeful search for internal or 
external opportunities, that can be carried out by any organization, that can take place at 
any stage of the life cycle of a product or organization, that increases an organization's 
social and economic potential (Schumpeter, 1912, 1934, 1942; Drucker, 1998, 2014). 
Entrepreneurs can come from both the public and private sectors; entrepreneurship can 
exist at many scales from individuals, to groups, to entire countries; and the entrepreneur 
does not have to directly profit from innovation as the benefits can accrue to the society 
at large. While innovation can take place in any part of society or sector of the economy, 
the generation of innovation no longer depends on individual personalities but 
increasingly involves the cooperation of many different actors connected through 
collaborative networks that even reach across the globe. Spontaneous innovation, though 
dominant in popular culture is the exception rather than the rule. Schumpeter (1912, 
1934, 1942) pointed out that entrepreneurs innovate not just by figuring out how to use 
inventions, but also by introducing new means of production, new products, and new 
forms of organization. These innovations, he argued, take just as much skill and daring as 
does the process of invention. Perfectly competitive firms and markets operating in 
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equilibrium lack innovation and fail to spark the entrepreneurial behavior that is 
necessary for social and economic progress.  
Schumpeter (1912) divided the innovation process into four dimensions: 
invention, innovation, diffusion and imitation. For him the invention and innovation 
dimensions have the least impact on society, while the diffusion and imitation dimensions 
have a much greater impact - invention and innovation often take years, and often require 
the convergence of multiple streams of knowledge before they become socially 
acceptable or commercially viable, making the entrepreneur central to implementation. 
Drucker identified seven sources of innovation, all of which are relevant to the water 
economy: (1) unexpected occurrences, such as climate change which represents an 
opportunity, a failure or crisis; (2) incongruities, such as below-cost pricing of water 
which represents a misalignment in the system and which requires a shift in perspective 
about the business model to be employed; (3) process needs, such as a greater role for the 
private sector which is driven by the requirement for greater efficiency; (4) industry and 
market change, such as deregulation which is a response to structural changes in the 
water sector; (5) demographic changes, which are impacting demand for water through 
changes in household size, age or income; (6) changes in perception, such as viewing 
water as a commodity which does not alter facts but changes their meaning; and (7) new 
knowledge, such as new treatment technology. New knowledge is the most high-profile 
source of innovation; however, it is also the most costly and risky type of innovation, 
with the longest time to market, which requires the convergence of multiple sources of 
knowledge, and which is very dependent on the capacity of the users and their actual 
needs. Drucker also offers three principles of innovation: (1) it must be purposeful, which 
 
 58   
  
means that innovation is systematic and begins with the analysis of new opportunities; (2) 
the process of analysis is both conceptual and perceptual and should be understood from 
the user's perspective; and (3) innovation should be simple and user friendly, and often 
takes place in small and incremental steps. According to Drucker innovation is built on 
hard work rather than genius. Considering the role of innovation and entrepreneurship in 
the case studies helps to answer the following research question: Do individual or 
organizational champions enhance the competitiveness of water technology innovation 
clusters? 
IV. Institutional Economics, Economic Change and Economic Performance. 
Douglass North argued that the tools of neoclassical economics provide an 
incomplete understanding of long-term economic change and he gave institutions a 
central place within economics through an extension of neoclassical economics. North 
challenged the notion of the rational and optimizing actor posited by neoclassical 
economics and instead argued that agents act intentionally but perceive the world through 
cognitive lenses that are part inherited from their culture and part derived from their own 
experience – the drivers of change are thus far more subjective than would be suggested 
by the neoclassical economics (North, 1991). The actions of agents are also governed by 
interests and incentives shaped by relative prices, endowments, and institutional 
constraints, as well as by subjective perceptions of the agent about how the world works 
(North, 1991). Social and economic outcomes are the sum of individual actions, but the 
summation process is not a simple adding up of outcomes - interactions between agents 
whose actions are based on decisions and beliefs critically influence the behavior of 
everyone so collective outcomes are far more systemic and dynamic and unpredictable 
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than would be suggested by traditional neoclassical economics (North, 1991). Like a 
complex adaptive system, North’s institutional economics is characterized by path 
dependence and emergence; and, unlike the world posited by traditional neoclassical 
economics, actors operate in a social and economic reality shaped by non-zero 
transaction costs, incomplete or asymmetric information, unequal endowments, and 
institutions that provide economies of scale that incentivize and reward certain actions by 
agents that may be individually rewarding but collectively sub-optimal (North, 1991). 
The economy described by North is very reflective of the structure and function of the 
water economy described earlier in the literature review. 
North defines institutions as both the ‘rules of the game’ and ‘means of 
enforcement,’ and separates the rules from the organizations that actually ‘play the 
game’. Institutions are the humanly devised constraints that structure political, economic 
and social interaction; institutions evolve incrementally; and institutions create order and 
reduce uncertainty in exchange (North, 1991). This conceptualization makes it possible to 
have a dynamic relationship between institutions and organizations - as the structure of 
the rules determines the interests and incentives facing the organizations – and, in some 
societies, the interaction of institutions and organizations produces a series of institutional 
changes that incrementally improves the performance of the system (North, 1991). This 
theory of institutional development explains differences in economic performance: why 
some organization or societies flourish and grow while others stagnate or decline?  
The idea that institutions are the humanly devised constraints that structure 
political, economic and social interaction is also found in the work of Vincent and Elinor 
Ostrom. The Ostroms were pioneers in advancing our understanding about how 
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institutions allowed people to gather information and make decisions to creatively solve 
collective human problems; and, equally importantly, how alternative institutional 
arrangements could be devised that overcome failures in key institutional regimes, 
namely the market system and a centralized, hierarchical state. The Ostroms employed 
the tools of public choice and game theory - linked these to theories about constitutional 
and institutional design, federalism, and polycentric orders - and applied these 
epistemological frameworks to the concepts of self-governing as this existed in the real 
world, especially in relation to water resource management (Ostrom, 2007, 2010, 2015).  
The Ostroms saw social and economic problems as existing within a complex, 
systemic environment and sought to avoid oversimplification and compartmentalization 
in their analysis of these problems. Thus they employed multiple epistemological 
frameworks and multiple methodological approaches to understand the problems of 
social interaction and decision-making at the heart of policy analysis and design, and 
their body of work can be summarized as seeking to understand how society at different 
scales of governance employs information gathering and decision-making processes to 
balance the needs of groups and individuals which are driven by various combinations of 
shared, competing and conflicting interests, behavior that would be found in a market 
economy or in an industrial cluster. The contributions of the Ostroms that are relevant to 
this dissertation, which support the ideas of North (1991), fall under the following: (a) 
decision-making processes, (b) group versus individual interests, (c) institutional 
structures and institutional rules versus human behavior, (d) centralized versus 
decentralized approaches to governance, (e) institutional change, and (f) institutional 
analysis and design.  
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A.  Decision-making processes.  Probably the most important philosophical 
tenet of the Ostroms was the belief that humans can solve most collective 
problems without the intervention of a centralized, coercive and hierarchical 
authority, and that self-governance is the optimal mechanism for selecting 
decision outcomes, which is the ideal outcome for a competitive and sustainable 
industrial cluster. The promotion and maintenance of a self-governing 
administration was more compatible with heterogeneous, 'bottom-up' decision-
making regimes as opposed to homogeneous, 'top-down' decision-making 
regimes, which are again characteristic of industrial clusters. This perspective 
contrasts with the view of many social scientists that perceive the general 
citizenry as ignorant and uninformed on social and economic issues and incapable 
of making decisions to solve collective action problems. The Ostroms employed a 
methodological individualist approach – which puts causal accounts of social 
phenomena as flowing primarily from the motivations and actions of individual 
agents pursuing their own interests - which required the social scientist or analyst 
to consider how individuals or groups of citizens understood social problems, and 
then how they chose to act upon them (Mises, 1949; Arrow, 1994; Hodgson, 
2007). Individuals, and groups of citizens who shared common interests and 
concerns, were best placed to judge of their own circumstances and conceive 
contextually appropriate solutions, such as the highly local issues that are found in 
local and regional water economies. The process of information gathering, 
problem framing, decision-making, and action might include contestation, even 
conflict; but it was also very likely to involve cooperation and compromise, which 
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builds social capital between individuals within communities, stretching the time 
horizon to permit reciprocity and commitment, thus permitting communities to 
resolve serious conflicts. Another important position of the Ostroms was the 
rejection of the notion of a single and universal 'optimal' solution, as well as the 
tradition within the social sciences to search for and implement as policy that 
solution (Ostrom, 2005).  
B. Institutional structures and institutional rules versus human behavior.  A 
core tenet of the Ostroms was a belief that institutions matter and that an 
understanding of socio-economic systems requires a deep understanding of 
institutions. Human behavior is driven by both altruism and self-interest, as well 
as by the structure of institutions, and the formal and informal rules that they 
impose on individuals and groups. These structures and rules provide constraining 
and enabling conditions, which determines the set of potential choices that are 
available to people, and which create regularities in social processes that structure 
interactions between people in social settings. The design of institutions is 
therefore meant to facilitate communication, deliberation, and contestation among 
the members of a community, such as a water technology innovation cluster, to 
enable that community to solve challenging dilemmas and achieve shared goals. 
Effective institutions require buy-in and commitment from those who would be 
bound by the rules. External authorities can enhance or impede the development 
of self-governing institutions by the 'constitutional' rules they adopt to address 
collective problems, which accounts for the reason why the Ostroms sought to 
facilitate the process of self-governance and constitutional choice at the 
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appropriate scale of governance, rather than advocate for expert solutions 
imposed by authorities situated at a distance. The Ostroms also believed that well 
designed institutions allowed members of a community to harness nature in a 
sustainable and equitable way and overcome the 'tragedy of the commons' which 
is a potential dilemma of common pool resources or resources for which there are 
unclear property rights (Harding, 1968; Ostrom, 1990).   
C. Centralized versus decentralized approaches to governance. Ostrom, 
Tiebout and Warren (1961) refined the concept of 'polycentric' governance which 
has been applied extensively to considerations of water resource management. 
Polycentric governance conceptualizes a system of government with multiple, 
formally independent decision-making centers – functioning under quasi-market 
conditions – as being more flexible and responsive to citizens' needs than a 
hierarchical governance regime. Polycentrism is a decentralized approach to 
governance which removes government as the focal point of ultimate knowledge 
and authority and it is designed to change how people think about shared 
resources, public services, centralized authority, collective decision-making, and 
property rights. Polycentrism suggests that governance should take place at 
multiple scales - because decision-making should be context specific - which 
permits a greater variety of policy approaches to meet diverse needs and 
conditions. Polycentrism provides a closer connection between taxes and benefits, 
reduces the chances for free-riding associated with large anonymous groups, and 
increases the likelihood of consensus which naturally comes with smaller, self-
selected groups (Ostrom et al, 1961; Olson, 1965).  Polycentrism has multiple 
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centers of power - with jurisdictions that sometimes overlap, and at other times 
have different roles and responsibilities – that creates a check on power and 
allows citizens to seek justice elsewhere, thus advancing human welfare and 
creating a more stable, responsive and accountable political order.  The 
conceptual framework of polycentric governance is that of a complex and 
adaptive system that mirrors the workings of an ecosystem in nature. The Ostroms 
believed that traditional neoclassical economic and political models designed to 
explain decision-making in complex policy arenas were too simplistic to capture 
the variety of institutional forms people had created (Ostrom, 2007). 
D. Institutional change. Institutions are not always static and, ideally, they 
should be able to adapt to changing circumstances, and adapt with evolving sets 
of rules for managing emerging social, economic, and environmental dilemmas, 
such as those faced by the emerging water economy. Institutions influence human 
behavior but within that structure people can exercise agency and can transform 
institutions, potentially to better serve human needs or solve complex collective 
problems. Overall, these investigations show that - given the ability to 
communicate, experiment, and adapt institutional rules - people can develop 
various solutions to the sustainable management of the common pool resources 
(CPR), to which the ‘tragedy of the commons’ is supposed to apply, and to 
overcome both market and government failure to which the water economy is 
subject.  
Many different institutional arrangements are feasible. The key to deciding 
which of the alternatives should be selected is found in the design the citizens 
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would choose for themselves. Where others saw chaos, the Ostroms saw an 
underlying logic in which policy settled at varied levels consistent with the 
appropriate degree of social consensus. Not every issue had to be settled at the 
level of the state or even the metropolitan area. Instead, they predicted that 
simultaneous policy activities in distinct arenas could emerge without having to 
find a single consensus in the large scope decision settings. Elinor Ostrom and her 
research collaborators demonstrated that human communities have created a 
number of informal institutional arrangements for regulating access to common 
resources that succeed in creating a stable balance between resource use and 
renewal.  
Institutions are rarely either private or public – ‘the market’ or ‘the state’. 
Many successful CPR institutions are rich mixtures of ‘private-like’ and ‘public-
like’ institutions defying classification in a sterile dichotomy. Here ‘successful 
institutions’ mean institutions that enable individuals to achieve productive 
outcomes in situations where temptations to free-ride and shirk are ever present. 
The water economies of many regions are now successfully employing public-
private partnerships to optimally allocate technical, policy and regulatory 
responsibilities for water where these responsibilities were previously exclusively 
a government responsibility.  
The competitive market - the epitome of a private institution - is itself a 
public good. The Ostroms also found the existence of path-dependence given that 
economic structures can crystallize around small events and lock-in, and this has 
raised awareness among policy makers that governments should avoid the two 
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extremes of either coercing a desired outcome or keeping strict hands off, and 
instead seek to push the system gently toward favored structures that can grow 
and emerge naturally, as is the preferred strategy for building water technology 
innovation clusters . This is not a heavy hand, nor an invisible hand, but a nudging 
hand (Arthur, 1999). Policies succeed better by influencing the natural and 
evolving processes of the formation of economic structures, rather than by forcing 
static, inflexible and predetermined outcomes. 
 E. Institutional analysis and design. The Ostroms advanced that a  
systematic, comparative assessment of institutions required a framework 
supported by a family of theories that facilitates an analysis of institutional 
participants, structure, rules, and performance, which allows for theorists to 
predict likely socio-economic outcomes, but which also allows policy makers to 
improve collective choices through institutional reforms (Ostrom & Ostrom, 
2003). Elinor Ostrom’s framework for Institutional Analysis and Design will help 
to highlight the complex, interlocking nature of institutions and facilitate an 
understanding of institutional rules, and the impact of the costs and benefits that 
are the outcome of social interactions and institutional processes, as subjectively 
understood by institutional stakeholders. Institutional Analysis and Design has 
three analytic levels: the operational level, where day-to-day decisions are made; 
the collective choice level, that includes those decisions that set policies that 
govern the operational level; and the constitutional level, which establishes who 
will be involved and lays out the rules to be used at the collective choice level. 
Institutional Analysis and Design helps to understand the virtually endless number 
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of institutional permutations that exist in the real world; and, also, to ensure that 
when designing or reforming institutions that the incentive systems of an 
institutional regime are aligned between these three levels, for without this 
alignment institutional arrangements for collective action will fail. Despite the 
complexity of institutions, the Ostroms believed that within the institutional 
framework patterns could be identified and a finite set of rules generated for 
generalization into a prescriptive framework to support well-performing collective 
choice processes.  
Considering the relationship between institutions and economic 
performance in the case studies helps to answer the following research questions: 
What public policies and strategies do governments employ to support the 
development or expansion of water technology innovation clusters? and Does the 
institutional setting of a jurisdiction affect water technology policy outcomes? 
V. Industrial Clusters & Competitiveness 
A. Michael Porter’s Diamond Model of Competitiveness 
Developing and diffusing water technologies is an important activity within the 
emerging water economy, especially as technologies are important for ensuring a reliable 
supply of clean quality, protection of the environment from polluted water, and the 
production of fresh water with minimal energy inputs. Water technology innovation 
clusters are being promoted as the most effective and efficient structure for producing 
new cost-effective water technologies, supporting local economic development, and 
improving the quality of water infrastructure. Water technology innovation clusters are 
expected to fulfill this mission by supporting the development of new businesses and 
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expanding products and services of existing businesses through the following: (1) by 
spurring innovation through sharing ideas and solutions to challenges in the water 
economy and by increasing access to finance for R&D and commercialization; (2) by 
accelerate the development of new technologies by building partnerships to facilitate 
easier access to test beds and for pilot studies; and (3) by increasing communication 
between technology firms, utilities and regulators to streamline the diffusion and 
adoption of new water technologies in the marketplace. Michael Porter’s Diamond Model 
provides a framework for understanding how and why industrial clusters situated in local 
economies support the development of competitive water technology firms and a 
competitive water technology industry. Porter’s economic theory explains that clusters 
with certain factors available to them have an increased likelihood of becoming 
internationally competitive and explains how proactive governments can act as catalysts 
to improve the conditions for competitiveness. Porter moves beyond the traditional 
economic notion that location, natural resources, labor and population size are the 
primary determinants in a country's comparative economic advantage: a company’s 
ability to compete in the international arena is based mainly on an interrelated set of 
location advantages that certain industries in different nations possess: 
1. Factor Conditions. The first element of the diamond is factor conditions. 
These are the human, physical, knowledge, capital and infrastructural 
resources whose efficient and effective deployment determines the 
competitiveness of any industry. Factors can be either basic – such as 
natural resources, unskilled or semi-skilled labor, or debt capital – which 
require little investment, or advanced – such as highly skilled labor, 
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modern telecommunications, or sophisticated financial products – which 
require large and often sustained investments for their development which 
delivers higher-order competitive advantage. Factors can also be 
generalized – which means they can be widely deployed across the 
economy – and can be easily duplicated, or specialized – which means that 
they have a narrow field of application – and cannot be easily duplicated, 
offers a unique competitive advantage, but which requires focused, high 
risk private and public investment. A country or industry with a generous 
endowment of basic factors tends to be put at a long-term disadvantage as 
industries seek to compete along cost or price, rather than quality or 
innovativeness, and cost and price advantages tend to be easily duplicated 
and unstable and unsustainable in the long run. Disadvantages in basic 
factors are often a stimulus to innovation as governments, industries and 
firms devote scarce resources to the creation of advanced and specialized 
factors to create a competitive advantage.   
2. Related and Supporting Industries. Firm that are innovative and 
competitive do not succeed exclusively through their own efforts as few 
firms rely on internal markets to produce all the inputs and services they 
require to produce their own outputs. Firm that are innovative and 
competitive require relationships with other firms that are also innovative 
and competitive, and which can offer high quality, cost-effective inputs 
and services to support the production process. When those related and 
supporting industries are domestic a process of mutual innovation and 
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upgrading is possible as firms use contacts that extend through the entire 
value chain to engage in information sharing, mutual learning, and joint 
problem solving. Firms are also able to spread some of their costs through 
the sharing of common resources and R&D and pull through demand for 
complementary products and services that supports the entire industry 
value chain. 
3. Demand Conditions. In a market economy what is produced and the price 
it can command is determined by the needs of buyers and their purchasing 
power, and without effective demand the other determinants of the 
‘diamond’ offer only latent attributes. The composition of home demand, 
the size and pattern of growth of home demand, and the presence of 
foreign companies that operate in the domestic market and buy 
domestically are the three drivers that shape the rate and character of 
innovation by domestic firms, which in turn drives competitiveness. With 
the first driver the presence of sophisticated and demanding domestic 
buyers exert pressure on firms to offer goods and service of high quality 
that meet buyer needs. With the second driver a large and growing 
domestic market encourages large-scale facilities, technology 
development, and productivity improvement that deliver economies of 
scale and supports learning. With the third driver domestic firms create a 
point of access to international markets through foreign multinational 
firms as the needs of the domestic market get transmitted to or inculcated 
in foreign buyers which are then transmitted back to their home country. 
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4. Industry Structure and Rivalry. The political-economy context at national, 
regional, and local scales, and the industry context in relation to structure 
and rivalry, influence how firms are created, organized and managed. 
These contexts either constrain or expand the competitive possibilities 
available to the industry and the firm. The achievement by firms of 
competitive advantage depends on the degree to which the choices of 
firms with regards to goals, strategies, and ways of organizing and 
managing firms in industries, are aligned to the sources of competitive 
advantage present in a nation and in an industry. Firm strategy and 
structure at the macro level are affected by national priorities and a desire 
for national prestige; while at the micro level they are reflective of both 
company and individual goals. National priorities affect the sustained 
public commitment to ensuring that an industry has access to high quality 
human resources, capital, and infrastructure. Company goals, strategies 
and organizational choices are most strongly determined by ownership 
structure, the nature of corporate governance, the motivation of owners 
and holders of debt, and the incentive structure created to address the 
principal-agent problem with senior managers. Vigorous local rivalry can 
also stimulate productivity and competitiveness by creating a pressure to 
upgrade factors, innovate processes and products, and find new markets. 
Firms are therefore strongly influenced by the behavior of its competitors, 
and the presence of competitors in the domestic market forces firms to 
seek positions that are dependent on advanced factors created by and 
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unique to the firm, rather than basic factors available to all firms in the 
domestic market. Firms that have upgraded their competitive capacity in 
the domestic market are in a stronger position to upgrade their strategy to 
compete nationally and globally as they seek to expand their markets and 
increase profitability. 
5.   Government and Chance Events. The role of government and chance  
events are not as directly important as the four determinants in influencing 
the creation of a competitive advantage; however, they can be significant 
in shaping the direction and magnitude of each of the four determinants. 
Government policies can influence the entire system of determinants and 
their interaction and either undermine or enhance competitive advantage 
by acting as a catalyst or challenger for change. Government policies 
determine to a large degree the political, economic and social environment 
in which industries and firms must operate. Governments cannot create 
competitive industries and firms but they can be a positive influence in 
their creation and upgrading through health, safety and environmental 
regulations which raise product, process or performance standards, 
through public procurement which stimulates demand for advanced 
products, through support for education and training which promotes the 
creation of advanced and specialized factor creation, and through anti-trust 
and competition regulations which discourages the formation of 
monopolies and cartels and stimulates local rivalry. Chance events are 
developments beyond the control of firms that can play an important role 
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in shifting competitive advantage in many industries and include events 
such as pure inventions, breakthroughs in basic technologies, wars and 
conflicts, and natural disasters etc. 
B. Maryann Feldman and Johanna Francis. Feldman and Francis examine 
clusters and explain how they emerge, grow and become embedded in the wider 
economic system. From their research they offer a three-phase model of cluster 
formation: 
1. Phase one. In the first phase the initial entrepreneurial ventures have been 
sparked, possibly by some exogenous event, and the process of 
entrepreneurship undertakes a classic trial and error or learning-by-doing 
process as it seeks to adapt to the emerging crisis or opportunity. The learning 
process and the adaptation to new events and to the existing environment are 
important determinants in the development of the cluster. The cluster, its 
structure, its features, and its characteristics therefore emerge over time from 
the individual activities of the entrepreneurs and the organizations and 
institutions that co-evolve to support them. 
2. Phase two. The second phase is dominated by increased entrepreneurial 
activity as entrepreneurs adapt to changes in the external environment and 
define and mobilize resources to promote and protect their interests. The 
independent actions of entrepreneurs are catalytic components of a self-
organizing system and clusters self-organize around the entrepreneurial 
activities - the organization of the cluster and the entrepreneurial ventures 
evolve simultaneously, synergistically, and symbiotically. Once a critical 
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mass of start-ups is in place, supporting organizations are attracted and the 
cluster becomes self-sustaining: entrepreneurs are attracted by physical and 
human capital in the area, public and private networks build up to support and 
facilitate the ventures, relevant infrastructure is created through public and 
private initiatives, and services grow to support companies. 
3. Phase three. The final stage is the establishment of a critical mass of 
resources: local resources developed within the region and external resources, 
such as venture capital, which locate to the area to benefit from the cluster. It 
is usually after the cluster becomes established that regional public sector 
financing and grant giving programs are established. Government policy 
creates further incentives for investment, incubators and other technology 
partnerships are created to promote growth of the industry, and mergers and 
acquisitions begin to thin out the companies. 
Considering the relationship between clusters and competitiveness in the case 
studies helps to answer the following research questions: Do governments intervene to 
facilitate the development and diffusion of water-related technologies and promote the 
development of industrial clusters for water technology firms? What public policies and 
strategies do governments employ to support the development or expansion of water 
technology innovation clusters? What are examples of successful clusters in which 
specific strategies of government intervention can be used as good practices? and What 
are the roles and responsibilities – or the division of labor – between public and private 
partners in developing or expanding water technology innovation clusters? 
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VI. Diffusion of Innovation 
Addressing the key challenges facing the emerging water economy will require 
both appropriate institutions and greater deployment of a wide range of water-related 
technologies. The water economy is, however, faced with key barriers to the 
development, diffusion, and adoption of water technologies such as insufficient access to 
financing for innovation, high capital-intensity, and built-in risk aversion of water 
utilities (EIP, 2014; Conway et al., 2015, Speight, 2015). Overcoming these barriers 
should therefore be a priority for public policy to ensure that water-related activities 
make a sustainable contribution to economic development, public health, and 
environmental preservation. The development of institutions that stimulate, strengthen 
and sustain research, development, diffusion and adoption of the water technologies that 
are essential for the successful management of water-related challenges must precede the 
development of water technologies.  
The existence of substantial demand for water-related technologies must not lead 
to the assumption that the supply of water-related technologies to meet that demand will 
automatically follow, as the utility-optimizing, profit-maximizing theories of neo-
classical economics would suggest. It must be recognized that technically inefficient and 
ineffective innovations can and do diffuse, while technically efficient and effective 
innovations fail to be adopted (Abrahamson, 1991), a pattern identified by Conway et al. 
(2015) with the innovation bias in supply-side over demand-side water technologies. 
Policy makers, innovators and entrepreneurs must therefore understand what facilitates 
diffusion of an innovation given the characteristics of an innovation and the 
characteristics of the social, political, and economic system in which the diffusion 
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process will take place. Theories for the diffusion of innovations seek to explain how, 
why, and at what rate new ideas, policies, and technologies spread, are adopted, and 
become part of the fabric of social, political, economic and technological life. Diffusion 
of innovation theory complements economic theory related to market failure by offering 
explanations for why market forces sometimes fail to support the development or 
diffusion of water-related technologies - namely insufficient incentives for investment, 
the public goods nature of water, incomplete markets, or information asymmetries – 
which become bottlenecks during the diffusion process. Everett Rogers (1962, 2003) 
argues that diffusion is the process by which an innovation is communicated over time 
through a specific population or social system and, depending of the characteristics of 
that population or social system, the theory of diffusion explains how an innovation gains 
momentum, diffuses, and is adopted, or conversely is not adopted.   
Rogers (1962, 2003) proposes that four main elements influence the spread of a 
new idea: the social system, rate of adoption, communication channels, and the 
innovation itself. This diffusion process also relies heavily on the quality of human 
capital, is strongly influenced by the decision-making processes, which people employ, 
and the innovation must be adopted by a critical mass of persons to be self-sustaining 
with a social system.  
The adoption of an innovation, which involves series of stages people undergo 
from first hearing about a product to finally adopting it, is an individual process; the 
diffusion of an innovation, which is how an innovation spreads, is a group phenomenon. 
The structure and characteristics of a social system have a strong influence on the 
diffusion and adoption of innovations (North, 1962, 2003; Wear, 2012). First, innovations 
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are often adopted within a social system through two types of innovation-decision 
processes: collective innovation decisions and authority innovation decisions. The 
collective decision is a bottom-up process which occurs when adoption is by consensus; 
while the authority decision is a top-down process which occurs when adoption is among 
very few individuals with high positions of power within an organization or hierarchical 
group. The development, diffusion and adoption of water-related technologies is often a 
top-down process driven by regulation and public investment rather than water scarcity or 
market demand, which is why Norway and Switzerland are leaders in water innovation 
(Conway et al., 2015). Second, communities with strong interpersonal networks, such as 
rural communities or clusters, have the capacity to be more innovative or have faster rates 
of diffusion-adoption. Third, opinion leaders, gatekeepers and change agents are very 
important in the diffusion-adoption process because of the influence they have on the 
diffusion-decision process, on the various categories of adopters, and at the various stages 
of the diffusion process. The water economy is considered a low innovation sector and a 
supportive culture is considered critical to stimulating innovation and supporting the 
diffusion-adoption process (Conway et al., 2015; Speight, 2015). Fourth, elites often have 
a vested interest in the status quo and are often not innovators, and innovations are often 
introduced by outsiders who push innovations up a hierarchy to the top decision makers: 
innovation is often a bottom-up and outside-in process (Rogers, 1962, 2003; North, 
1991). The bottom-up and outside in influence is particularly strong in the water 
economy where water utilities generally rely on outside actors to identify solutions to 
problems, perform R&D, and deliver pre-tested technologies (Conway et al., 2015; 
Speight, 2015). 
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Communication-influence processes are important to the diffusion-adoption 
process and opinion leaders, gate keepers, and change agents tend to have special 
characteristics that make them important actors (Rogers, 1962, 2003). Opinion leaders 
have the most influence during the evaluation stage of the innovation-decision process 
and on getting late adopters on-board with an innovation. Opinion leaders typically have 
greater exposure to the mass media, are more cosmopolitan, have greater contact with 
change agents, have more social experience and exposure, have higher socioeconomic 
status, and are more innovative than others. Opinion leaders and change agents are also 
important in assembling the network or social system, which implements innovation. 
Change agents introduce innovations to a social system first through the gatekeepers, 
then through the opinion leaders, and then to the wider community. It found that direct 
word of mouth and example were far more influential than broadcast messages. Not all 
individuals exert an equal amount of influence over others. In this sense, opinion leaders 
are influential in spreading either positive or negative information about an innovation. 
Nevertheless, opinion leaders and change agents do not always fit neatly within the 
structure of a traditional hierarchy of influence based on official, bureaucratic, 
technocratic, political or economic status. In addition to the gatekeepers and opinion 
leaders that often exist within a given community, change agents may come from outside 
the community. Therefore, innovators are not necessarily members of the elite or insiders 
and much innovation is a bottom-up, or outside-in, process.  
The rate of adoption that is present in a social system, which is the relative speed 
at which persons adopt an innovation, is significantly determined by an individual’s 
adopter category (Rogers, 1962, 2003). The rate of adoption is usually measured by the 
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length of time required for a certain percentage of the members of a social system to 
adopt an innovation. Rogers divides adopters into five categories: innovators, persons 
with a high threshold for risk who are willing to experiment with innovations; early 
adopters, who are leaders within a social system who are aware of the need for change 
and are willing to embrace innovations; the early majority, who are willing to adopt a 
successful innovation for which there is perceived evidence of a need; the late majority, 
who are risk averse persons who will adopt well-established innovations that offer 
established benefits; and laggards, who are conservative, bound by tradition, and resistant 
to change and will often require some form of pressure to adopt an innovation. In general, 
innovators and early adopters require a shorter adoption period when compared to late 
adopters and laggards.  
Rogers (1962, 2003) also identifies several stages through which the innovation-
diffusion process progresses. The rate and degree of adoption in this cycle is significantly 
influenced by the type of adopters present in the social system and innovation-decision 
process the adopters employ. At some point along the adoption curve, the innovation 
reaches a critical mass with enough individual adopters to ensure that the innovation is 
self-sustaining. Identifying the stage by which a person gains awareness of an innovation 
and the need for that innovation, tests the innovation, makes continued use of that 
innovation, and makes the decision to adopt (or reject) determines the rate and degree of 
diffusion and adoption. The diffusion-adoption cycle includes awareness of the need for 
an innovation, interest in the innovation, evaluation of the need for the innovation, trial of 
the innovation to test it, and the decision to adopt (or reject) the innovation (Rogers, 
1962, 2003). The five stages of the diffusion-adoption cycle are: (1) knowledge, (2) 
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persuasion, (3) decision, (4) implementation, and (5) confirmation. At any time during or 
after the adoption process a person might reject an innovation. Diffusion thus occurs 
through a decision-making process, which is a series of communication channels over a 
period that exists among the members of a similar social system.  
Rogers (1962, 2003) also identified five main factors that influence adoption of an 
innovation, and each of these factors is at play to a different extent in the five adopter 
categories and during each of the five stages of the adoption cycle. The five factors are: 
(1) relative advantage, the degree to which an innovation is seen as better than the idea, 
program, or product it replaces; (2) compatibility, the degree of consistency of the 
innovation is with the values, experiences, and needs of the potential adopters; (3) 
complexity, the degree of difficulty in understanding how to use the innovation; (4) 
triability, the extent to which the innovation can be tested or experimented with before a 
commitment to adopt is made; and (5) servability, the extent to which the innovation 
provides tangible results. Rogers outlines several strategies to help an innovation reach 
this stage, including when an innovation is adopted by a highly respected individual 
within a social network thus creating an instinctive desire for a specific innovation. 
Another strategy includes injecting an innovation into a group of individuals who would 
readily use a technology, as well as providing positive reactions from and benefits for 
early adopters. Considering the processes for the diffusion and adoption of innovations in 
the case studies helps to answer the following research questions: Do individual or 
organizational champions facilitate the development and diffusion of water-related 
technologies and enhance the competitiveness of water technology innovation clusters? 
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In Table 3.1 a list of concepts, which have been identified as collectively 
constituting the theoretical framework of both the water economy and water technology 
innovative clusters, are presented. 
Table 3.1. Conceptual framework for the water economy, water technology innovation clusters and 
selected sources of data that support these concepts 
The Concept    Inquiry Character   Selected Sources of Data 
______________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Path Dependence   Epistemological Concept  Douglass North 
Emergence   Epistemological Concept  Douglass North & Elinor Ostrom 
Transaction Costs  Epistemological Concept  Douglass North 
Institutional Analysis   Methodological Concept  Elinor Ostrom 
Market Failure   Epistemological Concept  Joseph Stiglitz 
Innovation & Entrepreneurship Epistemological Concept    Joseph Schumpeter & Peter 
                                                                                                                   Drucker 
Clusters & Competitiveness Epistemological Concept  Michael Porter 
Cluster Formation  Epistemological Concept  Maryann Feldman & Johanna 
                                                                                                                   Francis 


















 82   
  
CHAPTER 4 
CLEAN WATER TECHNOLOGY PROGRAM: THE EPA INITIATIVE TO PROMOTE 
WATER TECHNOLOGY INNOVATION CLUSTERS IN USA  
I. Introduction 
 Policymakers in the United States are increasingly linking two traditionally 
separate policy domains: the need to strengthen regional economies so that they remain 
competitive in the global economy, while providing good jobs for workers and a healthy 
tax base for local governments; and the need to upgrade water infrastructure to ensure an 
adequate supply of fresh water, to protect public and environmental health, and to support 
industry and agriculture. The historic approach was not only to address these policy 
domains separately but to see them as being in opposition – economic development came 
at the expense of environmental health. The current trend, however, is to approach water 
resource management and local economic development in an increasingly integrated and 
coordinated manner. There are several components to this policy logic. One is that public 
and environmental health can be improved through innovative water technologies that 
reduce or minimize pollution, increase the efficiency of water use, and reduce the amount 
of energy required to transport and treat fresh-and-waste water. A second is that the 
general competitiveness of the economy is supported by a reliable supply of fresh water. 
A third is that innovative water technology firms can form the basis of a competitive 
industrial clusters. A fourth is that innovative and competitive water technologies firms 
are most likely to emerge in business clusters or business ecosystems that exist within a 
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well-developed local water economy with strong demand from water utilities, water-
intensive industries, or water-enabled industries that demand cutting-edge water 
technologies. Finally, innovation and entrepreneurship within the cluster is facilitated by 
a well-developed local research and educational base that is particularly geared to 
developing cutting-edge science and engineering capabilities. Water technology 
innovation clusters (WTICs) are increasingly seen by U.S. policy makers as a potent 
source of innovation and entrepreneurship that will lead to increasing productivity and 
competitiveness while providing innovative solutions to both existing and emerging 
water resource management challenges. Governments and leaders in the water sector are 
increasingly supporting the development of these clusters through innovative policy 
measures, novel financing tools for startups, cross-sector partnerships that connect 
entrepreneurs with other stakeholders, and support for cutting-edge research to build 
economically stronger and environmentally more resilient communities.  
 This case study provides a background to the Environmental Protection Agency's 
(EPA) Clean Air and Clean Water Technology initiatives from which arises the EPA's 
support of Water Technology Innovation Clusters. This case study begins by showing 
how the federal government is attempting to shift from a fragmented policy framework to 
an integrated policy framework to jointly address environmental and economic 
challenges. It then recounts how the EPA and Small Business Administration (SBA) 
launched the Water Technology Innovation Cluster (WTIC) Program in Cincinnati. The 
case study then outlines the goals and objectives of the EPA with regards to the WTIC 
Program, the strategies employed by the EPA to roll out the WTIC Program, and how 
these strategies, through specific pieces of legislation and programs, fit into the larger 
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federal policy framework to support innovation and entrepreneurship. Throughout the 
case study, specific examples of EPA projects are offered to demonstrate the Clean Water 
Technology Program in practice.    
II. Background to the Federal Policy on Innovation & Clusters 
 Public policy at all political scales in the U.S. has long been involved in 
promoting clusters to support local and regional economic development; in regulating 
water resources to protect public and environmental health; and in supporting universities 
and federal laboratories which carry out research and develop technologies which protect 
the quality and quantity of water resources (Wessner 2012; Water Citizen, 2013). This 
long-standing commitment to economic development and to water resource management 
involves legislation and regulation going back decades. It has also involved the 
commitment of public resources to support research, development, technology transfer 
and the commercialization of innovative water technologies. The effectiveness of these 
policies and programs for both economic development and water resource management 
has, however, been criticized as being ad hoc and uncoordinated, for demonstrating a lack 
of understanding about both regional economic dynamics and the complexity of the water 
economy, for being under-resourced, for misdirecting those limited resources to the 
wrong sectors, and for a gap between the public rhetoric and the reality of the 
government's commitment to meeting water challenges (Rodgers 1993; Mills et al. 2008; 
Water Citizen, 2013). Several reports highlight these concerns. With respect to business 
clusters, a 2008 study by the Brookings Institute suggests that federal programs tended to 
target lagging or declining sectors rather emerging or growing sectors, support economic 
inputs or factor endowments rather than strengthening advanced or specialized factors, 
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and channel only about one percent of economic development spending towards 
upgrading clusters (Mills et al. 2008). With respect to water resource management, a 
2004 study by the National Research Council suggests the following: (1) that real levels 
of total spending by 10 federal agencies for water resources research, which were around 
$700 million in 2000 dollars, have remained relatively constant or may have even slightly 
declined over the previous 30 years; (2) that funding for water resources research has not 
paralleled the growth in either demographic and economic parameters, or the growth in 
federal budget outlays compared to other sectors; (3) that the actual federal water 
resources research portfolio is inconsistent with, and lags behind, the public policy 
priorities assigned for water resources; (4) that water research is traditionally conducted 
in a decentralized and uncoordinated manner; and (5) that the water resources research 
portfolio has a decidedly short-term focus when seeking solutions to water resource 
problems (National Research Council 2004). Also, with respect to water resource 
management, a 2012 study by the Congressional Research Service on selected federal 
water activities suggests that while water resources have historically received generally 
broad policy attention, the emphasis of federal research has been towards supporting 
regulation rather than innovation, and towards environmental protection rather linking 
water development with economic development (Cody 2012). In recent years, however, 
there appears to be a shift towards linking water development with economic 
development, and to shift the financial responsibility from the state towards the private 
sector, and this can be seen in part by the programs of the Small Business Administration 
(SBA) and Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) towards supporting clusters involved 
in the innovation and commercialization of water technologies (Water Citizen, 2013). 
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 In the U.S. water economy some of the specific challenges that policy makers and 
water innovators at all scales must recognize and address include: (1) a highly 
fragmented or dis-aggregated fresh-storm-and-waste water industry with a few large 
utilities and a large number of small, financially-constrained community water utilities; 
(2) regulated water utilities and water businesses that have traditionally been highly risk 
averse; (3) an innovation diffusion process where the movement of technologies from 
idea to commercialization face points of dis-junction and a diffusion timeline measured in 
decades rather than months or years; (4) a water supply-demand imbalance than it very 
pronounced in some regions of the country; (5) a water resource management challenge 
that crosses geographical and jurisdictional boundaries; and (6) an unsustainable funding 
gap in maintaining and replacing aging infrastructure (Water Citizen, 2013; Earth & 
Water Group 2016; EPA Water Technology Cluster Leaders, n.d.).  To the first challenge, 
a highly fragmented or dis-aggregated water industry creates challenges for water 
entrepreneurs and innovators to establish viable business strategies to support 
investments in new water technologies. To the second point, state-by-state regulation and 
technical standards for technology testing, certification and approval, limits market size 
and thus profitability; and developing a broad product range, building multiple 
distribution channels, and providing technical support to serve multiple, divergent 
markets raises the cost of, and risks associated with, commercialization (Water Citizen, 
2013; Earth & Water Group 2016; EPA Water Technology Cluster Leaders n.d.).  To the 
third point, a reduction in the efficiency and effectiveness of the process of innovation 
and diffusion of water technologies also raises the costs of, and risks associated with, 
commercialization. Small businesses lack the resources to wait for the decline in capital 
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and operating costs, and improved learning, that comes with wide-spread adoption and 
economies of scale in production (Jaccard 2005). Addressing the intersection between the 
management and protection of water resources, the promotion of economic development, 
and the promotion of water technology clusters, requires a public policy framework that 
recognizes that the water economy exists in a complex social, economic and 
environmental context with competing interests and shifting priorities at multiple scales; 
it involves recognizing that water is a unique resource with unique properties; and it has 
to be addressed by multiple strategies (Water Citizen, 2013; Earth & Water Group 2016; 
EPA Water Technology Cluster Leaders n.d.).  
  The most recent set of federal responses to the water economy have involved a 
combination of strategies to strengthen business innovation ecosystems connected to 
water resources. This strategy has been implemented through programs and projects 
aimed at increasing the efficiency and effectiveness of the innovation-diffusion and 
innovation-commercialization processes. These processes involve innovations in a 
number of complementary areas: (a) in streamlining the development, testing, and 
adoption of better water technologies, (b) in developing models for the sustainable 
financing of water project, (c) in choosing appropriate structures for public-private 
partnerships, and (d) in regulations for protecting water quality and public and 
environmental health that stimulate innovation and entrepreneurship. For the Obama 
administration, the strategy has involved policies connected to the broader goals of 
promoting sustainable economic growth through innovation and entrepreneurship that 
strengthen competitiveness in key economic sectors, chief among these being 'advanced' 
and 'knowledge-driven' sectors such as 'clean' and 'green' technologies. These strategies 
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of the Obama White House were articulated and communicated to the public and to 
policy makers through a series of presidential addresses, presidential memorandum, 
White House Summits, and legislation (The White House, 2009; The White House, 2011; 
The White House, 2015; The White House, 2016).  
 In 2009, President Obama issued the first 'Strategy for American Innovation' 
which articulated a vision that innovation is essential to developing competitive 
industries, sustaining long-term economic growth, and lifting incomes and standards-of-
living; and that the private sector remained the engine of economic growth (The White 
House, 2009). Government should act as a facilitator for private-sector led innovation and 
government's facilitation role was best carried-out through a combination of incentives 
and regulations (The White House, 2009). The strategy emphasizes that the building 
blocks of American innovation rests in strengthening and broadening national advantages 
in R&D, better harnessing science and technology, building a knowledgeable and skilled 
world-class workforce, creating a national environment which supports entrepreneurship 
and risk taking, building and maintaining high quality public infrastructure, maintaining 
national advantages in information technology and knowledge management, and securing 
competitive advantages in emerging industries and their associated technologies (The 
White House, 2009). In both 2011 and 2015, the 'Strategy for American Innovation' was 
updated and expanded. In the 2011 version a 10-year, $150 billion commitment was made 
to public investment to support R&D, and piloting the commercialization of clean energy 
technologies, such as solar, wind, green buildings, efficient lighting, next-generation bio-
fuels, proliferation-resistant nuclear reactors, energy storage, and carbon capture and 
storage (The White House, 2011a).  The 2015 version set out the six key elements which 
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would set the framework for the evolving innovation strategy: (1) investing in the 
building blocks of innovation, which include basic R&D, education, infrastructure, and 
immigration; (2) stimulating private-sector innovation through tax credits, policies to 
support innovators and entrepreneurs commercialize technologies, and through  
supporting local innovation ecosystem; (3) empowering innovators and entrepreneurs 
through prizes and grants; (4) supporting emerging industries, such as advanced 
manufacturing and 'clean' and green' technologies, to support long-term economic 
growth; (5) catalyzing breakthroughs in areas identified as national priorities, such as 
smart cities and infrastructure, clean technologies, and energy efficiency; and (6) 
delivering innovative government that is better integrated and which better serves citizens 
and businesses (The White House, 2015, pp. 3-9). In 2011, The White House also issued 
a Presidential Memorandum directing agencies with federal laboratories to improve the 
results from their technology transfer and commercialization activities (The White House, 
2011b).   
 In addition to directives from the executive branch of government there are 
numerous pieces of legislation designed to promote innovation and entrepreneurship, 
encourage R&D collaborations between the federal government, universities and the 
private sector, and improve the process for the commercialization of technologies, 
including those related to water. Three of the most important pieces of legislation that 
relate to both water technologies and water technology innovation clusters are the United 
States Federal Technology Transfer Act (FTTA) of 1986, the Water Resources & 
Development Act (WRRD) of 2013, and the Water Resources Development Act (WRDA) 
of 2016. The FTTA was the second piece of legislation to address the transfer of 
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technology from federal government agencies to the commercial sector (the first being 
The Stevenson-Wydler Technology Innovation Act of 1980), it formally chartered the 
Federal Laboratory Consortium (FLC) which was established in 1974, it enabled federal 
laboratories to enter into Cooperative Research and Development Agreements 
(CRADAs), and it allowed federal agencies to negotiate licenses for patented inventions 
made in federal laboratories. (The FLC is a national network of federal laboratories that 
provides the forum to develop strategies and opportunities to help transfer technologies 
developed in federal labs into commercial products for the global marketplace; and a 
CRADA is an agreement between a government agency and a private company or 
university to work together on R&D.)  
 Building on the FTTA are the Small Business Technology Transfer Act (SBTT) of 
1992 and the Small Business Research and Development Enhancement Act (SBRDE) of 
1992. The SBTT is designed to increase opportunities for small businesses and non-profit 
organizations to collaborate with federal research laboratories, and the Act also requires 
agencies with a R&D budget of more than $1 billion to reserve 0.3% of their research 
budget for Small Business Technology Transfer (STTR) awards. The SBRDE, which has 
been reauthorized several times, is designed to provide startups and small business with 
incentives to undertake R&D that carries high technical risk but have the potential to 
generate high commercial reward. The Water Resources Reform and Development Act 
(WRRD) of 2013 is a bill to authorize the United States Army Corps of Engineers to do 
various water related projects, such as improvements to ports or flood protection. The 
WRRD changes the way projects are planned, reviewed and authorized and it allows non-
federal organizations and groups to provide funding for water projects. Despite being a 
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water bill its main goal is economic development by improving the nation's 
competitiveness through better water related infrastructure (Kasperowicz, 2013). The 
Water Resources Development Act (WRDA) of 2016 is the latest in a series of bills going 
back to 1974, which were enacted by Congress to deal with various aspects of water 
resources, such as environmental protection, improved navigation, and flood protection. 
The WRDA also authorizes the EPA to provide grants and loans to state and local 
governments, public water systems, and nonprofit organizations to support a wide range 
of water quality projects and programs (EPA, 2016). These pieces of legislation 
collectively allow federal agencies, including the EPA, to conduct collaborative research 
with non-federal partners, broaden the scope of an agency's research by leveraging 
partner research resources, protect intellectual property that is developed during these 
collaborations, and license an agency's technologies (DOI, 2017; EPA, 2016).  The EPA 
and the Confluence Water Technology Innovation Cluster, working under this framework 
between fiscal years 2011 and 2013, have supported technology innovation through the 
funding of 17 water technology collaborative research projects, to include joint research, 
patenting, new technology development, technology commercialization, workshops, and 
events. This framework has facilitated eight CRADAs for water-related technologies, 
with an additional six CRADAs proposed or in progress (NIST, 2016).  
 Current federal policy has evolved towards facilitating an integrated strategy 
designed to improve water resource management, public health, environmental 
protection, and local and regional economic development that is private-sector led. The 
policies are being implemented jointly by federal agencies and partners in regional 
innovation clusters that draw together private industry, university research, government 
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agencies, and other public resources. The federal government has also promised to make 
substantial investments in R&D, in physical and technological infrastructure, in funding a 
process of collecting and bench-marking performance metrics, in providing financial and 
technical support for mentoring entrepreneurs and innovators, and in providing financial 
support for regional water cluster organizations. (The White House, 2009, 2011a, 2011b, 
2015; Wessner, 2012).  
Federal policy has evolved in this direction because of a growing recognition of 
the complexity of the water economy and the multiple barriers to innovation that exist in 
that sector to include the following: (1) the U.S. has been under-investing in the essential 
drivers of innovation and competitiveness, such as education and physical and 
technological infrastructure; (2) too many economic and environmental policies and 
strategies have had a short-term orientation; (3) innovation and entrepreneurship are 
essential drivers of competitiveness, economic growth, and job creation and need to be 
nurtured; and (4) the federal government plays an essential facilitation role but must itself 
evolve to also become innovative, entrepreneurial and joined-up if it is to solve important 
problems (White House, 2009, 2011a, 2011b, 2015; Wessner, 2012; EPA Water 
Technology Cluster Leaders, n.d.) 
III. The EPA's Water Technology Innovation Cluster Program 
A. Origins of the EPA's Water Technology Innovation Cluster Program 
 The policies and strategies of the federal government to boost economic 
development, protect the environmental, and safeguard water quality and quantity, have 
opened new challenges and opportunities for businesses and local governments and has 
placed new responsibilities on federal agencies to create the programs that facilitate 
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implementation of these policies and strategies. The federal government has identified 
regional business clusters as the economic scale at which to intervene, and several federal 
agencies are engaged in supporting regional efforts to strengthen regional innovation 
ecosystems around targeted industries that can sustain economic growth and job creation 
while also improving environmental outcomes. Although about 10 federal agencies are 
involved in supporting regional clusters and regional innovation ecosystems, the   
US Small Business Administration (SBA), US Commercial Service of the Department of 
Commerce (USCS), and the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) are key to efforts 
with respect to clean technologies, public health, and environmental protection. 
 In 2010, the EPA and the SBA began exploratory work with local businesses, 
academic institutions and communities in Ohio, northern Kentucky and southeast Indiana 
to establish the feasibility of creating an environmental technology innovation cluster 
focused initially on the commercialization of water technologies. The region was chosen 
for several reasons: (1) the Andrew W. Breidenbach Environmental Research Center in 
Cincinnati is one of the largest federal water R&D laboratories in the country with 
substantial research facilities and many federal and contract scientists; (2) the federal 
government has supported water research and water technology development in 
Cincinnati for over a century, particularly related to regulatory standards set by the EPA 
to protect human health and the environment; (3) several university and private-sector 
research facilities have developed in the region around the EPA lab; (4) the region's 
utilities have been leaders in fresh and waste water systems; and (5) the region has a large 
number of water-intensive and water-enabled industries (The White House, 2011). In 
January 2011, EPA Administrator Lisa P. Jackson and SBA Administrator Karen Mills 
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traveled to Cincinnati to announce a new collaborative effort called the Water Technology 
Innovation Cluster (WTIC) program. The program consists of a network of small and 
large businesses, business incubators, investors, water utilities, manufacturers, 
technology developers, researchers and other stakeholders with an interest in fresh-storm-
and-waste water and the commercialization of water technologies. In May 2012, the 
USCS also partnered with the EPA and SBA and announced efforts to launch an 
environmental technology initiative intended to support the export of U.S. water 
technologies that would help create jobs in the growing environmental industry.  
 The Cincinnati cluster was not the first water technology innovation cluster in the 
United States. It was, however, the first to officially receive such a designation and 
recognition by the federal government and its key environmental and economic 
development agencies. The WTIC in Cincinnati, later to be named Confluence, was 
conceived as a public-private partnership that would bring together private businesses, 
universities, and public utilities with a focus on, or interest in, the development of state-
of-the-art technologies that would help maintain water quality and quantity, that would 
protect public and environmental health, and support economic development.  The EPA 
and SBA see these clusters as the ideal business ecosystem to develop and commercialize 
innovative technologies to solve environmental and public health challenges, encourage 
sustainable economic development, and create jobs. The EPA and SBA facilitated the 
creation of a steering committee, made up of a cross-section of stakeholders from the 
Cincinnati metropolitan region, to develop a framework and operating structure for the 
industry association that would represent the water technology cluster, and to develop a 
business model that would enable the association to flourish independently of public 
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support. After Confluence, the EPA and SBA began to explore similar relationships with 
the water industries in other regions of the country, and the EPA has officially identified 
and designated 14 regions as having ‘emerging’ or ‘established’ water technology 
innovation clusters (EPA, 2016). As of 2015 there are at least 56 federally funded clusters 
supported by the SBA and various other agencies of the federal government: 14 Pilot 
Contract-based Clusters supported by the SBA; 10 Jobs Accelerator Advanced 
Manufacturing clusters, involving the SBA, EDA, ETA, NIST, and DOE; 20 Jobs 
Accelerator Collaboration Clusters, involving the SBA, EDA and ETA; 13 Rural Jobs 
Accelerators, involving the DEA, USD, ADRA, ARC; and three emerging clusters which 
include the Confluence WTIC (SBA, 2017). Since 2010 these SBA-led or coordinated 
initiatives have provided over $27 million in support for clusters involved in clean 
technologies, food processing and agribusiness, aeronautics and aerospace, music and 
entertainment, wood products, biotechnology, and advanced materials and manufacturing, 
among others. The EDA also supports another 19 regional innovation projects that have 
been funded through the EDA’s i6 program. Although these programs have been 
criticized as being too small in scale and scope to have a meaningful national impact on 
the overall economy, Mark Muro of the Brookings Institute suggests that well-designed 
cluster and accelerator programs which pull in tangible local support in the form of 
industry champions and matching capital are “are a low-cost way to stimulate a 
significant amount of collaboration, innovation, and new economic activity in the local 
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B.  Vision, Mission, Goals & Objectives of the Water Technology Innovation 
Cluster Program 
  The current federal policies on regional economic development and 
environmental protection suggest a vision, being pursued both jointly and independently 
by multiple agencies and their local and regional partners that environmental protection 
and economic progress can go together. This is a position also supported by Porter who 
argues that intelligent regulations for health, safety and environmental protection 
stimulates innovation and drives international competitiveness in regulated industries 
(Porter, 1990, 1998). The assumptions about clusters contained in economic development 
policy at all scales of government suggests the following: (1) that industry clusters within 
an economically connected region promote positive spillovers, labor market 
specialization, and the sharing of industry-specific inputs; (2) that thriving regional 
innovation ecosystems create institutions that build social capital and networks which 
improve communication and knowledge sharing; and (3) that the cumulative effect of 
these synergistic relationships are productivity growth, cost or technological advantages, 
and increased competitiveness (Porter, 1990, 1998, 2000; Porter & Kramer, 2011; 
Wessner, 2012).  Studies of the economic and social impact of the Clean Air and Clean 
Water Acts seems to suggest that the resulting regulations have not reduced economic 
growth and have been a good economic investment for America. These Acts have 
reduced premature deaths and illnesses which means that Americans experience longer, 
better quality lives, have lower medical expenses, fewer school absences, and better 
worker productivity (DeMocker, 2003).  
 In 2012, the EPA released a document entitled Technology Innovation for 
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Environmental and Economic Progress: An EPA Road-map, which presented a vision in 
which the agency promotes technology innovation that eliminates or significantly reduces 
the use of toxic substances, reduces exposure to pollutants in the environment, and 
promotes the growth and competitiveness of the industries that develop and 
commercialize these technologies (EPA, 2012). The Road-map outlined a strategy that 
states that the EPA “will undertake policy, regulatory, financial, and voluntary actions, 
grounded in science, that will promote innovation along the entire continuum of 
technology development and deployment,” and “will advocate more cost-effective, 
innovative solutions that eliminate, or significantly reduce, adverse impacts to natural 
resources in a manner that promotes healthy, productive communities” (EPA, 2012, p. 3). 
The Road-map gives four broad areas of strategic thrust where the EPA will focus initial 
efforts: (1) leveraging technology innovation through the design of policies, regulations, 
standards, and the system of permitting; (2) working with a broad coalition of 
stakeholders to improve the process by which water technology is commercialized and 
adopted; (3) working across agency boundaries to ensure that water technology is 
commercialized and adopted; and (4) building new relationships and improving 
communication with the private investment community to ensure funds are available to 
commercialize technologies (EPA, 2012, pp. 4-5). The EPA vision for WTICs is of an 
industrial system capable of the following: (1) the development of the technical and 
institutional capacity, and the human and financial resources, to develop, test, market, and 
deploy innovative processes and technologies that are economically and environmentally 
sustainable; (2) action on controlling a broad array of contaminants to improve public 
health and environmental protection; (3) increasing the efficient use of water and energy 
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to reduce the environmental impact of human activity; (4) making the adoption of new 
technologies cost effective for both utilities and consumers; and (5) making investments 
capable of being financed by local governments and their private financial partners (EPA, 
2012).  
 The EPA mission is to collaborate with internal and external stakeholders and 
partners – including businesses, academia, researchers, and public utilities - to develop a 
portfolio of policies, regulations, and financial instruments that, when taken together, will 
institutionalize and promote technology innovation along the entire continuum from 
technology development, to technology testing and validation, to technology deployment 
(EPA, 2012). The EPA is seeking to go beyond simple organizational boundaries, employ 
an increasingly open innovation framework, partner with diverse stakeholders to identify, 
develop and deploy innovative technological solutions, build on a strong record of 
successful technology transfer, and secure the greatest prospect for achieving multiple 
environmental and economic development goals (McMohan, 2011). The goals and 
objectives of the EPA, SBA, EDA and USCS include promoting innovation, 
entrepreneurship and investments in cutting-edge technology that will protect America's 
water, air and environment, protect public health, promote economic development and 
international competitiveness, commercialize new technologies, and expand national and 
international markets, and doing so in a way that is complementary and synergistic 
(Benson & Garmestani, 2011; Fieldsteel, 2013).  
C. Strategy and Structure of the Water Technology Innovation Cluster Program 
 The strategy of the EPA for encouraging and supporting the growth and 
development of WTICs is outlined in two agency documents: The Technology Innovation 
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Roadmap published in 2012 and Building a Successful Technology Cluster published in 
2013. This strategy follows the prevailing theoretical frameworks that are found in the 
literature of clusters, and it incorporates the experience of actual clusters (Smilor et al., 
1989; Porter 1990, 1998; Saxenian, 1994; EPA, 2012; Fieldsteel, 2013). The strategy is 
articulated by a focus on the following areas: (1) the design and implementation of 
appropriate policies, regulations, and procedures by federal, state and local governments 
to encourage innovation and entrepreneurship and facilitate the commercialization and 
adoption of technologies; (2) the encouragement and leveraging of R&D by federal 
laboratories, universities or other research institutions; (3) the facilitation of technology 
transfer from the public to the private sector; (4) the creation of networks for facilitating 
communication and knowledge diffusion; (5) the facilitation of cross-agency cooperation; 
(6) the encouragement of more public-private partnerships; (7) the development of new 
relationships with the investment community and the leveraging of private capital from 
private capital markets; (8) the nurturing of technology start-ups; and (9) the partnering 
with established water-technology, water-intensive, and water-enabled businesses (EPA, 
2012; Fieldsteel, 2013). Each of these strategies is outlined below in greater detail. 
1. Policies, Regulations, and Procedures.   
With this strategy the 'Roadmap' provides a framework for 
connecting and advancing a regime of policies, regulations and procedures 
that ensures that all stakeholders make sound environmental choices, 
which in turn promotes technology innovation in the water industry that 
protects public and environmental health while supporting regional 
economic development (EPA, 2012). Governments at the various scales 
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play different but complementary roles (Fieldsteel, 2013). The role of the 
federal government is to set standards for water quality and provide the 
financial and technical resources, which would allow local and regional 
governments to meet those standards. The role of the local government is 
to provide physical, economic, and institutional infrastructure that supports 
entrepreneurship and innovation in both the public and private sectors. 
Physical infrastructure includes of transportation, telecommunications, 
water, and sewerage; economic infrastructure includes an educated and 
skilled workforce; and the institutional infrastructure requires a 
competitive rate structures for financing the ongoing operations of public 
services and utilities, financial mechanisms to meet the capital 
requirements to build and maintain infrastructure, and legal mechanisms to 
enable and support the public-private partnerships which allow roles and 
responsibilities to be optimally allocated among stakeholders (Porter, 
1990, 1998, 2000; Fieldsteel, 2013).  
Governments at all levels also need to collect information on 
existing social and economic assets that will indicate the state of the water 
economy at various scales, and the level of development of the industries 
that will identify the existence and strength of water technology clusters. 
Accurate information will allow for the design of better public policies, for 
the marshaling of limited public and private resources, and for the 
alignment of those policies and resources with the needs of the local 
cluster to better foster economic development. Accurate information also 
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allows stakeholders to understand the unique mix of assets that each region 
possesses so that local clusters leverage and build on their unique assets to 
create an industry with unique capabilities that best serves local needs and 
is difficult for competitors to replicate. Regions should avoid copying the 
industrial focus of other successful clusters and instead focus on economic 
specialization to achieve increasing productivity growth and 
competitiveness (Porter, 2007; EPA, 2012; Fieldsteel, 2013).  
2. Research and Development.  
The EPA's experience suggests that both basic scientific research into 
environmental challenges and applied R&D into promising environmental 
technologies is critical to understanding the water cycle, protecting water 
quality, increasing the efficiency of water use, and reducing the energy 
associated with treating and moving fresh water and waste water (EPA, 
2012; Fieldsteel, 2013). Here the strategy is to connect the considerable 
R&D capabilities in water that exists across the many federal research 
laboratories, especially the EPA, and bring them to bear to address water 
and environmental challenges. These public capabilities and public 
intellectual assets need to be leveraged and combined with similar 
capabilities to be found in academia and the private sector to help develop, 
test and validate new water technologies and bring them to the 
marketplace in a timely manner, and at the correct technical and economic 
scale. Providing universities with adequate financial resources is important 
to encouraging both undergraduate and graduate students to explore 
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courses of study in the environmental sciences and water resource 
management, and deliberate public-private partnerships are necessary to 
the support the commercialization and adoption of the technologies 
(Fieldsteel, 2013).  
The most successful business clusters possess locally-based R&D 
excellence in core products and processes, and co-locating R&D with 
production, marketing, and customer support can increase efficiency in 
sourcing and sharing knowledge among cluster members, which leads to 
cost savings, quicker time-to-market, and more responsive customer 
service (Porter, 1990, 1998, 2000; Fieldsteel, 2013). Beyond basic 
scientific research, the most successful business clusters are also 
associated with universities that are highly engaged with the clusters and 
offer a combination of academic, business, legal, workforce, and financial 
support that are aligned with the needs of that cluster (Paytas et al., 2004). 
The presence in a cluster of R&D capability, of physical and intellectual 
assets connected to R&D, of adequate funding to conduct R&D, and the 
patenting of technologies, does not, however, automatically translate into 
patents that are high quality or technologies that move through the entire 
commercialization process to adoption (Paytas et al., 2004; Fieldsteel, 
2013). Cluster development therefore requires an audit of the R&D 
capabilities of nascent or emerging clusters, a mapping of existing patents 
granted, and an ongoing monitoring and evaluation of patents in the region 
to determine the patent's value, analyze on their impact on and relationship 
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to the diffusion of technology, and their strategic fit in an industry 
(Fieldsteel, 2013). Research and development can be a potential driver of 
innovation in water technology, environmental protection, and local 
economic development, but developing a viable product or business from 
a patent requires capital, business support services, and a competent 
management team (Fieldsteel, 2013). The EPA is leveraging its R&D 
capability and agency science, policy and technology programs to catalyze 
the creation of environmental technology innovation clusters (EPA, 2012). 
In 2011, the EPA and the University of Cincinnati signed a memorandum 
of understanding (MOU) which strengthened the long-term partnership 
between these two organizations to conduct joint research and collaborate 
on innovative water technology development (Kunnen-Jones, 2011) 
3. Supporting Technology Transfers.  
This strategy supports the EPA's belief that successful transfer of 
technology or diffusion of innovation is vital for supporting an effective 
and efficient process of commercialization and adoption of water 
technology (Fieldsteel, 2013). The transfer of technology is the process of 
transferring or disseminating technology from its point of origin to a wider 
set of stakeholders who have an interest in that technology. It takes place 
between universities, businesses and government agencies to further 
development and commercialization; it occurs both formally, such as 
through technology transfer offices, and informally, such as through social 
or professional networks; and it involves a process which extends from the 
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identification of technology to its transfer to its protection through patents 
and copyrights (IPP, 2013).  
Despite social and economic incentives to move scientific research 
from the laboratory into the production of commercial products, the 
process is often more difficult in practice than in theory. The potential 
complexity of the technology transfer process requires organizational and 
institutional structures that are multidisciplinary and include economists, 
engineers, lawyers, marketers and scientists (Fieldsteel, 2013). The 
process of technology transfer has improved with the passage of 
legislation such as the Bayh-Dole Act of 1980, Stevenson-Wydler 
Technology Innovation Act of 1980, the Federal Technology Transfer Act 
(FTTA) of 1986, and other pieces of legislation and regulations, and 
guidelines such as the 'Green Book' (EPA, 2016). Because of the potential 
for positive social, economic and environmental impacts the federal 
government is encouraged to reach out to private industry, academic 
institutions, foundations, state and local governments, and international 
institutions to establish collaborations and partnerships (Fieldsteel, 2013).  
The EPA, through the Office of Research and Development’s Science 
to Achieve Results (STAR) program, has invested $5 million over a 3 to 5-
year period to support cluster development and technology 
commercialization, especially in the Cincinnati region. These funds were 
used to conduct key studies of the environmental technology marketplace 
for drinking water; to acquiring the services of a cluster consultant; to 
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conduct technology and knowledge mapping of the region to gauge its 
strengths; to fund, through a competitive application process, research 
grants and graduate fellowships in various environmental science and 
engineering disciplines; and to help start-ups and research facilities 
develop, test, and market innovative processes and technologies (Barry et 
al., 2014).  
4. Facilitating Communication and Diffusing Knowledge.  
EPA thinking about environmental protection and environmental 
technology is evolving. The emerging paradigm is more holistic, 
integrated and synergistic. It connects scientists, innovators, entrepreneurs, 
academics, and regulators into a more efficient and effective framework 
for protecting public and environmental health while promoting economic 
development (EPA, 2012). Key components of this strategy are increased 
networking, collaboration and information sharing that builds social 
capital and encourages organizations to be more adaptable and flexible 
(Fieldsteel, 2013). Clusters are not only driven by economic imperatives, 
they are also significantly influenced by non-economic imperatives that 
shape regional social structures and institutions, which in turn shape the 
regional corporate culture and influences the regional creative process 
(Saxenian, 1994). The organizations in a cluster that are at the heart of 
entrepreneurship and innovation therefore exist within a unique 
institutional and cultural context. Cluster institutions and culture determine 
the degree of openness to new ideas and innovation, the ways in which 
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incentives are structured, the degree to which people work together 
towards a common purpose, the values and attitudes towards risk and 
failure, and the degree of strategic patience that stakeholders have towards 
investing the time and energy required to build a successful cluster and 
wait for a return on that investment (Fieldsteel, 2013). Openness to ideas 
requires high levels of mutual trust and cooperation, and a tolerance 
towards risk-taking and failure. Mutual trust and cooperation among 
stakeholders increases communication, leads to repeated transactions, 
reduces the effort in information processing, and reduces transaction costs, 
which should lead to a more productive and competitive cluster (Porter, 
1990; North, 1990; Saxenian, 1994). Increased communication, 
collaboration and mutual trust are facilitated by an institutional 
arrangement that includes industry associations and public fora where 
valuable cluster attributes are actively fostered among the widest cross-
section of stakeholders to includes law, marketing, venture capital, and 
technology firms, universities, public laboratories, and government 
regulators (Saxenian, 1994; Fieldsteel, 2013).  Cincinnati's Confluence 
hosts the Regional Utility Network Conference, Milwaukee's Water 
Council hosts the annual Water Leaders Conference, and the EPA hosts the 
annual Cluster Leader's Conferences, which are examples of key 
organizations playing a central role in supporting communication and 
networking within and between clusters.  
5. Cluster Champions 
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Closely linked to networking, communication and collaboration is the 
critical role of cluster champions. Cluster champions are critical to both 
cluster formation and long-term cluster success, and it is champions that 
often increase public awareness and the cluster profile, serve as cluster and 
industry advocates, drive communication and collaboration, coordinate 
efforts between researchers and universities, connect members to investors 
and commercialization partners, and offer general business advice 
(Fieldsteel, 2013). In Milwaukee the champions were two local 
businessmen – Rick Meeusen and Paul Jones – and in Cincinnati these 
included two members of the University of Cincinnati Foundation’s Board 
of Trustees, Jerry Leamon and Jeffrey Williams (Fieldsteel, 2013).  
Politicians and public officials have also played a role as champions to 
ensure that the resources and policies of the government align with the 
goals and objectives of the cluster, and because public officials have an 
interest in both local economic development and environmental protection. 
Politicians and public officials can ensure that the local state supports 
cluster development by providing high quality schools, modern 
infrastructure, high-quality amenities, and well-managed and well-
financed local utilities that work closely with the cluster, especially with 
testing, validating and piloting new technologies and being an initial 
customer (Fieldsteel, 2013). The mayor of Milwaukee, Tom Barrett, has 
played a very proactive and supportive role with that city's cluster; Ohio 
Senator Rob Portman (R) has been actively involved in water-related 
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legislation and in bringing legislative attention to water-related problems 
in Ohio and the Mid-West; and the staff at the EPA's Cincinnati, especially 
Sally Gutierrez, have actively served as a catalyst both for the Cincinnati 
cluster, for other water technology clusters across the U.S., and a focal 
point for inter-agency cluster coordination with other federal agencies such 
as the SBA and EDA (Fieldsteel, 2013).  
6. Public-Private Partnerships.  
The EPA views public-private partnerships (PPP) as an important 
vehicle for connecting water economy stakeholders with different 
capacities, capabilities and resources– such as regulators, businesses, 
investors, and researchers - to take a focused approach that facilitates 
entrepreneurship and innovation along the entire continuum of 
development, testing, validation, piloting, commercialization and 
deployment of environmental technologies (EPA, 2012; Fieldsteel, 2013). 
Public-private partnerships (PPPs) can be defined as agreements for 
collaborative governance between a diverse cross-section of public and 
private actors to achieve a set of goals and objectives that address policy 
problems. Public-private partnerships require the establishment of 
common norms and rules to facilitate decision-making and 
implementation. Public-private partnerships also institutionalize a hybrid 
type of authority which goes beyond the traditional forms of interaction 
between state and non-state actors - where roles, responsibilities and 
operational boundaries were clearly defined – to incorporate more flexible 
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and adaptive governance and management regimes (Andonova, 2010). The 
EPA sees PPPs as a more effective and efficient mechanism for bringing 
scientific knowledge and innovative water technology to bear on solving 
complex and systemic environmental and economic development 
problems, especially those which require novel solutions or new 
organizational forms (Porter, 1998; EPA, 2012; Fieldsteel, 2013).  
The many novel organizational forms offered by PPPs offer ways of 
structuring economic relationships beyond pure competition on one end of 
the spectrum and pure public provision on the other, offering relationships 
which fit better with the regional and global competitive realities of the 
modern economy (Porter, 1998; National Research Council, 2012, 2013). 
Public-private partnerships can bring together both public and private 
researchers, profit and non-profit sectors, and public water suppliers and 
private technology firms; they can bring into the water industry additional 
technical and management expertise and a wider choice of funding 
mechanisms; and they provide a balance between the private sector's 
greater ability to act quickly, boldly and flexibly, and the public sectors 
role to provide for the common good (Fieldsteel, 2013).  
Many emerging water technologies are coming out of collaborations 
between federal, university, and private laboratories, which increasingly 
receive support from both federal grants and venture capital funding 
(Fieldsteel, 2013). The areas of common interest, mutual dependence or 
collective responsibility between these stakeholders create an incentive for 
 
 110   
  
them to forge alliances to solve problems or create collective goods (Porter 
1998). Public-private partnerships can take the form of a for-profit 
business contracted to provide a service on behalf of the state – such as 
Veolia and the Milwaukee Metropolitan Sewerage District – or a non-
profit – such as The Water Council in Milwaukee which represents the 
Milwaukee water industry. The Water Council and Confluence have 
become models for successful public-private partnerships. 
7. The Investing Community and Private Capital Markets.  
This strategy recognizes that the water utility industry is a capital-
intensive sector, where capital projects take years to come to fruition, 
investments are long-term, and scale economies and available technologies 
traditionally favored large-scale infrastructure – which historically 
accounts for the high level of public sector involvement in the industry 
through much of the 19th and 20th Centuries (Rogers, 1993; Solomon, 
2011; Siegel, 2015; EPA, 2017). Water utility infrastructure needs 
continuous monitoring, maintenance, repair or replacement, and its 
efficiency and effectiveness are affected by demographic and climatic 
change. Financing the rebuilding and upgrading of America's water 
infrastructure, much of which is nearly a century old, will require billions 
of dollars in the coming decades, and new and innovative ways of 
financing (Rogers, 1993; Solomon, 2011; AWWA, 2016). The way water 
infrastructure has been financed in the U.S. has evolved over the decades. 
Traditionally cities issued bonds to finance water projects, paying back 
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these loans out of revenue for the services offered; in the post-war period 
the federal government offered municipalities grants of money to 
underwrite much of the cost of water infrastructure; later federal financial 
assistance was restructured to take the form of loans from revolving 
infrastructure funds (Rogers, 1993; Foss-Mollen, 2001; Christian-Smith & 
Gleick, 2012). The reliance of water utilities on long-term debt financing 
for infrastructure means that municipalities must find a balance between 
low-cost financing, offering investors a competitive rate of return, and 
keeping tariffs down, which usually means issuing tax-exempt bonds.  
Water infrastructure has traditionally been a safe investment: the 
default rate on water projects, which is estimated to be less than 1%, is 
low; inelastic demand creates stable and inflation linked cash flows; and 
governments guarantees infrastructure loans (Clark et al., 2012; AWWA, 
2017). Private-sector financing for water infrastructure has, however, often 
been difficult to raise even as the amount of potential financing from 
private sources has increased. The challenge is to get the private sector to 
help underwrite the cost of financing water infrastructure and water 
technology, but as an active rather than passive investment partner sharing 
both the risks and the rewards over the long-term. Raising private capital 
for water infrastructure is seen as necessary given the scale of the 
investment required over the coming decades, the fiscal constraints faced 
by governments at all scales, and the better financial and management 
discipline offered by the private sector. Global trends in private-sector 
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funded infrastructure investment have, however, fallen well short of 
expectations, despite almost three decades of vigorous attempts at 
privatization. One solution is for institutional investors to develop the 
technical capacity to better manage infrastructure investing (Clark et al., 
2012; Arezki et al., 2016).  
In addition, the U.S. infrastructure market faces unique challenges 
related to lack of strategic vision and poor coordination, weak technical 
capacity in the public sector, and costly, complex, and fragmented 
procurement policies and practices (Puentes & Sabol, 2015). The 
involvement of private capital markets in water infrastructure requires a 
stable and predictable policy, regulatory, and governance environment that 
can attract investment in infrastructure (Bielenberg et al., 2016). Raising 
more venture capital for water technology startups is also considered to be 
desirable, but this has long been perceived as a challenge. Venture capital 
is not equitably distributed across the U.S., and while this distribution may 
reflect risk perceptions and information asymmetries in capital markets, it 
does not reflect the investment needs of many regions across the country 
(National Research Council, 2012). In 2011 California absorbed 51.5% of 
all U.S. venture capital investment, Massachusetts absorbed 10.4%, while 
New York, Texas and the next four states accounted for 21.7% of venture 
capital investment (Fieldsteel, 2013). Although there have been calls from 
many stakeholders for a greater role for the government in venture capital 
markets, there are many who caution against a direct role for the state, 
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point to a mixed track record of the state as venture capitalist, and note 
that venture capital makes up only a small fraction of the overall capital 
market (Florida & Smith, 1993; Porter, 1990). The current strategy of the 
federal government is therefore to improve the ways federal agencies 
communicate with the private sector and private capital markets about the 
opportunities to earn market rate returns from helping technology firms 
commercialize environmental technologies and from financing 
environmental projects; and the government is encouraging private sector 
investment in the water utility industry as a way to expand product 
markets and increase profitability, help water utilities reduce costs and 
improve service, and help local governments grow their economies and 
create new jobs (McMohan, 2011; Fieldsteel, 2013).  
An example of the ways the federal government is supporting the 
financing of water infrastructure is the Water Infrastructure Finance and 
Innovation Act (WIFIA) of 2014. WIFIA is a five-year pilot federal credit 
program administered by EPA to provide low-cost, long-term loan 
financing and loan guarantees for water projects that may be under-served 
by existing state revolving funds (SRFs) because of their size, cost, and 
purpose. WIFIA is designed to accelerate new investment in, or support 
major improvements to, regionally and nationally significant projects in 
drinking and wastewater systems, as well as water resources projects such 
as flood control and navigation. WIFIA it is open to a wide cross-section 
of eligible borrowers to include governments, partnerships, joint ventures, 
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corporations, and trusts; and it promises to be budget neutral in the long 
run (AWWA, 2017). WIFIA is designed to fill an existing financing gap by 
funding large projects costing over $20 million, as these are unable to 
access funds from SRF programs, and small projects over $5 million for 
communities with under 25,000 residents who may be unable to access 
loans through traditional measures (AWWA, 2017). Borrowers have up to 
35 years to repay the loans, with a maximum repayment deferral period of 
5 years after substantial completion of the project; projects must be 
creditworthy and have a dedicated source of revenue; and the interest rate 
charged will be equal to or greater than the U.S. Treasury rate for projects 
of a similar maturity at the date of project closure. Each dollar authorized 
and appropriated by the EPA can support up to 50 times that amount in 
loans, and borrowers can fund up to 49% of a project through WIFIA 
while the remaining 51% can come from SRFs, which the program is 
meant to complement, and other sources such as private equity 
investments (AWWA, 2017). For the fiscal year 2017, the EPA-WIFIA 
program received 43 letters of interest from prospective borrowers across 
the country for $6 billion in WIFIA loans for water infrastructure projects 
that, when combined with other sources, such as SRF loans, private equity, 
and municipal bonds, will provide over $12 billion to implement projects 
(EPA, 2017). Seventeen of the letters of interest came from California and 
one each came from Wisconsin, Indiana, and Washington State. In 2017 
the City of Milwaukee plans to utilize $25-27 million in SRF funds and 
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seek $20 million in funding from the WIFIA program to maintain the 
financial balances of the Drinking Water State Revolving Loan Funds and 
the Water Infrastructure Improvements for the Nation Act (WIIN) (City of 
Milwaukee, 2017). 
8. Nurturing Technology Startups.  
This strategy recognizes that startups, whether high-technology or not, 
play an important role in economic growth and job creation, in bringing 
new and innovative ideas and products to the marketplace, and in 
potentially being the large corporations of the future. Although most 
startups fail, and others may be bought out by existing businesses with 
their founders returning to the role of being a serial innovator, those 
startups that survive still generate almost half of all new jobs and 
encourage subsequent employment growth in their related industries, 
helping to strengthen and deepen business ecosystems (Morelix et al., 
2016). Startups face many challenges to commercializing their products or 
growing their businesses into successful and sustainable ventures 
(Feinleib, 2011; National Research Council, 2012). One challenge relates 
to the market, such as small size or fragmentation. A second challenge 
involves a failure to create a viable and sustainable business model, such 
as a cost-effective way to attract, win and retain customers that provides 
the business and the entrepreneur with a return on the time and resources 
invested. A third challenge relates to the problem of finding, building and 
retaining a good management team. A fourth challenge relates to having 
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working capital at critical points in the commercialization life cycle, 
especially as venture capitalists and angel investors become more risk 
averse. A fifth challenge relates to the product, such as a failure to find the 
correct product-market mix. Finally, a sixth challenge often involves 
isolation and an inability to enter industry networks and meet 
organizations from other sectors that have the same technology focus.  
The federal government, in seeking to stimulate the growth of both 
startups and industry clusters, is facilitating networking opportunities 
through conferences, workshops, and fora, and is encouraging the creation 
of cluster associations to support their respective industries by providing 
networking opportunities and advocacy services (Fieldsteel, 2013). To 
succeed as a startup, entrepreneurs also need to take the time to participate 
in the cluster, find mentors and coaches to provide business knowledge, 
have interactions with other organizations to gain market knowledge, and 
develop partnerships or collaborations to develop new research and 
business opportunities (Fieldsteel, 2013). Entrepreneurs flourish in a 
connected, dense, and diverse ecosystem where they can move quickly to 
take advantage of market opportunities, and that type of ecosystem exists 
when it is endowed with adequate human and financial resources and good 
research and technological infrastructure (National Research Council, 
2012; Morelix et al., 2016).  
An industry association such as Confluence and The Water Council can 
support startups by advocating with the state, universities, and established 
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businesses to focus on policies and strategies that benefit new innovators 
and entrepreneurs. One set of strategies involves workforce development 
policies to increase college completion rates, lift educational standards, 
and build and sustain a skilled, educated, and technologically competent 
workforce that can contribute to growing firms (Porter, 1993; Fieldsteel, 
2013; Kauffman, 2016). A second set of strategies would involve policies 
for attracting and supporting immigrant entrepreneurs and innovators, who 
often play a disproportionate role in founding startups, and foreign 
students who graduate from American universities with the skills both 
startups and mature firms require (Morelix et al., 2016). A third set of 
strategies would involve advocating for policies that limit the scope, 
duration, and enforcement of non-compete agreements so that former 
employees with industry knowledge, entrepreneurial ambitions, and 
potential innovations can more easily start new businesses within the 
cluster, as was the case in the more open innovation environment of 
Silicon Valley as opposed to the more closed innovation environment of 
Route 128 (Saxenian, 1994; Morelix et al., 2016). A final set of strategies 
involves mapping the industry cluster to include identifying and analyzing 
the companies and their areas of expertise, the technology present in the 
cluster, the number of patents awarded, and publications made and their 
impact. Equally important is establishing a performance management 
system backed by a set of metrics from which the performance of clusters 
can be measured and bench-marked (National Research Council, 2012; 
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Fieldsteel, 2013).  
 
9. Partnering with Established Businesses & Universities.  
This final strategy recognizes that large businesses play an important 
role in industry clusters (Porter, 1990, 1998, 2000; Markusen, 1996). At a 
minimum level, large businesses serve clusters by anchoring both the 
cluster and the local economy, by maintaining relationships with major 
research universities, and by nurturing talent that can lead to the growth of 
new businesses. In a cluster with a more open culture or a well-organized 
industry association, large businesses share their industry expertise, 
collaborate with the other businesses on projects of mutual interest, 
conduct research with the federal laboratories, universities and start-up 
companies to commercialize technologies and products, work with 
educational institutions to develop curriculum, provide apprenticeships to 
build the workforce, and provide essential guidance for the cluster 
organization (Fieldsteel, 2013; Morelix et al., 2016). In an era were 
government resources are limited and private venture capital for startups is 
geographically concentrated, large businesses are becoming more 
important in supporting startups. They do this in several ways: (1) by 
providing capital for research, testing and validation, and for scaling up 
production; (2) by raising the market profile of startups that will expand 
their customer base; (3) by providing a market for their products and 
services; (4) by supporting startups during the long gestation period that it 
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sometimes takes for products to penetrate markets and begin to make a 
profit; and (5) in some cases by acquiring startups when they show 
promise, or spinning-off startups to form new and independent businesses 
(Porter, 1998; National Research Council, 2012; Fieldsteel, 2013; Morelix 
et al., 2016). In the contemporary economy, businesses increasingly 
depend more on outside firms, external support services, and local 
institutions that are better placed to provide specialized products and 
services than can be produced internally, and the culture and bureaucracy 
of large businesses often place constraints that stifle innovation making 
relationships with external innovators and entrepreneurs valuable 
(Saxenian, 1994; Porter, 1998; Fieldsteel, 2013; Morelix et al., 2016). 
These business realities provide startups with a potential market, and an 
incentive to locate within a strong cluster, through an opportunity to serve 
large, well-established firms and by being a source of innovative 
technologies and products for large businesses (Saxenian, 1994; Porter, 
1998; Fieldsteel, 2013; Morelix et al., 2016).  
Not all large businesses embrace an active role in clusters (Saxenian, 
1994). Some large companies are reluctant to interact with their 
competitors in a cluster organization, some fail to recognize that 
competition and cooperation can and does coexist within clusters, and 
some fear a loss of control over intellectual property or propriety 
information (Fieldsteel, 2013). In the case of the Milwaukee cluster, 
Badger Meter and A.O. Smith Corporation served the role of anchor 
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companies, worked to raise the profile of the cluster and its members, 
served as advocates with governments at all scales, worked with 
universities to stimulate research and improve workforce development, 
and provided essential guidance for the cluster organization (Fieldsteel, 
2013).  
Universities also play an important role in building and sustaining 
clusters largely by conducting research and development, by training and 
developing the next generation of scientists, innovators and entrepreneurs, 
and by nurturing or spinning-off startups (Porter, 1990, 1998, 2000; Boh, 
De-Haan & Strom, 2012; Fieldsteel, 2014). Silicon Valley and Boston are 
among the most famous and celebrated regions with well-endowed and 
prestigious research universities that have supported cluster development 
and nurtured generations of innovators and entrepreneurs who have 
concentrated themselves in these locations (Saxenian, 2000; Fieldsteel, 
2014). While research universities are universally considered to be a key 
anchor institution in clusters, not all universities are equal to the task of 
supporting their respective clusters (Saxenian, 2000; Fieldsteel, 2014). To 
support their clusters universities need to carry out a wide variety of tasks: 
(1) support basic and applied research that leads to the discovery of 
technologies that can be utilized within the cluster; (2) develop curriculum 
that will prepare their students for employment in the cluster by giving 
them the relevant knowledge, skills and experience, and by fostering a 
mobile and flexible workforce; (3) offer mentoring programs, accelerator 
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programs, entrepreneurship training for students and faculty, and 
interdisciplinary project-based classes that bring together teams of science, 
policy, law, and business students to write business plans and grant 
proposals to create strategies for the commercialization of technology; (4) 
offer sophisticated support for the process of registering and licensing 
patents, and the capability in technology analysis to determine how 
successful its research, invention, patenting and licensing process has 
been; (5) offer incentives to attract and retain high-quality professors and 
research students; and (6) maintain reasonable fees for startups and small 
businesses to access the research findings and facilities (National Research 
Council, 2012; Boh, De-Haan & Strom, 2012; Fieldstee,l 2014). The 
University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee, the University of Cincinnati, and the 
University of Washington-Tacoma are all attempting to fulfill these roles 
for their respective clusters. The EPA also awards research grants to, and 
enters into cooperative agreements with, universities through the National 
Center for Environmental Research’s (NCER) Science to Achieve Results 
(STAR) Program; and the NCER also manages the EPA’s Small Business 
Innovative Research (SBIR) Program.  The EPA’s STAR program, through 
grants and graduate fellowships, engages some of the nation’s best 
scientists and engineers in targeted research projects across several 
scientific disciplines that complement the agency's own intramural 
research program which is designed to protect human health and the 
environment. STAR research is funded through a competitive solicitation 
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process, or request for applications (RFAs), that attracts nearly 2000-2500 
proposals every year; and of the applications, more than 200 research 
grants and graduate fellowships are awarded (EPA, 2017).  
IV. Other Supporting Federal Policies and Programs 
A. Cooperative Research and Development Agreement (CRADA) 
There are several federal policies and programs that the EPA uses to specifically 
support both innovation and entrepreneurship in the water economy and, indirectly, 
business cluster development. First, it is important to understand the federal government's 
role in R&D. The U.S. federal government invests a considerable amount of public funds 
in R&D through both federal research facilities and grants to external organizations. 
These funds reflect important, but often shifting, policy priorities for the federal 
government which during the Obama Administration included advanced manufacturing, 
clean energy technology, climate change research, neurological science and medicine, 
STEM education, and a permanent R&D tax credit (Steward & Springs, 2015; Hourihan 
& Parkes, 2017). The outlay for R&D in FY 2016 was budgeted at $145.2 billion, which 
represents about 3.6% of a $4 trillion budget, 12.4% of discretionary expenditure, and 
about one-third of all R&D expenditure in the U.S. (Steward & Springs, 2015; Hourihan 
& Parkes, 2017). In nominal, non-inflation adjusted dollars, this allocation for R&D in 
FY 2016 represents an increase of about 6.4% above FY 2015. In terms of priorities the 
DOC received an increase of 40.4% while the EPA received an increase of only 1.3%, 
suggesting that local economic development, industry support, and job-creation were 
relative priorities (Hourihan & Parkes, 2017). In terms of 'character,' about 53% of R&D 
expenditure goes to defense related R&D, and the remainder to civilian, non-defense 
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R&D which includes health, space, energy, agriculture, environment, and social science 
research. Research and Development 'character' can also be divided into roughly five 
classes which includes basic research, applied research, development, facilities 
construction, and R&D equipment (Hourihan & Parkes, 2017). The heavy emphasis on 
defense related R&D which, unlike civilian R&D, is heavily skewed to development, is a 
source of concern in some quarters among those who worry that it may crowd out 
valuable civilian R&D, erode long-term U.S. productivity and competitiveness, and put at 
risk the quality of public and environmental health (Porter, 1993; Hourihan & Parkes, 
2017).  The scale and scope of the federal research system is considerable with over 700 
research facilities spread across the country, many of which work with civilian 
researchers, innovators and entrepreneurs to solve many of the country's important 
problems. These research facilities are a rich source of scientific and technological R&D, 
but they have traditionally had difficulties commercializing their technologies and 
reaching their full potential as catalysts for local and regional economic development. 
Since the 1980s, Congress through legislation has been encouraging these facilities to 
partner with non-government organizations to commercialize their technologies and 
better support local and regional growth (National Research Council, 2012).  
The commercialization of the technologies which result from these partnerships 
requires a formal mechanism, and a Cooperative Research and Development Agreement 
(CRADA) is the main vehicle for enabling these partners to work together, to allocate 
roles and responsibilities, and distribute benefits and burdens (National Research 
Council, 2012; EPA, 2017) A CRADA is an agreement between a federal government 
agency and one or more external, non-government partners to pursue joint R&D projects, 
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to share research materials, to create new intellectual property, and to commercialize new 
technologies (EPA, 2017). This type of agreement was designated under the Federal 
Technology Transfer Act (FTTA) of 1986 and is intended to speed the commercialization 
of technology, optimize resources, and protect the propriety rights of all the parties 
involved. A CRADA enables a federal agency and its outside partners to leverage their 
respective resources and technical capabilities, reduce a duplication of effort, expand 
their competencies and skills through increased collaborations, and make patented 
technologies available for licensing by outside parties (EPA, 2017). The range of 
potential non-government partners in a CRADA is considerable and includes businesses, 
universities, state and local governments, trade associations, foreign governments, and 
individuals. 
 A recent study by the Association of University Technology Managers (AUTM) 
of university technology-transfer programs since 1991, reveals a mixed record of success. 
This is despite a dramatic increase in the number of university inventions, licensing 
revenue, expenditure on full-time technology-transfer specialists, patent applications, and 
the number of start-ups launched by AUTM members (National Research Council, 2012). 
The 'productivity' of university technology-transfer programs, and the 'quality' of the 
patents and inventions, lags behind the impressive increase in raw output: 'successful' 
patent applications and the number of licenses have remained flat; 59% of  invention 
disclosures by universities resulted in U.S. patent applications; 26% led to signed 
licenses; 16% resulted in U.S. patents issued; 3% of those inventions led to the formation 
of start-up companies; 52% of technology-transfer programs lose money for their 
universities; only 16% technology-transfer programs are financially self-sustaining; and 
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most universities lack sufficient staff and funds to help startups navigate the 
commercialization process  (National Research Council, 2012; Fieldsteel, 2014). Despite 
the challenges, the EPA believes the collaborations which the FTTA and CRADAs 
facilitate can lead to improved research outcomes, the creation of new intellectual 
property, and an improvement in the rate of commercialization of environmental 
technologies that lead to better protection of human health and the environment (EPA, 
2017).  
 The collaborations that take place at the EPA's Cincinnati facility are a concrete 
realization of federal policy. In 2012 the EPA and its researchers began a collaboration 
with Urbanalta, a Cincinnati-based small business, and the Metropolitan Sewer District of 
Greater Cincinnati (MSDGC), to develop novel technologies and measurement methods 
for monitoring sewer flows during heavy rains and detecting the location of the resulting 
combined sewer overflows (Connair, 2014). The EPA developed a CRADA with 
Urbanalta which let the EPA take the lead on a joint patent for which Urbanalta was 
granted an exclusive first commercial license to use the technology (FLC, 2017). Under 
the CRADA, the EPA and Urbanalta contributed to cost sharing for the research, 
development, and demonstration of the flow monitoring technology; and royalties from 
the license will be returned to the EPA laboratory, and the researchers involved in 
developing the technology, thereby providing an incentive for future technology transfer 
(FLC, 2017). Urbanalta and the EPA developed several prototypes before eventually 
developing and designing a final, commercially viable sensor platform. Urbanalta's low-
cost networked sensors have the potential to revolutionize flow monitoring and 
management for municipal utilities and reducing one of the most important threats to 
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water quality (FLC, 2017). 
B. Regional Innovation Cluster Award Program.  
 The U.S. economy has faced challenges in evenly and equitable delivering growth 
in productivity, output, and jobs across the country, a problem exacerbated by the Great 
Recession of 2008. Certain cities and regions have consistently outperformed, and others 
consistently under-performed, the national average (Shearer et al., 2017). Uneven and 
inequitable economic performance is correlated to the economic character of the 
contemporary U.S. economy. Cities and regions that specialize in R&D-intensive and 
advanced industries saw the fastest growth in output and productivity, but productivity 
declined in cities and regions where the economy depended on retail, hospitality, or 
health care. Cities and regions that were strong in hospitality, construction, and 
professional services, saw the greatest increases in hiring by young firms, suggesting that 
prosperity is not necessarily linked to the growth in employment (Shearer et al., 2017). 
Uneven economic performance is nothing new and the shifts in the structure of the 
national economy that were exacerbated and reinforced by the Great Recession are part 
of an historic pattern of continually evolving and shifting economic development 
connected to location and industry specializations. Early concerns about regional 
development led to the Public Works and Economic Development Act of 1965 and the 
creation of the Economic Development Agency (EDA) to facilitate job creation, increase 
private-sector investment, promote innovation, and accelerate long-term sustainable 
economic growth. The Stevenson-Wydler Technology Innovation Act of 1980 - which is 
part of a federal effort to actively foster innovation and better coordinate federal support 
for scientific and technological research and development, technology transfer, and 
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commercialization - is connected to more recent concerns about U.S. global 
competitiveness (Federal Register, 2017). Support for clusters was one of the founding 
justifications for the establishment of the U.S. EDA in the 1960s (CREC, 2015). Policy 
makers at all scales of government have increasingly come to see regional innovation 
clusters as significant catalysts of local economic development; and there also is the 
widespread belief that without federal support some local communities would struggle to 
effectively support cluster development, especially in certain industries (Federal Register, 
2017). Subsequent amendments to the Stevenson-Wydler Technology Innovation Act led 
to Regional Innovation Strategies (RIS) and the implementation of the Regional 
Innovation Program, which is managed by the EDA’s Office of Innovation and 
Entrepreneurship (OIE). Under the Regional Innovation Program, the EDA currently 
awards grants designed to support innovation and entrepreneurship through proof-of-
concept and commercialization assistance, operational support for organizations, and 
early-stage risk capital which are in turn designed to translate into local economic growth 
and jobs (Federal Register, 2017).  
 In 2010, the EDA became the lead agency in cluster development; however, since 
FY 2011 there are at least five federal agencies directly involved in the promotion of 
innovation and entrepreneurship in regional clusters: the EDA, SBA, DOE, USDA, and 
NSF. The policy of the Obama Administration is to expand federal support for clusters 
and regional development through multiple federal programs - embedded in multiple 
federal agencies, targeting several priority areas of the economy, but which complement 
each other - rather than anchoring them in a single discrete program or agency (Muro & 
Katz, 2011). The U.S. Small Business Administration Administrator (SBA) currently 
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supports a portfolio of 14 Regional Innovation Clusters through its national infrastructure 
of financing and consulting networks as part of the federal strategy of supporting 
American global competitiveness by creating support systems for emerging small 
businesses in targeted industries (Muro & Katz, 2011). In 2014, the Milwaukee water 
technology innovation cluster was one of four Regional Innovation Cluster awardees to 
receive a grant of $500,000 from a pool of more than 40 applicants representing a wide 
range of diverse geographic areas and industries (SBA, 2014). Clusters supported through 
the program are awarded $500,000 for the base year of the contract, with four option 
years to be exercised at the SBA's discretion, for up to a total of $2.5 million per cluster 
initiative over five years. The SBA’s funding will be provided to each cluster's organizing 
entity, in this case The Water Council, to strengthen opportunities for small businesses 
within the cluster by providing mentoring and counseling services, teaming with partners 
for research and commercialization, providing fora to pitch their businesses to 
prospective investors, and opportunities to showcase their products and services to public 
and private sector adopters of new technology. The Water Council intends to utilize this 
SBA grant to establish a Center of Excellence for Freshwater Innovation and Small 
Business Development (The Water Council, 2014). 
C. Small Business Innovation Research Program (SBIR).  
 The U.S. economy faces challenges with small businesses commercializing their 
technologies and products; and challenges with U.S. businesses in general maintaining 
their technological and innovative edge in the face of global competition from other 
advanced or emerging economies that have been upgrading their specialized factors 
(Porter 1990, 1998, 2000). The Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR) program was 
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established by the Small Business Innovation Development Act of 1982 to build a strong 
national economy by using federal research funds to encourage scientific excellence, 
stimulate technological innovation and support entrepreneurship – especially among 
socially and economically disadvantaged persons - in priority areas identified by policy 
makers as critical to America's security, economy, environment, public health, or 
management of information and data (SBA, 2017). The SBIR is targeted at small 
businesses – defined for purposes of this award as businesses not exceeding 500 
employees, including its affiliates – that engage in R&D, that have technologies with the 
potential for commercialization, and that meet specific U.S. government R&D needs 
(SBA, 2017). The program funds projects that are considered too risky for traditional 
sources of investment capital, where the risk and expense of conducting serious R&D 
efforts are often beyond the means of many small businesses, but where the wider public 
interest may be served. The SBIR is supposed to help promising small technology 
companies compete on a more level playing field with larger, better resourced, and better 
networked businesses (SBA, 2017).  
 Currently 11 federal agencies participate in the SBIR Program and approximately 
$2.5 billion is awarded through this program each year - the United States Department of 
Defense (DoD) is the largest agency in this program with annual grants totaling 
approximately $1 billion. The participating federal agencies are those with extramural 
R&D budgets that annually exceed $100 million, which are required to allocate 3.2% of 
their R&D budget to SBIR programs, which they individually administer within 
guidelines established by Congress (SBA, 2017). These agencies designate R&D 
priorities, according to their mandated missions, in their solicitations for proposals and 
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awards which take the form of highly competitive contracts or grant which are subject to 
rigorous evaluations. The SBIR Program is structured in three phases (SBA, 2017). The 
first phase is designed to establish the technical merit, feasibility, and commercial 
potential of the proposed R&D efforts, award a contract or grant not exceeding $150,000 
to successful applicants for a project period of 6 months, and evaluate the awardee to 
determine the quality of performance of the small business prior to providing further 
federal support in Phase II. The second phase seeks to continue the R&D efforts initiated 
in Phase I and funding – which does not exceed $1,000,000 over a 2-year period - is 
based on the results achieved in Phase I, the scientific and technical merit, and the 
commercial potential of the R&D project proposed in Phase II. The third phase is 
designed to help the business pursue commercialization of the technology or product; 
however, although the SBIR program does not fund Phase III, non-SBIR funded R&D or 
production contracts may be available for products, processes or services intended for use 
by the U.S. Government. Since its enactment in 1982, thousands of small businesses have 
received SBIR awards; and annually about a quarter of the companies receiving grants 
are receiving them for the first-time. Five federal agencies with extramural R&D budgets 
over $1 billion also operate a similar program to the SBIR, the Small Business 
Technology Transfer Program (STTR), which is used to expand public-private sector 
partnerships between small businesses and nonprofit U.S. research institutions (SBA, 
2017). The STTR program requires the successful business to have a partnering research 
institution, which must be awarded a minimum of 30% of the total grant funds. These 
five federal agencies are required to fund STTR programs using an annual set-aside of 
0.40% of their R&D budgets. The SBA serves as the coordinating agency for both the 
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SBIR and STTR programs (SBA, 2017). 
 The U.S. EPA is one of the 11 federal agencies that participates in the SBIR 
Program and the projects that it funds align with the agency's mission of ensuring clean 
air and water, increasing resilience to climate change, reducing the impact of waste, 
promoting clean and green manufacturing, and ensuring water security (Fieldsteel, 2014; 
EPA, 2017). In recent years the EPA's SBIR Program has supported the development of 
technologies from environmental monitoring devices to pollution clean-up systems and 
processes. In 2016 the agency announced that 13 small businesses nationwide would 
receive Phase I contracts totaling $1.3 million to advance 'proofs-of-concept' which 
would lead to the development and commercialization of technologies to help solve 
current environmental issues ranging from greener manufacturing of plastics to low-cost 
air sensors (EPA, 2017). If successful in their Phase I contracts, these businesses will be 
eligible to apply in 2017 for Phase II contracts of up to $300,000 each to develop and 
commercialize their technologies for the marketplace. One such business is Faraday 
Technology, Inc. which was awarded $100,000 to develop a technology to mitigate some 
of the impacts of animal agriculture on the environment via recovery of phosphorus and 
nitrogen from waste. Faraday, in collaboration with the University of Illinois, will seek to 
demonstrate the potential for an economically-viable, sustainable, industrial-scale 
nutrient extraction process that reduces agricultural costs while co-generating hydrogen.   
Faraday's technology employs a chemical free, energy efficient method of extracting 
nutrients from wastewater, while generating renewable energy sources, that represents 
improvements over current extraction methods based on aeration and chemical additions 
(EPA, 2016; Mibourn, 2016). The wastes from industrial-scale agriculture, to include 
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concentrated animal feeding, is a significant source of pollution that impacts the quality 
of both surface and groundwater, increases the cost of water treatment, threatens 
environmental health, and creates significant amounts of manure with an annually cost of 
disposal is about $1.6 billion. 
D. Networking: Cluster Leader's Conferences & Water Technology Market 
Summit.  
 Innovation, entrepreneurship and the success of a business cluster all depend in 
part on the quality and frequency of information sharing; and information sharing 
depends on opportunities for networking and the presence and degree of trust between 
agents in a cluster (Porter, 1990, 1998, 2000; Alves et al., 2004; Fieldsteel, 2014). 
Innovation and entrepreneurship are highly complex processes which require a high level 
of trust-based interactions and cooperation between a diverse set of economic and social 
agents. These trust-based networks facilitate peer-based learning and the sharing and 
creation of complementary knowledge, which in turn reduces the uncertainty surrounding 
a wide variety of risks, helps to identify emerging trends and technologies, improves the 
quality of policy and government action, and stimulates and reinforces innovative 
attitudes within firms (Drucker, 1985; Alves et al., 2004; Fieldsteel, 2014). Innovation 
and entrepreneurship are increasingly a collaborative process involving diverse economic 
and social agents who bring to the table complementary skills and interests (Drucker, 
1985; Porter, 1990, 1998, 2000; Alves et al., 2004; Fieldsteel, 2014). Innovators and 
entrepreneurs who are embedded in reciprocal networks with other innovators and 
entrepreneurs tend to outperform those who are not embedded, and firms that innovate in 
isolation tend to have an innovation process that is inefficient and unsustainable (Enright 
 
 133   
  
& Ffowcs-Williams, 2000; Alves et al., 2004).  
Cluster networks do not always emerge organically nor are they automatically 
sustained. Cluster networking produces the greatest benefits if it is sustained over the 
long-term, and if it is facilitated by neutral parties representing the widest cross-section of 
stakeholders. Cluster networking can be both formal and informal. Formal mechanisms, 
however, create an important point for positive, proactive intervention for cluster 
associations and state agencies for economic development where the state can motivate, 
facilitate, and provide incentives for collective action by the private sector which is best 
placed to understand its own challenges and meet emerging opportunities (Porter, 1990, 
1998, 2000; Enright & Ffowcs-Williams, 2000). Robust, trust-based, reciprocal networks 
of communication therefore offer a number of benefits for clusters and their members: (1) 
they reduce transaction costs by making the transfer of information easier and less costly; 
(2) they facilitate the access to strategic information and knowledge as cluster members 
have preferred access; (3) they facilitate easier and less-costly bench-marking and 
performance monitoring and measurement with similar firms with the cluster; and (4) 
they facilitate a rationalization of production by sharing quasi-public goods, supply 
chains, marketing channels (North, 1990; Porter, 1990, 1998, 2000; Alves et al., 2004). 
 The EPA, in supporting the agency's clean environmental technology program, 
recognizes that networking and good communication among cluster stakeholders is key 
to encouraging technological innovation and entrepreneurship (EPA, 2012; Fieldsteel, 
2014). To achieve this the EPA has instituted several initiatives. One of the first was a 
Water Technology Market Summit in 2012, which was co-sponsored with American 
University and which brought together 150 representatives of government, industry, 
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investment and academia (EPA, 2012). The goals of the Water Technology Market 
Summit were: (1) to begin a dialogue among stakeholders to identify strategies to 
stimulate and accelerate innovation and the adoption of environmental technologies, (2) 
to expand the environmental technology market to support economic growth and create 
jobs through environmental protection, (3) to protect environment and human health and 
develop partnerships among key environmental stakeholders, (4) to identify concrete 
actions that the public and private sectors would take to increase investment in 
technology clusters, and (5) to broaden business opportunities in commercializing 
innovative environmental technologies (EPA, 2012).  
Another initiative to support networking has been the annual Water Technology 
Innovation Cluster Leaders Meetings. The first meeting was held in 2013 in Cincinnati, 
Ohio and was entitled Technologies and Innovative Solutions for Harvesting and Non-
potable Use of Rain and Stormwater in Urban Settings and it was attended by 
approximately 100 stakeholders. This meeting discussed innovative ways to capture and 
use rain and storm water while monitoring water quality and protecting public health 
(Lye & Waits, 2013). The second meeting was held in 2014 in Cincinnati, Ohio and was 
entitled Successfully Supporting Early-Stage Companies: The Role of Technology Testing 
and it was attended by approximately 60 stakeholders. This meeting discussed the 
challenges relating to the testing of technologies that must be addressed before a new 
water technology can go to market (Waits, 2014). The third meeting was held in 2015 in 
Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania and it was entitled Federal Funding Opportunities for Early-
Stage Water Companies and it was attended by approximately 75 stakeholders. This 
meeting, which was held in partnership with the Water Economy Network, discussed 
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federal funding opportunities for early-stage water technology companies, the role of 
water cluster anchor companies, and the benefits of belonging to a water cluster (Waits, 
2015). 
V. Conclusion 
  The U.S. faces economic and environmental challenges that include stressed 
water resources and the declining global competitiveness of its high-technology industrial 
base. Both challenges threaten the quality of life of the American people. These 
challenges are not new – they have been emerging for several decades and have been 
subject to continual policy intervention at all political scales. The limitations to the 
efficiency and effectiveness of traditional public policy is partially connected to the fact 
that these policy problems, though connected, have been addressed in an ad hoc and 
fragmented manner, and that the resources committed to address these problems have not 
always been sufficient to the task. Over time, however, federal policy has been evolving 
to adopt a more joined-up approach to both planning and implementation. The EPA's 
Clean Air and Clean Water Technology initiatives are an example of a more integrated 
approach to federal policy towards both regional economic development and 
environmental protection. With this new approach, the goal of the federal government is 
to improve both economic and environmental outcomes by strengthening regional 
business clusters build around the water industry and water technology firms. The EPA 
and SBA, which have partnered to implement this policy, have given these regional 
business clusters the designation Water Technology Innovation Clusters. The idea behind 
the policy is to identify where clusters exist and support their growth and development 
with resources such as federal funds for both basic and applied R&D, increased 
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networking such as through conferences and industry associations, increased 
collaborations such as those that support innovators to develop pilot projects and field 
test their technologies, and by streamlining regulations and regulatory processes which 
speeds up and simplifies the permitting process for water technologies. All these efforts 
collectively improve the process by which technological and institutional innovations 
diffuse and become available to meet America's growing and evolving water, economic, 
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CHAPTER 5 
WATER TECHNOLOGY CLUSTER IN CINCINNATI, USA 
I. Introduction  
 This case study examines Confluence, the water technology innovation cluster 
based in Cincinnati, Ohio. Cincinnati was one of the first cities in the U.S. to be 
designated as a water technology cluster by the SBA and EPA under the federal 
government’s efforts to promote both regional clusters and clean technologies. The case 
study begins with a brief look at the historical relationship between water, economic 
development and environmental impacts in Ohio over the last 200 years. It then moves on 
to the establishment of Confluence, which is the industry association representing the 
water technology sector in the Greater Cincinnati Metropolitan Region. Several specific 
examples of the efforts of Confluence and its stakeholders are examined: the attempt by 
the Greater Cincinnati Water Works (GCWW) and the Metropolitan Sewer District of 
Greater Cincinnati to spur local economic development; the creation of a Regional 
Utilities Network; the establishment of a tristate regime to simplify the approval of water 
technologies and to speed their commercialization; the partnership with the business 
incubator and accelerator, The Hamilton Mill, to support several water technology 
startups; the efforts to support two technology startups, Citilogics and Pilus Energy; and 
the multi-stakeholder project to respond to toxic algal blooms in Ohio waterways. 
Interviews with several key stakeholders were conducted: Sally Gutierrez and Teresa 
Harten of the EPA, Melinda Kruyer of Confluence, and Anthony Seppi of The Hamilton 
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Mill. Finally, Confluence is analyzed using Porter’s Diamond to gain insights into its 
competitiveness as a water technology cluster.  
II. Background and Context to Cincinnati Water Cluster 
A. Early History 
Ohio has an important and historic relationship with its water resources. Rivers 
and lakes were important for communication and trade in the 18th and 19th centuries, and 
reliable supplies of water became an important input in manufacturing from the late 19th 
century onwards (Herdendorf, 1996). Rich soils, relatively smooth topography over much 
of the state, nearly 70,000 kilometers of rivers and streams, and adequate rainfall 
provided fertile farmland. The hilly south-east of the state was rich in timber 
(Herdendorf, 1996). Ohio sits on top of the 1.5-trillion-gallon Great Miami aquifer, one 
of the country’s largest sources of fresh groundwater. Ohio is home to some of the 
country’s largest and most important urban and industrial centers and all are situated near 
a source of water - whether it is Lake Eire in the case of Cleveland, Sandusky, and 
Toledo, the Ohio River in the case of Cincinnati, or one of the rivers that feed the Ohio 
River as in Dayton and Columbus. Water resources were not always managed with the 
care they deserved, with the most infamous example being the badly polluted Cuyahoga 
River which caught on fire of 1969. The state of Ohio and its regional partners are now 
striving to sustainably manage its water resources and leverage this local asset. 
The economy and innovation have had an important and historic relationship in 
Ohio. Great Ohio inventors included Charles F. Brush, Thomas A. Edison, Martin Hall, 
Charles F. Kettering, Thomas Midglet, Jr., and Orville and Wilber Wright. Great 
entrepreneurs included John D. Rockefeller, Marcus A. Hanna, Samuel L. Mather, 
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Harvey S. Firestone, and Frank A. Seiberling. Ohio was the nation's leading agricultural 
state at the end of the Civil War and in 1880 there were nearly 250,000 farms in Ohio. 
The state maintained this position until overtaken by farms in Western states at the end of 
the 19th century. With the rise of manufacturing Ohio also became a major producer of 
farm machinery, but agriculture remained an important industry supported by the creation 
of the Ohio Agricultural and Mechanical University, the 4-H movement, the Ohio 
Agricultural Experiment Station at Wooster, and the establishment of the Ohio 
Cooperative Extension Service with agents in every Ohio County (Herdendorf, 1996). 
Building upon is rich natural resource factors Ohio became a major industrial region in 
the emerging steel, oil and rubber industries, all of which require access to a reliable 
supply of water.   
Research and development have been a well-established activity since the late 19th 
century. Ohio researchers, colleges and universities have been making significant 
scientific and technological advances in many fields that have been an important support 
to Ohio’s industry and economy, and this has kept the state’s economy among the most 
important in the United States (Herdendorf, 1996). Ohio colleges and universities have 
strong curricula supported by cutting-edge laboratories in the fields of science, 
technology and engineering. In 1913 Ohio State University established the Engineering 
Experiment Station, which was also sponsored by industry and government, to carry out 
research associated with the development, utilization and conservation of the state's 
natural resources and the promotion of economic development. By 1950, there were 
approximately 300 industrial research laboratories in the state, employing more than 
33,000 persons; and today the state has more than 6,000 scientists involved in 
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implementing nearly $4 billion worth of research annually, of which about 1,000 are 
doing research associated with water and sanitation. Ohio's economic growth in general, 
and particularly its industrial growth, has always been closely linked to scientific and 
technological advancement and this is being translated into supporting innovation and 
technological development in the water economy.  
B. Recent History 
Cincinnati, which is the home base for the Confluence Water Technology 
Innovation Cluster, is the 24th largest metropolitan area in the United States with a 
population of more than 2 million people, a rich and diverse workforce, and a diversified 
economy of both manufacturing and services. The Cincinnati metropolitan area is also 
home to several educational institutions, such as The University of Cincinnati, Xavier 
University, Northern Kentucky University, Thomas More College and Cincinnati State; 
the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency’s (EPA) internationally respected Andrew W. 
Breidenbach Environmental Research Center, a leader in water research, bio-remediation 
and pollution prevention; and the U.S. Air Force Research Laboratory in Fairborn, which 
applies leading-edge aerospace research to water needs. The Cincinnati metropolitan area 
was one of three locations identified by the EPA and Village Capital as a water 
technology innovation cluster, the other two locations being San Diego and Milwaukee. 
A 2010 study found that Greater Cincinnati has more water-technology patents per 
person than any region of the country; and it is also a major source of scientific 
publications in drinking water, waste water and storm water. Many of these patents and 
publications are connected to the EPA’s Cincinnati Research Center, and to private 
companies such as Procter and Gamble, Shell Oil, Eli Lilly, Zoeller, General Electric, and 
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Aspen Technologies. With 80 percent of their products containing or relying on water, 
Procter & Gamble was one of the early and ongoing firms conducting research and 
developing technologies related to water. Many private companies and public utilities 
therefore contribute to the water research field. The tristate region identified as being 
associated with the Cincinnati cluster is home to about 90 public water utilities to include 
the drinking-water utilities in Cincinnati and Dayton, Cincinnati’s Metropolitan Sewer 
District and Northern Kentucky’s Sanitation District.  
Cincinnati is considered the birthplace of federal government water research 
(Verbeten, 2016) when in 1913 the United States Public Health Service established a 
Field Investigation Station to oversee the first federally funded water research studying 
the relationship between water-borne diseases in drinking water, pollution in streams, and 
wastewater treatment technologies. These studies led to the introduction by the federal 
government of safe drinking water standards and to standards for the maximum 
acceptable contaminant levels in water. The federal government’s actions were largely a 
response to Ohio being a pioneer in freshwater supply, water softening and wastewater 
treatment. The first public fresh water system in Ohio was constructed in 1821 in 
Cincinnati, by 1870 there were 11 public systems serving 2.7 million people, and by 1970 
there were 680 plants serving over 80% of the state’s population (Cosgrove & Hushak, 
1972). Ohio opened the country’s second rapid sand filtration plant in the city of Warren, 
Ohio in 1895, which was followed by further major water treatment facilities in Lorain, 
Cleveland, Columbus and Cincinnati and the establishment by Ohio State Board of 
Health of the first systematic investigation of the efficiencies of the filtration plants in the 
years 1908-08 (Burges, 1916). At the time of its opening in 1907, the Cincinnati 
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treatment plant was the second largest of its kind in the world and these investments paid 
off with a dramatic reduction in water-borne illness, such as typhoid, among the Ohio 
population. The Cincinnati’s Field Investigation Station remained at the forefront of 
federal water research when in 1948 the United States Congress enacted the first Water 
Pollution Control Act which authorized the Public Health Service to protect water quality 
for fish and aquatic life and the facilities in Cincinnati to conduct research on water 
pollution and train personnel in pollution control. The United States Public Health 
Service and the Greater Cincinnati Water Works (GCWW) had been collaborating since 
the early 1900's (Thompson, 2013). In 1970, the newly created EPA took over 
Cincinnati’s Field Investigation Station which has grown into the 22-acre Andrew W. 
Breidenbach Environmental Research Center. It is the second largest EPA research and 
development facility in the country. 
 Major Ohio utilities continue to be pioneers in the provision of fresh and waste 
water services to both industry and consumers, as well as in the protection of public and 
environmental health. The population of the state, the levels of urbanization, the 
requirements of agriculture and industry, the cooling requirements of thermoelectric 
power, and the need to sustainably exploit the hydrologic cycle are all drivers of water 
management in the state. Companies like Cincinnati based Procter & Gamble are 
intensive users of water with 80 percent of their products containing or relying on water. 
In 1970 Ohio ranked sixth in total water use among the 50 states, the only other eastern 
state to use more was Pennsylvania, and its industrial use of water was the highest in the 
nation (Cosgrove & Hushak, 1972). In 2010, its total water use of the Cincinnati area was 
twelfth among the 50 states and its industrial use of water was tenth in the nation. Most of 
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the other leading states either had larger populations or heavy demands for irrigation 
(Maupin et al., 2014). Ohio utilities such as the GCWW and Cincinnati Metropolitan 
Sewer District (MSD) continue to be leaders in the use of rapid-sand filtration, chlorine 
and granular activated carbon (GAC), and ultraviolet (UV) disinfection technologies; and 
the MSD is regarded as a national leader in the development of sustainable storm water 
management solutions and asset management and a Wet Weather Strategy designed to 
reduce combined sewer overflows as mandated by the federal government. This 
innovative environment in water technology is why Melinda Kruyer, Executive Director 
of Confluence, is confident that the region will be a national and global leader in fresh, 
storm and waste water technologies and services (M. Kruyer, personal communication 
March 11, 2017).  
III.  Confluence Water Technology Innovation Cluster 
A. Creation of Confluence Water Technology Innovation Cluster 
The idea to formally designate the Greater Cincinnati Metropolitan Region as a 
water technology innovation cluster and to encourage the formation of an industry 
association what would eventually become Confluence rests on a recognition of the 
following: the region’s water assets, the long local tradition of water research and 
innovation, a unique concentration of labs and testing facilities, and the long presence of 
the EPA’s research center. The cluster’s geographic scope includes the Dayton and 
Cincinnati metro regions, Northern Kentucky and Southeastern Indiana. The joint EPA 
and Small Business Administration (SBA) initiatives attempts to harness regional 
expertise in public utilities, public and private research facilities, and innovative 
businesses to achieve what were traditionally seen as discrete goals of their respective 
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agencies. These goals are the encouragement of local economic development and the 
protection of environmental and human health and they are now seen as complementary 
and interrelated.  
In April 2010, EPA Cincinnati was charged with launching the development of a 
public-private partnership focused on the commercialization of innovative environmental 
technologies for clean air and water. The EPA Cincinnati initiated several studies and 
organized several briefings with regional leaders in the water industry to investigate the 
potential for forming a technology innovation cluster in the Greater Cincinnati 
Metropolitan Region focused on water. The response the EPA received during these 
briefings was overwhelmingly positive and the region quickly formed a steering 
committee to spearhead the effort. This committee drafted an initial vision and mission 
for the cluster and developed agendas for two stakeholder meetings, which EPA hosted at 
its facility in October 2010 and January 2011. Approximately 60 stakeholders from 
regional universities, large corporations, emerging companies, all three levels of 
government, and economic development agencies attended each of these meetings. A 
market analysis was produced by the 2010 U.S. Drinking Water Innovation Vendor 
Outlook Report on the companies and market trends shaping innovation the U.S. drinking 
water sector; and there was a Mapping Report on Proposed Water Cluster in Cincinnati 
Region which mapped the regional output of research publications and patents. These 
reports were presented to the stakeholders.  
During these two meetings, the stakeholders concluded that the region did possess 
unique strengths in water resources and water technologies and would provide a viable 
base on which to formally build a water technology innovation cluster to competitively 
 
 145   
  
meet present and emerging needs in regional, national and global water markets. The 
stakeholders agreed to proceed with the development of an industry association, to be 
named Confluence. Based on the draft framework and operating structure developed by 
the steering committee it was determined that the steering committee would serve as the 
basis for the initial Confluence Board of Directors. On 18th January 2011, the EPA and 
SBA announced the start of the Water Technology Innovation Cluster for the Ohio River 
Valley Region. The EPA provided $5 million of seed money for research to help attract 
companies to the cluster for public-private collaborations, while the SBA provided 
website support. Confluence was one of three initial clusters identified by the EPA and 
SBA – the others being in San Diego and Milwaukee – and the number of clusters has 
grown to 14 nationwide. 
B. Vision, Mission, Goals and Objectives of Confluence 
Confluence is a 501(c)(3) non-profit which was established in 2011 as a regional 
partnership between the private sector, local, state and federal governments, public 
utilities, non-profits, economic development agencies, the EPA, universities, and research 
facilities. The Confluence region includes southwest Ohio, northern Kentucky, and 
southeast Indiana. Confluence coordinates scientific, technological, and financial 
resources from the stakeholders to aid the development and diffusion of promising water 
technologies; and it promotes leveraging water resources to support local economic 
development, build and maintain a vibrant, technology-driven economy, and protect 
environmental and public health. To achieve these goals Confluence focuses on five 
distinct objectives that supports innovators and entrepreneurs by matching existing and 
emerging technology companies with the appropriate resources and potential markets: (1) 
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increased networking between stakeholders, (2) speeding up technology testing, (3) 
improving public policy and regulation, (4) linking entrepreneurs with sources of 
funding, and (5) assisting with the commercialization and marketing of technologies and 
products. These objectives ultimately enable water technology innovators and 
entrepreneurs to successfully market their technologies and solve in unique and creative 
ways some of the most challenging issues facing the water economy. The cluster focuses 
particularly on developing technologies that facilitate sustainable water resource 
management, improve water and energy efficiency, reduce costs for utilities and 
consumers, address a broad array of contaminants, and improve public health. 
Confluence states that its vision is “to identify, test, develop and commercialize 
innovative technologies to solve environmental challenges and spur sustainable economic 
development and job creation, by: (1) attracting the best and brightest scientists and 
entrepreneurs, (2) promoting economic development through the creation and attraction 
of jobs and investment, and (3) becoming the world’s source for practical and affordable 
solutions and sustainable practices.” Confluence’s mission is to “collaborate to establish 
the region as a global leader in sustainable environmental technology innovation, with an 
initial emphasis on water.” To facilitate the vision and mission, Confluence has employed 
a number of strategies: (1) host an annual water symposium that brings together 
stakeholders to network and share perspectives on regional, national, and global water 
challenges; (2) market the cluster to attract more innovators and entrepreneurs to the 
region; (3) support local innovators and entrepreneurs; (4) work to remove barriers and 
expedite approval processes through the multi-jurisdiction agreement between Ohio, 
Kentucky and Indiana; and (5) align the efforts and increase the interactions of different 
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organizations in the water industry. Alan Vicory, Confluence's former board chairman, 
states that:   
"We help facilitate the efficiency of the ecosystem—in this case, toward 
the development and deployment of new technologies—and in doing that, you 
create economic development by growing indigenous businesses and attracting 
new ones from the outside. Our vision is to help businesses identify markets and 
test, develop, and commercialize innovative technologies to solve environmental 
challenges and, at the same time, spur sustainable economic development and job 
creation locally. The cluster is all about economic development -- bringing jobs to 
our region. That's why we're here -- to capitalize on these assets that we have. We 
want to bring manufacturing here, and we want to bring the best and brightest 
minds (Cunneff, 2014)."  
Confluence also focuses on five distinct objectives that many of these 
entrepreneurial companies are looking to meet: (1) networking, (2) testing, (3) policy and 
regulation, (4) funding, and (5) purchasing. Through this approach Confluence serves as 
the focal water networking hub of the Greater Cincinnati area, offering an exclusive point 
of contact with other important entities and matching technology companies with the 
appropriate resources and accommodations to establish an all-encompassing foundation 
that considers all aspects of the development process. 
C. Structure and Leadership of Confluence 
Confluence is a geographically concentrated network of interconnected public, 
private and non-profit organizations that voluntarily work together to leverage regional 
water resources to promote regional economic growth and technological innovation in the 
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water industry. The leadership of Confluence comes from these organizations and 
represents a variety of interests and perspectives, offers a range of knowledge and skills, 
promotes relationships and networks that cross organizational and disciplinary 
boundaries, and facilitates access to resources.  
The board membership is made up of persons from the private sector, the public 
sector and academia as follows: Reese Johnson, Vice President, CH2MHill (Confluence 
President); William Scheyer, President, Skyward (Confluence Vice President); Verna 
Arnette, Deputy Director, Greater Cincinnati Water Works (Confluence Secretary); John 
Menninger, Principal, Stantech (Confluence Treasurer); Michele Simmons, 
Environmental Manager, City of Dayton Water Department (Member); Dr. Patrick 
Limbach, Vice President for Research, University of Cincinnati (Member); and Jim Uber, 
CEO, CitiLogics (Member). The management team consists of Melinda Kruyer, 
Executive Director, and Roger Smith, Finance Director, and office space is on Kellogg 
Avenue near the Greater Cincinnati Water Works.  
Confluence’s paid up membership of 20 companies includes startup companies, 
such as CitiLogics, Lagoon, Green Forward Technologies, Searen, Pilus Energy, Urban 
Alta, and Aquionics, major corporations such as Procter & Gamble Co. and General 
Electric, federal water laboratories, major research universities, and water industry 
experts. Stantec, as one of the largest water consultancies in the world, provides critical 
resources of technological knowledge and industry connections. As a Sustaining Member 
of Confluence, Stantec’s roles include strategic planning and advisor to the board and 
members. Procter and Gamble put up seed money to get the group an office and provides 
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international connections. Confluence is also targeting around 250 more companies and 
about 90 utilities around the region to participate in the program. 
D. Partnerships and Activities of The Water Council 
1. Regional Utility Network 
The utility industry is the United States is highly fragmented and the 
Confluence cluster has over 90 utilities in a 100-mile radius of Cincinnati. 
These utilities face a range of challenges to include replacing aging and 
crumbling infrastructure, a lack of funding for capital improvement projects, 
difficulty implementing full-cost recovery for providing services, the 
declining quality of water, planning for and responding to water scarcity, 
drought and climate change, replacing a retiring workforce, meeting 
government regulations for water quality, reducing energy usage and costs, 
planning and responding to emergencies and threats to security, a public with 
a lack of building appreciation for the value of water, and building 
relationships with customers that communicates the challenges of water 
stewardship and develops public support for local utilities (AWWA, 2016; M. 
Kruyer, personal correspondence, March 11, 2017). In 2015 Confluence 
responded with the creation of the Confluence Regional Utility Network 
(RUN), which represents a complete cross-section of the region’s public 
utility industry from fresh to storm to waste water. Confluence is attempting 
to create a network of utilities, which would be linked to scientists, 
technologists, innovators and entrepreneurs within the Confluence cluster. The 
RUN is designed to provide a platform where stakeholders could 
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collaboratively find customized, forward-thinking solutions to the challenges 
faced by utilities, promote scale efficiencies, which would conserve scarce 
resources, and create markets for technologies from the cluster (M. Kruyer, 
personal correspondence, March 11, 2017).   
Confluence and RUN host annual conferences to discuss and address the 
challenges facing its members and recognize innovation in the field. The first 
conference was held in November 2015 and the membership created a created 
a prioritized list of 21 urgent challenges that they faced which included 
protecting source water, the real-time monitoring for contaminants, 
incorporating information and communication technology into operations, and 
the risks posed by lead service lines. A workshop to specifically address lead 
was held in June 2017. Confluence also hosts the Reverse Pitch Conference 
which gives potential solution providers an opportunity to hear about water 
challenges directly from regional utilities and submit abstracts on their 
technologies that would be applicable to the specific needs of these utilities. 
Reverse Pitch allows stakeholders to share detailed information on technology 
specifications, project plans, and budget constraints which act as constraints to 
addressing water challenges (M. Kruyer, personal correspondence, March 11, 
2017).   
Confluence has also created the W Prize out of its Confluence Innovation 
Fund as a challenge-based competition to stimulate and recognize innovation 
in the water technology sector. The specific challenges for this W Prize were 
developed by the 2016 Confluence Regional Utility Network and presented at 
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the Reverse Pitch Conference in July of that same year. In December 2016, 
twenty-four companies at the Confluence Tech Showcase were selected to 
participate and after an evaluation process and voting by the Technical 
Committee and Confluence board, four companies were selected for W Prizes 
which was awarded in February 2017. The Confluence Innovation Fund and 
the W Prize are both designed to support innovation in the water technology 
sector by supporting the process by which technologies that address real-
world water challenges are identified, developed and commercialized of 
specific innovative technologies that will address today's unprecedented water 
challenges (Verbeten, 2016). 
2. Tri-State EPA Agreement 
To simplify and expedite the commercialization process of water 
technologies, Confluence in 2013 brokered a multistate memorandum of 
understanding between regulators from Ohio, Kentucky and Indiana, which 
would allow startups and firms to get water technologies approved by all three 
states at once. The three state environmental agencies have agreed to work 
together to simultaneously develop water technologies and expedite testing. 
According to Kruyer, there are many obstacles firms face converting water-
technology ideas into commercial projects, and field testing and regulatory 
approval are among the most significant (M. Kruyer, personal 
correspondence, March 11, 2017). Even if a firm receives approval for its 
technology from the EPA the technology must still be approved by state 
environmental regulators; and water technologies traditionally can take 12-15 
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years to move from the laboratory to commercialization. Confluence is 
working to take down barriers to technology commercialization and to 
expedite the regulatory approval process. On January 16, 2013, Confluence 
brokered the landmark signing of a multi-state agreement with the EPAs of 
Ohio, Kentucky and Indiana to help streamline and harmonize the approval 
process of emerging drinking and waste water treatment technologies. In both 
the Chesapeake region and the Midwestern states of Ohio, Kentucky and 
Indiana, regional water clusters have helped to remove these barriers, by 
enabling collaboration between state regulators to develop cooperative 
agreements, allowing for reciprocity of new technology testing across multiple 
states. Innovation in regulation at the regional level will substantially increase 
market attractiveness and accelerate innovation through increased market-pull. 
Many pressing water quality and related environmental and public health 
problems – such as lead in pipes and algal blooms – cannot and should not 
wait 12-15 years to be addressed when, over the past 20 years, an expanding 
range of potentially viable technologies have become more commonly 
available than most users realize or can quickly be brought on stream (Najm 
& Trussell, 1999).  The ongoing discovery of new contaminants, the 
promulgation of new water quality standards, and the increasing cost of 
providing utility services have stimulated the development of new water 
technologies; however, the state processes for small-scale pilot testing, and 
subsequently approving and implementing at full-scale the new technologies, 
has lagged both technological advances and consumer demand. According to 
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Ringenberg et. al. (2017), obtaining state regulatory agency approval for the 
implementation of new water technologies is a long-standing national 
problem, especially in small drinking water systems. The state regulatory 
approval process is a barrier because of the following: (1) state regulators lack 
time, specialized training for their staff, and pilot test data from vendors; (2) it 
is difficult to obtain independent verification or certification of water 
technologies; and (3) there is insufficient networking between state regulators 
and local water utilities that would facilitate - for both existing and emerging 
technologies - the collection, evaluation and sharing of performance data 
(Ringenberg et. al., 2017). Confluence is convinced that a simpler and faster 
approval process will encourage more water technology companies to locate 
in the Confluence cluster, where they could leverage the region as a domestic 
market for their technologies. A simpler and faster approval process would 
also allow more utilities to employ technologies to improve water quality, 
improve the reliability of their service, simplify operations and service 
delivery, reduce capital and operations and maintenance costs, and reduce 
non-revenue water losses. Having a three-state coordinated testing protocol, 
allows a successful demonstration to immediately create a market for 
deployment in three states instead of one. 
3. Ohio Algal Blooms 
In 2014 Lake Erie was affected by an algal bloom that covered several 
hundred square miles and extended the 120 miles from Toledo to Cleveland. Part 
of that bloom formed directly over the water intake for Toledo’s municipal water 
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supply and caused a disruption in that city’s fresh water supply that lasted several 
days affecting almost 400,000 residents. In 2015 the Ohio River was affected by 
an algal bloom that extended 600 miles along the river from Pittsburg to Illinois, 
which affected the operations of more than 14 municipal waste utilities along the 
river and closed the river to recreational activities. These blooms were so severe 
that they could be observed from space. Algal blooms, once a severe problem in 
Ohio waters in the 1950s and 1960s, but largely resolved by the 1980s, have once 
again become more noticeable in Ohio’s lakes, streams and rivers during the first 
decades of the 21st century (Wines, 2013, 2015; Smith et al., 2015). 
Although most blooms in waterways are green algae and are not harmful, 
there are some types of cyanobacteria that have the ability to produce toxins 
called harmful algal blooms (HABs). Algal blooms have been recorded for 
centuries but with urbanization, industrialization, modern agriculture and poor 
sewerage practices that dump nutrient loaded wastewater into lakes, rivers and 
oceans their frequency and severity have increased. One of the most celebrated 
cases took place in June 1969 when parts of Lake Erie near Cleveland caught on 
fire. This brought the problem to national attention and prompted Congress to 
pass the Clean Water Act of 1972 – later supported by a separate Great Lakes 
phosphorus reduction agreement between the United States and Canada - which 
largely restored Lake Eire over the next decade by improving water quality and 
restoring aquatic life to the Lake. Lake Erie was particularly susceptible to 
pollution because it is the warmest and shallowest of the Great Lakes and its 
shores are home to more than 11 million people, several of the largest cities in 
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North America, and the location of a significant concentration of North American 
industry (Wines, 2013, 2015; Smith et al., 2015). 
Lake Erie is again sick and so are many other bodies of water in and 
around Ohio. The Clean Water Act of 1972 redressed point sources of pollution 
but not non-point sources of pollution. The current phase of pollution of water is 
driven by urbanization and industrial agriculture that have spawned new and 
potent sources of runoff from fertilized farms, cattle feedlots, and leaky septic 
systems whose origin cannot easily be identified. There are some 250,000 farms 
in the Ohio River watershed which makes regulation and monitoring more 
difficult than when regulators must monitor the discharges from a few hundred 
sewerage plants and factories. The consequences of algal blooms include not only 
threats to public and environmental health, but it also raises the cost of treating 
municipal water. The water plant in Huntington spent $700,000 to deal with one 
outbreak on the Ohio in 2015. Toledo saw its budget for chemicals double 
between 2010 and 2014 to $4 million annually to address this problem (Wines, 
2013, 2015; Smith et al., 2015). 
Algal blooms, which have been increasing in frequency and severity 
around the world, are caused by a combination of the discharge of additional 
nutrients into bodies of water, warm weather, and sunlight. Algal blooms reduce 
the oxygen levels in water which can reduce aquatic life and when the algae die 
they can produce toxins that can cause skin rashes and burns if touched, and 
diarrhea vomiting, liver damage, and even death if ingested (EPA, 2017). The 
amount of toxin needed to kill animals is remarkably small. Beyond the dangers 
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to people and animals, the cost of algae on commercial fishing and on recreation 
runs into the tens of billions (Wines, 2013, 2015; Smith et al., 2015). The only 
effective and efficient way to control cyanobacteria blooms is to control the 
release of excess nutrients into bodies of water; however, the protection of public 
health also requires sophisticated technologies to predict their occurrence and 
monitor water quality. Until recently the EPA was not required to regulate toxic 
algae leaving the problems to be managed by individual states (Wines, 2013, 
2015; Smith et al., 2015).  
Confluence has contributed to addressing algal blooms in Ohio by 
convening two Algal Toxin Summits in 2014 and 2015, which sought to raise 
public awareness about the problem and focus attention on solutions. Confluence 
did this by bringing together leading experts in water technology, utility water 
treatment, water quality and water monitoring to share information and ideas 
regarding the algal toxin challenge to safe drinking water. During the 2015 bloom 
on the Ohio, Confluence brought together a project team which included 2 
researchers from the Ohio River Valley Water Sanitation Commission, one from 
Bowling Green State University, another from YSI (a company that makes high-
tech water quality meters), and NASA researchers from NASA’s John H. Glenn 
Research Center in Cleveland. NASA had been providing information to water 
utility in northern Ohio, but this was their first-time assisting people in southern 
Ohio (Smith, 2015). Confluence is confident that its network of scientists, 
engineers, technologists, public utilities, public and private research facilities, and 
local, state and federal agencies uniquely positions the industry association to 
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facilitate this critical and timely discussions of this continuing and growing 
problem (M. Kruyer, personal correspondence, March 11, 2017). 
Although in 2009 the EPA and state water authorities issued a joint report 
on the problem of pollution of the nation’s waterways by phosphorus and other 
nutrients, titled An Urgent Call to Action, measures at the federal level to address 
algal blooms have only recently come one step closer to reality with the Drinking 
Water Protection Act of 2015, which was authored by Senator (R-OH) Rob 
Portman. After the bloom on Lake Erie in 2014, Portman convened a panel of 
regional experts from state and federal agencies, universities and utilities, which 
resulted in an ongoing collaboration which worked toward finding solutions to the 
algal bloom problem. The 2015 legislation will direct the EPA to do the 
following: (1) develop and report to Congress a strategic Algal Toxin Risk 
Assessment and Management Plan, which will evaluate the risk to human health 
from drinking water provided by public water systems contaminated with algal 
toxins; (2) recommend feasible treatment options to mitigate any adverse public 
health effects associated with harmful algal blooms; and (3) recommend source 
water procedures and protection practices (portman.senate.gov., 2017).  
IV. Other Contributors to the Confluence Water Cluster 
A. MetroWest Commerce Park  
Water is an important component of local economic development (Addams et al., 
2009; OECD 2011; Goldman Sachs 2013) and even in the water rich U.S. regional 
disparities in water supply, climate change, and pollution are driving up risks associated 
with water quality and quantity. The city of Cincinnati, through the Greater Cincinnati 
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Water Works (GCWW) and the Metropolitan Sewer District of Greater Cincinnati 
(MSD), are launching a nationwide marketing effort to attract high-volume, high-quality 
water users to the MetroWest Commerce Park in Cincinnati’s Lower Price Hill 
neighborhood (MSDGC& GCWW, 2013). The 18-acre site - which is targeted at 
specialty users such as food and beverage processing, light industrial manufacturing, 
high-tech applications – offers up to 50 million gallons daily of any quality water at what 
it claims to be significantly lower rates than other communities around the country, and 
that close proximity to the MSD processing facility will also reduce discharge rates. The 
GCWW and MSD also claim that the ability to supply customers with reclaimed water 
allows firms to meet their sustainability targets and environmental goals, and that their 
services go beyond the supply of water and collection of sewerage to include water 
technology expertise. This type of initiative is part of the efforts of the MSD to reduce the 
180 million gallons a day of treated wastewater which is discharged into the Ohio River 
by offering non-potable, reclaimed water for irrigation, cooling and other industrial needs 
at reduced rates. To make the MetroWest Commerce Park more attractive to potential 
investors, state and local financial incentives may also be available to qualified parties, 
representing the collaborative and cross-functional nature of emerging local economic 
development practices. 
B. Pipeline H2O 
Business incubation and acceleration is an important component in building water 
technology innovation clusters. Business incubators are designed to increase the success-
rate of new businesses and accelerators are designed to jumpstart more developed 
businesses. Most sophisticated incubators or accelerators offer entrepreneurs rigorous 
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professional development programs, coaching and networking, professional guidance in 
areas such as accounting and law, administrative support, and seed funding to move their 
ventures forward and to allow them to focus on core commercialization issues (Pettersen 
et al., 2015). Confluence is supporting business incubation in water technology through 
an initiative called Pipeline H2O with the mission to identify the world’s leading water-
based startups and commercialize their technologies (A. Seppi, personal conversation, 
July 6, 2017). Pipeline H2O is managed by and based at The Hamilton Mill, a business 
incubator in Hamilton, Ohio which specializes in advanced manufacturing and clean 
technologies. Pipeline H2O, the Greater Cincinnati region’s first water technology 
accelerator program, is a partnership between the cities of Hamilton and Cincinnati, local 
public utilities, local universities, non-profits in economic development, venture capital, 
and universities involved in education and research. An important partner for Pipeline 
H2O is Village Capital, which The Hamilton Mill brought into the Pipeline program. 
Village Capital is a community network that is dedicated to innovation which operates 
business development programs for early-stage entrepreneurs in agriculture, education, 
energy, health and water and which facilitates entrepreneurs to work together across the 
boundaries of other organizations. Over the past five years, Village Capital program 
graduates have reached 6 million customers, created over 7,000 jobs, and raised more 
than $110 million in follow-on capital. Greater Cincinnati is one of five Village Capital 
communities dedicated to innovation around water technologies, and therefore is an 
important resource on which Pipeline H2O can draw.  
The program plans to utilize The Hamilton Mill’s existing “City as a Lab” 
approach which enables startups to have access to municipal utilities to help test their 
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technologies and get market validation for their projects in a few weeks instead of the 
years which have been typical for water technologies (A. Seppi, personal conversation, 
July 6, 2017). In addition to utilities throughout the region, startups will potentially be 
able to test their ideas and water technologies at local universities and at the EPA test 
beds in Cincinnati.  Hamilton, Ohio is considered to have high quality municipal water 
and the municipality owns three hydroelectric plants in its network of water, sewage, 
electric and gas utilities. Pipeline H2O public-private collaboration which Confluence 
facilitates. The Executive Director of Pipeline H2O, Anthony Seppi, is a city-paid 
employee who is on loan to The Hamilton Mill. Pipeline thus offers startups access to 
mentorship, professional support, venture capital, and, most importantly, access to 
companies and utilities that are willing to beta-test their technologies. These companies 
and utilities which serve as test facilities will likely become the first customers for these 
technologies.  
Pipeline is hoping to attract eight-ten startups a year who will be competitively 
chosen from a field of global applications and then put through a 15-week 
commercialization program that connects the startups which important organizations in 
the water-tech industry, which will assist them in the commercialization process (A. 
Seppi, personal conversation, July 6, 2017). During their participation in the program the 
startups will be peer evaluated using 20 criteria in six categories - team structure, product, 
finances, validation, scalability, and return on investment – and this process will 
determine which two startup from the cohort receives funding to support full 
commercialization. The first cohort of Pipeline H2O began their commercialization 
program in February 2017 and consists of eight startups from across the United States 
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who were selected from a competitive field of sixty-six applications. They represented 14 
different countries from five continents to include two from Africa, 11 from Asia, one 
from Australia, three from Europe and 49 from North America. The call for applications 
to participate in the 2017 program was initiated on September 2016 and the final 
selection was made in November 2016.  
The eight startups in the first cohort were: AguaClara, which is designing non-
electric municipal scale water treatment technologies that are sustainable in traditionally 
underserved communities; ANDalyze, which is developing DNA-enzyme sensors to 
bring real-time water testing to the field; kW River Hydroelectric, which is developing 
technologies to extract renewable energy from low-level dams using a micro-turbine 
which they patented; PowerTech Water, which is developing a disruptive technology 
platform to clean and purify water; Searen, which is using vacuum air-lift technology to 
streamline water treatment; WaterStep International, which is developing a mobile unit to 
provide a rapid response mini-water treatment solution for emergencies or disasters; 
Slipstream ZLD, which is developing a low-cost and extremely efficient wastewater 
crystallization system which would completely eliminate wastewater from low-volume 
industrial producers; and WEL Enterprise, which is developing the first ever system to 
handle all treatment and reclamation of wastewater on one platform which would reduce 
water consumption, wastewater production, and thus costs of production. Three of the 
startups are from the Greater Cincinnati area: kW River Hydroelectric of Hamilton; 
Searen of Cincinnati, and WEL Enterprise of Covington, Kentucky. The culmination of 
the 2017 Pipeline H2O program will be a demonstration day by the participating startups 
at the Water and Energy Exchange Summit to be held in Cincinnati in November 2017. 
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Pipeline H2O is thus designed to identify and help startups working on water 
technologies that will help solve some of the world’s most pressing water challenges 
which include water reuse and recycling technologies, waste-and-storm water treatment, 
metering and monitoring of water usage, infrastructure management, and data analytics 
(A. Seppi, personal conversation, July 6, 2017). These technologies in turn will improve 
water quality and quantity and reduce the energy associated with the collection, 
conveyance and treatment of water. The project will help technology startups overcome 
one of the most important and challenging aspects of the commercialization process, 
which is piloting technology projects before scaling-up and deploying them nationally or 
globally. 
C. Startups: CitiLogics & Pilus Energy 
Confluence has helped several startups move through the commercialization 
process, one of which is CitiLogics whose co-founder Jim Uber is a professor of 
environmental engineering at the University of Cincinnati. CitiLogics developed a 
predictive-analytical software called Polaris which helps municipal water companies 
more efficiently analyze and monitor water pipes and pinpoint leaks and ruptures in aging 
water infrastructure. The ability to integrate data from multiple sources allows for more 
accurate forecasts of how complicated water systems behave which will improve the 
management of risks, minimize damages to infrastructure, and reduce operating costs. 
There is almost one million miles of water pipe in the United States supplying drinking 
water to 90% of the population, they break about 240,000 times a year, and lose almost 6 
billion gallons a day to leaks, which represents waste of 14% to 18% of the water which 
is treated each day (AWWA 2017). Most of the water pipes were laid down in the first 
 
 163   
  
half of the 20th Century - and so are reaching the end of their 75-100-year lifespan – yet 
are being replaced at about half the rate that is required (AWWA, 2012, 2016).  This 
suggests that if CitiLogics can get its technology to market there is potentially significant 
demand.  
With the support of Confluence and its network of partners, including the EPA, 
CitiLogics was able to fast-track product development and beta-test its software at the 
Northern Kentucky Water District (NKWD) and the Greater Cincinnati Waterworks 
(GCWW), demonstrate its technology at various Kentucky and Ohio water utilities, 
signed its first contract with the GCWW, and hired its first employee. Both the NKWD 
and the GCWW are active partners in Confluence. At this was accomplished in 2 years 
rather than the 12-15 years that the commercialization of water technology usually takes. 
In 2013 the Covington, Kentucky-based water-technology startup recently received a 
$150,000 federal Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR) grant which will be 
matched from Kentucky's Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR) Matching Fund 
Program; and the company will be eligible for a follow-up $750,000 SBIR grant and 
another $500,000 in matching funds from Kentucky (May 2013). CitiLogics has so far 
been successful in generating $300,000 in research grants in 2013, $500,000 in 2014 and 
an expected $2.5 million in 2015 (FLC, 2015).  
Another startup which Confluence has helped is Pilus Energy of Cincinnati, Ohio. 
Pilus and University of Cincinnati microbiology professor Daniel Hassett has developed 
genetically engineered bacterial robots that turns sewage into electricity and has the 
potential to disrupt the wastewater industry and impact the important water-energy nexus. 
With increasing urbanization and industrial agriculture, the amount of sewerage 
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generated is increasing beyond the current capacity of the world to treat, and the current 
treatment technologies require a considerable amount of fresh water. Waste water has the 
potential to generate electricity and produce biogas using a combination of synthetic 
biology and fuel cell technology.  
Pilus Energy has, however, struggled to find funding from Cincinnati investors as 
there is a reluctance to invest in clean technologies because of the high risk and long time 
to earn a return (Globe News Wire, 2014). While Cincinnati has much to offer water 
innovation technology companies, funding remains a weakness. In 2014 Tauriga Science 
of Danbury, Connecticut, acquired Pilus Energy for $2,000,000. The EPA, after learning 
about the company through Confluence, has entered into an agreement to let Tauriga use 
their test and evaluation facility, which it runs in partnership with the Metropolitan Sewer 
District of Greater Cincinnati, to conduct a five-phase, $1.7 million commercial pilot test 
of this technology at commercial scale (Globe News Wire, 2014). This joint project 
offers the potential to provide commercial validation for the technology and allow access 
to the global wastewater-to-value market which is currently estimated at $10 billion and 
is projected to grow to $27 billion by the year 2021 (Globe News Wire, 2014). 
V. Application of Porter’s Diamond 
A. Factor Conditions 
Confluence recognizes the fact that the Cincinnati Metropolitan Region is 
geographically central between the U.S. East Coast and Midwest and has access to large, 
reliable supplies of fresh water from the Miami aquifer, thousands of miles of streams 
and rivers, the Ohio River, and Lake Erie. Confluence explicitly states that it intends to 
support the water industry by leveraging these natural resources and sees the state’s fresh 
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water as one of the industry’s premier assets (M. Kruyer, personal conversation, March 
11, 2017). The local economic development community is promoting the state’s access to 
water when attracting investors and cites as a success the recent decision of Abbott 
Laboratories to invest $240 million, and hire hundreds of people, for a new nutritional 
drink manufacturing facility (Thompson, 2013). This basic factor is, however, not unique 
to Confluence's region as most Eastern states also have access to large, reliable supply of 
fresh water. The challenge for Confluence is to help is stakeholders maintain the quality 
of the region's water as urbanization, manufacturing and industrial agriculture threaten 
the supply.  
A more important factor advantage for Confluence is industry access to a large 
pool of scientists, engineers, and technologists, to public and private research facilities, to 
high quality institutions of higher education, and a 100-year history of regional, water-
related ingenuity and innovation (M. Kruyer, personal conversation, March 11, 2017). 
The region's universities are heavily involved in water technology projects, such as 
NKU's College of Informatics and the Biology Field Station at Thomas More College, 
which brings students into partnerships with the Northern Kentucky Sanitation District, 
Duke Energy, and other local agencies to find solution to regional, national and global 
water challenges. Confluence also has access to 4 networked business incubators and 
accelerators, including The Hamilton Mill, and beta-site testing facilities to include the 
EPA's facilities in Cincinnati, local universities, and local public utilities. Ohio is also 
home to the U.S. Air Force Research Laboratory at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base. 
These are collectively all advanced and specialized factors. There are, however, concerns 
with the rate of entry of young people into science, engineering and technology fields, 
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especially environmental disciplines (M. Kruyer, personal conversation, March 11, 2017; 
T. Harten, personal conversation, March 11, 2017).  
Ohio has access to venture capital at a per capita rate of about US$6 
(Clustermapping.us, 2017) – which is low by national standards, but which must also be 
balanced by the state’s population of about 11.6 million which is 7th overall nationally. 
Massachusetts has the highest amount of venture capital per capita at US$109, but a 
smaller population. Ohio’s R&D expenditure is at a per capita rate of about US$946 – 
which is about the middle range among states with the highest being US$4,137 in 
Massachusetts - while federal R&D is at a per capita rate of about US$114 – which is 
also in the middle range among states with the highest being US$469 in Maryland 
(Clustermapping.us, 2017). Venture capital and R&D expenditure are advanced and 
specialized factors and Confluence needs to improve these for its industry, especially to 
support public projects to upgrade public utilities and protect public and environmental 
health which puts the focus especially on public R&D. From the Harvard Cluster 
Mapping Program, Ohio receives an innovation score of 8.04 – which is an average score 
compared to California which scores 27.01 – and an annual patent count of 3,370 – which 
is a slightly above average count but far behind the leader, California, with a count of 
33,343 patents (Clustermapping.us, 2017). 
B. Related and Supporting Industries 
Confluence has identified, and is actively recruiting, many interconnected firms 
and supporting institutions which have the potential to support the water cluster provided 
they work together in a coordinated manner to promote economic growth and 
technological innovation (M. Kruyer, personal conversation, March 11, 2017). Access to 
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financial resources is usually an important need for technology startups. A wide range of 
financing programs to help small businesses start and grow their operations are available 
from federal, state and local governments and these offer a wide range of benefits to 
include low-interest loans, venture capital, and scientific and economic development 
grants; however, only a small number of startups will qualify for these funds. Water 
technology startups have a particularly hard time finding investors, however, investors 
are far more willing to invest in water utilities which are offering stable long-term 
regulates rates that are inflation protected and largely immune to economic cycles 
(Goldman Sachs, 2013). Startups also require business support. To help address the 
financing and business support needs of startups, Confluence has partnered with four 
regional incubators and accelerators: The Entrepreneur Center in Dayton, Hamilton Mills 
in Hamilton, Hamilton County, the Business Center in Cincinnati, and UpTech 
Accelerator in the city of Covington, Kentucky.  
Facilities to test and validate water technologies are an important resource for 
technology startups and a critical step that must be achieved if the technology is to be 
commercialized. The cluster has access to some of the best laboratories and test facilities 
in the United States, such as at the EPA and with local utilities who are members of 
Confluence. Some of the major universities are actively working to support the cluster, 
particularly with water research and development, to include the Universities of 
Cincinnati, Dayton, and Northern Kentucky. The University of Cincinnati has made 
‘water clusters’ one of five targeted areas of research over the next five years and is 
investing between $12 and $15 million and hiring six new faculty members in support of 
the Confluence cluster (Federal Laboratories Consortium, 2017).  
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The Confluence board of directors and membership, which is critically involved 
in networking, is drawn from across the tri-state region and is composed of a variety of 
leaders and experts from industry, government and academia. Confluence has also 
formed several working groups helping to advance the agenda of Confluence: the Three-
State Protocol and Test Bed Development Work Group, the Water Policy & Water Event 
Work Group, the Confluence Business Advisory Council, the Confluence Partnerships 
Work Group, and the Communications & Marketing Work Group. One of the key roles 
of a cluster association is to facilitate the creation of networks and communication 
channels that better integrate the technology supply chain and facilitates technology 
commercialization (S. Gutierrez, personal conversation, March 11, 2017); and clusters 
associations connect key stakeholders across organizational and disciplinary boundaries 
to create synergies that increases the economic potential of the entire water industry 
(Haddaway, 2015). 
C. Demand Conditions 
The water industry is facing one of the most promising markets with good 
prospects for growth and profit, for stimulating local economic development, for meeting 
the need for sanitation and hygiene, and for supporting the competitiveness of other 
industries which are heavy water users. The annual global demand for water technology 
is estimated at about US$500 billion, and about US$100 billion in the United States, with 
annual growth estimated at about six-eight percent a year; and the estimate for investment 
in water infrastructure up to 2050 are about US$9 trillion globally, and about US$ one 
trillion for the United States (Addams et al., 2009; OECD, 2011; Goldman Sachs, 2013). 
The annual regional market for water technology in the Ohio, Indiana, and Kentucky tri-
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state area is estimated at about US$2.1 billion, with growth prospects of six to seven 
percent every year; and the Confluence cluster is also situated within 600 miles of more 
than 40% of the United States population and economy, positioning it to compete in a 
large and dynamic market of both water utilities and water intensive industries 
(Haddaway, 2015; M. Kruyer, personal conversation, March 11, 2017). The cluster has 
also started to attract considerable interest from overseas investors, especially from other 
water clusters in Israel and Canada, which are attracted to Cincinnati because of its pool 
of scientists, technologists and engineers, because of its world-class public and private 
research facilities, and because of its large local market (Strauss, 2013). This interest 
from foreign investors bodes well for stimulating greater rivalry, increasing the flow of 
knowledge, increasing the pool of sophisticated local buyers, and offering local 
technology firms access to foreign markets.   
D. Firm Strategy, Structure and Rivalry 
Confluence has identified roughly 250 regional companies whose work is related 
to water. These companies range from large water intensive industries - like Cincinnti's 
Procter and Gamble - to small water technology firms - like Newport, Kentucky’s 
CitiLogic and Cincinnati’s Pilus Energy - to larger technology firms - like Dayton, 
Ohio’s 40-year-old UES Inc., a 220-employee research and development defense 
contractor which has developed several technologies to include a portable sensor for 
detecting bacterial contaminants in water (May, 2013). Firms in the water technology 
industry therefore operate on several scales but do not have the same structure and level 
of regional domestic rivalry that is present in other industry clusters, especially those that 
produce more homogeneous products. Water technologies are often highly specialized 
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and subject to intense intellectual property protection. The industry is also dominated by 
water utilities, who are its largest customers by far (GWI, 2015), and this influences the 
structure of the industry and the nature of rivalry because of the long life-cycle of many 
utility investment, the conservative nature of utility management, and highly restrictive 
nature of regulation and technology verification which affects the commercialization of 
water technologies. Despite these challenges, however, the utility sector potentially 
provides water technology firms a large guaranteed regional and national market. 
Interfirm rivalry is thus more likely to come from other water technology firms at the 
national and global level, which is precisely why the efforts of Confluence at networking 
and attracting outside investors to Cincinnati are so important to expose the water 
industry to greater rivalry which will stimulate competition and thus industry upgrading 
and innovation.    
E. Role of Government and Chance Events 
Confluence was established in January 2011 by public and private leaders of the 
Cincinnati water industry as a direct result of a concerted effort between the SBA and 
EPA to achieve two complementary goals: promote local economic development by 
strengthening the competitiveness of a key regional industry; and promote the 
development of clean water technologies that would help to protect the quality of water 
either supplied to the public or discharge to the environment. The EPA, through its 
Cincinnati office, has continued to support the Confluence cluster on two levels: through 
public relations channels, by publicly encouraging and promoting the work of 
organization; and through technical support, by allowing Confluence members access to 
scientists and research facilities at the EPA's Cincinnati Test and Evaluation Facility 
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(TEF) to support testing and validation of new technologies. The partnership between the 
TEF and local utilities is designed to facilitate the commercialization of technologies - by 
making it easier for companies to try out their innovations in controlled, government-
approved settings – and the streamlining of regulatory approvals in the tri-state area. The 
EPA also carries out several research projects and market analysis studies which would 
be of technical and commercial value to innovators and entrepreneurs.   
According to the Brookings Institute good economic development policies would 
strengthen regional clusters, stimulate innovation, and attract both local and foreign 
investments; would focus on important emerging industries, such as clean water 
technology; and would achieve this through targeted public investment in infrastructure, 
basic R&D, and workforce skills that are required to support the new knowledge-based, 
high-technology, and environmentally sustainable economy of the 21st Century (Saha et 
al., 2014). The government therefore has an important a role to play in building strong 
industry clusters by securing the basic drivers of innovation, economic growth, and 
competitiveness that would secure the country’s long-term prosperity. The track record 
and the commitment of the federal government in supporting these drivers generally is, 
however, open to challenge: public investment in R&D has been weak or declining, 
having fallen in 2014 to its lowest levels since the Second World War, and tends to favor 
defense over civilian technologies; the federal government’s present priority seems to be 
on regulation rather than innovation and R&D; the workforce skills gap in the United 
States between what is produced by the public education system and what is required by 
the emerging knowledge-based economy continues to grow; and current United States 
immigration policy continues to reinforce this skills gap by allowing a disproportionate 
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number to low-skilled immigrants to enter the country (Drucker, 1985; Porter, 1990; Saha 
et al., 2014). The track record and the commitment of the federal government in 
supporting research into water is even more open to challenge as the federal government 
spends 50 times as much on R&D for clean energy as for clean water; and federal 
spending on water infrastructure has been declining since 2010, with the financial burden 
being increasingly shifted to state and local governments (Eskaf, 2015; Musick & Petz, 
2015; Fishman, 2016).  
 State and local governments also have an important role to play is supporting the 
water technology industry through infrastructure investment, as the largest purchaser of 
water technologies are public utilities (GWI, 2016); however, water utilities are 
hampered by the tariffs that are set for water that do not cover the cost of providing water 
services (Goldman Sachs, 2013). Low tariffs constrain capital flows and slows the rate at 
which water utilities can adopt new technologies. Despite these challenges facing the 
Confluence cluster, the Brookings Institute has identified Cincinnati as having an out-
sized global foreign direct investment profile in high-technology areas, such as chemicals 
and general-purpose machinery manufacturing (Saha et al., 2014); and Israeli high 
technology companies have been investigating investing in the Greater Cincinnati region 
(Thompson, 2013; Rutledge, 2016). This is reflective of the relatively high technical 
capacity of many of the region’s larger utilities, the high quality of the water 
infrastructure, and the scientific, technical, and engineering base of the cluster. 
Chance also plays an important role in the water industry with disruptive events 
coming from advances in ‘big data’, membranes, and sensors dramatically changing what 
was possible in fresh and waste water management and treatment; from climate change 
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which will require better technologies which helps society to use less water and produce 
less waste; from disasters that can unexpectedly disrupt sources and infrastructure; and 
from political, legal and regulatory shifts that affect how water is collected, stored, 
conveyed, treated and returned to the environment. An example of a political shift with 
important ramifications for water management was the 2008 signing by President Bush of 
the Great Lakes Compact which bars new diversions beyond the Great Lakes Basin, with 
few exceptions. This compact affects how new or expanding communities in the Great 
Lakes region will access fresh water, and largely guarantees that regional water 
exploitation will have to be worked out in the courts for many years to come (The 
Economist, 2010). 
V. Conclusion 
 The water technology innovation cluster centered in Cincinnati, Ohio has the 
ingredients to be considered an emerging cluster (Tichy, 1998); but, it will require time 
and continued concerted effort, or external intervention, on the part of key cluster 
stakeholders if the cluster is to become self-sustaining, and the region is to realize the 
long-term economic benefits that can be derived from a successful cluster made up of 
globally competitive firms (Brusco, 1990). Smilor et al. (1989) and Phillips, (2006) laid 
down several prerequisites for a successful cluster: for Smilor these were scientific 
preeminence; new technologies for emerging industries; the attraction of major 
technology companies, and the creation of home-grown technology companies; and for 
Phillips there needed to be a high degree the interaction and collaboration between major 
sectors in the cluster to solve complex problems and achieve joint goals. These 
prerequisites can emerge and be sustained if the region has well-resourced, high quality 
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research universities; has a network of champions and support organizations; has support 
in critical areas from all scales of government; has an environment conducive to 
supporting startup companies; and has large corporations willing to use their resources in 
a catalytic role to support and sustain the cluster (Smilor et al., 1989).  
 The Confluence cluster boasts 'scientific preeminence' in water technology due to 
the presence of the Andrew W Breidenbach Environmental Research Center, which is 
one of the largest EPA research facilities, and the University of Cincinnati, for which 
water research has always been an important element in its academic and environmental 
portfolio, and several companies which are intimately connected to water technology 
innovation. The region's industries, universities and innovators have also registered many 
patents, and published numerous articles related to drinking, waste and storm water 
which also supports the existence of 'scientific preeminence' (McMillan, 2011). The 
sources of these patents and articles are, however, currently concentrated in three 
organizations - Procter and Gamble, the EPA and the University of Cincinnati 
(McMillan, 2011) – and most of the rest distributed largely among a few medium-to-large 
corporations in the water industry.  Nevertheless, while a steady stream of new 
technologies is emerging from home-grown technology sources, most of these are from 
established companies, the EPA and the University of Cincinnati. Confluence has been 
working hard to attract major technology companies, with some interest shown from 
Israel; however, to date, no major successes have been recorded. There has been some 
interest from startups from around the world to utilize the emerging resources of 
Confluence, and this can be seen among the startups which have applied to join the 
incubator at The Hamilton Mill. This 'scientific preeminence' could be considered a 
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strength of the Confluence cluster; however, the concentration of this activity in a few 
organizations could also be a weakness suggesting a low level of entrepreneurship and 
innovation in this industry.  
 Confluence has had several strong local champions, however, most support has 
come from the EPA and the University of Cincinnati, more than from the private sector. 
This could be connected to the fact the most of the private sector stakeholders are water-
intensive or water-enabled industries rather than water technology companies. Strong 
support has come from all scales of government, particularly the EPA and SBA at the 
federal level, and from local governments through their economic development agencies 
and local utilities. This is borne out by the Regional Utility network, the Tri-State EPA 
agreement, and the collaboration between Confluence, The Hamilton Mill, and the City 
of Hamilton. These limitations are to be expected in an emerging cluster where initial 
progress is slow as stakeholders build social and economic networks in a small but 
fragmented industry; where the cluster's infrastructure and capacity is being built; where 
the technological fruits of innovation is not yet profitable, and the main attention of 
existing businesses is elsewhere; and the cluster is working out where its core 
competencies will lie (Tichy, 1998). The dependence on the state and research 
universities for external intervention should be considered a long-term weakness of this 
cluster (Porter, 1990). 
 Utilizing Porter's Diamond Model (1990), Confluence is well endowed with basic 
factors, such as fresh water, advanced factors, such as large pool of highly skilled labor, 
and specialized factors such as the Andrew W Breidenbach Environmental Research 
Center and the University of Cincinnati. These advanced and specialized factors are a 
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potential source of competitive advantage for both startups and existing firms and a 
strength of the Confluence Cluster. Confluence is well endowed with related and 
supporting industries - to include public utilities, water-intensive and water-enabled 
industries – to provide inputs and services to support the process of research, 
development and commercialization of water technologies, and mutual innovation and 
upgrading. The regional utilities have been supportive of water technology firms in the 
testing, validating, and commercialization emerging technologies, and this collaboration 
is supportive of the process of mutual innovation and upgrading which is vital to 
protecting water quality and reducing water use. These relationships be a strength of the 
Confluence cluster. 
 No industry can survive without effective demand and sophisticated and 
demanding buyers push firms to upgrade quality and become more competitive. The 
demand for water technologies is considerable, especially from utilities, and the 
government's regulatory requirements for water quality and environmental protection are 
driving innovation in the water technology industry. The market for water technologies 
from utilities should be an opportunity for the Confluence cluster; however, the 
challenges of finding a sustainable model to finance capital projects and maintenance is a 
threat to the industry. The main challenge facing water technology firms, especially 
startups, is the length of time it takes to test, validate and approve technologies to meet 
regulatory requirements; however, industry associations such as Confluence are ideally 
positioned to support the industry in this regard. The presence of an industry association 
is a strength of the Confluence cluster; however, the absence of a sustainable business 
model to adequately finance the association is an important weakness.   
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 Local industry rivalry among water technology firms is limited as firms within the 
region tend to produce heterogeneous products; however, when taken at the national or 
global scale there is considerable competitive pressure and customers have the option to 
source technologies from all over the globe. Israeli firms have been particularly active in 
exploring opportunities in the Ohio region and they have expertise in waste water 
treatment and data analytics that could be useful in the Ohio region. The absence of 
intense local rivalry is a potential weakness of the Cluster; however, the presence of 
national and global rivals should reduce this problem. Finally, the state is a key player in 
the water technology industry: it provides grants and seed capital to support startups and 
research, it sets regulatory standards, and it is the major customer for water technology 
through its water utilities. Confluence as a water technology innovation cluster did not 
emerge as a result of spontaneous generation but through a process of external 
intervention; and governments at all scales and the local research universities must 
continue to support entrepreneurship and innovation, and themselves be innovative and 
entrepreneurial, until the critical mass of private technology firms is created to take the 
lead which is necessary for the long-term viability of a mature cluster (Brusco, 1990; 
Porter, 1990). This dependence on state support, which is subject to shifts in policy 
priorities, is a potential threat which Confluence must address as its number one priority 
if it to reach maturity. 
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CHAPTER 6 
WATER TECHNOLOGY CLUSTER IN MILWAUKEE, USA 
I. Introduction 
 This case study examines The Water Council, which is the industry association 
representing the water technology innovation cluster based in Milwaukee, Wisconsin. 
Milwaukee is being aggressively promoted by The Water Council, and a wide cross-
section of city leaders, as one of the world's leading clusters for innovation and 
entrepreneurship in water technology, a bold claim, which has been challenged is some 
quarters. The case study begins with a brief look at the historical relationship between 
water, economic development and environmental impacts in Milwaukee over the last 150 
years. It then moves on to the establishment of The Water Council, which is the industry 
association representing the water technology sector in the Greater Milwaukee Region. 
Several specific examples of the efforts of the Council and its stakeholders are examined: 
the establishment of a Global Water Center, which houses The Water Council and several 
of its partners in industry and academia; the establishment of an incubator and accelerator 
at the Global Water Center; the establishment of the Innovation Commercialization 
Exchange (ICE), which is water technology database; and the networking efforts of the 
Council through such events as the annual Water Summit. At The Water Council Dean 
Amhaus, President and Chief Executive Officer, and Isaiah Perez, Membership Manager, 
were interviewed.  
 
 179   
  
The work of three important partner organizations is also examined: the 
Milwaukee Metropolitan Sewerage District (MMSD), which overseas sewerage for the 
city; Veoila Water, which operates the city's two sewerage treatment plants on behalf of 
MMSD; and the University of Wisconsin – Milwaukee School of Freshwater Science, a 
global center for freshwater research. Key stakeholders interviewed included Kevin 
Shafer and Matthew McGruber of the MMSD, Joyce Harms of Veolia, and Elizabeth 
Sutton of the School Freshwater Science. 
Finally, the Milwaukee water technology cluster is analyzed using Porter’s 
Diamond, which is a well-established framework for analyzing competitive advantage. 
The four determinants of Porter’s Diamond – factor conditions, domestic demand, firms 
structure and strategy, and related and supporting industries - and two additional factors – 
government and chance - interact as a system whose structure and behavior supports 
entrepreneurship and fosters innovation which can stimulate firms to increase 
productivity and improve business. The structure and behavior of the Milwaukee’s water 
technology cluster historically arose from the region’s ample supply of fresh water and 
the presence of numerous water-intensive and water-enabled industries; however, this 
case will show that public and private entrepreneurs and innovators have been actively 
using public policy and private initiative to upgrade the regions water cluster with 
moderate success. 
II. Background and Context to Milwaukee Water Cluster  
 The economy of Milwaukee has been significantly shaped for more than one and 
a half centuries by its relationship to water. The city is located on the western shore of 
Lake Michigan and at the confluence of the Milwaukee, the Menomonee and the 
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Kinnickinnic rivers. The Great Lakes are the largest fresh water system on the planet and 
hold about 20% of the world’s fresh water (EPA 2017). The city’s water intensive 
industries have included at various times in its history fur-trading, meatpacking and food 
processing, tanning, brewing, pulp and paper production, power generation, and shipping. 
As a port city, it has access to both Lakes Michigan and Huron and it became a center for 
collecting, distributing, and processing raw materials produced in the city’s hinterland. 
For a time in the second half of the 19th Century, Wisconsin was the second ranked 
wheat-growing state in the U.S. and Milwaukee shipped more wheat than any place in the 
world. The state’s production of barley and hops, and the presence of German 
immigrants, helped to support a major brewing industry, making Milwaukee the largest 
beer producing city in the world with the four largest breweries in the world  
 While the 19th Century economy was dominated by flour-mills, packing plants, 
breweries, brick-works, railways and stockyards, bulk commodity storage, and tanneries, 
the 20th Century economy became dominated by heavy industry and machining. Like so 
many traditional U.S. industrial cities the post-war period witnessed a long and painful 
industrial decline which saw industries close, or move to lower-wage regions, and several 
corporate headquarters relocate to other parts of the U.S. (Wisconsin Economic 
Development Corporation, 2017). While the top 10 Milwaukee employers in 1970 were 
all manufacturing firms, 9 of the top 10 employers in 2004 were service firms. Although 
Milwaukee is now dominated by services, and has seen growth in finance and banking, 
publishing and printing, and healthcare, there remains a residual presence of traditional 
manufacturing and some growth in more advanced manufacturing (Mattoon & Wang, 
2014). Manufacturing remains the single largest employment category, with 17% of the 
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workforce, and maintains the second highest location quotient, at 1.58 (Mattoon & Wang, 
2014). Milwaukee remains the international headquarters of six Fortune 500 companies: 
Johnson Controls, Northwestern Mutual, Manpower, Rockwell Automation, Harley-
Davidson, and Joy Global (Newman, 2013).  
Wisconsin is still home to more than 200 companies that depend on water as a 
key input. These companies together employ nearly 250,000 people and generate $56 
billion in annual sales (Wisconsin Economic Development Corporation, 2017). The skills 
and knowledge associated with Milwaukee’s traditional water-intensive and water-
enabled industrial base still exists and are now employed manufacturing water meters, 
water heaters, pumps and plumbing fixtures; and recently, the city has made a large 
investment to upgrade and leverage its strengths in water technology. The region is 
estimated to be home to possibly 150 -200 water-technology companies such as A.O. 
Smith, manufacturing water heaters, Badger Meter, manufacturing water meters, Kohler, 
manufacturing faucets and toilets, Siemens, manufacturing filtration, Pentair, 
manufacturing flow management and filtration systems, and Veolia Water, managing 
sewage and water treatment. These water-based companies are estimated to employ 
nearly 37,000 people and generate $5.7 billion in annual sales (FDI Alliance, 2017). 
Efforts are being made by a partnership of private firms, public utilities, universities, and 
government to attract water technology firms to Milwaukee to establish the city as a 
leading center for freshwater expertise and technologies (Muller, 2013). Developing the 
water and wastewater technology industry has been identified in the 2013 Milwaukee 7 
Regional Economic Development Partnership strategy plan as one of nine strategies that 
are focused on improving regional productivity and competitiveness. 
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III. The Water Council 
A. Origins of the Water Council 
The idea to form The Water Council to represent the water technology industry 
emerged from a 2006 meeting between two local chief executive officers, Rick Meeusen 
of Badger Meter, which makes water meters, and Paul Jones of A.O. Smith, which 
produces water heaters and filters. Meeusen and Jones convened a meeting of 80 local 
businesses and civic leaders representing the region's water technology companies and 
universities to formulate a vision, work out a strategy, identify resources, and prepare a 
plan to make Milwaukee into a regional and global ‘water hub’ (Muller, 2013; Daigneau, 
2013). In 2007 local water leaders held their first Water Summit, which has been an 
annual feature since then, and convened quarterly meetings to steer the establishment of 
the association. In 2008, what was at that time called the Milwaukee 7 Water Council, 
established a paid membership structure and the first members of the association were 
welcomed. In 2009 The Council was formally established as a collaboration between 
industry, utilities, and academia and registered as an industry-led non-profit 501(c)(3) 
organization (Muller, 2013). In 2012, the Milwaukee 7 Water Council was renamed The 
Water Council. Under The Water Council’s leadership, the Global Water Center opened 
at the renamed Freshwater Way, across from the Milwaukee Metropolitan Water District 
(MMWD), helping spur interest in the redevelopment of what has become known as 
Milwaukee’s Water Technology District. The District attracted more than $211 million 
worth of development between 2010 and 2015, including The Water Council’s Water 
Tech One and the University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee School of Freshwater Science at 
Freshwater Plaza, which is located a few blocks to the south. 
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The efforts of Meeusen and Jones to promote the Milwaukee water technology 
industry first received support from the Milwaukee 7 Regional Economic Development 
Partnership because of the publication in 2007 of a landmark Economic Asset and 
Opportunity Analysis (Milwaukee 7, 2007). This analysis identified the water technology 
industry as a sector with growth potential and a natural evolution for the Milwaukee 
economy. The Milwaukee 7, which was launched in September 2005, is the regional 
cooperative economic development platform for the seven contiguous counties of 
southeastern Wisconsin - Kenosha, Milwaukee, Ozaukee, Racine, Walworth, Washington 
and Waukesha counties. The Milwaukee 7 mission is to attract, retain and grow diverse 
businesses and talent in the seven counties in the greater Milwaukee region and it remains 
a partner with The Water Council (mke7.com 2017). The idea of a cluster was not 
original but no one before Richard Meeusen and Julia Taylor, head of the Greater 
Milwaukee Committee, formally initiated the studies, consultations and surveys to gather 
evidence, nor drove the process to marshal the human and material resources to support 
organizational development (Miner, 2010). 
B. Vision, Mission, Goals, and Objectives of The Water Council 
The vision of The Water Council is to position Milwaukee as the premier location 
in the world for research and development, education, manufacturing, and the 
commercialization of technologies related to fresh water. The Council’s vision statement, 
as laid out in the 2016 annual report, is to “Be the globally connected epicenter of water 
research, innovation, education, and business development” (The Water Council, 2016). 
The Water Council positions itself as both a unique industry association and a unique 
industrial community in the North American setting, and a national model from which 
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other water technology clusters can learn and which other clusters can model (D. 
Amhaus, personal correspondence, May 17, 2017). Levine (2009) describes The Water 
Council as the world’s first collaboration between business and academia for integrating 
academic water research and water technology commercialization in one facility. 
Although it works closely with and seeks moral and material support from government 
and non-profits, it is ultimately an industry-led initiative to create an industry-focused 
association with the incentives and flexibility to drive the interests of a specific segment 
of the water industry (Muller, 2013). By aligning the interests and coordinating the 
efforts of water technology businesses of different scales, water-intensive and water-
enabled industries, nonprofit organizations, and academic institutions, the Council hopes 
to identify, research, develop, and serve new market opportunities in water technologies, 
and in the process create jobs, attract capital and talent, and have a long-term, positive 
economic impact on the Milwaukee region.  
The Water Council’s broad goals are three-fold: support economic growth in the 
region, attract new talent, and develop the technology to solve the world's water problems 
(Muller, 2013). The Water Council’s specific goals are to create a global water hub that 
helps grow innovators, entrepreneurs and firms focused on developing cutting-edge 
technologies for both industrial and domestic markets - technologies that improve the 
efficiency of water use, protect water quality, and ensure the availability of water 
supplies (Daigneau, 2013). For its efforts, the Council received an important enforcement 
when Michael Porter suggested that The Water Council is “best-in-class with its water 
technology development,” that the Council is an industry association global leader in 
supporting its cluster, and that it is an example of a cluster helping to drive regional 
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development initiatives (Harvard Business School, 2014; Leitz, 2016). MIT and Harvard 
have announced the launch of a study of the Milwaukee cluster and hope to use what they 
learn to develop a model of cluster development for use in other cities (Harvard Business 
School, 2014; Leitz, 2016).  
The Water Council has also begun to receive national and global recognition and 
awards for its efforts. In 2009, Milwaukee was designated as a U.N. Global Compact City 
for its work on water quality and is hoping to use this award to enhance the city’s image 
and reputation and build its brand as a global hub of water technology. Milwaukee is one 
of 13 cities given this designation and is only the second such U.S. city, the other being 
San Francisco, which has a Silicon Valley supported Business Council on Climate 
Change which promotes low-carbon environmental practices. Milwaukee is also only the 
second city to focus on water, the other being Jamshedpur in India, where Tata Steel 
works on industrial sewage treatment projects. Global Compact cities must commit to 
align their governance regimes with 10 universally accepted principles in the areas of 
human rights, labor, environment and anti-corruption, and work with partners to progress 
social equality and justice, environmental sustainability and good governance in the 
urban environment. In 2011, The Water Council received one of four inaugural U.S. 
Water Prizes from the Clean Water America Alliance, a Washington, D.C.-based 
advocacy group, in recognition for efforts to advance water "as a finite, reusable and 
sustainable resource" (Schmid, 2011). In 2015, the State Science & Technology Institute 
(SSTI), a highly respected national organization focused on technology-based economic 
development which supports initiatives to create a better future through science, 
technology, innovation and entrepreneurship recognized The Water Council with its 
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award for ‘Improving the Competitiveness for Existing Industry’ (The Water Council, 
2017). In 2016, CoreNet Global, a non-profit association representing executives from 
across the globe with strategic responsibility for the real estate assets of large 
corporations, recognized the Council for ‘Water Technology Cluster Leadership’ when it 
received its Economic Development Leadership Award, which celebrates the successful 
implementation of innovative and economically promising projects in a community or 
region (The Water Council, 2017).  
The vision of The Water Council has evolved over the years and its ambitions 
have grown. Like so many other clusters around the world, The Water Council 
specifically invokes a comparison with Silicon Valley (Muller, 2013); however, this 
rhetoric has not gone unchallenged (Levine, 2009).  Initially The Water Council 
promoted the water cluster as a core driver of job creation and economic growth in the 
region (Schmid, 2012; Muller, 2013; Daigneau, 2013). Now the Council has adopted a 
global perspective and is branding Milwaukee as a Global Water Hub. The Water 
Council believes that Milwaukee has a rightful claim to be considered a global water 
technology cluster because of its historic industrial, public utility, and academic traditions 
in addressing water quality and water management; and because of a strong, existing base 
of water technology companies with considerable experience serving regional utilities 
and water-intensive and water-enabled industries (Schmid, 2012; Muller, 2013; 
Daigneau, 2013). The Harvard-based US Cluster Mapping Project suggests that the 
efforts of The Water Council have positioned Milwaukee as a Global Water Hub - like 
Leeuwarden in The Netherlands, Israel, and Singapore – and one of the world’s most 
significant places for water research, for water technology businesses, and for water 
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intensive industries because of its established and extensive history of engagement in the 
study, treatment, movement, and storage of water. (Clustermapping.org, 2017)  
C. Structure, Leadership, and Strategy of The Water Council  
To achieve its vision and mission The Water Council has worked aggressively to 
promote the water technology industry and a network of related and supporting industries 
(D. Amhaus, personal correspondence, May 17, 2017). This has been done through the 
selection of strategies that align with the Milwaukee 7 Framework for Economic Growth 
which consist of nine mutually reinforcing strategies designed to increase the number of 
firms, the overall size, and the productivity and competitiveness of the traded sectors of 
the Milwaukee economy, as well as restructure the economy within the paradigm of the 
'new-economy' which is 'information-driven,' 'lean,' and 'green' (Milwaukee 7, 2014). The 
strategies of The Water Council in general address the promotion and branding of 
Milwaukee as a 'Global Water Hub,' the building of strategic partnerships, the support of 
local educational institutions and the creation of talent, the support of research and 
development related to water technology at local through to global scales, and the 
facilitation of startups through coaching, mentoring and access to capital (D. Amhaus, 
personal correspondence, May 17, 2017; I. Perez, personal correspondence, May 17, 
2017). The strategies also reflect the conventional wisdom that clusters usually emerge 
organically and are built on and leverage unique local factors. These unique local factors 
include (1) natural resources, in this case an abundance of fresh water; (2) logistical 
advantages, such as access to both a port and a hinterland; (3) human capital advantages, 
the historic presence of skilled immigrant workers and a strong university system with a 
history of water research; (4) economic history, the city’s long history with water-related 
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industries such as brewing, water heating components, and wastewater treatment; and (5) 
chance, such as the fact that de-industrialization, the pollution of rivers and lakes by 
industry and urbanization, and the requirements of the Clean Water Act  have all 
converged to create an historic window of opportunity to promote local water technology 
firms and position Milwaukee as a 'Global Water Hub' (Porter, 1993; Foss-Mullan, 2001; 
D. Amhaus, personal correspondence, May 17, 2017).  
The first strategy, the promotion and branding of Milwaukee as a 'Global Water 
Hub,' aligns with both the second, sixth and seventh strategies of the Milwaukee 7 
Framework which are to “become a global hub for innovation and startup activity in the 
water technology industry,” to “foster a dynamic, richly networked innovation and 
entrepreneurship ecosystem, building on existing nascent, but fragmented activities,” and 
to “catalyze 'economic place-making'” (Milwaukee 7, 2014, p. 61-3). Both the 
Milwaukee 7 and The Water Council identify water and wastewater technology as a 
viable industry in a rapidly growing global water market; and both believe that the 
region’s water cluster is a potential source for innovation and entrepreneurship (D. 
Amhaus, personal correspondence, May 17, 2017). The promotion and branding of 
Milwaukee as a 'Global Water Hub' received an early endorsement from a study paid for 
by The Water Council but carried out by Sammis White, Associate Dean, School of 
Continuing Education and Professor of Urban Planning at UWM. Professor White 
claimed to have found 120 firms involved in water and declared Milwaukee had a 
window of opportunity to build a water cluster provided that sufficient public and private 
funds could be raised to build the organizational infrastructure to develop and support the 
cluster (Miner, 2010).   
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The second strategy, the building of strategic partnerships aligns with the sixth 
and ninth strategies of the Milwaukee 7 Framework which are to “cultivate a densely 
networked, integrated and dynamic ecosystem of regional actors driving innovation and 
entrepreneurship,” and to “enhance inter-jurisdictional cooperation and collaboration for 
economic growth” (Milwaukee 7, 2014, p. 62-67). Both competition and cooperation are 
features of successful clusters; and cooperation allows an industry to create and share 
public goods and infrastructure, spread certain costs, share information, solve common 
problems, and achieve economies of scale externally rather than internally (Porter, 1993). 
The Water Council has been highly successful in bringing people together around a 
common vision and this is beginning to have a direct impact on the efficiency and 
effectiveness of the innovation to the commercialization process (D. Amhaus, personal 
correspondence, May 17, 2017). Probably the most important strategic partnerships were 
the early support Richard Meeusen received from Julia Taylor, head of the Greater 
Milwaukee Committee, and from the Milwaukee 7, the regional economic council 
spearheaded by the Metropolitan Milwaukee Association of Commerce (Miner, 2010).  
The third strategy, the support of local educational institutions and the creation of 
talent, aligns with the fifth strategy of the Milwaukee 7 Framework which is to “align 
workforce development with growth opportunities in targeted, high-potential industry 
clusters” (Milwaukee 7, 2014, p. 62). The success of water technology firms depends on 
Milwaukee being able to both retain and grow a skilled workforce, support cluster-
specific career pathways, and create industry recognized certification and credentialing 
related to water technology (D. Amhaus, personal correspondence, May 17, 2017).  
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The fourth strategy, the support of research and development related to water 
technology, aligns with the sixth strategy of the Milwaukee 7 Framework which is to 
“strengthen industry-academic partnerships... to better align institutional R&D agendas,” 
to “stimulate university technology transfer to bring more institutional R&D to market 
through commercialization,” and to “accelerate adoption of new technologies, processes 
and business models in more mature industries” (Milwaukee 7, 2014, p. 62-3). Research 
and development and the innovation to commercialization process is vital to the success 
of water technology firms. Traditionally, the slow pace of adoption of new water 
technologies by utilities, of between 12 to 15 years, has made it more challenging for 
innovators and entrepreneurs to create viable businesses, increases the cost of operating 
utilities, increases the time needed to comply with water quality regulations, and puts the 
environment at risk (D. Amhaus, personal correspondence, May 17, 2017; K. Schafer, 
personal correspondence, May 17, 2017).  
Finally, the facilitation of startups through coaching, mentoring and access to 
capital aligns with the fourth and sixth strategies of the Milwaukee 7 Framework which 
are to “enhance the export capacity and capability of the region’s firms, focusing on 
small-and-medium-sized enterprises,” to “enrich the array of technical support, funding 
and other resources available to emerging innovators and entrepreneurs,” and to 
“augment capital resources available to regional entrepreneurs” (Milwaukee 7, 2014, p. 
62-3). While large firms and utilities might be the main consumers of water technologies, 
much of the innovation in water technology comes from startups and small small‐and-
medium‐sized enterprises (D. Amhaus, personal correspondence, May 17, 2017). 
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 The Water Council is led by a Board of Directors consisting of 20 leaders from 
across the spectrum of industry, academia, public utilities, and conservation. The co-
chairs are Rich Meeusen of Badger Meter, Inc., and Paul Jones formerly of A.O. Smith 
Corporation, who were the original innovators of the idea of a developing a formal water 
cluster in Milwaukee and supporting this cluster with an industry association in the form 
of The Water Council. The executive team is led by Dean Amhaus who has served as the 
President and CEO of The Water Council since March 2010. Other members of the 
executive leadership team includes a VP of Business Development who is responsible for 
program development, implementation and oversight of the  U.S. Small Business 
Administration's Regional Innovation Cluster Contract; a Chief Technical Officer who is 
responsible for research and commercialization initiatives, while also continuing his role 
as Associate Vice Chancellor for water technology research and development at the 
University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee (UWM); a VP for Sustainability and Stewardship 
initiatives whose focus is on rolling out the Alliance for Water Stewardship’s 
International Water Stewardship Standard in North America; a VP for Marketing & 
Communications who leads the strategic marketing for the Council including branding, 
public relations, global communications, the annual Summit, events, and membership; 
and a Director of Entrepreneurship & Talent who leads the BREW Accelerator, the Pilot 
Program, the Talent Campaign, and the overall mission of growing the water generation. 
The executive team is also supported by a support staff of about 30 people.  
The current membership of The Water Council consists of about 191 public, 
private and non-profit organizations with an interest in water, which represents 
considerable growth from the five initial members.  The Water Council is housed in a 
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refurbished 100-year-old box factory which was opened in 2013 and which serves as a 
head office, as a research hub, as a business incubator and accelerator for emerging water 
technology companies and promising startups, and as the focal point for industry 
networking. The building was named The Global Water Center, and it represents a shift 
for The Water Council from a regional focus to a re-positioning as a globally-focused 
water technology center of excellence. The seven-story building, at the renamed 247 
Freshwater Way in what is now called the Milwaukee Water Technology District, has 
approximately 40 tenants in its 98,000 square feet which includes universities, water-
related companies, municipal utilities, startups, and others. Here, industry experts, 
academics, graduate students, lawyers, accountants, and entrepreneurs share facilities that 
includes a state-of-the-art water flow lab, board and conference rooms, and an auditorium 
(I. Perez, personal correspondence, May 17, 2017). The Global Water Center is modeled 
on Kinrot in Israel, the world's largest incubator focused solely on water, which was 
started by the government of Israel in 1993 but privatized in 2006 (Siegel, 2015; K. 
Shafer, personal correspondence, May 17, 2017). 
D. Partnerships and Activities of The Water Council 
 The Water Council’s rapid evolution in Milwaukee, supported by vigorous 
public-private partnerships, is creating a powerful and unique international success story, 
with far-reaching effects for the city, the state, the region and the global water industry. 
The Council brings together research entities, existing businesses, start-ups, and 
government agencies to commercialize technology, promote water entrepreneurship, and 
increase access to capital. From the start, the initiative has been driven by the private 
sector and most stakeholders seem to agree that this governance arrangement works best 
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for the industry, and that it should stay that way (D. Amhaus, personal correspondence, 
May 17, 2017). The Mayor of Milwaukee,Tom Barrett, was quoted in Forbes magazine 
as saying that “if it had started at the public end, we would be hustling to get private-
sector involvement” (Daigneau, 2013). Nevertheless, both city and state governments has 
been a very supportive partner which has enabled the Council to be more aggressive, 
flexible and innovative (Daigneau, 2013; D. Amhaus, personal correspondence, May 17, 
2017). The Water Council has also been connecting to other water technology clusters 
internationally and has signed memorandums of understanding to share expertise with 
water technology clusters in Leeuwarden, Netherlands, Montpelier, France and Tianjin, 
China (Murphy, 2015). The building of partnerships is the second strategy of The Water 
Council. 
 One of the most important partnership which The Water Council has developed is 
with the Alliance for Water Stewardship (AWS), an international multi-stakeholder 
organization dedicated to enhancing water stewardship through the development of 
global water standards. In 2014, The Water Council become the official North American 
regional partner for AWS, thus making a commitment to help this organization brings 
together leading organizations from around the globe who are committed to advancing 
the responsible use of freshwater (Schmid, 2012). The AWS also named Milwaukee as its 
North American headquarters and regularly conducts training in water stewardship at the 
Global Water Center. In line with their second strategy, The Water Council is 
aggressively working to build new partnerships and expand its network. The International 
Water Association (IWA) is global network of over 9,000 water professionals in 130 
countries, with offices in London, The Hague, Nairobi, Dakar, Bangkok, Beijing, 
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Singapore and now Milwaukee. Its membership – which includes scientists and 
researchers, water utilities, large water-enabled and water-intensive industries, nonprofits, 
and water technology providers - works across the full spectrum of the water cycle and 
water economy (IWA, 2017).  
1. Business Research Entrepreneurship in Wisconsin (BREW) 
Accelerator  
Technology startups face numerous challenges to include barriers to 
entry for their innovations and technologies, lack of capital, an 
inappropriate business model, a lack of general business expertise, a 
deficiency or even absence of administrative support, and difficulty 
finding talent to help grow the business (Feinleib, 2011). Technology 
startups also have a very high rate of failure, even when they offer 
sophisticated technology the market may present a challenge to 
commercialization. Technology innovators and entrepreneurs might have 
great ideas and technically impressive products; however, they must solve 
the dilemma of the product-market fit and deliver value to customers with 
products that meet needs, fit with their systems, are reliable and 
economical, and are user friendly (Feinleib, 2011). This often requires 
user feedback and field testing or pilot projects that are capable of being 
scaled up (D. Amhaus, personal correspondence, May 17, 2017; K. 
Schafer, personal correspondence, May 17, 2017). Wisconsin faces a 
struggle in producing startups and, when compared against other states, 
traditionally scores low in this regard (Schmid, 2017). In line with their 
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fifth strategy, The Water Council is working to create a startup pipeline to 
support a steady stream of innovators and entrepreneurs (Muller, 2013; 
Daigneau, 2013). 
 To address the challenges faced by water technology startups The 
Water Council has created an initiative called The BREW Accelerator 
(Business, Research, Entrepreneurship, in Wisconsin). This accelerator is 
designed to support water innovators and entrepreneurs with wide ranging 
business and technical support from the World Water Hub, to integrate 
them into a collaborative network of technologists, innovators, and 
entrepreneurs, and to fund water technology startups with 
commercialization potential (I. Perez, personal correspondence, May 17, 
2017). Water startups with commercialization potential will receive up to 
$50,000 in investments from the Council in exchange for a small percent 
of equity. The BREW accepts up to six water technology startups for a six 
months program which includes: a lease of office space; access to research 
facilities and the Global Water Center’s Flow Lab; access to faculty and 
students from the University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee (UWM) School for 
Freshwater Sciences; business training from the University of Wisconsin-
Whitewater (UWW) through the Institute for Water Business; coaching 
and mentoring from business and water technology experts; participation 
in the activities and events of The Water Council; and opportunities to 
make pitches and presentations (I. Perez, personal correspondence, May 
17, 2017). The first BREW cohort graduated in June 2014 and included: 
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H2O Score, which developed software to track water usage and encourage 
conservation; Microbe Detectives, which developed a DNA sequencing 
process to provide comprehensive microbial evaluations for water quality 
and disease management that would go undetected under traditional tests; 
New Works, which offers hands-on training for water management 
professionals and water technology experts using state-of-the-art lab 
equipment; Noah Technologies, which developed a monitoring system to 
warn against basement flooding which could save millions in property 
damage; and Vegetal Innovation & Development, a French startup which 
is a global leader green roof technology. To date BREW has graduated 24 
startups to include one from France, one from Ireland, and two from 
Canada. The current cohort of six startups also includes one from Canada 
which is working to improve urban resilience through technologies to 
harvest and hold rainwater.  
 Further support for water technology startups comes from various 
public and private resources which are channeled through the The Water 
Council. The Council in 2015 became one of the U.S. Small Business 
Administration's (SBA) Regional Innovative Cluster Participants; and in 
2015 also became part of the U.S. Department of Commerce 
(DOC)/Economic Development Administration's (EDA) Regional 
Innovation Strategies Program (Verbeten, 2016). The SBA Regional 
Innovative Cluster Participant program is a national partnership that has 
established a Small Business Channel to support small-and-medium-sized 
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water technology businesses become globally competitive by linking them 
to regional networks of research institutions, supply chains, skilled 
workers, commercialization tools, and sources of financing. This award is 
for $500,000 and will be channeled through the Council's Center of 
Excellence (CoE) for Freshwater Innovation and the Small Business 
Development program. The Water Council was one of four organizations 
selected from 40 applicants from across the United States. As for the 
Regional Innovation Strategies Program, this has been used to support the 
establishment of a Water Seed Fund which will let the Council provide 
seed-stage investments to promising water technology startups. The 
$71,625 cluster grant will receive matching funds from the Council as part 
of a fund-raising effort to create the $5 million Wisconsin Water Cluster 
Seed Capital Fund (BizTimes, 2015). In 2014, The Water Council was one 
of 10 organizations nationally to receive from JPMorgan Chase & Co. a 
one-year grant of $225,000, which was followed up in 2015 by a second 
grant of $230,000. These two grants were awarded to help identify 
potential water technology investors and connect them with innovators 
and entrepreneurs and their emerging businesses (Gallagher,, 2014; 
Schuyler, 2015; Murphy, 2015). These grants are from of JPMorgan 
Chase's 'Small Business Forward' program, which is providing a number 
of organizations access to $30 million over the next five years to boost 
high-performing small business clusters. These funds are being used to 
complement the work of The BREW (Verbeten, 2016).  
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While not all BREW startups have gone on to be successful, 
several have gone on to commercialize their technologies and services or 
have been acquired by larger firms (Schmid, 2017). Ireland-based 
OxyMem Ltd. which is a designer of wastewater treatment reactors has 
attracted an investment stake from Dow Chemical. Wellntel Inc. which 
supplies real-time systems that monitor wells and groundwater sources for 
homeowners, farmers and communities moved out of the Global Water 
Center and established its own headquarters in Milwaukee. CORNCOB 
Inc.  which developed a new, more energy-efficient, lower maintenance, 
and more reliable system to run contaminated water through membrane 
filters now operates out of suburban Waukesha. Solar Water Works - 
which supplies portable, solar-powered water treatment systems – has 
secured an initial contract to supply units that will be utilized to improve 
water quality at two Milwaukee area beaches. And Radom Corp. which 
manufactures portable instruments that detect toxic trace metals in water, 
wastewater and industrial processes maintains offices in the Global Water 
Center but has added a production site in suburban Hales Corners and has 
licensed its patents to larger, established multinationals. 
2. The Water Summit 
 In 2007, The Water Council convened the first Water Summit in 
Milwaukee to discuss creating an industry association to promote and 
develop the region's water technology cluster. Sixty individuals from 
business, government and academia attended this participatory forum, 
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agreed that the region had the elements and potential to develop into a 
water technology cluster, and collectively agreed to an agenda to make it a 
reality (Miner, 2010). The participants came to the conclusion that 
Milwaukee had the natural and human resources, the academic and 
research institutions, and a sufficient concentration of businesses, to 
constitute a nascent cluster; that the water technology industry was 
capable of making a contribution to local economic development, research 
related to fresh water, and education and talent development of water 
technologists, innovators and entrepreneurs; and that an industry 
association would play an important role in raising public awareness, 
building support from a wide cross-section of stakeholders, and assisting 
innovators and entrepreneurs commercialize cutting-edge water 
technologies (Miner, 2010; The Water Council, 2017).  Since that 
inaugural 2007 event, the Water Summit has grown into a two-day event 
which is attended by about 400 of the world’s water industry thought-
leaders and decision-makers, innovators and entrepreneurs, potential 
investors, economic development specialists, water technologists, and 
students. The building of partnerships is part of the second strategy of The 
Water Council. 
 The summits have adopted different themes each year to reflect 
emerging issues and trends and to promote the work of the Council and 
the Milwaukee cluster. In 2008, it was the “Water Innovation Economy: 
Growing a Blue Business in a Green World,” and the keynote speaker was 
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the Senior Adviser to the United Nations Global Compact Program; in 
2008 the theme was “The True Costs and Opportunities of Water,” and the 
Council celebrated Milwaukee being named a 'Global Compact City'; in 
2010 the theme was the “Blue Footprint” which recognizes the huge 
amounts of energy required to move and treat water and wastewater; in 
2011 the summit was expanded from one to two days and featured three 
tracks, “The Global Water/Energy Nexus,” “Urban Watersheds: Striking 
the Balance” and “Making Urban Agriculture Work”; in 2012 the theme 
was “Building the Water Centric City” which looks at the financial and 
engineering challenges of aging water infrastructure; in 2013 the summit 
showcased The BREW and the new World Water Center; in 2014 the 
theme was “Thriving in the Global Water Economy” which examined 
water innovation and sustainability, financing and investment, and 
operating in the global water market; in 2015 the theme was “Creating a 
One Water Region,” which considered a model that connects and 
enhances the performance of the historically fragmented water economy; 
in 2016 the theme was “Establishing a Water Resilient City,” which 
considered urban planning and environmental strategies to overcome risks 
to water quality and quantity; and finally in 2017 the theme was “A Secure 
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3. Innovation Commercialization Exchange Institute 
The Innovation Commercialization Exchange (ICE) Institute is an 
initiative of The Water Council designed to aggregate and evaluate 
promising and emerging water technologies from across the research and 
development community of university, private sector and federal 
laboratories and connect these technologies to water related industries - 
including utilities, agriculture, and manufacturers. Industry experts will act 
as technology scouts to seek out these new innovations and bring these 
back to the Council where they will be vetted, cataloged and stored in a 
database powered by IBM Watson which has the capacity to help match 
technology to industry needs (Chawaga, 2016). A key component of the 
ICE Institute is the partnership with the Federal Laboratory Consortium 
for Technology Transfer (FLC) which represents 300 federal labs across 
the United States. A key challenge facing the water technology industry is 
the difficulty of commercializing emerging technologies, and university 
and government laboratories doing water and water-related research have 
traditionally faced a difficult commercialization process (Thomas & Ford, 
2016). The Water Council has appointed Dr. David Garman - Associate 
Vice Chancellor for water technology, research, and development for 
UWM - as the new Chief Technology Officer for The Water Council with 
responsibility to lead the ICE Institute. The partnership with the FLC 
fulfills a commitment The Water Council made during the 2016 White 
House Water Summit to develop a channel between federal laboratories 
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and water industries (White House, 2016). Only members of The Water 
Council can utilize the services of the ICE Institute. Development of the 
ICE project was supported by a $75,000 grant from WEDC through the 
agency’s Targeted Industry Projects program which was instituted to 
support industry cluster and sector development in the state of Wisconsin. 
The creation of a data base is in line with the fourth strategy of The Water 
Council.  
IV. Other Contributors to the Milwaukee Water Cluster 
A. University of Wisconsin, Milwaukee: School of Freshwater Science 
 In 2009, the University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee (UWM) launched a project to 
create the School of Freshwater Sciences (SFS), which represented a key initiative in the 
university's aspirations to become an entrepreneurial organization and a driver of 
economic development in Milwaukee. This initiative builds upon and leverages an almost 
50-year history of UWM scientists and students conducting internationally recognized 
research into freshwater science and ecology on Lake Michigan (Levine, 2009). This 
initiative received impetus in 2007 because of the work of a coalition of Milwaukee’s 
civic and business leadership who were seeking to create a regional economic 
development strategy. One outgrowth of this strategy led to the desire to brand the city of 
Milwaukee as the “global capital of freshwater research and water technology” and to the 
establishment of the Milwaukee 7 Water Council (Schmid, 2007c; Schmid, 2008). The 
leadership of UWM envisioned the SFS as an institution that would serve as a “magnet or 
anchor tying together the water cluster” which the Milwaukee 7 Water Council was 
working to promote (Schmid, 2007c). As part of the rhetoric of local economic 
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development the leadership of both the Milwaukee 7 Water Council and UWM marketed 
the SFS as a vital ingredient is creating a “Silicon Valley of water.” What would be 
established would be a world-class research center staffed with professors, graduate 
students, technologists, and policy experts that would be the only institution of its kind in 
the U.S. This team would work closely with local businesses to develop and 
commercialize water technologies (Milwaukee Journal Sentinel, 2008; Milwaukee 7 
Water Council, 2009). The UWM was seeking to emulate other universities, such as 
Berkeley and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, which are widely believed to 
facilitate innovation and entrepreneurship in their respective technology hubs (Levine, 
2009; Schmid, 2014) 
 The promotional and networking efforts of the Milwaukee 7 Water Council and 
UWM eventually led to the state of Wisconsin agreeing in 2009 to fund the establishment 
of the SFS. The project, which cost $53 million, was approved in 2011 by the UWM 
Board of Regent and would involve the expansion and upgrade of the harbor campus 
which the UWM has occupied since 1971. The project involved the addition of 100,000-
square-feet to produce a three-story facility with 200,000-square-feet of space divided 
among labs, classrooms, workshops, and administrative offices, as well as space for a 
water policy division (Schmid, 2014). The SFS, which opened in 2014, physically 
consists of two parts: the original Port Building which supports marine operations, on-site 
collaborators, research activities, and the Great Lakes Aquaculture Center; and the new 
Starboard research building which houses state-of-the-art facilities such as biosecure and 
quarantine laboratories for studying aquatic species, a pathogen testing facility, and the 
Great Lakes Genomics Center. The Great Lakes Genomics Center is the first DNA 
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sequencing lab in the U.S. dedicated to water and environmental issues. The new SFS 
would build on a tradition of research excellence in freshwater science and ecology 
which includes work on industrial pollutants, pharmaceutical pollutants, invasive species, 
exotic pathogens, and sewer overflows; and also be a locus of much-needed 
interdisciplinary public policy research and teaching on issues of water economics and 
resource management, sustainable development, public health, and environmental 
infrastructure (Levine, 2009; Schmid, 2014; Bauter, 2014). The work of the SFS will be 
depend on an annual research budget of $10 million, but the intention is to secure 
additional resources to expand research. This vision for the SFS has not gone 
unchallenged.  
   The aim is to move from a facility dedicated to research to a multi-disciplinary 
institution conducting water-related research and education and offering newly 
introduced courses on water policy, management and economics (Bauter, 2014). Plans 
are to expand the faculty and create around each faculty member a project team of 
graduate students and technicians who would be capable of moving projects beyond 
research to include testing and commercialization of technologies. An example of the 
future direction of the research-commercialization nexus at SFS is the discovery of how 
to manipulate heat and light to speed up the growth of yellow perch and increase food 
yield by a factor of 12. Bell Aquaculture, an Indiana fish-farming company, has so far 
invested $50 million on applying the technology (Muller, 2013).  
 Levine (2009) has, however, challenged the notion of the entrepreneurial 
university in general and the business model of the SFS in particular. He has challenged 
the ability of the water cluster to generate the jobs promised; and he has even challenged 
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the claim of Milwaukee becoming a national or globally significant water hub. Others 
have noted that the school has historically focused on ecological research and not on the 
commercial applications of water technology (Schmid, 2010). There are concerns that 
much of the research done at the school will not be able to secure a patent and should not 
be patented because the discoveries are of public value (Levine, 2009; Miner, 2010). The 
consensus seems to be that the academic, educational, and public policy aspects of the 
school are laudable; however, the notion that a research university can become involved 
in the commercialization of technology leads some to have concerns as to whether 
corporate and proprietary values, and the profit motive, will replace traditional university 
values built around the creation and dissemination of knowledge (Levine, 2009). The 
primary basis for the establishment of the SFS was local economic development, and this 
strategy was highly successfully in galvanizing ideological and material support from the 
civic and business leadership of Milwaukee. Conceptualization of the SFS as one 
cornerstone of a local economic development strategy, however, runs the risk of the 
academic and scientific mission of the school being subordinated to a business-
dominated, and potentially conceptually flawed, economic development strategy (Levine, 
2009).  
B. Milwaukee Metropolitan Sewerage District (MMSD)  
 The Milwaukee Metropolitan Sewerage District (MMSD) is a regional 
government agency that provides water reclamation and flood management services to 
the Greater Milwaukee Area. The MMSD serves approximately 1.1 million people in 28 
communities covering 411 square miles that includes six watersheds. The district is 
established by state law and had been granted taxing authority to fund its activities. The 
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district is governed by 11 commissioners and is staffed by several hundred employees 
with a wide range of skills in engineering, management, and public policy.  
 The MMSD plays a significant role in safeguarding natural resources, protecting 
public and environmental health.  The district treats billions of gallons of wastewater 
every year from a range of residential and industrial sources, as well as surface and storm 
water runoff. In addition to these core responsibilities in wastewater treatment and flood 
management, the MMSD is also responsible for public education, through facility tours 
and presentations on water quality issues, for developing green infrastructure, for 
promoting sustainability, and preparing the community for the hydrologic impact of 
climate change. The MMSD has worked to improve wastewater treatment, to meet 
statutory water quality requirements, and improve flood management to reduce the 
frequency of combined sewerage overflows. Much of the pollution which reaches Lake 
Michigan, and which impedes the ability of the city of Milwaukee to meet water quality 
standards set by the Clean Water Act, is the result of surface runoff and combined 
sewerage overflows. Wisconsin regulations allow combined sewers to overflow up to six 
times a year and since 1994, when a deep tunnel system was brought into operation, the 
district has reduced overflows from about 60 a year to an average of 2.4 overflows a year 
(Behm, 2013, 2017; Murphy, 2014). In recent decades the city of Milwaukee has spent $5 
billion to address pollution from all sources and there are plans over the next 20 years to 
spend another $1-1.3 billion to control overflows, largely through green infrastructure 
capable of capturing all surface runoff, ending all combined sewerage overflows, and 
ending all backups of wastewater into basements (Bergquist & Behm, 2014; Behm, 
2017). The district's current tunnel storage capacity for capturing surface runoff is 521 
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million gallons and the plans to upgrade the system, known as Fresh Coast 740, would 
raise this to 740 million gallons; the number of homes and businesses that remain in the 
100-year flood zone have been reduced from 3,800 in 1999 to 1,300 in 2016; and while 
the national standard for capturing and cleaning all the rain and wastewater that enters 
their sewer systems is 85%, the MMSD has been able to achieve a rate of capture of 
98.4% in 2016, with an average of 98.4% since 1994 (Bergquist &  Behm, 2014; Behm 
2017). For its record of achievement, the MMSD was a recipient of the 2012 U.S. Water 
Prize and many other awards.  
  The MMSD is at the forefront of waste and storm water management and in 
employing the latest water technologies. The MMSD embraces both innovation and 
entrepreneurship to meet its vision and mission. An innovation in relation to sustainable 
water use it the adoption the principle of 'one water,' which is both a philosophy and 
management approach that views all water – drinking water, wastewater, storm water, 
and grey water – as potentially renewable resources that moves through a closed system 
that must be managed holistically (US Water Alliance, 2016; K. Schafer, personal 
conversation, May 17, 2017). Another innovation is the 'management of water where it 
falls.' Early approaches to surface and storm water runoff involved conveying untreated 
runoff as quickly as possible to a receiving body of water. Current approaches involve 
conveying it to a treatment plant, although these plants are often overwhelmed when 
there are large volumes of water. Managing water where it falls involves learning from 
nature and employing green infrastructure to capture, store or absorb this runoff thus 
reducing the cost of infrastructure and the energy involved in treating water (K. Schafer, 
personal conversation, May 17, 2017). The treatment and conveyance of water is energy 
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intensive and the MMSD is committed to reducing the energy it uses, and to becoming 
energy self-sufficient by the year 2035, by employing technologies such as landfill gas, 
solar power, and sewer heat (K. Schafer, personal conversation, May 17, 2017). An 
example of both innovation and entrepreneurship is the production and sale of 
Milorganite by the MMSD. Milorganite stands for Milwaukee Organic Nitrogen. The 
production of the organic-nitrogen fertilizer Milorganite, which began in 1926 as the 
result of research efforts at the University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee, is one of the oldest 
recycling efforts in the U.S. and demonstrates that sustainable and environmentally 
responsible practices can also help improve the financial bottom line (Steffan, 2016; K. 
Schafer, personal conversation, May 17, 2017).   
C. Veolia Water Milwaukee  
 In 2006, the MMSD awarded a 10-year contract worth $400 million to Veolia 
Water to be its operations and maintenance partner while the MMSD retained ownership 
of the facilities.  That contract took effect in March 2008 and Veolia replaced United 
Water Services which was awarded the first operating contract in 1998. The Veolia 
contract with the MMSD is the largest publicly owned wastewater treatment system 
under private operating contract in the U.S. serving 1.1 million in 28 municipalities. 
Veolia operates and maintains two water reclamation facilities, at Jones Island and South 
Shore with a combined daily capacity of 660 million gallons, the 320-mile system of 
interceptor and main sewers, the 500 million gallon 'Deep Tunnel' storage system, and the 
annual production of 48,000 dt of Milorganite. In 2016, the MMSD awarded a 10-year 
contract extension worth $500 million to Veolia Water to continue operating its two 
sewage treatment plants and other facilities. This contract would take effect in March 
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2018. The continuation of this public-private partnership is based on the belief that the 
city of Milwaukee saves money and gains access to the resources and expertise of a 
major multinational water business (Behm, 2016). Veolia Water Milwaukee is a part of 
Veolia Water North America, which is itself part of Veolia Water, a division of Paris-
based Veolia Environment, the world's largest environmental company. Veolia conducts 
business in the infrastructure and utility sectors traditionally managed by public 
authorities - water management, waste management, public transport, and energy 
services. Veolia employs approximately 300,000 employees in 48 countries serving more 
than 108 million customers. Veolia Water North America is the leading provider of 
comprehensive water and wastewater services in the U.S., serving approximately 550 
communities and about 100 industrial facilities (Veolia, 2017).  
 Veolia Milwaukee actively engages with the local community to support 
economic, environmental and social development and sustainability. This includes direct 
support from Veolia for the Milwaukee water cluster. As part of the contract with the 
MMSD, Veolia has committed to invest $1.5 million in R&D and active partnerships 
with regional universities. Veolia also has important relationships with The Water 
Council – it has offices at The Global Water Center. It has joined with the Council and 
the Wisconsin Economic Development Corporation (WEDC) to launch a national 
competition to support innovators and entrepreneurs seeking to improve sustainability 
and resiliency efforts in the water and clean-tech industries. The new program is called 
'Pow!' - which stands for 'emPowering Opportunities in Water.' The Pow! program is an 
extension of The BREW program, and it functions as an accelerator to support promising 
water technologies and build channels to market their products. The specific support of 
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the Pow! program includes cash prizes totaling $40,000 – with $25,000 from Veolia and 
$15,000 from the Council and WEDC - $10,000 worth of tuition to The BREW for 
business and entrepreneurship training, 12 months of free office space in Veolia's suite at 
the Global Water Center, access to the Global Water Center's Flow Lab, coaching and 
mentoring opportunities from water experts, and access to the Veolia network. The 
MMSD will provide on-the-ground testing support for new technologies that might be 
installed in their wastewater treatment facilities. This new program is connected to the 
Veolia Innovation Accelerator's clean technology sourcing program, which seeks to 
identify technologies that can help Veolia solve its problems; but it also confirms Veolia's 
commitment to the efforts of The Water Council to position Milwaukee as a major world 
hub in water resource management and water technology solutions (Behm, 2016; 
Thomas, 2016). 
 Pow! applicants must be entrepreneurs, innovators and companies with a water-
related innovation with a high viability for commercialization in the areas of smart-data 
technologies, watershed management, resilience and sustainable water management, and 
disruptive water innovation. Each year three winners are chosen to enter the program.  
The first three winners were Nano Gas Technologies, Nutrient Recovery and Upcycling, 
and WAVVE Stream. Deerfield-based Nano Gas is working on a product that will 
recycle oil industry waste water, recovering the oil that otherwise would be lost and 
reducing demand for fresh water; Madison-based Nutrient Recovery and Upcycling is 
working on a product that removes phosphorus or nitrogen from wastewater and turns it 
into a high-purity, highly concentrated fertilizer; Houston-based WAVVE Stream is 
working on a gel made of food-grade materials that removes nutrients and heavy metals 
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from water (The Water Council, 2016). This type of partnership with Veolia Water aligns 
with the second strategy of the Milwaukee 7 Framework which is to “become a global 
hub for innovation and startup activity in the water technology industry.” 
VI. Application of Porter's Diamond 
A. Factor Conditions 
The competitive basis of the economy of the Milwaukee region rests historically 
on its unique location to fresh water – both Lake Michigan, and by extension the Great 
Lakes, and to the Mississippi River (Foss-Mullan, 2001). Industries which were intensive 
users of water sprang up in Milwaukee and the port facilities on Lake Michigan enabled 
the city to become a major export center for both its own locally produced goods and the 
goods produced in the other areas of the state of Wisconsin. Even today, suggestions have 
been raised in some local economic development quarters that Milwaukee should exploit 
its natural advantage in fresh water to offer concessionary rates to water-intensive and 
water-enabled industries to encourage them to remain in the city or relocated there.  
Milwaukee already has some of the lowest water rates in the U.S. (Schmid, 2009).  The 
suggestion to leverage cheap water, while supported in some quarters, has been 
challenged by those who suggest that both water conservation and water technology 
innovation are stimulated by charging customers the true economic value of water, or as 
close to this rate as can reasonably been ascertained (Miner, 2010). In this context the 
competitiveness of Milwaukee's industries was traditionally, and at least partially, built 
because of water being a 'basic' and 'general' factor. This factor is abundant available in 
Wisconsin but is not unique to this city (Longworth, 2015).  
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The Milwaukee economy was also, however, built on a set of more advanced and 
specialized factors. The city has a history of skilled workers, going back to German 
immigrants in the mid-19th Century. The city has several world-class research 
institutions, such as University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee. It also has a high concentration 
of water-intensive and water-enabled businesses, suppliers of technologies to those water 
users, and rail and water-based logistic capabilities. These advanced and specialized 
factors have also been upgraded in recent years, much of it because of the efforts of The 
Water Council; however, these advanced and specialized factors are not unique to 
Milwaukee and other cities in the region are also developing their water clusters (White, 
2010; Longworth, 2015; McDearman, 2018). The cities in the region with emerging 
water clusters include the Michigan Water Technology Initiative, Current Water in 
Chicago, the Cleveland Water Alliance, the Akron Global Water Alliance, and the 
Confluence Water Technology Innovation Cluster in Cincinnati (EPA, 2017). These 
clusters may not be as advanced as Milwaukee's; these clusters are upgrading their 
institutional capacity and observing and learning from the work of The Water Council 
(White, 2010; D. Amhaus, personal conversation, May 17, 2017). The traditional 
technological capacity of Milwaukee's water technology firms rests primarily in mature 
technologies like meters, pumps, and valves rather than emerging technologies such as 
membranes and desalination (Miner, 2010). 
Wisconsin has access to venture capital at the per capita rate of about $3. This is 
below the national median of $5 and well below Massachusetts at $109 and California at 
$94 (Clustermapping.us, 2017). The per capita rate must be considered against the state’s 
population of about 5.8 million which is 20th overall nationally which means that the pool 
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is relatively small. Wisconsin's R&D expenditure is at the per capita rate of about $1005 
– which is about the middle range among states with the highest being $4,137 in 
Massachusetts. - Federal R&D is at the per capita rate of about $117 – which is also in 
the middle range among states with the highest being US$469 in Maryland 
(Clustermapping.us, 2017). Venture capital and R&D expenditure are considered in 
Porter’s Diamond to be advanced and specialized factors. Although it has had some 
success in attracting grants from the private sector and the federal and state governments, 
The Water Council needs to improve these for its industry. In 2013-14, Wisconsin placed 
14th among the 50 states in academic R&D spending, with UW-Madison holding fourth 
place nationally in the NSF rankings, but the state ranked 21st in the nation in industry 
R&D spending which also represents the state's relative industrial position (Still, 2016; 
Conroy & Deller, 2017). In this environment Wisconsin struggles with low levels of 
economic growth and low levels of innovation – the state placed last among the 50 states 
in startup activity (Romell, 2017). From the Harvard Cluster Mapping Program, 
Wisconsin receives an innovation score of 8.44 which is an average score compared to 
California which scores 27.01; and Wisconsin’s annual patent count of 1,815 is slightly 
above the average patent count but far behind the leader, California, with a count of 
33,343 patents (Clustermapping.us, 2017). 
B. Related & Supporting Industries 
 The Water Council has worked aggressively and persistently to build a working 
coalition of public, private and non-profit organizations to support the work of the 
Council and build the Milwaukee Water Cluster into a Global Water Hub. Clusters exist 
within a value chain and the water technology industry is connected to universities that 
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supply it with talent and R&D support, and to water-intensive and water-enabled 
industries and public utilities to which it supplies technologies. Every major educational 
institution in the state of Wisconsin offers some form of specific water-related training. 
There are 36 water-focused academic programs and research centers available across 17 
educational institutions to include several graduate programs at the School of Freshwater 
Science of University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee, at the Water Quality Center of 
Marquette University, at the Institute for Water Business of University of Wisconsin–
Whitewater, at the Water Environmental Analysis Lab of University of Wisconsin–
Stevens Point, and at numerous other colleges (Daigneau, 2013). Though not unique to 
Milwaukee, this educational and research base provides the Milwaukee water cluster the 
talent and research pipeline to successfully compete against other emerging water clusters 
(White, 2008; Longworth, 2015).   
 To further strengthen collaboration and build the networks necessary for 
innovation and the diffusion of technologies, The Water Council has championed the 
creation of a Global Water Technology Park on 18-acres adjacent to their offices at 
Freshwater Way. The Reed Street Yard has been set aside as the focal point of 
Milwaukee's Global Water Hub and is envisioned as a “evolving eco-industrial zone, 
balancing natural resources and economic development” (Daigneau, 2013). The 
reclaimed brownfield site which will include a system of sustainable infrastructure such 
as urban bio-swales and rain gardens to eventually make it water-and-energy-neutral will 
be home to research facilities, demonstration and educational projects and water 
technology firms (Daigneau, 2013). The first tenant to join The Water Council in the 
Global Water Technology Park is the 52,000 square-foot headquarters of Zurn Industries, 
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which was relocated to Milwaukee from Pennsylvania in 2016 (Daykin, 2017). Zurn, 
which has been owned by the Milwaukee-based Rexnord Corp. since 2007, is a plumbing 
products manufacturer and makes toilets, faucets, waste water treatment systems and 
other water tech products. Rexnord Corp. - which designs, manufactures, markets and 
services specialized and highly engineered mechanical components that are used within 
complex mechanical systems - recently relocated its headquarters to the nearby Global 
Water Center. 
C. Demand Conditions 
 The Water Council has identified considerable national and global demand for 
cutting-edge water technologies that should last well into the 21st Century. Nationally 
there have been declines in deep aquifer reserves and surface water supply sources, 
impaired water quality from both point and non-point pollution sources, contaminated 
municipal water from faulty water infrastructure, and high operating costs and 
maintenance challenges from aging water infrastructure. Globally many countries face 
challenges with water quality and quantity, and the need to address sanitation and 
hygiene deficiencies through expanded water and sanitation infrastructure. Water and 
sanitation has become a global development imperative and trillions of dollars of 
investments are needed over the next half-century to solve these challenges. There is also 
a growing consensus in Milwaukee about the need to protect and conserve the city's 
water resources which has led business and civic leaders and academics to collaborate to 
find solutions to local water quality and environmental problems; and Milwaukee is 
currently working to leverage both its water resource assets and its expertise in water 
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technology, green infrastructure and sustainable water practices to align its water 
industries to meet national and global needs (Howard, 2015).  
 Strong local demand and sophisticated local consumers are the best drivers to 
pressure an industry to innovate and upgrade to become more globally competitive 
(Porter, 1993). The largest single source of demand for water technologies comes from 
the public utilities and public infrastructure. The city of Milwaukee has suffered in the 
recent past from seriously degraded water quality due to decades of pollution from 
industry and urbanization, including a 1993 breakdown in the city's clean water system 
that contaminated drinking water and caused more than 100 death; and Milwaukee has 
suffered from flooding that has caused considerable damage to infrastructure and private 
property, and has led to loss of life - the most recent severe flood being in 2010 (Bergquis 
& Crowe, 2014). Milwaukee has laid out its plan and stated its commitment in a 
comprehensive 10-year sustainability road-map and strategic framework called 'Refresh 
Milwaukee' (Howard, 2015); and a specific example of this political commitment, and 
the technical capacity to carry it out, is the $3 billion Deep Tunnel which was opened in 
1993 and which has been the single most important contributor to improved water quality 
(Behm, 2013). The demands to address water and environmental quality and 
sustainability have created a healthier and aesthetically pleasing environment and 
improved water quality is linked to rising property values along Milwaukee's water ways 
(Daykin, 2017). The response to the water quality and environmental problems of 
Milwaukee have contributed to the development of the region's water technology and 
management expertise, offering the city's water technologists a home base from which to 
competitively launch into global markets (Miner, 2010). 
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 Milwaukee industry has traditionally been heavily linked to the region's water 
resources (Foss-Mullan, 2001). Even with a reduction in traditional industries due to de-
industrialization and economic restructuring, water remains an important component of 
Milwaukee's industrial base and continues to be sold by local economic development 
leaders as a reason to do business in Milwaukee (Schmid, 2009). To put things in 
perspective, Wisconsin's economy uses approximately 2 trillion gallons of water out of 
lakes, rivers and underground aquifers each year to run power plants, municipalities, 
large farms, paper mills, food and beverage processors, and other industries (Behm, 
2013). The state's 30 power plants are the largest consumers of surface water; the 49 pulp 
and paper producers are the second largest consumers; and the 40 municipal water 
utilities are the third largest users of surface water (Behm, 2013). Ground water 
extraction is primarily to meet municipal and agricultural demand; but use of water by the 
multi-billion-dollar agricultural sector is becoming more efficient, even while yields 
increase, as farmers switch to more modern forms of irrigation (Behm, 2013). The 
Milwaukee economy, and Wisconsin economy in general, continues to be heavily 
influenced by manufacturing which is the largest single employer at 17% and second 
highest traded sector with a location quotient of 1.58 (Matoon & Wang, 2014). The 
competitiveness challenge for the water technology industry is that much of local 
demand, especially from industry, is for mature technologies; and much of the pressure 
for innovation is driven by government environmental and water quality regulations. 
D.  Firm Strategy, Structure and Rivalry 
 Milwaukee calls itself the World Water Hub and sees industries connected to 
water as key to the economic future of the city and one of the region’s most promising 
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sectors to create jobs. The Water Council makes the claim that about 150 – 200 water-
related companies employing up to 20,000 people, including five of the 11 largest water 
companies in the world and 38 water technology company headquarters, are based in and 
operate from the Milwaukee region. The prime objective of both The Water Council and 
the city of Milwaukee is job creation and economic growth to increase corporate profits 
for the Council's membership and increase government revenues for the city (D. Amhaus, 
personal conversation, May 17, 2017). Environmental and public health concerns are 
ancillary to local economic development in that these tend to affect the attractiveness of 
the city to investors and residents and boost property values (Daykin, 2014).  
 The goals, objectives and strategy of both the water technology industry and the 
city government – local economic development – is relatively easy to identify; however, 
determining the industry structure and nature of industry rivalry is much more 
problematic. The first step in determining the structure of the water industry - which 
consists of organizations directly involved in various stages of the water cycle - is to be 
precise about the term 'water technology firms.'  The industry can be divided into (1) 
water and wastewater utilities that collect, treat, store and monitor water; (2) water 
infrastructure businesses that includes engineering and manufacturing firms that make 
water control equipment, such as pumps and pipes, and construction and consulting firms 
that design, build, and maintain infrastructure; and (3) water technology businesses that 
design and produce equipment and chemicals for improving water quality, for measuring 
and metering water, and improving the efficiency of water use (Calvert, 2008). The water 
technology industry therefore includes a broad spectrum of products and services, many 
of which are difficult to pinpoint within standard industrial classification systems. Water 
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technology businesses are the primary constituency that The Water Council represents 
(D. Amhaus, personal conversation, May 17, 2017). There is no single NCIS 
classification for water technology firms, which presents practical challenges when 
analyzing this narrow segment of the water industry; however, The Water Council has 
identified several NCIS codes related to water and manufacturing which can be used for 
the Council's classification purposes (D. Amhaus, personal conversation, May 17, 2017). 
The exact number of firms in Milwaukee which would meet a more precise and objective 
definition of a water technology firm is not publicly known and at this point may be 
unknowable (Levine 2008), and a more accurate figure may be considerably below 100 
firms and employment may be closer to between 3,600 and 7,500 people (Levine, 2009; 
Murphy, 2015). The number of firms and employees is not by itself a good indicator to 
the relative strength of a cluster. By way of comparison Israel multi-billion-dollar water 
technology cluster – one of the world's best established and most internationally 
successful – has about 300 firms employing 8,000 people. Milwaukee firms license 
technology from Israel (Levine, 2009; Siegel, 2015).  
 At the regional scale, employment in the water technology sector represents only 
about one percent of regional employment, while Milwaukee ranks 21st in the 
employment of water hydrologists nationally; patents for water technology constitutes 
less than two percent of patents generated regionally, while Milwaukee ranks 19th 
nationally; and of the global top-40 water companies by revenue, none have their 
headquarters in Milwaukee, while the city ranks seventh nationally for branch plants and 
offices (Levine, 2009; Miner, 2010).  The limited evidence available therefore suggests 
that water technology firms, narrowly defined, consists of mix of small, medium and 
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large firms at various stages of the industry cycle producing a range of highly specialized, 
heterogeneous technologies. This suggests that the cluster may not be as economically 
significant as its political and industry proponents have so enthusiastically claimed, and 
that domestic rivalry among these firms is limited and will not be the main driver of 
innovation.   
 At national and global scales, the water technology industry faces a different 
structure and degree of rivalry. Milwaukee is not the only city U.S. city promoting itself 
as a water innovation technology cluster (White, 2010; Longworth, 2015; Newberger & 
Toussaint-Comeau, 2015). At least 14 other regions in the U.S. are promoting these 
clusters and several well-established water clusters are scattered across the globe, each 
offering expertise largely based on unique characteristics and histories. Across the U.S., 
universities are bolstering their water-related curricula and research capabilities; and state 
and local governments and industry associations are putting in place institutional 
arrangements to develop nascent capabilities and market their water assets (Miner, 2010; 
Longworth, 2015). Milwaukee is one of six water clusters in the Midwest. The Nebraska 
Water Center, which is part of the University of Nebraska, was established in 1964 by 
Congressional mandate as one of 54 Water Resources Research Institutes in the United 
States. The Cleveland Water Alliance, which is a non-profit organization launched in 
2014, joins together corporations, universities and government agencies in Northeast 
Ohio to drive economic development through water innovation. The Akron Global Water 
Alliance, which was launched in 2014, has partnerships with the City of Akron’s 
Economic Development and Water Departments, the University of Akron, the Akron 
Global Business Accelerator, Akron City Council and Summit County Council. Current 
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Innovation, which was launched in 2016 to promote local economic development by 
leveraging Chicago's expertise in water infrastructure, purification, and treatment, is a 
not-for-profit organization in partnership with the City of Chicago, the Metropolitan 
Water Reclamation District of Greater Chicago (MWRD), World Business Chicago 
(WBC), and the 'WaterCAMPUS' at the University of Illinois. Confluence Water 
Technology Innovation Cluster in Cincinnati, which was launched in 2011, has a 
particularly close working relationship with the EPA's water research facility in that city.   
 One potential rival to Milwaukee is to be found nearby in Michigan, which 
recently initiated the Michigan Water Technology Initiative through its state marketing 
arm, the Michigan Economic Development Corporation. The state also commissioned 
two reports, which were published in 2014 as the 'Michigan Blue Economy' and the 'State 
of the Great Lakes,' which highlight the strategy to promote innovation in water 
technology as part of the overall restructuring and 'greening' of the Michigan economy 
(Austin & Steinman, 2014; Department of Environmental Quality, 2014). The Initiative 
brings together nearly every major university in Michigan and seeks to leverage this 
talent pipeline which claims to have 68 undergraduate and graduate degree programs in 
water-related areas which produce 3,400 graduates in water-related fields (Department of 
Environmental Quality, 2014). The Initiative also makes the claim that more than 80 
industry sub-sectors requires high quality and plentiful water as a key input, and one in 
five Michigan jobs, totaling 138,000 workers, is linked to core water products and 
services, such as water treatment facilities and solving water quality and quantity issues 
(Department of Environmental Quality, 2014). Across Michigan there are numerous 
companies and research facilities dealing directly with 'hard' water-related technologies 
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from pumps, valves, meters, filters, controls, heaters, and bio-digesters; and other 
companies and research facilities working on 'soft' water-related technologies from 
software to monitor water quality and use, water resource conservation, and ecosystem 
management (Longworth, 2015). Examples of major industries located in Michigan that 
are connected to water include Whirlpool - developing more water efficient appliances - 
Dow Chemicals – which has a water and process solutions division with expertise in 
filtration – and auto parts maker Cascade Engineering – which is also now producing 
inexpensive water filters. 
 By improving water quality and protecting water ways and the environment in the 
most efficient and effective ways, Michigan is hoping to attract and retain the many 
industries such as agriculture, food and beverages, chemicals, paper, pharmaceuticals, 
computer chips and tourism that require clean water and a pristine environment 
(Longworth, 2015).  The fact that Milwaukee is not the only potential water cluster and 
Global Water Hub in the U.S. should serve as a warning to The Water Council, but also 
as an incentive to innovate more aggressively; and home-grown success in improving 
Milwaukee's water quality and public and environmental health will be the single most 
important signal to the market that Milwaukee's water cluster is ready to compete in the 
global water market (Miner, 2010).  
E. Role of Government & Chance 
 The Water Council has actively sought the support of the state in promoting and 
resourcing the Milwaukee water technology cluster, and the state at all scales has 
enthusiastically given its public endorsement and provided funds from public coffers. The 
mayor of Milwaukee has been described as an enthusiastic early support and the city’s 
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political leadership has come to see water technology as a replacement for those 
traditional manufacturing sectors which are in decline and a way to nurture the new 
manufacturing economy in the city (Lowe, 2013). Milwaukee politicians have been at the 
forefront of re-branding the city as the 'Fresh Coast' or the 'Silicon Valley of Water' 
(Lowe, 2013). The city has even floated the idea of using low-cost - meaning publicly 
subsidized - but high-quality water to attract investors to the region. Public and private 
universities in the state have been willing to align their training and research to support 
the council and the state has helped with the resources to make this a reality, most 
notably the $53 million investment in University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee's School of 
Freshwater Sciences. The state has also been generous with financial resources and the 
federal government has given the Council and its partners over $4 million in grants for 
business incubation, job creation and water research. These grants include funds from the 
SBA to support startups, and from the DOC to start a seed fund; while the state of 
Wisconsin, through the WEDC, has provided grants for both the 'POW!' and ICE 
programs. In this case, the state is attempting to enhance competitive advantage by acting 
as a catalyst for change by influencing political, economic and social environment in 
which industry must operate and providing direct financial support.   
 The state can also act as a challenger of change, such as when the state 
government sued the city government in 1977 and 1978 over combined sewer overflows, 
forcing the creation of the MMSD we know today with greater regional responsibility 
(Nusser, 2015). Combined sewer overflows were polluting the Milwaukee, Menomonee 
and Kinnickinnic rivers - which flowed into Lake Michigan – and what was required was 
an inter-jurisdictional solution which crossed geographic boundaries. The higher water 
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quality standards required by the Clean Water Act of 1972, and the last opportunity to use 
federal grant (as opposed to loan) money provided by the Act, facilitated the city solving 
its flooding problems through the construction of the 'Deep Tunnel' (Nusser, 2015). 
These days there seems to be much less focus on the state's role as a challenger for 
change, such as through raising water quality or environmental standards or ensuring that 
consumers pay the full-cost price of water that reflects its social, economic and 
environmental value.  
 Chance has also played a role in stimulating the emergence of a water cluster in 
Milwaukee. The location on Lake Michigan, and abundance of fresh water, stimulated 
many water-intensive and water-enabled industries and logistics companies to invest in 
the city; and to support these core industries many supporting industries that became the 
basis of a water technology industry emerged. The heavy concentration of industry, and 
urban development, however, came at a cost to public and environmental health which 
eventually over many decades forced public action (Foss-Mullen 2001). Milwaukee 
became a leader in wastewater management from the late 19th century and was one of the 
first cities in the U.S. to build combined sewers, to install a treatment plant, to use 
biological processes to treat waste, and to recover usable resources from the waste 
(Nusser, 2015). Initially the city conveyed its sewerage and storm water to Lake 
Michigan through its sewer mains, but disease outbreaks prompted construction of the 
sewerage plant at Jones Island, which opened in 1925 (Foss-Mullen, 2001). By 1940 
about 85% of the city's residents were connected to the city's sewerage system - 
compared to zero in many other major U.S. cities, making Milwaukee an early national 
leader in waste and storm water management (Holmes, 2015). The head start means that 
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Milwaukee's environmental remediation efforts are ahead of other cities, which positively 
impacts property prices, restores many natural ecosystems, makes more recreational areas 
available for public use, and lowers the financial burden which taxpayers have to bear 
over time to pay for infrastructure (Holmes, 2015).These chance events have converged 
to give both the city government and the private sector considerable policy, engineering, 
scientific, and technological know-how which can be leveraged to help the rest of the 
U.S., and the wider global community, solve urgent water quality and quantity issues 
while supporting local economic development (Nusser, 2015).  
VI. Conclusion 
The water technology innovation cluster centered in Milwaukee, Wisconsin has 
the ingredients to be considered a growing cluster (Tichy, 1998). It initially emerged as a 
cluster largely through a process of spontaneous generation, but it has also received some 
external intervention to facilitate and accelerate the process of cluster formation (Brusco, 
1990). Largely because of the work of The Water Council, Milwaukee can be classified 
as a growing cluster: it has a large number of supporting enterprises, agencies and service 
organizations; it has an evolving innovation network supported by information platforms 
and intermediary agencies that provide the needed industry knowledge and business 
services; it is developing robust communication channels for exchanging information and 
knowledge among its members; and The Water Council has developed a sustainable 
business model. To become a mature cluster, The Water Council will require time and 
continued concerted effort, both internal and external, on the part of key cluster 
stakeholders if the cluster is to become self-sustaining, and the region is to realize the 
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long-term economic benefit that can be derived from a successful cluster made up of 
globally competitive firms. 
The Water Council cluster boasts 'scientific preeminence' in water technology due 
to the presence of 36 water-focused academic programs and research centers available 
across 17 educational institutions, chief among them being the School of Freshwater 
Science at the University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee, a number of companies which are 
intimately connected to water technology innovation, and the historic relationship of the 
economy to water-intensive and water-enabled industries (Milwaukee 7, 2007; White, 
2008). Home grown technology firms and universities have also produced many 
innovative technologies and scientific advances that have brought the cluster global 
attention. The claim of 'scientific preeminence' is a strength of the Milwaukee cluster 
(Smilor et al., 1989); however, this claim of 'preeminence' is not without challenge, and it 
has not been backed up by objective criteria (Levine 2009). Neither The Water Council 
nor the Milwaukee 7 offers list the number of patents and publications connected to water 
that have been produced by the cluster's universities and firms; there is no accurate 
number of water technology firms, and how this concentration compares with others 
clusters; and there is no accurate figures on the number of jobs that exist in this industry 
and the amount of money the industry generates.   
The Water Council has been working hard to attract major water technology 
companies (Smilor et al., 1989) and has had some limited success: Zurn relocated its 
headquarters from Pennsylvania to Milwaukee, and French multi-national Veoila now 
operates both sewerage plants on behalf of the Milwaukee Metropolitan Sewerage 
District.  There has been some interest from startups from around the world to utilize the 
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incubator, accelerator and laboratory resources of The Global Water Center, which is 
operated by The Water Council; however, recent plans for expanding the Center by 
opening a second office in the Walker's Point neighborhood, with the support of a 
$750,000 grant from the Wisconsin Economic Development Corporation, were dropped 
after the proposed development failed to draw enough prospective tenants (Daykin, 
2017). The difficulty in attracting existing technology firms could be an indication of a 
weaknesses relating to the structure of the Milwaukee cluster, and an indication that it 
should focus on core strengths that are locally based rather than building a broad-based 
water technology innovation cluster. The difficulty in attracting more startups could be an 
indication that The Water Council is overly ambitious about the rate of growth – the 
water technology industry is notorious for the slow adoption of technologies and is not a 
high priority for resources such as venture capital and R&D funds when compared to 
other sectors. To determine the relative strength and potential sustainability of 
Milwaukee's water cluster requires a more robust methodology.  
The Water Council has been highly successful in its marketing and public 
relations initiatives, has raised the national and global profile of the Milwaukee cluster, 
and increased the amount of networking and collaboration that takes place through the 
auspices of the Council.  According to Phillips (2006) there needs to be a high degree the 
interaction and collaboration between major sectors in the cluster to solve complex 
problems and achieve joint goals and there is considerable evidence that this is taking 
place. The Water Council has a high national profile in the general media, within the 
industrial and environmental communities connected to water and sanitation and is a key 
member of the member of the EPA's Water Technology Cluster Leaders Committee. 
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According to Smilor et al. (1989) a successful cluster also needs many key supportive 
elements: the Milwaukee cluster has a strong network of champions and support 
organizations, it has support in critical areas from all scales of government, it has several 
large corporations willing to use their resources in a catalytic role to support and sustain 
the cluster, and it has access to the research and laboratories of several well-resourced 
and high-quality research universities. This public profile, supporting infrastructure and 
institutional framework can be considers strengths of the Milwaukee cluster; however, 
caution must be exercised in separating rhetoric from reality (Miner, 2010).  
 Utilizing Porter's Diamond Model (1990), Milwaukee's cluster is well endowed 
with basic factors, such as fresh water, advanced factors, such as large pool of highly 
skilled labor, and specialized factors such as the School of Freshwater Science and The 
Water Council which acts as the industry association. These advanced and specialized 
factors are a potential source of competitive advantage for both startups and existing 
firms and a strength of the Milwaukee Cluster. Milwaukee is well endowed with related 
and supporting industries - to include public utilities, water-intensive and water-enabled 
industries – to provide inputs and services to support the process of research, 
development and commercialization of water technologies, and mutual innovation and 
upgrading. The Milwaukee Metropolitan Sewerage District and regional utilities have 
been supportive of water technology firms in the testing, validating, and 
commercialization emerging technologies, and this collaboration is supportive of the 
process of mutual innovation and upgrading which is vital to protecting water quality and 
reducing water use. These relationships can be considered a strength of the Milwaukee 
cluster. 
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 Effective demand and sophisticated and demanding buyers push firms to upgrade 
quality and become more competitive and no industry can survive without these pressures 
(Porter, 1990). The main demand for water technologies comes from utilities, and the 
main driver for innovation in the water technology industry comes from government's 
regulatory requirements for water quality and environmental protection. The 
environmental challenges of Milwaukee have helped to produce a network of 
knowledgeable and experienced water technology firms, public utilities, and public 
regulators which have a long history of collaboration and coordination. This home gown 
base of experience is a source strength for the cluster, and continuing demand for meeting 
environmental and public health requirements is an opportunity for the cluster to generate 
income and test emerging technologies in the local market. Like many other markets for 
water technologies, the absence of a sustainable model to finance capital projects and 
maintenance is a threat to the industry; while the length of time it takes to test, validate 
and approve technologies to meet regulatory requirements is a weakness which is 
especially hard on startups which often lack the knowledge and resources to survive this 
long and complex process. The presence of The Water Council, which seems to have 
fund a sustainable business model, is a strength as this well-established and experienced 
industry association is ideally positioned to support the industry in this regard.    
 Local industry rivalry among water technology firms in Milwaukee is 
limited as firms within the region tend to produce heterogeneous products; however, 
when taken at the national or global scale there is considerable competitive pressure and 
customers have the option to source technologies from all over the globe. Multi-national 
firms like Veoila have the technical expertise and networks to bring technology to 
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Milwaukee and, conversely, to take Milwaukee's technology to the world. The absence of 
intense local rivalry is a potential weakness of the Cluster; however, the presence of 
national and global rivals should reduce this problem. Finally, the state is a key player in 
Milwaukee's water technology industry: it provides grants and seed capital to support 
startups and research, it sets regulatory standards, and it is the major customer for water 
technology through its water utilities. The Milwaukee water technology innovation 
cluster emerged because of spontaneous generation; however, it was supported through a 
process of external intervention by governments at all scales and the local research 
universities. The continued support of The Water Council by a cross-section of public 
and private collaborators must continue if the Milwaukee cluster is to shift from being a 
growing to a mature cluster (Brusco, 1990; Porter, 1990). The Water Council must 
remain vigilant and continue its aggressive marketing and public relations efforts as it 
still has a long way to go before the Milwaukee cluster reaches maturity (Gallagher, 
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CHAPTER 7 
WATER TECHNOLOGY CLUSTER IN TACOMA, USA 
I. Introduction 
 This case study examines Urban Clean Water Technology Zone, which is the 
water technology innovation cluster based in Tacoma, Washington. The City of Tacoma, 
and its neighboring communities, lies at the southernmost end of the Puget Sound and 
borders a body of water known as Commencement Bay; the region is the home to more 
than 800,000 people and 38 miles of waterfront; it is a highly desirable area to live and 
work and play; the juxtaposition of industrial, agricultural, commercial, residential and 
recreational land in an environmentally complex and fragile region has produced a major 
challenge for sustainable urban and environmental management; but Tacoma has been 
working to turn this challenge into a track record of environmental and commercial 
success. Tacoma is seeking to emerge as an important city in new global water economy 
by capitalizing on its decades long struggle to find a balance between the sustainable 
management of water resources, the protection of the natural environment, and the 
promotion of economic development; and a collection of both public and private partners 
are packaging their innovative environmental and technological achievements to compete 
in the global market for clean and green technologies. This case study will show that 
Tacoma's water technology innovation cluster is not as advanced, from a private sector-
industrial perspective, as either Milwaukee or Cincinnati; however, it the case will outline 
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that Tacoma is part of a larger struggle to restore the natural ecology of the Puget Sound, 
after a Century of unregulated exploitation, and that this struggle has allowed key water-
sector stakeholders to accumulated considerable experience in the science of estuary 
ecology, in the practice of estuary protection, and in the planning and implementation of 
low-impact urban development. 
 This case study will begin by providing an overview of the economic history and 
ecology of the Puget Sound because this sets the context for the water economy of the 
region and eventual emergence of the Urban Clean Water Technology Zone in Tacoma. 
The case goes on to examine the State's Innovation Partnership Zones (IPZ) program in 
general and the IPZ in Tacoma in particular. The IPZ in Tacoma is the framework under 
which public and private partners are attempting to build a water technology innovation 
cluster in Tacoma. A small sample of emerging water technology firms will be briefly 
examined to see how local innovators and entrepreneurs are attempting to exploit or 
create opportunities. Supporting the work of the IPZ is the Center for Urban Waters 
which houses a number of key organizations - the Puget Sound Partnership, the City of 
Tacoma Environmental Services Unit, and the University of Washington Tacoma – which 
are all engaged is the science and practice of restoring and maintaining the ecological 
health of the Sound, in developing innovative and commercially viable technologies to 
assist this process, and in building an environmentally sustainable and competitive 
economical in the region. Several key stakeholders from the Tacoma cluster were 
interviewed: Jim Parvey and Geoff Coffman of the City of Tacoma Environmental 
Services Division, and Cathy Cochrane of the Puget Sound Partnership. The case will 
conclude with an examination of the level of development and competitiveness of this 
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cluster using Porters Diamond Model which looks at the determinants of factor 
conditions, any related and supporting industries, demand conditions, firm strategy and 
structure and rivalry, and the role of government and chance events. The interaction of 
the four determinants in the unique context of Tacoma’s water economy, and particularly 
the role of the government at all political scales, offers insights into the challenges this 
technology cluster faces to position itself as an innovative and competitive industry both 
nationally and globally.     
II. Economic History and Ecology of the Puget Sound 
A. Economic History  
 Water has historically been central to the economic, social and political life of 
Puget Sound going back thousands of years to the arrival of the first humans in the region 
and all the way up to the present day. Successive waves of humans have extracted food 
and other resources from the waters of the Sound, or put its waters to use by collecting, 
storing, or moving it. The archaeological evidence suggests that economic and social 
organization of Native Americans in the Puget Sound region of the state evolved from 
hunter-fisher-gatherer societies, to a network of permanent villages which relied on the 
high productivity of the natural resources specific to the region, to improvements in 
technologies for fishing, hunting, and food storage, and on increasing social complexity 
and organization, which together supported tens of thousands of people in flourishing 
material and artistic cultures and an economy of abundance (Kruckeberg, 1991; Batker et 
al., 2008). The European historical record begins in 1792 with the arrival of the British 
explorer Captain George Vancouver, who found a region peopled by about 50 named 
tribes, all sharing a common language and a similar culture, living on or near to rivers, 
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lakes or to the Puget Sound itself, for whom water was their primary means of 
transportation, and water-based ecosystems a key economic resource. European 
explorers, trappers, hunters and traders arrived in  Washington state via ship or the 
Oregon Trail during the early 19th century, attracted by sea otter and beaver; later in the 
mid-to-late 19th century logging, fueled by the California Gold Rush, became a focal 
point of economic activity; while in the late 19th century railroads increased the rate of 
European settlement and, when combined with mechanization, the rate of extraction of 
the Sound's natural resources (Batker et al., 2008; Quinn, 2010). The resource-based 
economy of the sound reached its peak of extraction and exploitation during the first half 
of the 20th century; during and immediately after World War II, the economy shifted 
towards industry; while by the end of the century the economy would gradually become 
increasingly diversified, shifting towards services, with the waters of the Puget Sound 
and its adjacent forests increasingly valued as an amenity with aesthetic and recreational 
value.   
 Washington State has a diverse and advanced economy focusing on the aerospace, 
information and communication technology, agriculture and food processing, clean 
technology, forest products, life science and health, maritime and logistics, and military 
and defense sectors; and the state government is committed to strengthening these sectors 
by supporting innovation and entrepreneurship to create a climate for an innovation-
driven economy (Washington State Department of Commerce, n.d.). Although the 
economy of Washington State in general, and of the Puget Sound region in particular, is 
best known for high-tech industrial firms, such as Microsoft and Boeing, and high-end 
service firms, such as Starbucks, much of the economy is still intimately linked to water 
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(Batker et al., 2008). The state is the country's largest producer of hydro-power, which 
accounts for three-fourths of the electricity produced in this state; it is one of the 
country's largest agricultural producers, which would not be possible without irrigation 
water which makes much of eastern Washington’s agriculture possible; it is the fourth 
largest exporting state in the country, with the ports in the Puget Sound handling 8% of 
all American exports and 6% of its imports; and tourism and recreation, mainly centered 
around water, are major contributors to the economy and to the high level of employment 
in the leisure and hospitality sector (Washington State Department of Commerce, n.d.; 
Cargill, 2016; Briceno &  Schundler, 2015; BLS, 2017). Within the high-technology 
sector is the high-priority and growing clean technology sector, where more than 100 
firms provide technologies and related production processes, services, and products 
related to water (Washington State Department of Commerce, n.d.; Batker et al., 2008).  
 The economy of the Puget Sound is ultimately built upon the land, waters, and 
other natural resources of the region; the economic value of the natural environment 
extends far beyond what is traditionally extracted and traded in formal markets; and all 
economies are built on a foundation of natural, built, human and financial capital which 
in combination produce the goods and services that satisfy human needs and wants 
(Batker et al., 2008). The natural capital of the Puget Sound includes the forests, 
wetlands, lakes, rivers, and shorelines of the region and they produce economically 
valuable goods and services such as natural goods – which include fish, timber, water, 
and agricultural products – and ecosystem services – which include flood protection, 
drinking water, waste absorption, climate stability, recreation, and aesthetic value (Batker 
et al., 2008). The natural capital of the Puget Sound are tremendously valuable economic 
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assets which sustain livelihoods, while the ecosystem services which nature provides for 
free and in perpetuity sustains a high quality of life and public health more efficiently and 
effectively than would the built capital that would be used as a substitute (Batker et al., 
2008). Unlike natural capital, which is self-maintaining and requires minimum 
investment, built capital, such as levees to replace natural flood protection, is often 
expensive to build, requires maintenance, depreciates, and often alters the functioning of 
natural ecosystems in devastating and unpredictable ways (Batker et al., 2008). 
Historically economic development has favored built capital; however, all forms of 
capital are required for development and sustaining a high quality of life. Given that 
human development is a necessity, and the fact that some natural assets like biodiversity 
cannot be replaced by infrastructure, natural capital and built capital are most often 
productively used as complements rather than substitutes.  
 All built capital is derived from natural capital, and natural systems provide a 
foundation of natural assets and ecosystem services upon which every economy depends. 
Every resident of the Puget Sound basin directly receives a flow of benefits from the 
natural assets of the Puget Sound; and while the natural goods of the Sound that are 
exploited receive a positive economic value, the economically valuable ecosystem 
services of the Sound have historically been given an economic value of zero and do not 
show up in national economic accounts (Batker et al., 2008). Historically, the natural 
resources of the Puget Sound were considered virtually limitless, requiring little human 
input for its exploitation, and thus void of economic value. The result was overuse and 
abuse of the Sound's natural assets; and this approach to resource exploitation must also 
be considered in conjunction with the significant increase in human development in the 
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Puget Sound region in the last two centuries which has exceeded the absorptive and 
regenerative capacity of the region's natural ecosystems. The failure to place any value on 
ecosystem services, and particularly to properly value water, leads to poor decision-
making about where and how to develop land and infrastructure, where and how to 
procure water for drinking and irrigation, how to manage wastes and abate pollution, how 
much pollution is tolerable, how to manage flood waters and droughts, and how much to 
invest in restoring and protecting the environment (Batker et al., 2008; ECY, n.d.).  The 
loss or degradation of natural capital has resulted in damage to human health due to air, 
water and soil pollution; it has resulted in losses to the economy from the increasing need 
to treat degraded fresh water and develop storm water and flood control systems, due to 
the loss of natural flood protection and water purification from watersheds; and it has 
resulted in rising costs to protect endangered species and habitats, restore natural habitats, 
and re-mediate the impacts from climate change, due to pollution runoff and the altering 
of about one-third of the Sound's shorelines (Batker et al., 2008; ECY, n.d).  
 Natural ecosystems in the Puget Sound have been lost and degraded over the past 
century, and they continue to be pressured by a combination of population growth, 
urbanization, and land use practices that increase the area of hard surfaces covering the 
land, cause losses of habitat, put pressures on fresh water supplies, and pollutes the water 
and air of the region (Batker et al., 2008; ECY, n.d). When the ecosystem services 
provided by natural assets are replaced by the services offered by built capital, these 
human infrastructural solutions often provide fewer and far less reliable benefits, at a 
greater economic and environmental cost, than the natural systems they replace (Batker et 
al., 2008; ECY, n.d). Although the methods used to determine the economic value of 
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natural assets and ecosystem services is inexact and subjective, this does not negate the 
value of putting a value on these assets. It is now widely accepted in the world of 
business that the economic value placed on intangibles assets - such as propriety 
knowledge and intellectual property - is now a greater proportion of the total value of 
most businesses than traditional assets - such as machinery and equipment - and the 
creation and management of intangible assets is a strategic endeavor that is a necessary 
ingredient to building competitive advantage and ensuring long-term business success 
(Low & Kalafut, 2002; Hubbard, 2014). The same principle can be applied to natural 
capital. Estimates of the annual economic benefit that the ecosystems of the Puget Sound 
provides to residents of the region range from a low of $7.4 billion to a high of $61.7 
billion, depending on the methodology used; the asset value of all the natural capital of 
the Puget Sound region range from a low of $243 billion to a high of $2.1 trillion; and the 
annual savings to Tacoma ratepayers from the natural filtering of the city's water supply 
by forests, compared to the capital and operating costs of additional water filtration 
infrastructure, is estimated at approximately $150 million (Batker et al., 2008). The 
reality that must be accepted by all stakeholders in the Puget Sound is that economies and 
natural systems are both essential parts of a larger, complex, integrated system that must 
be managed with these relationships in mind; and that natural capital and natural systems 
are an essential complement to built-capital, and together determines people’s quality of 
life in the Sound.  
B. Ecology of the Puget Sound 
 Natural capital is a necessary condition for both economic development and a 
high quality of life. The Puget Sound region has a thriving and advanced regional 
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economy, its citizens have a high quality of life, and they live in one of the most 
environmentally desirable locations in the world. The Puget Sound is the second largest 
estuary in the United States, after the Chesapeake Bay; it is approximately 16,000 square 
miles, of which 80% is land and 20% is water; it is an extension of the Pacific Ocean that 
extends inland where is meets 19 different river basins which are drained by more than 
10,000 streams and rivers; it experiences significant tidal flows, which reach a maximum 
of 14.4 feet at Olympia; its waters consist of a changing mixture of fresh and salt waters, 
whose unique combination of temperature, salinity and circulation is important to local 
aquatic life; and it has about 1,800 miles of shoreline which surround an estuary of about 
1,020 square miles, which is a mosaic of beaches, bluffs, deltas, mudflats and wetlands 
(Batker et al., 2008; Quinn, 2010; ECY, n.d). The varying topography and geology of the 
Puget Sound region creates highly variable local-scale climate which, in combination 
with diverse soil types, results in a wide variety of environmental and ecological 
conditions which supports high levels of biodiversity and other important biological 
phenomena (Batker et al., 2008; Quinn, 2010; ECY, n.d).   
 The calm, nutrient rich waters of estuaries allow many plant and animal species 
thrive, and to support many food webs; estuaries are traditionally and historically 
excellent sites for human communities because their waters, wetlands and flood plains 
provide a rich source of wild game and allow for the development of irrigation and 
agriculture; and their geography provides protection against flooding and erosion 
(National Geographic, n.d.). The unique ecology and environment of the Puget Sound 
makes its waters one of the most productive salmon, oyster, and clam fisheries in North 
America  (Puget Sound Action Team, 2007); its terrestrial landscape,  particularly at 
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higher elevations, is one of the most productive coniferous forests in the world; while 
between the forests, particularly at lower elevations, are a diverse range of ecosystems 
from prairie, to woodlands, to wetlands and bogs (Batker et al., 2008; Quinn, 2010; ECY, 
n.d). The hydrologic and geographic features that make the region desirable from an 
economic and residential perspective also mean that estuaries are particularly susceptible 
to pollution which accumulates in the water, sediment, flora and fauna of the estuary 
(National Geographic, n.d.). Unlike Chesapeake Bay which has a relatively flat bottom, 
the Puget Sound's shallow bays and inlets transition to a series of underwater deep 
valleys and high ridges, called basins and sills, where it takes approximately 5 months to 
completely exchange Puget Sound water with Pacific Ocean water. (Batker et al., 2008; 
Quinn, 2010; ECY, n.d). 
 The complex ecology of the region means that the relationship between water, 
human development, and the health of the Puget Sound is especially strong. The Sound 
has suffered serious environmental degradation due to the substantial modification of its 
shoreline, and the pattern and nature of coastal land use, resulting originally from the 
development of major ports and industries, and more recently from residential 
development (Batker et al., 2008; Quinn, 2010; ECY, n.d). In the past half century, it has 
become increasingly recognized that the Puget Sound's ecological integrity is threatened 
by a combination of habitat loss or damage, which some estimates put as high as 70%, 
species decline, and degraded water quality and quantity (Batker et al., 2008). The 
degradation results from a combination of the following: over-appropriation of many of 
the region's watersheds, with approximately one-quarter having insufficient water to 
supply granted water rights, support aquatic fauna, and maintain water quality; the 
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modification of about one-third of the shoreline by artificial structures; the legacy of 
point sources of water pollution, which remains a threat to the environment even after 
being effectively controlled by new technologies and regulations; non-point sources of 
pollution, especially storm-water and new classes of chemicals which collect on paved 
surfaces to be channeled into storm-drains, and failing residential septic tanks which are 
emerging as the major threat to water quality and the health of natural ecosystems; and 
the fact that all the major cities, many of the towns, and most of the heavy industry of this 
region, are located at river deltas or along the shores of Puget Sound (Batker et al., 2008; 
Quinn, 2010; ECY, n.d).  
 The environmental decline of the Sound worsened during the 20th century, despite 
efforts at every scale of government to address the problem from at least the middle of 
the last century, and despite increasing recognition during the 1960s and 1970s of the 
extent of the problem, its causes, and consequences (Puget Sound Water Quality Action 
Team, 2000). By 1985, when the Puget Sound Water Quality Authority was established to 
replace the Pollution Control Commission, there was general agreement among key 
stakeholders that better coordination among programs would improve the effectiveness 
and efficiency of programs to improve the health of the Sound; and in 1987 the first 
Puget Sound Water Quality Management Plan was prepared by the Authority, which was 
also responsible for its implementation (Puget Sound Water Quality Action Team, 2000). 
Updates to this plan were issued in 1989, 1991, 1994 and 1996 in response to evolving 
public policy from the national level, emerging environmental issues, changing public 
priorities, and the addition of new programs and projects and the completion of others 
(Puget Sound Water Quality Action Team, 2000). Some of the national drivers include the 
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1987 establishment by Congress of the National Estuary Program as Section 320 of the 
Clean Water Act; and the 1991 approval by the EPA of the Puget Sound Water Quality 
Management Plan as the federal Comprehensive Conservation and Management Plan for 
the basin; in 1991. Because of species decline, there have been changes to the fishery 
practices, and an increase in petitioning to add species to the Endangered Species Act 
(ESA) (Puget Sound Water Quality Action Team, 2000).  
III. Land-use Patterns and Demographics of the Puget Sound 
A. Land-use Patterns 
 The Puget Sound in Washington State is a deep fjord estuary considered to be the 
largest by volume in the United States, outside possibly unexplored estuaries in Alaska. It 
is one of a network of 29 estuaries across the country that forms the National Estuarine 
Research Reserve System (NOAA, 2017). The Puget Sound is located within the broader 
Salish Sea, which in 2009 was the name given to identify the waters of the Strait of 
Georgia, the Strait of Juan de Fuca, and the Puget Sound which are shared between the 
United States and Canada. This deep, vast, complex, and delicate saltwater ecosystem 
was carved by receding glaciers more than 10,000 years ago and varies in its physical, 
chemical, and biological properties. The typical estuary forms a transition zone between 
river and maritime environments; their water is a changing mixture of fresh and salt 
water; they serve as natural filters for runoff; they provide food, breeding grounds, and 
migration stopovers for many species of birds, fish, and other animals; they provide food, 
recreation, jobs, and coastal protection for humans; and of the 32 largest cities in the 
world, 22 are located on estuaries (NOAA, 2017).   
 The Puget Sound also encompasses the mountains, farmlands, cities, rivers, 
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streams, forests, and wetlands contained in a watershed that drain into this estuary and 
that impact the quality of its waters and the health of the ecosystem. Humans have long 
relied on the Puget Sound watershed for a range of economic, recreational, and ecological 
services. The Puget Sound supports a large part of the economy of Washington state and 
provides vital recreational, spiritual, and other essential quality of life benefits; however, 
over the past century, as the number of urban centers have reached 110 and the regional 
population living on its banks has soared to 4.5 million people, the Puget Sound has 
suffered severe ecological damage which threatens public and environmental health and 
the economy of the region. By some estimates the Puget Sound has lost approximately 70 
percent of its original estuaries and wetlands, thousands of acres of the Sound's floor are 
covered with contaminated sediment, the Orca population has decline by 50%, some 
salmon populations have declined by as much as 90%, and populations of some seabirds 
have declined by as much as 95% (Seattle Audubon, 2017). The challenge facing the 
Puget Sound region is to protect and restore the estuary in spite of a growing human 
population which is bringing with it more land development, more infrastructure, and 
more pollution; and also, in the face of the potential threat of climate change which is 
bringing with it warmer streams and ocean waters, a reduced snow-pack, more extreme 
weather events, and increased propensity for fires and floods.  
The Puget Sound's history of European colonization, the incorporation of the 
Oregon-Washington Territory into the United States, and the inclusion of the Washington 
State economy into the national and global capitalist system has had a profound effect on 
land use patterns, industrialization and urban development, and by extension of the 
ecological state of the Sound. The structure and role of government institutions and 
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institutions of governance, both public and private, are of critical importance to solving 
social, economic, and environmental problems. These institutions need to be at the scale 
of the issue or problem they are intended to address and be provided with sufficient 
powers and resources to achieve their mission (Ostrom, 1990).  
 The first European settlement in the region was established in 1846 at New 
Market, near present-day Olympia, when Washington was still part of the Oregon 
territory; in 1853, the Washington Territory was formed as a separate entity from the 
northern part of the Oregon Territory; and in 1889 Washington achieved statehood within 
the Union. Between these years, the pattern of development that emerged in the 
Washington territory followed a very different path from elsewhere in the Pacific 
Northwest, with different philosophies emerging for property rights, land-use, and 
industrial development (Quinn, 2010). Oregon was founded largely by farmers while 
Washington was founded largely by those who would exploit the natural environment 
through trapping, hunting, fishing, and logging; and these activities in time gave rise to 
sawmills, ports and railways which changed the physical landscape and ecology of the 
region (Quinn, 2010). The constitutions which the state adopted thus favored local power 
over central government, favored private property over public or communal rights, and 
supported the exploitation of natural resources as the economic engine of the region, a 
legacy which remains to this day and which some argue makes protecting and restoring 
the Sound more difficult (Quinn, 2010). Although the era of unrestrained exploitation of 
the resources of the Sound has long since come to an end, the legacy of that exploitation 
remains and new environmental pressures from new economic and urban development 
are arising (Quinn, 2010; PSRC, 2016).    
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B. Demographics 
 The Puget Sound Basin contains 4.5 million people, which currently represents 
approximately two-thirds of Washington State’s entire population, which is more than 
double its 1960 population of 1.8 million and quadruple its population of 1950. 
According to the Puget Sound Regional Council (PSRC), a board that plans for growth in 
the four central counties of the area, another one million people will live in the state by 
2025 with most of that increase in the Puget Sound (PSRC, 2016). The Puget sounds is 
also one of the most vibrant regional economies in the world, and this is also expected to 
continue to grow rapidly in the coming decades (PSRC, 2016). In the face of these 
demographic and economic pressures, the government of Washington State and other 
entities are responding to the challenges of protecting and restoring the Sound, with the 
two most important programs being the Puget Sound Nearshore Restoration Project - a 
joint effort sponsored by the Washington Department of Fish and Wildlife and U.S. Army 
Corps of Engineers - and the Puget Sound Partnership - a relatively new state agency 
which works closely with the Environmental Protection Agency. The Partnership is 
designed to operate at the correct governance scale for protecting and restoring Puget 
Sound (Puget Sound Partnership, 2012).  
IV. Governance of Puget Sound Water Resources 
A. Growth Management 
 The Growth Management Act (GMA) of 1990 is a series of statutes that requires 
local governments to plan, coordinate and manage growth in Washington state, while 
protecting natural resources and public interests (PSRC, 2016). The GMA was passed by 
the Washington State Legislature because policy makers came to recognize that 
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uncoordinated and unplanned growth posed a threat to the environment, sustainable 
economic development, and the quality of life in the state. The GMA requires local 
governments to develop long-term comprehensive plans for land use in their jurisdictions, 
to identify and protect critical natural areas and natural resource lands, to designate urban 
growth areas, to prepare comprehensive plans, to implement these plans through capital 
investments and development regulations, and to coordinate these plans with surrounding 
counties (PSRC, 2016). The GMA establishes state goals, sets deadlines for compliance, 
offers direction on how to prepare local comprehensive plans and regulations, and sets 
out requirements for early and continuous public participation in the planning process; 
however, the GMA continues the state's tradition of local control, it emphasizes local 
decision-making and implementation over centralized planning, and it gives discretion 
regarding the specific content of comprehensive plans and implementing development 
regulations (Laschever, 1998). Since its passage, the GMA has slowly, but significantly, 
changed the process used in Washington State to plan for and manage growth and protect 
critical natural areas (Laschever, 1998).  
B. Washington State’s Innovation Partnership Zones Program 
 One public policy initiative that has the potential to directly impact the water 
technology industry, and to indirectly impact the ecology of the Puget Sound, is the 
Innovation Partnership Zones (IPZ) program. The IPZ program was created in 2007 by 
Governor Gregoire, the Washington State Legislature, and the Washington State 
Department of Commerce (DOC). The DOC, the state agency charged with enhancing 
and promoting sustainable communities and economic vitality, was assigned as the lead 
state agency on this program. The goal of this program was to stimulate the growth of 
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industry clusters, catalyzed regional innovation, and build regional economies, in both 
traditional industries – such as aerospace and agriculture – and in emerging industries – 
such as clean water and energy, and biotechnology; the mission was to encourage - 
through decentralized and organic initiatives - bottom-up collaboration among regional 
partners to advance innovation; while the strategy was to create an economic 
development model that would, in a 5 to 10 year period, support the building of regional 
organizational capacity that could better coordinate fragmented federal, state, and local 
economic development initiatives (Green, Woodson & Zerr, 2016). IPZs empower 
regions to form partnerships between public and private sector partners, academic and 
research institutions, and workforce education and training entities, to develop patentable 
ideas and commercially viable technologies, address the regional economic challenges, 
and grow firms and jobs (Green, Woodson & Zerr, 2016). Each IPZ focuses on a different 
area - which is usually linked to the geography, local assets, and local economy of the 
region - and all have one or more institutions of higher education, which serve either as 
anchors or key cluster institutions, and a local government partner (Green, Woodson & 
Zerr, 2016). 
 Initially, in 2007, the Department of Commerce designated 11 IPZs around the 
state and allocated to the program $5 million in capital grants that were distributed to five 
of the IPZs on a competitive basis. In 2009 a 12th IPZ was designated by the DOC and an 
additional $1.5 million in capital grants distributed to the program. In 2012, six of the 
IPZs received $13.52 in grants; however, in the 2013-2015 period, the Washington State 
legislature reduced and eventually eliminated funding for IPZs, but kept statutory 
obligations related to them, including tracking and reporting of metrics for private 
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investment, patents filed, and jobs created (Green, Woodson & Zerr, 2016). Given that 
grants were competitive, not all IPZs received state capital grant funding; grants were not 
meant to be sufficient to fully fund any IPZs budget, and IPZs must find other sources of 
funding to meet or supplement their operating budgets. Many IPZs have used grant 
money to leverage private sources, obtaining money from local jurisdictions and the 
federal government. Some have formed 501(c)3 non-profit organizations and identified 
partners for fund-raising purposes. The largest award made to an IPZ by Washington 
State was $5 million which went to a project to build a new wine research and education 
facility at the Tri-Cities Research Zone of Washington State University-Tri-Cities; $3.67 
million was awarded to the Walla Walla Valley IPZ to address a shortage of technicians to 
maintain the area’s 5,000 wind turbines; $3.6 million was awarded for three new labs for 
Tacoma’s Urban Clean Water Technology Zone; $750,000 was awarded to the Grays 
Harbor IPZ for the Coastal Innovation Zone R&D Business Incubator Facility; and 
finally $500,000 was awarded to the Bothell Biomedical Manufacturing IPZ to help 
design a new incubator space for companies that develop biomedical devices 
(Sokolowsky, 2012).  
 The designation and re-designation of IPZs occur in each odd calendar year, but 
once granted a designation lasts for four years before a designee must reapply. To qualify 
for designation, applicants must put together a collaborative team consisting at a 
minimum of a university research partner, a workforce training provider, and a globally 
competitive cluster or company who are all in close geographic proximity and are 
capable of planning and executing a cooperative, regionally located, research-based effort 
that will lead to new and commercially viable products and create jobs. The IPZ must 
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also identify an individual or organization to be a Zone Administrator which must be an 
economic development council, port, workforce development council, city or county. The 
Zone Administrator has often been the driving force behind the IPZ but in some instances 
this key driver has come from industry or academia. In 2009 there were 12 IPZs; in 2011 
four new IPZs were designated while one IPZ did not receive re-designation, giving a 
total of 15 IPZs; in 2013 three more were added, bringing the total number to 18 
statewide; in 2015 two new IPZs were designated while six IPZs did not receive re-
designation, giving a total of 14 IPZs which remains the case as of 2017 (Green, 
Woodson & Zerr, 2016; Department of Commerce, 2017). The success of this program 
has been mixed: many were, and still are, hampered by a lack of funding and the absence 
of a sustainable business model; a lack of grant writers and other in-house expertise, with 
many staff working part-time; and the lack of  a standardized set of metrics for reporting 
activities meant that there was little consistency in the presentation of data in submitted 
reports, making it is difficult to demonstrate whether or not IPZs affect the growth of a 
targeted cluster or the region in which it operates (Green, Woodson & Zerr, 2016; 
Department of Commerce, 2017). The IPZ’s stated goals include recruiting, retaining and 
expanding organizations, businesses and jobs. While the zone has obtained grants for 
research projects, equipment and facilities, actual economic development has been slower 
to materialize.  
 Despite the lack of funding and human resources to build and sustain IPZs, the 
administrators and partners in some regions reported that the IPZ designation had 
benefits: the IPZ designation increases the economic profile of the region and assists with 
branding and promoting their clusters; the  IPZs provides a useful conceptual framework 
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for building industry cluster strengths; the IPZs could be structured and resourced to 
function as small business incubators, providing shared access to office and laboratory 
space, research and development laboratories and facilities, expert advice, training 
opportunities, and administrative and business services (Elliott, Mitchell & Salmi, 2010; 
Wallen, Cohen, Nickell & Salmi, 2012; Trimarco, Woodson, & Zerr, 2014; Green, 
Woodson, & Zerr, 2016). One of the architects of the IPZ program, Egils Milbergs, stated 
that successful innovation clusters require a combination of “hard” infrastructure – such 
as physical transportation, telecommunications, water and energy systems, universities 
and research facilities, and factories - and “soft” infrastructure – such as human capital, 
culture, and institutions that cultivate and sustain “hard infrastructure. In developing 
Washington's IPZs Milbergs identifies four important factors that make up the “soft 
infrastructure” necessary to launch and sustain an innovation cluster: (1) business 
leadership, which is critical for mobilizing and sustaining support; (2) strategy, which is a 
shared road-map with genuine buy-in from multiple stakeholders and the key 
performance indicators which drive it; (3) governance, which provides a structure to 
integrate leadership and strategy to grow and evolve the cluster; and (4) culture, which 
creates and sustains the spirit of collaboration (Stroo, 2014). The “soft” infrastructure 
working together is often the necessary conditions to support nascent or emerging 
businesses through their most difficult startup years; and the IPZs are a public policy 
attempt to nurture “soft” infrastructure.  
C. Tacoma Urban Clean Water Technology IPZ 
 In 2012 the city of Tacoma launched the Urban Clean Water Technology 
Innovation Partnership Zone (IPZ). This IPZ is the latest chapter in Tacoma's long history 
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where water, economic development, and pollution intersect. Tacoma underwent a long 
economic boom from the late 19th Century when it became the western terminus of the 
Northern Pacific Railroad; and today it is the largest port in Washington state and a major 
logistic gateway to the Pacific (Barringer, 2014). In 1981 the New York Times reported 
that the Federal Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) had named Tacoma's 
Commencement Bay as one of the 10 worst toxic waste sites in the country out of a list of 
144; and it noted that the city was engaged in a clean-up effort of the Sound for pollutants 
that had been discharged into its waters mainly between the 1940s and 70s (Turner, 
1981). Since then there have been calls for a comprehensive and coordinated approach to 
reducing pollution flowing into the Sound and cleaning up the environmental damage 
(Turner, 1981); and despite expensive efforts to reduce pollution and carry out 
remediation of the environment, the people of Tacoma still live with the environmental 
and health consequences of past industrial pollution, combined with new pollution for 
storm-water, new chemicals, pesticides from lawns and farms, and pharmaceuticals from 
leaking septic tanks (Barringer, 2014; Wong, 2015; Dunagan, 2016). Increasingly, poor 
air and water quality have come to be seen by many in Tacoma as a threat to sustainable 
economic development, not just public and environmental health, as both businesses and 
people are increasingly attracted to healthy and clean local environments (Forster, 2014).  
In Tacoma, the IPZ has helped brand the city and county as a world leader in clean water 
in urban settings; and the IPZ is seen by many stakeholders as the best strategy for 
commercializing water technologies, forming new technology firms, and creating new 
jobs. In 2014, the New York Times noted that Tacoma's expertise in storm-water was being 
studied by officials from countries such as Brazil, Thailand, Italy and Russia (Barringer, 
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2014). 
1. Vision, Mission, Goal & Objectives of Tacoma’s IPZ. The vision of the 
Tacoma Urban Clean Water Technology IPZ is to enhance the economic and 
environmental future of Tacoma by leveraging decades of local experience 
and technical capability in storm-water management, pollution control, and 
environmental remediation that has accumulated in the local government, 
universities, and technology companies of the Puget Sound (J. Parvey, 
personal correspondence, July 20, 2017). The leveraging of experience would 
in turn support the development of globally competitive, research-based, 
urban clean water technologies (City of Tacoma, 2011, 2015; Trimarco et al., 
2014; Green et al., 2016). The mission of the Tacoma IPZ, as laid out in its 
2011-14 and 2015-19 business plans, is to accelerate the development of a 
globally competitive, research-based urban clean water cluster to strengthen 
the local economy of Tacoma and Pierce Counties through the creation of new 
firms, the expansion of existing firms, and creation of high-paying jobs (City 
of Tacoma, 2011, 2015). The IPZ laid out three goals which were expanded 
upon in the objectives of the 2011 and 2015 business plans: (1) retain and 
expand existing businesses and organizations; (2) recruit and attract businesses 
and organizations that enhance the value of the cluster; and (3) expand 
networking opportunities that increase the cluster’s global profile. 
In its 2011 business plan, the Tacoma IPZ lays out three key objectives: (1) 
business and job retention and expansion; (2) build a membership that 
enhances the cluster long-term value; and (3) raise the cluster's national and 
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global profile through networking and knowledge sharing opportunities (City 
of Tacoma 2015). In its 2015 business plan it added several more objectives: 
(1) increase investments in key public assets; (2) update and expand the 
database of regional clean water businesses; (3) increase the talent base of 
water expertise through both recruitment and training; (4) establish at least 
one cooperative agreement between UW Tacoma and a local firm; (5) 
undertake a commercialization study by 2017 to identify additional business 
applications for local clean water research; and (5) develop a sustainable 
source of financing for the IPZ (City of Tacoma, 2015). Despite the challenges 
facing the Tacoma IPZ, there is the belief that this cluster can spur innovation 
and facilitate and accelerate the development and commercialization of new 
water technologies that can help to position Tacoma in the new high-
technology, clean and green economy.            
2. Structure, Leadership & Strategy of Tacoma’s IPZ. The Tacoma IPZ is an 
economic development partnership that involves educational institutions, 
research laboratories, public economic development organizations, local 
governments, and workforce training organizations within Tacoma–Pierce 
County. Each partner has made a commitment to providing the human and 
material resources necessary for the Urban Clean Water Technology IPZ to be 
successful (City of Tacoma, 2011, 2015). The City of Tacoma acts as the Zone 
Administrator and is responsible for coordination, management and 
administration of the IPZ (J. Parvey, personal correspondence, July 20, 2017). 
The University of Washington Tacoma, the primary research partner, is 
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responsible for providing staff, programs, and facilities to support research 
and training. The Port of Tacoma, as owner of substantial to real estate, 
provides commercial space to partners and investors, and works with partners 
in identifying and solving the Sound's environmental problems. The Economic 
Development Board for Tacoma-Pierce County is responsible for managing 
the collection of data regarding performance of the IPZ and recruiting new 
businesses for the cluster. The Tacoma Community College serves as the lead 
for workforce development and corporate training for the IPZ. The Institute 
for Environmental Research and Education serves as a resource providing 
consulting and evaluation services; the University of Washington Puyallup, 
which provides expertise in storm-water research. GeoEngineer, a technology 
firm specializing in earth science and engineering consulting services related 
to the natural or built environment. Finally, Parametrix, a private company 
providing engineering, planning, and environmental solutions to restore 
natural habitats and address infrastructure needs (City of Tacoma, 2011, 2015). 
Public sector agencies and academic institutions provide most of the staffing 
and operational support for the Tacoma IPZ (City of Tacoma, 2011, 2015; 
Trimarco et al., 2014; Green et al., 2016).  
Leaders at the highest levels of these organizations have been engaged in 
crafting a strategy for growing the cluster, building on the community’s assets 
and achieving the vision and mission. The City Manager of the City of 
Tacoma, or his designee, acts as the zone administrator and fiscal agent . The 
Administrator oversees the promotion of best waste and storm-water 
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management practices (J. Parvey, personal correspondence, July 20, 2017). 
The Chancellor of the University of Washington Tacoma (UWT) takes the lead 
in hosting workshops and establishing new graduate programs. The Science 
Director at the Center for Urban Waters, a professor from UWT, is lead 
researcher and collaborator, and assists in securing funding and database 
expansion. The Commissioner of the Port of Tacoma oversees the 
commitment to protecting waterways, assists with planning conferences, and 
brings private sector members to partner with the IPZ. The President and CEO 
of the Tacoma-Pierce County Economic Development Board leads business 
recruitment and database expansion and assists with planning conference and 
the commercialization study. The President of the Tacoma Community 
College leads workforce development and corporate training. The Chair of the 
Board and Executive Director for the Institute for Environmental Research 
and Education provides environmental evaluations for city, port and private 
businesses. Jeff Peacock, President & CEO of Parametrix is liaison to the 
private sector and a private sector adviser to the IPZ. Finally, the Director of 
the WSU Puyallup Research and Extension Center assists with planning 
conferences, works with partners to establish new graduate programs, and 
helps to secure funding for the IPZ. There has been considerable continuity 
among the leadership team of the IPZ between 2012-2017, with the only 
changes being the Zone Administrator, the Chancellor of UWT, and the 
President of the Tacoma Community College (City of Tacoma, 2011, 2015).  
V. Water Innovation Technology Firms 
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 Washington State is home to several water technology firms that are leading a 
wave of innovation in the water industry through the research, development and 
commercialization of water technologies. Some water technology firms are well 
established – such as older companies like the award winning Romac Industries of 
Bothell which makes water valves and couplings, Nelson Irrigation of Walla Walla which 
designs, develops, manufactures, and sells water devices for agricultural, environmental, 
and industrial applications, Itron of Liberty Lake which is a technology and service 
company that provides solutions that measure, manage and analyze energy and water use, 
and Northwest Pipe of Vancouver which manufactures and markets welded steel pipe for 
water transmission. Other firms are emerging. The Seattle-based CleanTech Alliance 
Washington counts several water-tech businesses as members and organizes several fora 
to promote the potential of the water sector in the state. This suggests that the State is in 
the early stage of developing a viable water innovation technology cluster but that more 
time, energy and resources are required to turn a nascent or emerging cluster into an 
established and sustainable cluster (Virgin, 2015). CleanTech Alliance is an industry 
association for businesses that represent all facets of clean technology; it consists of 
about 300 member organizations from six U.S. states and two Canadian provinces; and it 
is committed to growing the clean technology sector by supporting innovation and 
entrepreneurship through networking, business facilitation and incubation,  policy 
advocacy, commercialization programs, and signature events that educate and enlighten 
and enhance commercial possibilities by connecting key stakeholders (CleanTech 
Alliance, 2017).  
 A sample of Washington's water technology firms provides a general picture of 
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the industry landscape. First is WaterTectonics of Everett, Washington, just north of 
Seattle, which was founded in 1999 and in 2017 employed about 60 persons. 
WaterTectonics designs, manufactures, deploys and services integrated water treatment 
solutions for a global client base in oil and gas, mining, industrial and construction. Its 
technologies are designed to allow businesses to meet the demands of new and future 
environmental regulations. The company also claims to have a strong local market 
presence through its utilization by two-thirds of the construction projects in the Puget 
Sound region (WaterTectonics, 2017).  
 The startup HydroBee of Seattle, Washington was founded in 2013 and is a recent 
recipient of the Washington Manufacturing Awards. HydroBee designs micro-generators 
and charging systems whose power source can derive from water flows, wind, sun, fire, 
bicycles, and muscles. The technology can serve as a low-cost power source with 
multiple application, especially in remote places or in the Developing World where 
billions of people do not have access to public utilities (Bloomberg, 2017). HydroBee 
demonstrates the interconnected nature of high-technology industries and the difficulty in 
classifying them, because it can more correctly be classified as a renewable energy 
company. HydroBee, which designed its prototypes using 3-D printing, is currently 
attempting to scale up its manufacturing and marketing. In 2013 it unsuccessfully used 
Kickstarter, a global crowdfunding platform focused on creativity, to raise $48,000 in 
financing to support commercialization. It secured only $21,399 in pledges from 422 
people (Kickstarter, 2017). HydroBee has been persisting and in 2014 Warren Evans of 
World Bank joined the company’s Board of Advisors. One of its designs won the Alaska 
Airlines Environmental Innovation Challenge and $20,000 in funding 
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(CleanTechAlliance, 2015a).  
 The startup Pure Stormwater of Silverdale, Washington, was founded in 2014 to 
solve what is now the one of the greatest sources of pollution of US waterways: 
stormwater. With financial support from the EPA, Pure Stormwater is developing a line of 
storm drain filtration basins to filter hydrocarbons, metals and other contaminants from 
storm-water before it enters the storm drain system and flows out into local bodies of 
water.  The design uses a mix of textiles and natural fibers in filters inside stainless steel 
catch basins that will be installed in storm drains and the startup is in the process of 
applying for patents on the technology (Jerome, 2015). The principals of  Pure 
Stormwater had tried, and failed, to partner in 2013 with a California-based company 
called Safe Drain International to develop and market a similar technology; however, 
they felt that they knew the needs of the market better and wanted to pursue a filtration 
system, with numerous points of interception of small quantities of contaminants, over a 
spill-containment system (Kelly, 2015).  
 Apana, a Bellingham-based water-use and waste-analytics firm is helping its 
clients save money and reduce their water footprint by reducing waste and improving the 
efficiency of water use (Virgin, 2015). Apana, which got its start as Hydro-Care 
International before becoming Kirkland Analytics, is a leader in automated water 
management systems that help clients make informed decisions by analyzing, 
operationalizing and accounting for water use. This saves water, reduces compliance risk, 
strengthens supply chains, and improves operational sustainability. Apana counts 
Issaquah-based retailer Costco Wholesale as a major client (CleanTechAlliance, 2015b).  
 A good example of the type of technology firm that exemplifies the emerging 
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water technology industry is HaloSource, an award-winning clean water technology 
company based in Bothell, Washington, that provides innovative solutions to the 85 
percent of the world who do not have access to a reliable supply of clean, safe drinking 
water. HaloSource has more than 10 million people in China, India and Latin America 
who use its proprietary technological solutions for water purification and contaminant 
adsorption that are adaptable to a wide range of point-of-use devices ranging from entry-
level gravity systems to high-end pressurized systems (WaterWorld, 2010, 2012; Apfel, 
2013; Miller, 2014). HaloSource vision has been to position itself as a world-leader in the 
growing multi-billion-dollar market for clean drinking water. Its mission is to solve 
complex clean water challenges; its evolving 15-year strategy has come to focus on its 
core strengths - which are as innovators in the chemistry of water purification, and 
integrators of multiple technologies to solve complex water challenges. The firm also 
leverages the strengths of leading multinational companies through partnerships to 
distribute HaloSource technologies to meet the needs of clients and be market-focused 
rather than technology-focused (WaterWorld, 2010, 2012; Apfel, 2013; Miller, 2014). 
HaloSource in many ways was ahead of the global fresh water crisis and had to wait for 
the market to evolve; but through its expertise, resources, and partnerships is in a position 
to rapidly respond to emerging water markets for purification and treatment (WaterWorld, 
2010, 2012; Apfel, 2013; Miller, 2014). This reinforces the reality for many water 
technology firms that successful commercialization requires playing the long game.  
 HaloSource's technology focus is in three key sectors: (1) drinking water 
purification, (2) environmental water treatment and remediation, and (3) recreational 
water solutions. The global market for these three technologies is estimated at $16 
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billion, $3 billion and $23 billion respectively (WaterWorld, 2010, 2012; Apfel, 2013; 
Miller, 2014). Two of HaloSource's most innovative technologies are HaloPure 
Disinfectant, a novel contact biocide in the form of beads that bind to bacteria and viruses 
in water and kills them, and HaloPure Absorption, which is a novel composite engineered 
to selectively bind to contaminants such as lead, arsenic and fluoride. HaloSource is 
considered a key innovator in the residential drinking water market, supplying cutting-
edge proprietary technology to household appliance makers and suppliers. HaloSource 
produces cartridges for several global partners who then take this class leading 
technology to market through their devices, channels and brands. HaloSource also 
recently entered the consumer market with two products, a water pitcher and water bottle 
marketed under the Astrea trade-marked brand, which uses the company's patented 
technology to remove 99.9 percent of bacteria, viruses, and heavy metals to ensure that 
the water is safe to drink (WaterWorld, 2010, 2012; Apfel, 2013; Miller, 2014). In 2012 
HaloSource entered into a development and production agreement with Tupperware 
Brands Corporation, the U.S.-based direct selling company with a global sales force of 
2.7 million, to provide HaloPure absorption technology in cartridges for Tupperware’s 
new line of gravity-based water purifiers that will be initially launched in India. This 
potentially is a huge market for low-cost home purification of drinking water 
(WaterWorld, 2012; Apfel, 2013; Miller, 2014).   
  HaloSource has had a successful track record of raising funds to expand 
operations, with $25 million raised in 2012 from the investment community through the 
London Stock Exchange; while in 2017 it secured $2.2 Million in funding to further 
accelerate its drinking water market presence (WaterWorld, 2012; Apfel, 2013). In 2009, 
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HaloSource became the first drinking water technology in 30 years to have its technology 
registered by the United States Environmental Protection Agency (USEPA), widely 
recognized as having among the world’s most stringent performance requirements for 
water purification. In 2010, its technologies were approved by China's Ministry of Health 
(MOH); in Brazil, where it has major market share through Pentair, HaloSource's 
technologies have met or exceeded all appropriate standards of the National Institute of 
Metrology, Standardization and Industrial Quality (INMETRO); and the company's 
portfolio of products also meets the rigorous standards of many state and local regulatory 
bodies, to include the Washington Department of Ecology (WaterWorld, 2010, 2012; 
Apfel, 2013; Miller, 2014). 
VI. Center for Urban Waters 
A. Vision, Goals, Mission, and Structure of Center for Urban Waters 
 The Center for Urban Waters in Tacoma is envisioned as a revolutionary focal 
point for research, policy and the real-life application of science and technologies to 
water and environment challenges (J. Parvey, personal correspondence, July 20, 2017; J. 
Coffman, personal correspondence, July 20, 2017). The Center achieves this by bringing 
together environmental scientists, engineers, and policymakers who are developing 
creative and sustainable solutions to restore and protect Tacoma and the Puget Sound; and 
it also does this by providing them with a collaborative environment where the best-
available science and technologies can come together to form the basis for policy 
development and implementation (J. Coffman, personal correspondence, July 20, 2017). 
The Center for Urban Waters is the result of nearly a decade of work by a cross-section of 
community leaders who dreamed of a world-class research facility dedicated to finding 
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solutions to the problems of urban living and its impact on the environment. The City of 
Tacoma is a community of about 800,000 residents to the south of Commencement Bay 
with large industrial, commercial, residential, and recreational areas, and 38 miles of 
waterfront. Tacoma and its surrounding region face both historic and ongoing 
environmental challenges that to date has represented an investment of more than $105 
million in environmental cleanup, restoration, and mitigation (City of Tacoma, 2013a). 
The goal of the Center for Urban Waters is to serve all these sectors of the city by 
maintaining the quality of their water resources and the health of their natural 
environment (J. Parvey, personal correspondence, July 20, 2017; J. Coffman, personal 
correspondence, July 20, 2017). The efforts to establish a world-class, inter-disciplinary 
research and policy center, and to leverage the expertise of Tacoma in storm-water 
management and environmental remediation, led Water Online in 2014 to list Tacoma as 
one of twelve 'Water Technology Hot-Spots' in the United States (Martin, 2014).  
 In 2002, the City of Tacoma, the Port of Tacoma, the University of Washington 
Tacoma and business leaders met to outline a vision for the proposed center, to raise 
funds for a feasibility study, to establish an endowment to support a top-flight research 
facility for the University of Washington Tacoma, and labs and offices for the City of 
Tacoma’s Environmental Services Unit. In 2007, the City of Tacoma purchased former 
industrial land on the Thea Foss Waterway near Tacoma’s central business district; in 
early 2009 ground was broken for the facility; and in March 2010 staff began moving 
into the new building. The Center is housed in a 51,000-square-foot, $22 million, LEED 
Platinum building containing office and laboratory facilities that are designed to signal 
the commitment of the City of Tacoma to the water industry, and the application of 
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science and technology to improving urban environmental outcomes (City of Tacoma 
2013b). The Center, both in terms of governance and physical space, is designed to be 
flexible, adaptable and scaleable, so the research mission and the programs and projects 
that result can continue to evolve as new issues and opportunities arise (J. Coffman, 
personal correspondence, July 20, 2017). 
  The current tenants are the City of Tacoma, the University of Washington 
Tacoma, and the Puget Sound Partnership and together they work to address urban 
environmental issues through a process of applied research, policy analysis and 
development, and programs and projects for environmental remediation and protection (J. 
Parvey, personal correspondence, July 20, 2017; J. Coffman, personal correspondence, 
July 20, 2017). The Center for Urban Waters houses labs and offices for both the City of 
Tacoma's Environmental Services Unit (ESU) and the University of Washington–Tacoma 
(UWT).  The UWT research laboratories at the Center are equipped with analytical 
instrumentation focused on the detection, identification, and quantification of organic 
chemicals in the environment using both targeted approaches, to deal with known 
compounds, and non-targeted approaches, to deal with unknown compounds, that may 
put at risk public and environmental health. Both the ESU and the UWT work together to 
carry out for the city forensic work on pollution to facilitate enforcement of antipollution 
laws.  The center's emphasis on applied science is also designed to support the water 
technology industry and be a source of job creation and a greater, diversified tax base. It 
is hoped that innovative and commercially viable solutions may evolve from the center's 
research, that existing technology firms will expand or be retained in the region, that 
entrepreneurs will be encouraged to start new businesses new business, and that firms 
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will relocate to Tacoma. The center is designed to grow both itself and the Tacoma 
community; and the Center represents an example of both the 'hard' and 'soft' 
infrastructure which Milbergs suggests that every cluster requires for success. 
B. Puget Sound Partnership at the Center for Urban Waters  
1. Vision and Mission of the Puget Sound Partnership  
Many groups have an interest in protecting and restoring the health of the 
Puget Sound for the well-being of both the residents and the natural ecosystems 
of the region. The state agency charged with leading the collective effort to clean 
up, restore and protect the Puget Sound is the Puget Sound Partnership (PSP), 
which was created in 2007 as a successor to the Puget Sound Action Team which 
was itself created in 2001. The bill creating the PSP, which then Governor Chris 
Gregoire signed into law, tasked the new state agency with restoring the Puget 
Sound to a ‘healthy’ state by 2020, and to do so by developing a shared regional 
plan and common way to measure success which its predecessor agency lacked 
(Puget Sound Partnership, 2017). This time-frame was a decidedly ambitious task 
given the scale of the problem. The term 'healthy' is vague and clarification and 
operationalization of this term is of critical importance to any declaration of 
success (JLARC, 2016). According to then Governor Gregoire, the PSP was 
created to be a “community effort of citizens, governments, tribes, scientists and 
businesses working together to restore and protect Puget Sound” (Puget Sound 
Partnership, 2008). The vision of the PSP to is build “vibrant, enduring natural 
systems and communities,” and its mission is to “accelerate the collective effort 
to recover and sustain the Puget Sound” (Puget Sound Partnership, 2017). The 
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PSP, like its predecessor agency, also provides technical assistance on low impact 
development (LID) to numerous stakeholders in the region to help businesses and 
communities transition to more environmentally neutral methods for developing 
land and managing storm water, to reduce the Anthropocene impacts on the 
estuary (Wulkan, 2015).  
2. Goals & Objectives of the Puget Sound Partnership  
The goal of the PSP, as set by Governor Gregoire and the Washington State 
Legislature, was to restore and maintain the ecological health of the Puget Sound; 
and in 2008, the PSP created an Action Agenda that remains the road-map for 
cleanup and restoration efforts in and around Puget Sound. To achieve a more 
resilient Puget Sound, the broad goal was further refined by the Washington State 
Legislature which broke it down into six more specific ecosystem recovery goals 
that together were to achieve the following: (1) a healthy human population that 
is not threatened by changes in the ecosystem; (2) a vibrant quality of life that is 
sustained by a functioning Puget ecosystem; (3) thriving native species supported 
by a robust food web; (4) protected, restored, and sustained freshwater, estuary, 
nearshore, marine, and upland habitats; (5) abundant quality groundwater and 
stream flows that are sufficient to sustain people, fish, wildlife, and the natural 
functions of the environment; and (6) healthy water quality that is safe for 
drinking, swimming, and other human uses and enjoyment, and which are not 
harmful to the native marine mammals, fish, birds, and shellfish in the region 
(Puget Sound Partnership, 2017). These goals have been further clarified and 
linked to measurable objectives and objective indicators in the Action Agenda.   
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3. Governance of the Puget Sound Partnership  
The Partnership is responsible for coordinating, prioritizing, and 
monitoring the progress of recovery efforts implemented by partner organizations. 
While it works with a broad range of partner organizations - state and federal 
agencies, tribes, counties, cities, and private entities - the Partnership does not 
implement recovery actions on the ground, deliver funding, or have regulatory 
authority (C. Cockrane, personal correspondence, July 20, 2017). The institutional 
arrangements through which the Partnership achieves its goals and objectives are 
its various governing and advising boards and the Action Agenda. The Partnership 
is led by the Leadership Council – a seven-member body representing various 
interests including government, business, agriculture, academia, and tribes, among 
others - which is advised by three other boards – the Ecosystem Coordination 
Board, the Science Panel, and the Puget Sound Salmon Recovery Council – which 
give technical and expert advice in specific areas of interest within the remit of the 
Partnership (Puget Sound Partnership, 2017). The Puget Sound Partnership is 
guided by an Action Agenda, which is a comprehensive, prioritized, science-
informed, shared road-map for Puget Sound recovery. This agenda outlines the 
regional strategies and specific actions that are needed to restore the essential 
resources and functions the Puget Sound, and protect them for the future, while 
supporting ecologically sustainable economic and social development (Puget 
Sound Partnership, 2017). The Partnership is also responsible for assessing the 
effectiveness of recovery and restoration efforts by evaluating data to determine 
how well management actions and programs are working to achieve desired 
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outcomes; and communicating the results to decision-makers, so they can improve 
future projects, through such medium as the Puget Sound Vital Signs, Action 
Agenda Report Card, and State of the Sound report (Puget Sound Partnership, 
2017). 
The creation of this Action Agenda, and the steps taken to implement it, 
required the contributions of hundreds of partners – including academia, 
businesses, tribes and citizen action groups - and has involved input from all parts 
of government. Although Action Agenda is as a shared road-map representing the 
collective effort of regional stakeholders and interest groups, it is supposed to be 
informed by science, and a rational-scientific approach is expected to guide 
prioritized and effective investments (Puget Sound Partnership, 2017). The 
philosophy of the Action Agenda is to prioritize cleanup and improvement 
projects on actions that have the biggest impact, coordinate federal, state, local, 
tribal and private resources, make sure all partners are working cooperatively, 
base decisions on science, and hold all partners accountable for results (Puget 
Sound Partnership, 2017).  With regards to implementation, the strategic 
initiatives are led by state agencies which convene advisory groups of policy and 
technical experts to determine which projects are the best fit for sub-awards that 
most closely align with the Action Agenda and prioritize near-term recovery 
(Puget Sound Partnership, 2017). These advisory groups develop implementation 
strategies and use adaptive management approaches to address the challenges of 
the Puget Sound.  
To achieve the large and complex task assigned to the Partnership, the 
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Action Agenda relies heavily on a combination of national, regional and local 
resources and efforts to achieve its goal (C. Cockrane, personal correspondence, 
July 20, 2017). Much of the resources and efforts of the PSP is devoted to creating 
and maintaining the institutional infrastructure needed by stakeholders to facilitate 
the collaboration and coordination needed to identify, develop, and implement the 
priority actions needed to accelerate ecosystem recovery. The nine counties and 
numerous cities and towns of the Puget Sound region play a particularly important 
role as focal points for local implementation of the Action Agenda. The 
Washington Association of Counties (WSAC) facilitates collaboration and 
communication between the PSP and city and county governments to identify 
issues and prioritize restoration projects. This institutional infrastructure ensures 
the alignment of the work of all the partners around a shared vision and strategy. 
Decision-makers are supposed to be well-informed and have the information they 
need to identify issues, determine solutions, and prioritize projects, and decisions 
are supposed to be science-driven and not dominated by politics and special-
interests. The decision-making arrangement is intended to ensure the following: 
(1) investments in the recovery of Puget Sound are supposed to represent the most 
efficient and effective ways to allocate limited resources; (2) that the policy and 
regulatory environment is streamlined to ensure the flow of resources toward 
priority actions; and (3) that there is a shared, science-based system of 
measurement, monitoring, and evaluation that promotes accountability and 
effectiveness, and ensures progress (Puget Sound Partnership 2017). It is widely 
accepted that the ecology of the Puget Sound will never return to its state of 150 
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years ago, given the current level of human development in the region and 
expected additional development in the coming years; however, it is also accepted 
that the future health of the region's ecosystem, and the quality of life of its human 
population, will be determined by the current actions taken to restore and protect 
the Puget Sound.  
4. Resources of the Puget Sound Partnership  
The PSP finances its budget from a combination of federal, state, and local 
funds. An important priority for the Partnership is to develop a budget strategy to 
secure a stable and diverse stream of funds to implement Action Agenda priorities 
over the long-term (C. Cockrane, personal correspondence, July 20, 2017). The 
Partnership employs three approaches: the first involves getting the most from 
available funds by prioritizing projects and funding those that have the highest 
potential benefit to recovery efforts; the second is defining the size and nature of 
the funding gap; and the third involves identifying ways to bridge the funding gap 
(Puget Sound Partnership, 2017). The Partnership’s funding contributes to 
coordinating, prioritizing, and monitoring efforts. Partner organizations receive 
implementation funding directly, which is not included in the Partnership’s 
budget. The Partnership's budget for the 2015-17 biennium was $18.8 million, 
which included $9.9 million from the U.S. Environmental Protection (EPA) 
Agenda, $7.5 million from the State of Washington, and $1.4 million from the 
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOOA). The Partnership 
receives the bulk of its funding from federal, state, tribal and local government 
sources; however, nonprofits, businesses, and foundations also make significant 
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investments (Puget Sound Partnership, 2017). The federal government's 
contribution comes from the National Estuary Program, which is administered by 
the EPA, and the Partnership is one of six Washington state agencies to receive 
funds from this program. These resources are, however, considered inadequate 
for the task, and the 2013 State of the Sound report estimates a $390 million 
shortfall over a three-year period to implement near-term actions identified in the 
2012 Action Agenda (Puget Sound Partnership, 2013). Although the goals of the 
PSP have largely been bipartisan, and there has been support for putting Puget 
Sound at the same priority cleanup level as Chesapeake Bay in Maryland and the 
Great Lakes, the resources have historically been inadequate. In 2016, however, 
the Obama and Washington state administrations promised an additional $500 
million in funding for the Sound over five years (Ahearn, 2016). This promise 
requires Congressional approval and is currently threatened by budget cuts under 
the Trump administration. Funding requests fall far short of the estimated $8 
billion required to restore the Sound (Chasan, 2010, 2012; Connelly, 2017). The 
Puget Sound cleanup is not alone in being targeted by the Trump administration - 
both Chesapeake Bay and the Great Lakes cleanup efforts would suffer a 90 
percent reduction in their funding, and cleanup money for Long Island Sound and 
San Francisco Bay would be eliminated entirely (Connelly, 2017).  
5. EPA Partnership.  
The EPA receives money from Congress to help restore and protect the Puget 
Sound and support the Agenda using Cooperative Agreements (CA) with 
designated state agencies, local and tribal governments, universities and non-
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governmental organizations (NGOs) (Puget Sound Partnership, 2017). A CA is a 
relationship between the U.S. Government and a designated intermediary to carry 
out a public purpose which provides goods or services to an authorized recipient. 
Unlike a grant, a Cooperative Agreement involves a 'substantial involvement' by 
the federal awarding agency in directly performing or implementing parts of the 
program. In a grant, the federal government maintains more strict oversight and 
monitoring (grants.gov, 2016). The CA between the EPA and PSP focuses on 
regional engagement, stewardship, and managing the implementation of the 
Action Agenda. The CA targets three high priority issues in Puget Sound 
contained in the Action Agenda: natural habitats, shellfish, and storm water.  
Between 2010 and 2015, the EPA also provided 52 grants directly to local 
partners for projects that addressed specific areas of the Action Agenda that 
supported Puget Sound recovery and restoration.  The federal government also 
gives sub-awards to local, tribal, state, and county governments, NGOs and 
academic institutions to carry out a wide variety of projects, assessments, and 
monitoring.  
The 20 Northwest Treaty Tribes and three tribal consortia that are located in 
the Puget Sound region play an important role in restoring and protecting the 
Sound. The consortia represent regional leaders and partners who try to protect 
and restore the Puget Sound and co-manage the region's interconnected natural 
resources (C. Cockrane, personal correspondence, July 20, 2017). The EPA 
provides funds to support the Northwest Indian Fisheries Commission, to carry 
out projects of high tribal priority, and participate in regional coordination boards 
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and management conferences that are consistent with the Action Agenda 
(NWIFC, 2015; EPA, 2017).  It must be noted that Native Americans have a 
special economic and cultural relationship to the Puget Sound that includes their 
long and antecedent presence in the region. The tribes possess rights and 
privileges, to which they are entitled through treaties, which allow them to harvest 
fish, shellfish, wildlife and other natural resources in exchange for most of the 
land that makes up the region today (NWIFC, 2015).   
6. Criticism of the Partnership’s Restoration Efforts 
Efforts to restore and protect the sound, and the agencies tasked with the 
restoration and protection, have been the subject of continual controversy, 
criticism, and competing perspectives. Some stakeholders suggest that efforts to 
clean up Puget Sound had been floundering for two decades, with growth-related 
damage still outpacing government funded efforts (Stiffler, 2005; Lipsky & Ryan, 
2011). Other stakeholders suggest that efforts to address the ecological health of 
the Puget Sound threaten urban and economic development and burden businesses 
and the community with too many regulations that produce too few impacts 
(Stiffler, 2005); and yet other stakeholders suggest that some progress has been 
made, but with the provisos that much restoration work from earlier damage 
remains and storm-water from urban development remains the last major 
challenge to be addressed (Patrick, 2016). The PSP was not the first state agency 
to be tasked with restoring and protecting the Puget Sound: between 2001 and 
2007 that task fell to the now defunct Puget Sound Action Team, before that to the 
Puget Sound Water Quality Authority which was established in 1985, the 
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Pollution Control Commission which was established in 1945, and the 
Washington State Pollution Commission was created in 1937 (The Olympian, 
2006). Efforts to restore and protect the sound seem to face many ongoing 
challenges, chief among them being low public awareness of the extent of the 
problem and the ongoing challenge of poor leadership and governance which 
together provide strategic direction, delivers plans and policies, and ensures 
effective oversight (Dunagan, 2013; Myers, 2014; Myers, 2017). The Puget Sound 
Action Team, which the PSP replaced, was increasingly seen as lacking in 
independence and thus powerless to address the Sound's environmental and 
ecological problems. There has been an ongoing lack of political will to align the 
scale of resources required with the scale of the problem and there has been an 
inability among key stakeholders to keep the environmental and ecological needs 
of the Puget Sound ahead of narrow political interests (Puget Sound Action Team, 
2004; Stiffler, 2005; Lipsky & Ryan, 2011; Morgan, 2014).  
Many of the more recent criticisms of the PSP were driven by a scathing 
2011 audit report issued by Washington State's bipartisan Joint Legislative Audit 
Review Committee (JLARC) which suggested that, despite some progress, the 
agency has largely failed to fulfill many of its responsibilities and that leadership 
and management committed numerous acts of waste, corruption, nepotism, and 
fraud linked to contracts for services and hiring of staff (Ryan & Gates, 2010; 
JLARC, 2011). This was followed in 2013 by a report from the Freedom 
Foundation which stated: “Unfortunately, like the two agencies that preceded it, 
the Puget Sound Partnership has been unable to create positive changes for Puget 
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Sound. Instead of effectively using its resources and influence to help clean up 
Puget Sound, the Partnership has engaged in corrupt practices, wasted taxpayer 
dollars, and failed to fulfill any of its responsibilities as a state agency” (Freedom 
Foundation, 2013). The Freedom Foundation was concerned that the PSP did not 
actually carry out any recovery and restoration work itself, did not properly 
monitor and evaluate the work carried out on its behalf, and felt that too much of 
its time, energy and resources were spent on public relations and branding the 
agency rather than solving the problem.  
Concerns over poor leadership and governance have been driven by 
perceptions over the technical and administrative quality of its leadership cadre, 
the frequency of turnover of its executive team, and the agendas of various key 
people. To the matter of leadership agendas, the first Chairman of the Puget Sound 
Partnership Leadership Council was William Ruckelshaus, a Republican, who was 
the first to head the EPA where he served two non-consecutive terms. 
Ruckelshaus' daughter served as the chief scientist of the PSP for two and one–
half years on a half-time basis, while on loan from the National Marine Fisheries 
Service, with the federal government picking up the cost of her placement. She 
had previously been turned down for a more junior position with the PSP before 
securing the position of chief scientist. The first Executive Director of the PSP 
was a Seattle lawyer, David Dick, who was the son of a longtime Democratic 
Congressman from Washington State, Norman Dick.  Norman Dick was able to 
use his position as Chairman of the Interior Subcommittee in 2007 to increase 
federal money going to the PSP from about $500,000 a year to about $50,000,000; 
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however, some have argued that several of the projects to which these funds were 
allocated were of dubious environmental value, and based on a questionable 
scientific rational, which suggested as its underlying justification a benefit that 
was political rather than public. Under the leadership of both Ruckelhaus and 
Dick, the PSP became mired in accusations and investigations over appointments, 
hiring, and contracts that allegedly have involved nepotism, cronyism, and politics 
(Ryan & Gates, 2010; JLARC, 2011; Freedom Foundation, 2013). While none of 
the breaches may have reached the level of criminal intent and resulted in criminal 
charges they have left the public image of the agency tarnished and reduced its 
ability to achieve the public and political consensus necessary to secure a 
sustainable stream of public funding (Stiffler, 2010; Bradford, 2010). 
With regards to technical and administrative capacity, the leadership of the 
PSP seems to lack a sense of how to execute its vision and mission, and to find the 
correct balance between politics, science and public relations. At its formation, the 
legal mandate of PSP was to provide science-and-evidence-based leadership for 
the many political jurisdictions in the region responsible for reducing the 
environmental impact of human development on the functioning of the ecosystem 
of the Puget Sound. The Washington Policy Center is one stakeholder that seems 
to be leading the case for the PSP to have a primarily science-based and science-
driven agenda (Chasan, 2010; Myers, 2012, 2014). There are other stakeholders, 
among them former executive director David Dicks and former PSP chair Martha 
Kongsgaard, who seem to represent a more political agenda (Morgan, 2014; 
Myers, 2014). A third approach, which probably represents middle ground 
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between science and politics, suggests an emphasis around partnerships and 
collaboration among the hundreds of stakeholders in the Sound, and an Agenda 
built primarily from the bottom-up (Sea Grant, 2008; Nunnally, 2016; Patrick, 
2016).   
With regards to leadership turnover, the first executive director, David 
Dick, was perceived of being too political and left the agency following questions 
about weak administrative capacity, breaches of ethical guidelines, and a negative 
report from the State Auditor. The second executive director, Gerry O'Keefe, who 
was perceived as being more of a scientist than politician, was regarded as having 
the correct focus for the agency and for putting it on the right track. He was 
abruptly fired by the Governor. The third director, Anthony Wright, was perceived 
as being outspoken, and having a higher public profile that would energize the 
agency, but he offered his resignation after six months to return to work at a 
private consulting firm. The fourth director, Marc Daily, had previously served as 
deputy director at the PSP from 2011 and served a year as interim executive 
director. In 2014 the PSP appointed its fifth and current executive director, Sheida 
Sahandy, who came to an agency where only five of its 21 'vital signs' improved 
and was unlikely to reach its 2020 goals (Dunagan, 2013; Myers, 2014; Myers, 
2017).  
This history has put a cloud over the agency and caused many to question 
its value. At its worst, the PSP was a political agency, designed to deliver 
symbolic and politically useful environmental stories, even as scientific priorities 
were being ignored. At its best, the PSP provides scientifically-based 
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environmental performance audits, helping ensure funding is spent where it can 
do the most good for the flora and fauna of the Sound. When science-based 
priorities are combined with economics, and all underlying assumptions are made 
clear, it is much easier to determine which projects are worthwhile and effective, 
and which are political (Myers, 2017). Short planning time-frames, an incomplete 
inventory of actions and funding, and an unclear monitoring approach hinder 
recovery efforts (JLARC, 2016). In recent years there is evidence that the PSP has 
returned to a scientific approach, but continued success in restoring the Sound, 
and preventing further damage from new urban development and emerging 
pollutants, requires a balanced approach that takes into account several 
considerations: first, environmental degradation is a problem with environmental, 
economic, and political aspects and must be solved with all these in mind; second, 
environmental remediation on this scale is a long-term effort, that requires a 
realistic time-frame, that will transcend the lifespan of the organizational 
leadership of the PSP and the political leadership in Olympia; third, the scale and 
scope of the problems of the Sound will require sufficient resources to be 
committed over many years, and the dependence on federal funds must be 
reexamined; fourth, the Partnership must share information with the Legislature 
and public about the health of Puget Sound, and the efforts that are required to 
restore its health, to gain both public and political support; fifth, good program 
and project management requires a comprehensive monitoring system to judge 
progress, prioritize projects, and allocate scarce resources; sixth, the efforts of 
stakeholders, partners, agencies, and programs at multiple scales must be properly 
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coordinated, and organizational and disciplinary silos must be transcended; and 
sixth, the efforts of the Partnership must be continuous and consistent, which 
requires a sound game plan (Chasan, 2010, 2012; Dunagan, 2013; Myers, 2012, 
2014; Myers, 2017).  
C. City of Tacoma Environmental Services Unit.  
Tacoma's Environmental Services Unit is responsible for ensuring the city's public 
and environmental health by protecting and restoring natural resources, and keeping the 
city clean, safe and livable (City of Tacoma, 2013a). The Environmental Services Unit 
does this by providing the following services for approximately 210,000 citizens: garbage 
collection and recycling, wastewater treatment, household hazardous waste disposal, and 
protection from storm-water pollution which is driven by Tacoma's average rainfall of 
more than 37 inches a year (City of Tacoma, 2013b). Solid waste management provides 
garbage, collection, recycling and yard and food waste services for about 85,000 housing 
units and 13,000 businesses; surface water management prevents pollution from storm-
water from 500 miles of public storm-water pipes, 22,000 storm drains, four pump 
stations, and several water detention ponds. The city also provides wastewater 
management of more than 10 billion gallons of wastewater each year through more than 
700 miles of sewer pipes, 45 pumping stations, and two wastewater treatment plants (City 
of Tacoma, 2013a).   
 The City of Tacoma is nationally and globally recognized for its expertise in 
environmental remediation and storm-water management (J. Parvey, personal 
correspondence, July 20, 2017). Much of this expertise comes from parts of 
Commencement Bay being declared a Superfund site, and the subsequent historically 
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significant cleanup effort on the Thea Foss & Wheeler-Osgood Waterways which the City 
and its partners completed in 2006 (Center for Urban Waters, 2016). The City and its 
public and private partners worked for more than two decades to clean up and restore 
marine sediments and shoreline habitats in the City’s waterways and throughout 
Commencement Bay. These efforts have restored the City's waterways to the state where 
citizens and visitors can now live, work, and play on clean waters (J. Parvey, personal 
correspondence, July 20, 2017). Being good environmental stewards going forward is a 
priority for Tacoma (Center for Urban Waters, 2016).  The cleanup cost the city and its 
partners about $105 million, and the Environmental Services Unit controls an annual 
budget of at least $3.5 million to monitor storm water pipes to ensure that environmental 
disasters do not happen again (Barringer, 2014).  
 Clean water engineering projects recently completed by Tacoma’s Environmental 
Services Unit include an innovative set of storm-water treatment installations, including 
those along Pacific Avenue, the Prairie Line Trail, and at Point Defiance Park. These 
projects are important because Tacoma has separate systems for sewerage and storm-
water and does not treat storm-water before it enters the Sound. The Pacific Avenue Rain 
Gardens are designed to combine function and beauty. During 2013, the City of Tacoma 
installed 14 aesthetically attractive rain gardens for intercepting and filtering storm water 
along Pacific Avenue, which is a low-technology and low-cost way of using natural 
systems to filter out pollutants. The Prairie Line Trail is a regional storm-water treatment 
facility at the University of Washington Tacoma which is the result of a partnership 
between the City of Tacoma, UW Tacoma and the Washington State Department of 
Ecology to establish a demonstration site for dealing with the emerging challenge of non-
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point pollution. The Prairie Line Trail is what is known as a bio-retention facility, and it 
treats runoff from 42 acres of existing urban areas, which lie upstream of the facility, 
before the runoff is discharged into the Thea Foss Waterway (UWT, 2015). The Point 
Defiance Regional Stormwater Treatment Facility is a joint project by the City of Tacoma 
and Metro Parks Tacoma that is designed to improve the quality of storm-water flowing 
into Commencement Bay near an historically impaired area of Puget Sound overloaded 
with heavy metals from the Tacoma Asarco Smelter that operated for nearly 100 years. 
This innovative approach provides treatment for up to 8 million gallons per day from 754 
acres, in a footprint of only 5,500 square feet.  The $2.5 million project was jointly 
funded by the Washington State Department of Ecology and the City of Tacoma Surface 
Water Management Fund (City of Tacoma, 2013c).  
 The technical and management capacity developed and refined by the 
Environmental Services Unit enables it to trace pollutants right back to individuals, 
housing units and businesses who are responsible for a discharge. This capacity creates a 
different public policy environment and conversation with citizens about responsibilities 
and remedies for pollution and pollution prevention. The sources of pollution have 
evolved considerably over the past 40 years from industrial pipes contributing 85 percent 
of water pollution, to storm-water and the runoff from farmers’ fields now contributing 
85 percent of all pollution flowing into Commencement Bay (Barringer, 2014). The 
critical tools for the city in tracking pollution to its source is a combination of data – 
which provides a detailed, continuing and chemically specific picture of what flows 
through its system into the Thea Foss Waterway - and forensic techniques which create 
chemical maps of the city's storm-water system (Barringer, 2014). The City of Tacoma 
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committed $7 million to co-locate its analytical lab at the Center for Urban Waters, 
enabling the center's partners to share resources and coordinate work and share 
knowledge. The City also committed $500,000, which was matched with $250,000 from 
the University of Washington, to support storm-water research as one of the center’s 
priority areas. An example of the investigative skills and capabilities took place in 2014 
when city engineers investigated the source of a white cloud in the Thea Foss Waterway. 
They traced the cloud upstream to a catch basin near a yard where wrecked cars were 
stored by Bill's Towing Services. It turned out that a trailer full of coffee creamer had 
been towed to the yard after an accident by the local towing company, but the towing 
company had crushed a good portion of the creamer containers during the cleanup of the 
accident site. Bill's Towing was fined $10,000 for the improper cleanup which led to the 
pollution (Barringer, 2014). 
D. University of Washington Tacoma  
 The Center for Urban Waters was conceived as providing an intellectual 
environment where a community of environmental scientists, analysts, engineers and 
policy makers would collaborate to develop innovative and sustainable approaches to 
restore and protect the Puget Sound, and to encourage low-impact urban development. A 
key resident of the Center is the University of Washington Tacoma (UWT) which has 
located laboratories and scientists to conduct research which seeks to understand and 
quantify the sources, pathways and impacts of pollutants in urban waterways in general 
and the Puget Sound in particular. The UWT coordinates many programs and 
partnerships at the Center for Urban Waters in support of its scientific mission: (1) the 
Puget Sound Institute, (2) the Encyclopedia of Puget Sound, (3) the Washington 
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Stormwater Center, and (4) the Clean Water Innovation Laboratory.  
1. Puget Sound Institute.  
The Puget Sound Institute is a cooperative agreement between the University 
of Washington, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, and the Puget Sound 
Partnership. The Institute seeks to synthesize various streams of scientific 
research, ensure robust and rigorous analysis, and create a forum for the 
transparent discussion and dissemination of science in support of the restoration 
and protection of the Puget Sound ecosystem (UWT, 2017). The institute achieves 
this by doing the following: it brings together scientists, engineers and policy 
makers to work difficult issues faced in the restoration and protection of Puget 
Sound. The Institute provides expert advice that is based on the best-available 
science; and it serves as the bridge between the scientific community and those 
charged with restoring and protecting Puget Sound (UWT, 2017). One example of 
how the Institute achieves its mission is convening leading authorities from a 
diversity of disciplines to conduct commissioned critical reviews and evaluations. 
These reviews are meant to provide credible, consensus-based information to key 
decision-makers and other stakeholders (UWT, 2017). Funding for the Puget 
Sound Institute comes primarily from the EPA, which provided $4 million for 
creating the Puget Sound Institute from $50 million which was appropriated for 
cleaning up Puget Sound (UWT, 2017). 
2. Encyclopedia of Puget Sound.  
The Encyclopedia of Puget Sound is an open-access web-based encyclopedia 
that is a publication of the University of Washington Puget Sound Institute, but 
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which is guided by the Puget Sound Action Agenda which is produced by the 
Puget Sound Partnership (UWT, 2015). The encyclopedia is meant to be a 
comprehensive guide to the science and practice of Salish Sea ecosystem 
recovery, with articles that describe the region's major environmental threats and 
areas of concern, and that emphasizes the facts that the Salish Sea is an estuary of 
international importance. The encyclopedia receives major support from the 
Environmental Protection Agency's National Estuary Program and it works 
closely with numerous federal and state agencies. The creators of the 
encyclopedia are scientists, policymakers and educators who find and share 
information about many aspects of the Salish Sea ecosystem and its recovery. 
Much of the content of the encyclopedia is peer reviewed in a process facilitated 
by the Puget Sound Partnership; its primary audience represents many different 
backgrounds and interests but are expected to be science-literate. A secondary 
audience are college and university-level instructors and students who use it as a 
resource and teaching tool. Another audience are scientists and policymakers 
looking for a summary of the best available science describing the Puget Sound 
ecosystem (UWT, 2015).  
3. Washington Stormwater Center.   
The Washington Stormwater Center (WSC) was established in 2010 as a 
partnership between Washington State University Puyallup (WSU) and the 
University of Washington Tacoma (UWT) with two physical locations: the UWT’s 
Center for Urban Waters, and WSU's Research and Extension Center located at 
WSC which serves as an information clearinghouse on low-impact development 
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and emerging technologies. The goal of the WSC is to protect the state's waters by 
addressing storm-water pollution which has emerged as the critical current 
pollution issue in the Puget Sound area. The WSC does this by providing 
independent, non-regulatory assistance to storm-water permittees and storm-water 
managers as they navigate the complexities and challenges of storm-water 
management. The WSC serves as the central resource in Washington state for 
integrated National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) education. 
The WSC provides technical assistance, training on storm water management, 
information on storm-water management best-practices, and new technology 
research, development, and evaluation. The Center provides tools for storm-water 
management by supporting municipalities, storm-water permittees, and businesses 
in their efforts to control storm-water and protect water quality (UWT, 2017). 
Providing technological solutions that help municipalities and businesses meet 
NPDES requirements is an innovation stimulus for water technology companies 
like Pure Stormwater of Silverdale, Washington, whose principals anticipate a 
storm-drain filtration product like theirs will be in high demand as federal and 
state lawmakers and regulators implement laws and regulations for controlling 
water pollution (Kelly, 2015). The WSC also offers a training program for low-
impact development that is now being used as a resource by state agencies and the 
state legislature to ensure that all pertinent audiences in the state receive the 
training needed to meet new stormwater regulations and codes. The Washington 
State Department of Ecology provided grant funding to begin the process of 
creating the WSC, and support Center development, overall management, and the 
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administrative strategy for the organization (UWT, 2017). Private foundations and 
the private sector have been supportive of the WSC: two Pacific Northwest 
foundations, The Bullitt Foundation and The Russell Family Foundation, and the 
Boeing Company jointly fund the director’s position at the WSC, as well as the 
center’s long-range business-planning efforts (Kelly, 2015). 
4. Clean Water Innovation Laboratory.  
The mission of the Center for Urban Water includes both driving economic 
development in the Tacoma region, and restoring and sustaining the natural 
ecosystem of the Puget Sound. These tasks require the application of both science 
and technology. The Center for Urban Waters therefore has an integral role to play 
in supporting Tacoma's new Urban Clean Water Innovation Partnership Zone 
(IPZ). This supporting role will require collaborations between local research 
universities, private sector scientists and engineers, and government experts which 
is designed to increase the likelihood that new knowledge and inventions will 
make their way into new water technology products and services (UWT, 2012 & 
2017b). This process of research & development, technology transfer, and 
commercialization is a well-established path to building and expanding 
technology companies and creates jobs. This innovation and entrepreneurial 
process helps to achieve the goal of Tacoma's economic development leaders, the 
leadership of both UWT and WSU, and the IPZ program to build a clean water 
technology cluster (UWT, 2012, 2017b).  
Commencement Bay has for several decades provides a unique real-life 
laboratory for addressing many water quality issues affecting urban centers and 
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the natural environment. To leverage this history, public and private interests 
across the Tacoma region have been building an impressive collection of science 
laboratories to support high-level environmental research. This research capacity 
enables the region to grow and strengthen current local assets in environmental 
science, while building innovative programs in environmental engineering; and 
the considerable local investments in research and development publicly signals a 
commitment to make Tacoma the regional and global center of excellence for 
clean water technologies (UWT, 2012, 2017b). 
The laboratories at the Center for Urban Waters, UWT and WSU were funded 
in part out of a $13.5 million package which the Washington State legislature 
funded through the Department of Commerce to provide IPZs across the state 
with enhanced facilities and infrastructure. The Department of Commerce 
approved an application to establish an Urban Clean Water Technology IPZ in 
2012 provided the UWT with $2 million for a new 'Clean Water Innovation 
Development and Technology Transfer Laboratory,' which was in remodeled 
space on the UWT campus. The Department of Commerce also provided the 
Center for Urban Waters with $800,000 for specialized lab equipment to support 
the commercial development of clean water technologies (UWT, 2012, 2017b). In 
addition, the WSU's Puyallup Research and Extension Center, which partners with 
UW Tacoma on the IPZ and other applied science initiatives, also receives 
$800,000 to modify its Salmon Toxicology Lab into a multi-use Aquatic 
Toxicology Lab.  
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VII. Water Technology Networking 
A. Wellspring Conferences  
 Networks, communication, personal relationships and community ties and are 
vital for the success of business clusters and ecosystems (Porter, 1998). To help ensure 
that market, technical, and competitive information accumulates within the Tacoma 
cluster, the IPZ created the Wellspring conferences, and hosted three consecutive 
conferences between 2012 and 2014, to bring together local, national and international 
experts in water policy and management to present their ideas and share their 
experiences. Conferences facilitate local and national vendors of water technologies and 
services to showcase their offerings. The first conference in 2012 was organized by the 
Economic Development Board of Tacoma-Pierce County and hosted at the University of 
Washington Tacoma (UWT). The theme of this conference was the “sharing ideas to 
build a water economy” in the region. Although Tacoma has a lot to learn from the 
experiences of others, the city also has much knowledge and experience to share about 
how to manage complex water quality issues amid a complex natural ecosystem of 
immeasurable beauty and economic and aesthetic value. The clean-up to the Thea Foss 
and Wheeler-Osgood Waterways taught Tacoma much about environmental remediation. 
The area is successfully transitioning from a once polluted waterfront real estate into 
assets of new uses and purposes. One of the important issues identified by the 2012 
conference was the challenges presented by the lack of national standards and absence of 
permitting reciprocity across states which increased the time and costs associated with 
testing and approval of technologies. One solution to this challenge was seen to be the 
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creation of a national water technology network for organizing and coordinating water 
innovation clusters across North America.  
 The second Wellspring conference was held in October 2013 and again hosted by 
the UWT.  The theme of this conference was advanced waste-and-storm-water 
management and clean water technologies, and the topics covered included remediation 
and filtration systems, the effects of pollutants on biological systems, government 
regulatory trends impacting public and private water sectors, policy fragmentation, and 
the disconnect between water networks worldwide. The attendees were able to listen to, 
and gain ideas and insights, from nearly 20 expert presenters. Attendees were afforded the 
opportunity to participate in a guided tour of three Tacoma locations using current storm-
water management techniques. The Water Partners of Tacoma, Washington hosted its 2nd 
annual Wellspring Conference in October, at the University of Washington-Tacoma. The 
planners considered the conference a huge success as it was attended by hundreds of 
water professionals and innovators from around the world, a 60 percent increase in 
turnout from 2012. 
 The third Wellspring conference was held in 2014 and was hosted by the Water 
Partners of Tacoma. The themes of this conference were the idea that water, 
sustainability, economic development, clean water technology, water management, and 
sustainability in a field that is experiencing unprecedented change and unpredictability 
from water emergencies, climate change, extreme weather, storm-water events, and 
natural disasters. The attendees discussed the emergence of water technology innovation 
clusters all over the country, and how each cluster focused on developing innovative 
solutions to largely local problems and scaling those solutions to national and global 
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customers. The attendees all agreed the time had arrived to formalize a national network 
of water innovation clusters around information exchange projects, evaluation of new 
technologies, compiling best practices, improving access to financing, strengthening 
entrepreneurship, overcoming obstacles in the rapidly evolving industry, and developing 
increased capacity for policy change advocacy. Also discussed was the critical economic 
role played by water in the performance of many key Washington State industries, from 
agriculture and tourism to manufacturing and mining. The 2014 Wellspring Conference 
featured more than 30 speakers and was attended by hundreds of delegates from across 
the country, including water professionals from both the private and public sectors, 
engineers, elected officials, foundations and NGOs, private business consultants, 
financial institutions, and sustainability experts (Stroo, 2014) 
VIII. Prior Cleanup Efforts - Thea Foss and Wheeler-Osgood Waterways 
 In the 100 years up to the 1960s, when Tacoma grew to become a major industrial 
center, the city was home to lumber mills, a cement factory, petroleum processing plants, 
a chemical processing plant, and ship-building operations. These factories and the 
surrounding communities dumped industrial wastes, raw sewerage and untreated storm-
water into the waterways of the Puget Sound, without restriction, under the false 
assumption that the waters of the Sound would eventually be carried away by the tides 
into the Pacific Ocean where the open water would safely dilute their toxic effect. What 
happened instead was that pollutants settled onto the floor of the waterways, either by 
bonding with the sediments or by being trapped within the Sound by a combination of the 
irregular shape of the estuary floor and the different densities of salt and fresh waters. 
This historical practice led to the accumulation of more than 1 million cubic yards, and 
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more than 125 acres, of contaminated sediments on land and in waters of Tacoma; to the 
detection and identification of more than 1,000 man-made compounds and metals in the 
bottom sediments; and to the identification of more than 150 potential pollution sources 
in the city. Prior to 1981, when the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)placed 
Tacoma among its top 10 national priorities for cleanup, there had been no significant 
coordinated efforts or investment of money to try to fix the environmental problems of 
Tacoma's waterways; however, after EPA designated the Thea Foss and Wheeler-Osgood 
waterways and Commencement Bay as Superfund cleanup sites a more concerted local 
effort began to take shape, backed by the necessary leadership and resources.  
 Between 1983 and 2006 the City of Tacoma - in partnership with agencies, 
organizations, property owners and other responsible parties - invested about $105 
million to clean up its waterways and construct four new habitat restoration sites at the 
Middle Waterway Tide-flats, North Beach, Puyallup River Side Channel and Hylebos 
Creek which the City now monitors under the Environmental Stewardship Project. A fifth 
habitat restoration project has been constructed at Swan Creek, but this is monitored 
through an agreement with the Port of Tacoma. The cost of the cleanup was shared 
between as follows: $56.5 million from surface water rates from the City of Tacoma, 
$24.5 million in grants from the Washington State Department of Ecology, $13 million in 
private contributions, $7.3 million from PacifiCorp and Puget Sound Energy, and $3.7 
million from the Washington State Department of Natural Resources. The restoration 
project primarily involved a combination of habitat restoration, and the removing or 
capping in place of sediments contaminated by more than a century of environmentally 
detrimental practices; however, the ongoing protection of the waterways required that 
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pollution be traced through the city's subterranean maze of sewerage and storm-water 
drainage pipes to its many sources. While some areas of the Thea Foss Waterway were 
capped with clean sediments to contain some of the contamination in place, between 
2002 to 2006 about 425,000 cubic yards of contaminated sediments were dredged from 
the waterways and the toxic sediment buried in a sealed disposal site, under a permanent 
cap, behind a containment berm in the nearby St. Paul Waterway. The site for this 
disposal facility was made available in a partnership agreement with Simpson Tacoma 
Kraft pulp mill, for whom the 12 acres land is now available for environmentally 
appropriate industrial development. The final cap from the Superfund cleanup action on 
the Thea Foss Waterway occurred back in February 2006. 
 The designation of Tacoma as a Superfund site was not universally embraced by 
all segments of Tacoma society: some say it as a stain on the reputation of the city that 
could impact its attractiveness to investors, visitors and residents. Others were concerned 
that the clean-up would impose an unfair economic burden on the city. Over time, 
however, Tacoma's leaders came to see the clean-up as an opportunity to improve the 
waterways and revitalize the struggling downtown and declining industrial core of the 
city for both residents and businesses. Tacoma also viewed the cleanup as an opportunity 
to raise property values which would positively impact the public coffers. The 1983 
designation of the Thea Foss Waterway as a Superfund offered the City of Tacoma, the 
Tacoma Planning Commission, and the Community and Economic Development 
Department a unique opportunity to rally a coalition of stakeholders around a common 
redevelopment vision for the City; to lead this coalition through a challenging process of 
transforming a declining community and Superfund site into one of the premier mixed-
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use waterfront communities in the United States. In the process Tacoma struck a balance 
between preserving historic and traditional uses of the waterfront, while creating new 
opportunities for education, recreation, housing, and economic development. In 1990, 
Tacoma voluntarily took the lead in redeveloping the water front by purchasing and 
cleaning-up for future development 27 acres of Thea Foss Waterway land. In 1992 the 
city developed a plan and put forward a vision of a revitalized waterfront that included 
hotels, retail space, public access, parks, and restaurants that both residents and visitors 
could enjoy, and that would offer the city a long-term return on its investment. To 
coordinate and expedite redevelopment of the waterfront, the City of Tacoma established 
the Foss Waterway Public Development Authority in 1996 as the coordinating agency for 
the waterfront's development. This represents the city's commitment to local economic 
development. The 'design and development' phase of the Thea Foss Waterway 
redevelopment program was completed in 1998, and the program has subsequently 
benefited from being made a federally designated Renewal Community. This designation 
has allowed the city to allocated $12 million in annual tax deductions which, in turn, 
allows the City to create financial incentives for developers such as a 10-year property 
tax exemption for new residential construction of four units or more to encourage 
investment in the area.  
 Although the entire vision for the revitalized Tacoma waterfront has yet to be 
realized, the achievements of the Thea Foss Waterway project has brought the city 
national and international recognition for urban redevelopment. It has also allowed the 
city, its government agencies, and it partners in industry and higher education to develop 
unique expertise in environmental remediation and clean water technology; and it 
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requires the city to ensure it has the capabilities and capacity to keep pollution is kept in 
check and ensure the environment stays clean. Tacoma has emerged as a real-world 
laboratory for researching and testing clean water technologies and products, and for 
finding sustainable solutions for restoring and protecting precious and vulnerable estuary 
ecosystems.  
The development project faces many challenges going forward. First, the success 
of redevelopment in the urban core of a city depends on increases in population density to 
support business through consumer spending. Developers must be assured of an attractive 
return on their investment. A major issue slowing progress on the waterway project is that 
relatively low number of people who live and work in downtown Tacoma. For the full 
realization of the redevelopment vision, the city and its partners must ways to increase 
the number of residents and visitors. Second, success depends on keeping the waterway 
clean, and since the cleanup was completed in 2006 this has been the focus. The city, 
under a plan developed jointly with EPA, will employ several different types of ongoing 
monitoring from chemical tests of sediment samples, to underwater surveys, to 
monitoring the health of the sea life; and to prevent a recurrence of pollution the city has 
developed what has become a nationally recognized stormwater quality programs that are 
probably to date the most comprehensive in the United States, to dramatically reduce the 
level of contaminates entering the waterway. Third, success requires the maintenance of 
consensus among key stakeholders. While there has been considerable redevelopment on 
the west Foss waterfront, the future of the east Foss waterfront remains unclear because 
many port industries have opposed the development of condominiums on the waterway’s 
industrial side. The one major new development on the east waterfront that has been 
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acceptable to all stakeholders has been the Urban Waters Institute. Despite many 
challenges and some disagreements, the historic cleanup of Tacoma’s Thea Foss and 
Wheeler-Osgood Waterways has largely been a success: aquatic life is slowly returning to 
the waterways; people live a row of new condominium buildings with nearly 1,000 
residential units that line a bustling promenade that passes along a leafy park, restaurants 
and museums. People play on a clean waterway which also has a marina filled with boats. 
(Nunnally, 2016) 
IX.  Application of Porter’s Diamond Model 
A. Factor Conditions 
 Tacoma, and the wider Puget Sound region, is endowed with a considerable base 
of factor conditions from which to build and support a strong water economy and a water 
technology industry. With regards to basic factors, Tacoma is endowed with considerable 
fresh water which comes from a combination of high rainfall and snow packs which feed 
numerous rivers and streams. The Puget Sound estuary supports fishing and recreation; 
and the Puget Sound also provides Tacoma with a gateway to global markets through its 
ports.  With regards to advanced factors, Tacoma is endowed with a highly skilled 
workforce, many scientists and engineers, modern logistics and telecommunications, and 
access to sophisticated financial products. Washington State has been ranked as one of the 
top ten states in terms of quality of life (Hess & Frohlich, 2014). The state is part of one 
of the most vibrant regional economies in the United States, and is home to firms like 
Microsoft, Amazon, Infosys, HCL Technologies, Boeing, Cosco, and Starbucks (Kotkin, 
2013); and the State is home to 15 Fortune 1,000 companies (clustermapping.us, 2017).  
  With regards to advanced and specialized factors, Tacoma is also well endowed. 
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In 2010, 32.3% of Washington's workforce had a bachelor’s degree or higher, which is 
slightly higher than the national median of 27.74%; it compares favorably with 
Wisconsin at 25.79% and Ohio at 24.14%; but it lags Massachusetts at 38.29% 
(clustermapping.us, 2017). In 2014 the state awarded 14,716 scientific degrees in a 
population of about 7.2 million, which is slightly higher than the national median of 
9,378; it compares favorably with Wisconsin at 14,196 with 5.7 million people; but lags 
Ohio at 28, 894 with 11.6 million people, and Massachusetts at 38,038 with 6.8 million 
people (US Census 2017; clustermapping.us 2017). In 2010, the percentage of the 
Washington workforce made up of advanced scientific workers is 0.28%, compared to 
both Wisconsin and Ohio who were at the national median of 0.19% of the workforce; 
but it lags Massachusetts at 0.56% (clustermapping.us 2017). Between 2006-10, the 
number of scientific workers in Washington grew by 2.81% per year, which is higher than 
the national average; it compares favorably with Wisconsin at 2.7% and exceeds Ohio at 
1.38%; but it lags Massachusetts at 3.3% (clustermapping.us, 2017). In 2010, venture 
capital in the Seattle MSA was $11 per capita compared to the national median of $1, 
which also applies to Milwaukee and Cincinnati MSA; but it lags Massachusetts at $29 
(clustermapping.us 2017). In 2014, R&D expenditure in the state was $2,692 per capita, 
compared to a national median of $1,019; it exceeds Wisconsin at $1,005 and Ohio at 
$1,035; but lags far behind Massachusetts at $4,140; while Washington's federal funding 
for R&D per capital was $138 compared to a national media of $107, which is similar to 
Wisconsin at $117 and Ohio at $108, but it lags far behind  Massachusetts at $310 
(clustermapping.us, 2017). The State has historically had many water-intensive and 
water- enabled industries – such a pulp and paper, smelting, and chemicals – but the 
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generous availability of fresh water, a basic factor condition, and the ability to discharge 
waste into a salt water body, stifled innovation in the water economy and the water 
technology industry. The water economy is now beginning to upgrade, supported by a 
generous base of advanced and specialized factors. 
B. Demand Conditions 
 The historical presence of water-intensive and water-enabled industries in 
Washington State such as fishing, agriculture, hydro-power, smelting, pulp and paper, oil 
refining, and chemicals created a base domestic demand for water technologies. This can 
be seen from the sample of long-established water technology firms such as Romac 
Industries of Bothell, Nelson Irrigation of Walla Walla, Itron of Liberty Lake, and 
Northwest Pipe of Vancouver. Many of the state's traditional industries have gone into 
decline or have been shut down altogether. The ample supply of fresh water, and few 
restrictions on the disposal of wastes into the Puget Sound all combined to weaken 
demand for innovative water technologies. Long-term declines in traditional industries 
spanning decades and the recent impacts of the Great Recession of 2008 have slowed 
investments in water technologies, causing some existing firms to contract and others to 
retrench, reducing the number of new entrants into the industry, and discouraging existing 
firms from elsewhere to locate in the Tacoma region - despite marketing efforts by the 
Tacoma IPZ to build relationships with a national network of water technology firms 
(City of Tacoma, 2011, 2015; Virgin, 2015; Green, Woodson & Zerr, 2016). The state is 
currently, however, the largest producer of hydro-power in the United States; it is one of 
the largest producers of agricultural products, with 1.7 million acres of irrigated crop land 
annually generating about $4.8 billion in crops, which is slightly more than half of all 
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agricultural output; and fish-bearing waters generates about $1.3 billion a year 
(Washington Department of Ecology, 2010; EPA, 2016). 
 The current national and global technological trends are, however, towards water 
technologies which improve the efficiency of water use and guarantee water quality. One 
emerging stimulus for Washington's water technology firms to innovate has been less 
reliable supplies of fresh water to the west of the Cascades, because of over-abstraction of 
surface water; and increasing drought conditions to the east of the Cascades, which gets 
one-quarter the rainfall of the Puget Sound, due to climate change (EPA, 2016). The 
primary stimuli for Washington's water technology firms to innovate, however, has been 
the Clean Water Act of 1972, and the declaration of several areas of the Puget Sound as 
Superfund sites which meant federal mandates to local governments to carry out 
environmental remediation and to protect against further pollution. Despite the Great 
Recession and budget restrictions, the greatest source of demand for innovative water 
technologies seems to come from the public sector: public water, waste-water and storm-
water treatment systems represent the largest customer group in the sector; demands for 
environmental remediation, such as the multi-decade cleanup of the Thea Foss & 
Wheeler-Osgood waterways, represent another source of demand; and the emerging 
requirements for technologies to support low impact development (City of Tacoma, 2011, 
2015; Virgin, 2015; Green, Woodson & Zerr, 2016). These are areas for which there is 
growing national and global demand, worth potentially trillions of dollars over the next 
several decades, and several of the State's public water entities and private water 
technology firms have been making inroads into markets in Asia, South America, and 
Central America (Barringer, 2014; Virgin, 2015). The public utility industry, driven by 
 
 298   
  
demands to meet stringent regulations for water quality and pollution control, represents 
a sophisticated local consumer, a large and stable local market, and a platform from 
which to launch a globally competitive water technology industry.  
C. Related & Supporting Industries 
 The success of water technology firms is closely linked to many related industries 
such as clean energy, oil and gas, and information and communication technologies, and 
supporting industries such as universities, research facilities, government agencies, and 
technology firms which provide direct inputs such as components or software. Tacoma 
and the Puget Sound region possesses both categories of industries. The Tacoma IPZ is 
directly supported by two universities – University of Washington Tacoma and 
Washington State University's Puyallup Research and Extension Center – and a new 
public-private research and public policy facility – the Center for Urban Waters.  The 
offices of the United States Geological Service's Washington Water Science Center are in 
Tacoma a few blocks from UWT. It is a major resource for information on the State's 
rivers, streams and lakes, and its extensive satellite network of stream-gauging stations 
form the backbone of the state's flood-warning systems. This emphasis on supporting 
industries is related to the position that the water economy has political, social, economic 
and environmental aspects; and that solutions to problems in the water economy requires 
social and engineering solutions, and governance and regulation that goes beyond hard 
science (Stroo, 2014). There are, however, some concerns about the long-term research 
and technological capacity supporting the water technology industry. Concerns have been 
raised that too much of the research is closer to social science than the basic or applied 
science and technology which is required to build a viable technology sector (Miller, 
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2017). 
 The nature of water technology is evolving from devices that are primarily 
mechanical, towards devices that are primarily information and communication 
technology (ICT). Tacoma is well placed to leverage that trajectory because of the large 
concentration of ICT firms in Washington State, numbering about 14,000 firms, such as 
Microsoft and Infosys, employing about 200,000 people including game developers, 
programmers and software engineers (Washington State Department of Commerce, 
2017). Technological trends in the water industry are going to be dominated by Big Data, 
the Internet of Things, online customer engagement, smart meters, machine learning and 
automation, leak detection, and real-time water quality monitoring sensors which require 
the incorporation of ICT into water devices (Siegel, 2015; Ben-Dak, 2017; Barclay's 
Impact Series, 2017). This trend towards more employment of ICT-related devices by 
water-intensive-and-water-enabled industries and water utilities, offers opportunities to 
reduce the waste of water, reduce the use of energy, increase the resilience of facilities, 
and streamline operational performance (Ben-Dak, 2017). The water utility industry is an 
energy intensive industry and Washington is emerging as a center for clean energy 
(Young, 2017). This also presents opportunities for mutually beneficial collaborations 
across two emerging clean industries – water and energy (Meola, 2016).  
D. Firm Strategy, Structure, & Rivalry 
 The economic history and natural ecology of Tacoma and the Puget Sound have 
shaped firm strategy, industry structure and degree of rivalry of the water technology 
industry in Washington State. Older water technology firms arose to support logging and 
lumber, pulp and paper, chemicals, smelting, oil refining, and agriculture; current water 
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technology firms, whether startup or well-established, are more likely to support clean 
manufacturing, water-and-energy conservation, waste-water treatment, storm-water 
treatment, environmental remediation, and low-impact development. Romac Industries of 
Bothell for example designs, manufactures, and sells water valves, couplings, sleeves, 
fittings and tools, and other pipe products for the water and waste-water industry. 
Romac’s products are critical for keeping water and waste-water distribution, collection, 
and treatment systems operating efficiently and safely; however, the products are unseen 
to all but the engineers and technicians who work in the water industry (Virgin, 2015). 
The company was founded in 1969 with two employees and today its workforce stands at 
several hundred; its original offering was the first all stainless-steel repair clamp; its value 
proposition includes first-rate customer service, high quality products, continual 
innovation of new products, and fast product delivery. It invests consistently in R&D 
spending and in applying for new patents (Virgin, 2015; Bloomberg, 2017). Romac 
Industries has a simple supply chain because it keeps nearly all phases of manufacturing 
in-house - to include gaskets - to ensure that parts can be made to exact specifications, 
meet unique requirements, and ensure that design changes can be made quickly. Romac 
Industries is headquartered in Bothell, Washington with facilities in Seattle, Washington; 
Dallas, Texas; and Charlotte, North Carolina.  
 Itron of Liberty Lake is a world-leading technology and services company with a 
broad product portfolio that measures, manages and analyzes energy and water to ensure 
its efficient use. Some of the specific products include electricity, gas, water and thermal 
energy measurement devices and control technology. Other products include utility 
prepayment systems, including smart key, keypad, and smart card communication 
 
 301   
  
technologies; advanced and smart network collection technologies employing a range of 
handheld, mobile, and fixed devices; meter data management software; as well as 
knowledge management applications and consulting services (Bloomberg, 2017b). In 
2013 the company claimed that a major contract in Mumbai, India for smart meters was 
able to cut water losses by 50% after installation of Intron's smart, remotely read meters 
(Bloomberg, 2013). The company, which was founded in 1977, now has 450 workers in 
Spokane and 2,200 worldwide; it has 27 manufacturing and 49 facilities; it has nearly 
8,000 customers in more than 100 countries. It has annual revenues of more than $500 
million (Dobosz, 2011; Bloomberg, 2017b). Intron has over the years acquired many 
companies to strengthen their portfolio; and it has also engaged in many partnerships 
with high technology companies. In 2013, Itron and Cisco formed an alliance to deliver 
Internet Protocol (IP) communications to the smart grid market revolutionizing 
networking capabilities for utilities. Itron is also a partner of Microsoft's CityNext, 
helping with global Smart City initiatives; and it is a founding member of the Smart 
Cities Council, having joined in 2013 (Bloomberg, 2017b). Itron has received numerous 
awards and recognition, to include national recognition from the White House in 2010 for 
its commitment to manufacturing in the United States and its contributions to a clean 
energy economy.  
 The oldest company in our discussion is Nelson Irrigation Corporation of Walla 
Walla, WA. Nelson has been associated with manufacturing and irrigation products for 
over 100 years when it opened as Central Brass and Stamping Company in Peoria, 
Illinois in 1911. This company later became L.R. Nelson Mfg. Co. Inc., which ultimately 
was sold in 1972. Nelson Irrigation was founded at the time of the sale and moved to 
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Walla Walla after the Port of Walla Walla provided a 15,000 square foot facility for 
manufacturing (Townsend, 2014). In the nearly four decades since its founding, Nelson 
irrigation has been an innovator in the agricultural irrigation industry where it designs, 
develops, manufactures, and sells irrigation products around the globe (Nelson, 2017). Its 
product range includes pivot products, sprinklers, irrigation control valves and systems, 
pressure regulators, spinners and sprays, sprinkler stakes and tube assemblies, and impact 
sprinklers for agricultural, environmental, and industrial applications (Bloomberg, 2017). 
The company also provides irrigation design software that helps dealers to create 
irrigation designs. It has sold millions of its products through a network of dealers and 
distributors worldwide; about one-third of its products are sold overseas; its annual 
revenues are almost $50 million; and it employs about 200 people (Townsend, 2014; 
Nelson, 2017; Bloomberg, 2017). Nelson Irrigation values innovation and the company 
has 74 active U.S. and foreign patents which it sees as key to its future competitive 
position. Its success in innovation and quality extends to processes, having designed a 
robot to assemble sprinklers and in seeking to achieve zero defects in its products 
(Townsend, 2014) 
 Finally, Northwest Pipe of Vancouver which is the largest manufacturer in North 
America of engineered steel pipes for water and waste-water utilities, the energy industry, 
and numerous other industrial applications from mining and quarrying, to agriculture, 
construction and structural work, and fire protection. Northwest Pipe Company was 
founded in 1966 in Clackamas, Oregon with 20 employees. The company initially 
focused on the agriculture and wood products market before growing to become a major 
West Coast producer of steel pipe for the water and energy markets; at its peak it grew to 
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50 employees in Vancouver and 1,200 others across the United states, although it has 
been recently forced to restructure and downsize its workforce to 650 globally. It has 
annual revenues of close to $500 million (Copenhaver, 2016). The company has faced 
mixed fortunes over the years. In its first decade the company struggled to build market 
share; it was hard hit by the Great Recession; in recent years it has once again sustained 
losses, been plagued by overcapacity, and has had to lay off staff and close plants; it is 
looking to lean manufacturing to improve productivity; and it is refocusing on its core 
business, water transmission pipes (Sherwood, 2013; Copenhaver, 2016). Luckily for 
Northwest Pipes, welded steel pipes for water transmission involves the manufacturing 
and supply of a completely engineered system that will stand up to soil pressure, the 
corrosive characteristics in any type of soil, and have the flow characteristics that meet 
the customer specifications, making it a process that is anything but routine and hard to 
replicate (Farr, 2015). Despite its internal challenges, Northwest Pipe continues to 
innovate. One recent example is a partnership with Portland-based Lucid Energy to 
jointly develop and commercialize a steel pipe that generates electricity when water runs 
through it. In 2012, Portland, Oregon signed a contract to be the first city to test out this 
emerging technology (Sherwood, 2013). Northwest Pipe is also betting that its future will 
lie significantly with infrastructure, which has the potential to make its business portfolio 
more stable to the effects of economic cycles. Northwest Pipes believes that the water 
transmission side of Northwest Pipe’s business, which is driven by long-term city water 
projects and population demographics, is looking strong. It is concerned that much of the 
rest of its business portfolio will likely lag in the coming years (Sherwood, 2013; Bell, 
2009). In 2012, Northwest Pipe signed a $69 million deal to supply pipeline to a water 
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project in Texas. It is hoping to win a contract for as much as $50 million in pipes, out of 
a planned $274 million Michigan water project (Bell, 2009). Northwest Pipes is also 
pursuing remedies against foreign competitors with the International Trade Commission, 
which is currently reviewing oil-pipe imports from nine countries. If Northwest Pipe gets 
its way, imports from these countries would face new tariffs, making its products more 
competitive in this country. 
 These four firms suggest that the firms in the water technology innovation cluster 
do not face the vigorous local rivalry that can stimulate productivity and competitiveness 
by creating a pressure to upgrade factors, innovate processes and products, and find new 
markets. For older firms there may even be a measure of path-dependency which comes 
from the local economic context in which these firms arose. However, all the firms 
discussed demonstrate that competitive firms must continually evolve or reinvent 
themselves to remain relevant in the marketplace. Washington State's water technology 
firms are more likely to face competition from overseas, which can be particularly 
challenging for firms whose products involve more basic and easily replicated 
technologies; however, technologies like trench-less piping are complete engineering 
solutions that go beyond simply supplying pipes. In markets for these specialized 
products and services, Washington firms like Northwest Pipes continue to have a 
competitive advantage for the near future. There appears to be a trend whereby firms are 
upgrading their competitive capacity by employing advanced factors, focusing on core 
strengths, and leverage capabilities unique to the firm to gain a competitive advantage. 
This trend is particularly strong when water technology firms can draw on the 
considerable ICT capacity and capabilities available in the Seattle region.  
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E. Role of Government and Chance Events 
 The role of government and chance events does not directly create innovative and 
competitive firms, but it can be significant in shaping the direction and magnitude of each 
of the four determinants, by influencing how the determinants interact, by shaping the 
context in which firms must compete, or by creating the incentives or disincentives which 
firms face. The first way in which government can support the development of clusters 
and encourage the growth of competitive firms and industries is through its procurement, 
especially for infrastructure, and acting as a demanding customer (Porter, 1990, 1998, 
2000). Both Intron and Northwest Pipes depend to a considerable degree on municipal 
projects for fresh, waste and storm water systems.  
 A second way in which government can support the upgrading of existing 
clusters, the entry of new firms with innovative technologies, and encourage the growth 
of competitive firms and industries is through more stringent health, safety and 
environmental regulations which raise product, process or performance standards (Porter, 
1990, 1998, 2000). The Clean Water Act (1972), the designation of Commencement Bay 
as a Superfund Site, and other regulations for waste and storm-water have encouraged 
technicians, city engineers, public utilities, universities, and private water technology 
firms to invest in the science and practice of water resource management, and to find 
innovative solutions to prevent pollution and to restore natural ecosystems damaged by 
years of uncontrolled pollution. The startup Pure Stormwater of Silverdale, Washington, 
is an example of a technology firm rising to the challenge of reducing pollutants in storm-
water, which is now the greatest sources of pollution in U.S. waterways. Pure Stormwater 
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is developing a line of storm drain filtration basins to filter hydrocarbons, metals and 
other contaminants from storm-water before it enters the storm drain system and flows 
out into local bodies of water (Jerome, 2015; Kelly, 2015).   
 A third way in which government can support the upgrading of existing clusters, 
or nurture nascent clusters, is through support for education and training which promotes 
the creation of advanced and specialized factors. In support of Tacoma's IPZ, the State 
government allocated $2 million to the University of Washington Tacoma for a new 
laboratory at the Tacoma Campus, and $800,000 for specialized equipment for the 
laboratory at the Center for Urban Waters. The state government also allocated $800,000 
to Washington State University's Puyallup Research and Extension Center to modify its 
Salmon Toxicology Lab into a multi-use Aquatic Toxicology Lab (UWT, 2017). A Port of 
Tacoma Endowed Chair was created for the UWT, and this was funded by four 
contributors: The Port of Tacoma with $1 million, the City of Tacoma and SSA Marine 
with $500,000 each, and the UWT Foundation with $1 million.   
 A fourth way in which the government can support the upgrading of existing 
clusters, or nurture nascent clusters, is through public-private economic development 
partnerships, especially when there is the absence of an industry association. 
Washington's IPZ program encourages regions to form partnerships between public and 
private sector organizations, academic and research institutions, and workforce education 
and training entities, to address regional economic challenges, grow firms, create jobs, 
develop patentable ideas, and commercialize viable technologies. Washington State lacks 
a dedicated water technology industry association; and although many industry 
stakeholders see the value of a vibrant cluster and a strong industry association, “it 
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remains a fragmented and semi-organized affair” (Virgin, 2015).  Tacoma's IPZ is 
attempting to address this absence and has brought together the City of Tacoma, the Port 
of Tacoma, the University of Washington Tacoma, the Economic Development Board for 
Tacoma-Pierce County, the Tacoma Community College, the Institute for Environmental 
Research and Education, and several private water technology firms. Here, though, 
governments acting in the role of industry facilitator should proceed with caution, as 
industry associations tend to serve as better advocates for private capital (Porter, 1990, 
1998, 2000). 
 Chance events, although they are beyond the control of firms, can play an 
important role in stimulating innovation and entrepreneurship and in shifting competitive 
advantage in many industries.   One example involves Northwest Pipe in the early 1980s, 
when the company was pivotal in alleviating the water issues which stemmed from the 
eruption of Mount St. Helens in Washington in 1980. After the eruption the U.S. Army 
Corps of Engineers used 3,600 feet of pipe manufactured by Northwest to divert water 
from a failing dam away from several endangered communities. The pipe – which was 
buried in trenches carved through avalanche rubble, volcanic ash, sinkholes, erosion 
channels and enormous chunks of ice - maintained its integrity despite the continuous 
shifting of the ground. This project demonstrated the effectiveness of Northwest's 
products and services and contributed to the company's growth at the time (Farr, 2015). 
The success of individual firms, and of entire clusters, is not guaranteed, even if 
governments and private actors actively work to establish a viable, growing cluster. One 
example is Hydrovolts, the Seattle startup, which has been developing generators that 
produce clean power, but which work off existing flows of water like those found in 
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irrigation canals, municipal waterways, industrial waterfalls, as well as in tidal currents 
(Bloomberg, 2017). Hydrovolts' turbines don’t require expensive new infrastructure; and 
although they generate only 1 to 20 kilowatts each, depending on stream velocity, they 
can be grouped to produce more power. Hydrovolts was founded in 2007 as Puget Sound 
Tidal Power, after its future Chief Executive Officer was hired to help the City of Tacoma 
explore tidal energy opportunities in the Tacoma Narrows waterway. Although the 
conclusion was that the Puget Sound had promising hydro-kinetics potential, the 
environmental regulations and permitting burdens in the Sound's waterways were 
insurmountable at a large scale. The company, which won the 2011 Water-Energy Nexus 
Prize in San Francisco for its technology, and raised $1.5 million in 2012 alone, had been 
missing milestones, hemorrhaging money, and been unable to raise new cash to help 
close potential sales. Although it raised a total of $2.8 million from angel investors, 
Hydrovolts argued that raising additional funds was difficult in an investment climate that 
was more familiar with the business models of information and communication 
technology firms (Romano, 2013). Hydrovolts had estimated a market with huge 
potential both in the United States and in the developing world and had been buoyed by 
early interest from an Indian energy firm that had wanted to install 400 turbines on the 
Chilla Canal that feeds into the Ganges River (Chard, 2010). Hydrovolts had been 
looking to 2013 to start commercializing its turbines and had been targeting its systems 
for use in factories, water treatment plants and wastewater facilities (Cook, 2013).  
X. Conclusions 
 The City of Tacoma is in one of the most vibrant regional economies in the United 
States and is home to many of the country's leading technology and service firms. Many 
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of these globally competitive firms are in clusters for information technology, aerospace, 
logging and paper, and several others. Some of these clusters are well-established – like 
information technology and aerospace – some are emerging – like wine – and others are 
nascent – like water technology. Tacoma and the Puget Sound region in which it is 
situated have had a long economic relationship to water through natural resource 
exploitation, transportation and logistics, and urban development; and that economic 
relationship has been historically responsible for generating considerable pollution, which 
was dumped untreated into the waterways of the Sound causing considerable 
environmental damage to the region’s ecosystems. Decades of efforts to clean up the 
pollution and current efforts to prevent further pollution from both industrial sources and 
urban development have resulted in Tacoma accumulating considerable expertise in 
potentially valuable areas of environmental science and management. Washington State is 
also home to a small number of water technology firms which emerged to offer products 
and services for Washington's water intensive and water enabled industries. As the state's 
industries have evolved these firms – and the new ones that emerge – are evolving to 
serve emerging markets both in the United States and globally.  
 The Washington State water industry in general, and the water technology 
industry, is fragmented and semi-organized, like it is over much of the United States. No 
industry association yet represents the water technology industry; however, the State of 
Washington and the City of Tacoma have been working since 2011 to promote the Urban 
Clean Water Technology Zone under the state's Innovation Partnership Zone program. 
This program is meant to provide both the “hard” and “soft” infrastructure necessary for 
building and sustaining a water technology cluster. These two infrastructures are best 
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exemplified by the Center for Urban Waters with the “hard” infrastructure – of research 
facilities – and the “soft” infrastructure– of partnerships and collaborations. Progress has 
been slow and faulty, but clusters take decades to build and Tacoma's water technology 
innovation is in its very early stages. Part of the challenge that Tacoma faces, when 
compared to advanced water technology innovation clusters in places like Israel and 
Singapore, is that water scarcity and water security pose more compelling and immediate 
reasons for upgrading industry clusters. When compared to emerging clusters in places 
like Milwaukee and Cincinnati, some places are simply further along in the process of 
building a cluster and have a larger and more geographically concentrated set of partners 
than Tacoma, for whom the technology firms are scattered across the state serving a 
diverse market of public and private customers with very different needs. Tacoma's 
challenge will be to move from a public-sector led and dominated initiative to one where 
a dedicated industry association represents the interests of Washington State's water 
technology firms. 
 




WATER TECHNOLOGY CLUSTERS IN THE NETHERLANDS 
 
I. Introduction: Water in the Netherlands 
 
 The Netherlands, situated in the north-west corner of Europe, has been described 
as a hydraulic society because of its historic relationship with water. Dutch social, 
political and economic development has been significantly shaped by collective measures 
to manage both salt and fresh water. Dealing for more than eight centuries with a constant 
stream of water challenges forced Dutch society to produce continuous innovations in 
science, engineering, economics and governance to protect the people from the hazards 
associated with water, to secure an ample supply of freshwater, and to facilitate economic 
development (Lintsen, 2002; Metz & van den Heuvel, 2012; Lonnquest et al., 2014). For 
the Dutch, water has always been either too little, too much, too salty, or too dirty; and 
from addressing these challenges its scientists, engineers, policymakers, and 
administrators have accumulated considerable experience with water management, 
coastal protection, land reclamation, water supply, water quality, water reuse, the 
treatment of industrial waste-water, and the reintroduction of "used" water into the water 
cycle.  
The management of water has transformed The Netherlands into one of the most 
physically engineered landscapes on the planet: about 17% of the country's current land 
mass has been reclaimed from the sea and lakes, and without polders, dunes and dykes 
60% of the Netherlands would regularly be flooded (Lintsen, 2002; Metz & van den 
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Heuvel, 2012; Lonnquest et al., 2014). Despite the risks posed by water - with 
about one-quarter of its area and almost half of its population located below sea level - 
the Dutch have engineered one of the safest delta regions in the world. Water is both a 
threat and a resource essential to life, so the water sector is, more than any other, 
fundamental to Dutch culture and character. The Dutch water economy is the long-term 
result of a complex and constantly evolving interplay of climate, geography, population, 
economics and politics with water being both adversary and ally. 
 The Netherlands that emerged spatially, environmentally, and culturally is 
therefore a result of centuries of evolving and adapting to water management; yet despite 
these physical constraints and limited natural resources, the Dutch have created one of the 
most productive and competitive economies on the planet.  (Lintsen, 2002; Metz & van 
den Heuvel, 2012; Lonnquest et al., 2014). The Dutch government sees the water sector 
as one of nine 'top-sectors' in the economy with three primary focus areas - water 
technology; maritime technology; and delta technology - and these are concerned with 
protecting the land, conserving or generating renewable energy, designing, building, and 
operating safe and efficient ships, and developing and commercializing smart 
technologies for water recycling (OECD, 2014). The ‘top sectors’ approach is a form of 
innovation and industrial policy which focuses public resources on specific sectors and 
seeks to foster the co-ordination between businesses, knowledge institutions, and 
government actors to make these sectors more competitive. Dutch policy recognizes that 
water is essential for the health and well-being of its citizens, its industries, and its 
agriculture; that technological advantage translates into competitive advantage; that  
Dutch expertise in water technology and management is traded worldwide; and that water 
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is therefore a key element of economic development (Top Team Water, 2011).  
 There are several drivers and enablers behind the development of world-class 
Dutch expertise in water resource management and water technology 
(hollandtradeandinvest.com, 2017). Here drivers are structural features of a social, 
economic or ecological system to which society must respond; while enablers are areas 
for the exercise of human agency where society can respond to the wider social, 
economic, and environmental system in which it finds itself. The first driver is the 
country's geography and the exposure of Dutch society to both long-term and man-made 
climate changes (Lintsen, 2002; Metz & van den Heuvel, 2012; Lonnquest et al., 2014). 
The second driver is the long-term trend of a growing population, expanding economy 
and urbanization which puts pressure on scarce fresh water resources, but also threatened 
that fresh water with increasing pollution (Lintsen, 2002; Metz & van den Heuvel, 2012; 
Lonnquest et al., 2014). The first enabler is good governance and robust institutions, 
which the Dutch have gradually developed over considerable time to allocate roles and 
responsibilities, distribute benefits and burdens, ensure the availability of sufficient 
financial resources, and create networks for collaboration and coordination (Lintsen, 
2002; Lonnquest et al., 2014). The second enabler is the development of knowledge and 
skills which translate into technologies, policies, and practices for the improved 
management of water resources (Lintsen, 2002; Metz & van den Heuvel, 2012; 
Lonnquest et al., 2014). Here the Dutch developed scientific and engineering training and 
world-class educational institutions; systematically recorded, stored and disseminated 
information on water resource management and flood control; and invested both public 
and private resources in R&D, and now possess world-class research institutions. The 
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final enabler is the increasingly integrated manner in which water resources are managed, 
with the singular reliance on engineering, or 'hard', solutions giving way to multi-
disciplinary approaches that balance social, economic, environmental and engineering 
needs, and an emerging philosophy of working with nature rather than 'taming' her 
(Lintsen, 2002; Metz & van den Heuvel, 2012; Lonnquest et al., 2014).  
This chapter will show the following: (1) The Netherland’s historical relationship 
with water and how development of a national water economy was critical for 
underpinning its key political institutions and economic development; (2) The 
Netherland’s governance and institutional framework and how the country’s political 
leaders and technocrats gradually developed policies and institutions that are developing 
a financially and ecologically sustainable water economy; (3) The Netherland’s water 
resource management strategy and how it evolved exclusively from a technological and 
engineering orientation to a strategy that employs a combination of economics, science 
and technology to deliver a reliable supply of fresh water; (4) The Netherland’s 
innovation and economic development strategy and how it is continually upgrading its 
historic expertise in water resource management and water-related technologies; and (5) 
The Netherland’s competitive position in relations to its water technology sector and how 
the country is working to maintain its position as a major global exporter of flood control 
and water quality technologies.    
II. History of the Dutch Water Economy 
 The development of Dutch society, and of its the political and civic institutions, 
can be understood through an examination of the processes of change and adaptation in 
response to dynamic societal, ecological and climatological conditions. The history of the 
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Dutch water economy can be divided into roughly five periods. Each period reflects 
important changes - in the roles of national and local governments in water infrastructure 
development and management, in the state of hydraulic technology and scientific 
knowledge about water, and of socio-economic and demographic factors.  
Each of these periods can be understood in terms of tensions between competing 
philosophies of water policy and management, between various stakeholders and their 
economic and political interests, and between the technical and organizational approach 
to addressing the ever-present threat of flooding. Each of these tensions could be 
conceptualized as Dutch society being presented options that fall along a spectrum 
between the following: centralization versus decentralization of political authority; 
continuity versus path dependence of institutions; craft versus rational-scientific 
orientation of water professionals; economic development versus the limited fiscal 
capacity of the state to effect projects; flood control and public safety versus hydro-
logical and hydraulic knowledge; and project engineering versus technological capability 
(Lintsen, 2002; Lonnquest et al., 2014).  
 The five periods in the history of the Dutch water economy also provides insights 
into the process of institutional change and the diffusion of innovations within a 
hierarchical socio-technological system which eventually emerges, coalesces, and 
diffuses to create paradigm shifts in the form and function of the Dutch water economy 
(Geels, 2002; Geels & Schot, 2007). One example of the paradigm shift in the Dutch 
institutional and socio-technological landscape was the process of the diffusion of 
innovations in sanitation and hygiene, which took place roughly between 1870 and 1930 
(Geels, 2002). This shift was possible because of the convergence of a number of factors, 
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reinforcing the idea that institutional change and the diffusion of innovation takes place 
within a context: the expansion of the economy, population and urban centers; the 
development of specific water technologies; the increase in knowledge about diseases 
and their causes; the changes in cultural practices surrounding hygiene; and changes in 
public attitudes about the proper role of the state, and what should be collective versus 
individual spheres of responsibility (Geels, 2002; Geels & Schot, 2007).  
 Socio-technical systems exist at several levels within a hierarchy. At the macro-
level, or socio-technical landscape, economic and demographic expansion stimulated 
considerable urbanization, which ultimately reshaped the Dutch water economy 
(Berkhout, Smith, & Stirling, 2004). Urbanization and economic and population growth 
became important landscape drivers for the building of water and sewerage 
infrastructure; while geography, geology, and the state of public finances were important 
constraints which influenced which Dutch cities led the way in developing water and 
sanitation systems (Geels, 2002; Lintsen, 2002; Lonnquest et al., 2014). Local factors 
therefore created conditions in which a few (Geels, 2002). The initial driver for the 
provision of piped water was economic development; concerns for hygiene and public 
health came later.  
 At the meso-level, or socio-technical regime, changes in institutions, 
technologies, practices, values and attitudes, and industry structures ultimately affected 
the water economy (Berkhout, Smith, & Stirling, 2004). Coinciding with the change in 
the fiscal landscape were changes in attitudes about the appropriate level and type of state 
intervention in favor of a more interventionist state (Lintsen, 2002; Lonnquest et al., 
2014). The absence of public water and sewerage systems meant that a limited market 
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was opened for the private sector to supply water to those who could afford it, while more 
wealthy people made provisions for the independent supply of water through wells and 
catchment systems. Over time, solving the quantitative and qualitative problems of water 
supply stimulated a demand-pull for water and sewerage infrastructure at a scale beyond 
that which could be provided by the private sector. Also, at the meso-level, insights from 
new medical theories about disease and germs gradually began to take hold in the 
medical and public health fields; and new attitudes about personal hygiene and 
cleanliness slowly diffused from a more socially conscious urban elite to the working 
classes (Geels, 2002).  
 The micro-level, or socio-technical niche, is were fledgling technologies or 
radical innovations develop and take root (Berkhout, Smith, & Stirling, 2004).  In the 
1860s Louis Pasteur developed a new theory about the origin of disease based on micro-
organisms; in 1854 John Snow, a skeptic of the then-dominant miasma theory of diseases, 
traced the source of a cholera outbreak in Soho, London and launched the field of 
epidemiology; and greater affluence drove increasing demand for water closets, showers, 
baths, and soap -  all of which had been available for decades, but subject to very limited 
demand and therefore high cost. The dynamics of change within institutions and socio-
technological systems can be seen at work in the following five periods. 
A. Period 1 - Pre-1795 
The period before 1795 is often referred to as the period of the Dutch Ancien 
Regime. It was characterized by a laissez-faire political and economic regime with a 
decentralized form of Republican government, which resulted in decentralized water 
governance and management with local governments and private bodies taking primary 
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responsibility for all aspects of water resource management (Lintsen, 2002; Lonnquest et 
al., 2014). The numerous local water boards that gradually emerged after the 11th Century 
are the oldest civil water management and democratic institutions in the Netherlands, and 
their scale and scope were largely determine by local geographic and hydraulic 
characteristics. The primary focus of the water boards was flood protection and over time 
they designed and constructed increasingly sophisticated water works, which delivered 
increasing levels of flood protection, created a pool of hydraulic expertise, and 
contributed considerably to economic, social, and cultural development. 
B. Period 2 - 1798-1848. 
The period between 1798 and 1848 was shaped by the ideas of the Enlightenment, 
by the French Revolution, and by the 'enlightened despotism' associated with monarchy 
which led to the rise of national, and increasingly centralized, institutions in water 
management. Dutch society was influenced by the intellectual, scientific and political 
changes sweeping Europe which inspired it to seek new solutions to its increasing 
struggle to manage water. The political and institutional reforms of this period were to 
have a lasting impact of Dutch society and the water economy. What occurred in this 
period was a long political struggle to create national institutions to manage and finance 
complex, large-scale hydraulic projects; an equally long intellectual struggle to find 
technocratic and scientific solutions to hydraulic projects of increasing scale and scope; 
and the gradual rise of a national cadre of formally trained hydraulic engineers (Lintsen, 
2002; Lonnquest et al., 2014). 
This period of Dutch history in water management was fraught with tension and 
political struggles between factions who sought to institutionalize the French model of 
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professionalized bureaucratic-centralization, and those who sought to maintain the Dutch 
model of craft democratic-decentralization (Lintsen, 2002; Lonnquest et al., 2014). 
Complete centralization failed primarily because of fractured politics, and also because 
central government at that time lacked the financial resources, technical knowledge, 
skilled personnel, and legal instruments available at the local and regional level; complete 
decentralization also failed because regional and local governments lacked the capacity to 
manage and finance large projects; and both regimes were weakened by a lack of clarity 
about the division of responsibilities between the various scales of government (Lintsen, 
2002; Lonnquest et al., 2014). The result was a working political compromise between 
the two extremes, which emerged after 1815 and remained in place until 1848.  
Behind this period of political tension and turmoil several important 
developments in water management took place. Administratively, a national water 
resources organization, the Rijkswaterstaat, was established in 1898, and national water 
management was divided into coastal water management, river management, and internal 
water management; water management gradually became subject to legal rules and 
standardized practices; a formal bureaucracy gradually emerged with hierarchical roles 
and responsibilities, and staff positions emerged with detailed and formal job descriptions 
(Lintsen, 2002; Lonnquest et al., 2014).  Professionally, formal training grounded in 
science and scholarship was established at national institutions, and gradually a cadre of 
trained, professional engineers and administrators emerged (Lintsen, 2002; Lonnquest et 
al., 2014). Intellectually, empirical knowledge about water management was systematical 
collected, centrally archived, and available to all involved in water resource management; 
the collection of metrics on rivers and water quality, the creation of a river atlas, and the 
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performing of technical-scientific research into hydrology and hydraulics were begun; 
and the formal evaluations of water hazards, and the coordination of national responses to 
flooding and other natural disasters were instituted (Lintsen, 2002; Lonnquest et al., 
2014).  
 Dutch success as a colonial power and a capitalist state also brought enormous 
wealth, strengthened the fiscal base of the national government, and compensated for the 
fact that the Netherlands was slow to industrialize in the 19th Century compared to 
several other Western European nations. These developments in Dutch water governance 
and management indicate a combination of continuity and path dependence, as well as 
incremental change and adaptation; and it also indicates the long time-frame necessary 
for institutional change to take place. 
C. 1848-1900 
The period between 1848 and 1900 which saw the emergence of liberal 
democracy, a strong central state, and national water projects. The national government 
became increasingly entrepreneurial and willing and able to deploy public resources for 
the expansion and modernization of key infrastructure projects that were in the national 
interest, that supported economic development, and that maintained or improved the 
country's competitiveness (Lintsen, 2002; Lonnquest et al., 2014). This change in policy 
took place for several reasons: (1) a peaceful revolution in 1848 by liberal politicians laid 
the foundations of the modern liberal-democratic state, and a series of constitutional, 
legal, financial, and trade reforms provided the framework for improved management of 
the Dutch water economy (Lintsen, 2002; Lonnquest et al., 2014); (2) civil engineering 
and geographic knowledge increased, civil and mechanical technologies improved, and 
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new construction materials were developed that facilitated larger and more complex 
water infrastructure projects (Lintsen, 2002; Lonnquest et al., 2014); (3) the growth of 
tertiary institutions for the training of civilian engineers, and trade schools for the training 
of laborers, expanded the number of people with scientific, theoretical, and technological 
skills, and increased their social and professional status and political influence (Lintsen, 
2002; Lonnquest et al., 2014); (4) public finances improved as the Dutch economy 
expanded in the context of increasing world trade, the reduction in protectionism, and the 
intensive exploitation of Dutch colonies (Lintsen, 2002; Lonnquest et al., 2014); (5) the 
establishment in 1887 of the Ministry of Public Works, Trade and Industry consolidated 
the core related development portfolios of infrastructure, trade and industry and increased 
the profile and influence of engineers and other technocrats, facilitating the 
implementation of large scale projects of increasing complexity (Lintsen, 2002; 
Lonnquest et al., 2014); and (6) economic development increased demand for access to 
ports and navigable waterways in support of commerce, and to more fresh water to 
support an increasing population, urbanization, and the growing needs of agriculture 
(Lintsen, 2002; Lonnquest et al., 2014).  
All these changes were built upon the experience of the previous half century; 
however, it is important to recognize that improvements to water infrastructure and water 
resource management also required the co-evolution of geographic, geodetic, and 
cartographic infrastructure alongside developments in the legal, institutional, educational, 
and fiscal infrastructure of the Netherlands (Lintsen, 2002; Lonnquest et al., 2014). The 
scale and scope of projects required innovations in organizational structures and 
contractual arrangements: the result was a rise in public-private partnerships and a new 
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division of responsibilities with local entrepreneurs and business associations being 
actively involved in project financing and implementation, and the Dutch state 
underwriting project risk (Lintsen, 2002; Lonnquest et al., 2014). The Constitution of 
1848 and the growth of enabling legislation clearly defined the relationship between the 
different levels of government, allowing Dutch water management to pragmatically and 
gradually evolve to became one of co-governance between the various scales of 
government; it began to resolve the issue of fragmentation; and it afforded a greater role 
for parliament and civil society in decision-making about water management and 
infrastructure (Lintsen, 2002; Lonnquest et al., 2014). One unintended consequence of 
these political changes and the increasing technological complexity of water projects was 
an increase in the time for decision-making: projects which historically took 6 years to 
approve now took on average 12 years to proceed through the decision-making process 
(Lintsen, 2002; Lonnquest et al., 2014).  
D. 1900-1970 
The period between 1900 and 1970, which saw the rise of an industrial economy, 
the welfare state, centralized planning, and a water technocracy. In this period Dutch 
water resource management became a 'hydraulic technocracy'; the scale, scope, and 
complexity of water projects increased; the approach to infrastructure development 
moved from planning and implementing individual projects to regional and national 
systems of projects; the balance of power over technical policy areas shifted from 
lawyers and bureaucrats to engineers; and hydraulic administration became more 
centralized and less fragmented (Lintsen, 2002; Lonnquest et al., 2014). In the governing 
regime of a hydraulic technocracy, engineers tackle problems in accordance with their 
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scientific and technical training, and expert knowledge; empirical knowledge is replaced 
by theory, modeling, and experimentation; traditional 'shop culture' is replaced by 'school 
culture'; and technocrats define problems, identify solutions, and take decisions without 
the input or opinions of non-experts (Lintsen, 2002; Lonnquest et al., 2014). In this 
context the balance of power among actors in the field of water resource management 
shifted in favor of the central government and its agencies – a process started over 100 
years earlier – and national standards and practices were increasingly imposed on the 
water boards, thus encroaching on their autonomy (Lintsen, 2002; Lonnquest et al., 
2014).  
 The ascendancy of a hydraulic technocracy would not have been possible without 
a number of complementary developments: the Polytechnical School – which focused on 
the education of civil, marine, mechanical, and mining engineers – was elevated to 
university status in 1905; new engineering schools were opened over several decades; 
knowledge in fields such as coastal engineering, flood control, soil mechanics, and 
foundation engineering increased; and each project became a lesson for the subsequent 
projects of greater complexity as engineers built on the knowledge and experience of 
subsequent generations of civil engineers (Lintsen, 2002; Lonnquest et al., 2014). The 
gradual development of a hydraulic technocracy took place within the wider context of 
the rise of an interventionist state, a process which began in the 1890s, gained momentum 
after World War I and the Great Depression, and was fully in place by the of World War II 
(Lintsen, 2002; Lonnquest et al., 2014). Within the philosophy of modernization, the state 
was seen as modern, efficient, and effective and the marriage of politics and technology 
was seen as capable of addressing societal problems.  
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Widespread environmental criticism was suppressed as both public policy and 
public opinion favored modernization, rapid economic growth, full employment, and low 
inflation. Environmental values were largely subordinated to the dominant technocratic 
and economic orientation of the technocrats (Lintsen, 2002; Disco, 2002; Lonnquest et 
al., 2014). By the end of the 1960s, however, the primacy of the hydraulic technocracy, 
and their application of 'hard' engineering solutions to most water management problems, 
came under challenge with the emergence of the environmental movement (Lintsen, 
2002; Metz & van den Heuvel, 2012; Lonnquest et al., 2014). High levels of economic 
development, improvements in the standard of living of the Dutch people, the emergence 
of an affluent post-war generation, the reduction in risks from natural hazards through the 
taming of the country's waters, a slowing of growth and productivity, and competing 
fiscal demands from the emerging welfare state converged to encouraged a shift in 
national priorities away from flood control to concerns over water quality and 
environmental health (Lintsen, 2002; Metz & van den Heuvel, 2012; Lonnquest et al., 
2014). The high capital and maintenance costs of 'hard' engineering solutions also put 
pressure on the hydraulic technocracy to find less expensive solutions that worked with 
nature while preserving the natural environment (Lintsen, 2002; Lonnquest et al., 2014). 
E. 1970 to present 
The period after 1970 saw a reduction in public faith in grand technological 
solutions to water management and the rise of concerns for environmental protection and 
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III. The Rijkswaterstaat 
 A. Overview 
 The Rijkswaterstaat is the Dutch national water resources organization, but it is 
also responsible for other types of public works. The Rijkswaterstaat is geographically 
and culturally specific to The Netherlands and it has had a profound impact on the 
physical and cultural landscape of the country (Lintsen, 2002; Van Den Brink, 2009; 
Lonnquest et al., 2014). It was founded in 1798 but has undergone numerous changes in 
role, organization, and practice over the last 200 years in response to social, political, 
economic, environmental, demographic, and technological changes in The Netherlands 
(Lintsen, 2002; Van Den Brink, 2009; Lonnquest et al., 2014). The Rijkswaterstaat 
therefore operates in a complex and evolving environment: it must work with many other 
agencies and actors, both public and private, to influence and implement public works 
and infrastructure. 
 The Rijkswaterstaat is considered to belong to the non-commercial service cluster 
and the innovation models which best describes this agency are that of 'knowledge 
creator and diffuser' and 'knowledge absorber' (Roelandt et al., 1999). The 
Rijkswaterstaat is a knowledge intensive agency that creates and supplies innovations 
through its research to its sub-contractors and water resource partners at lower political 
scales; and it also absorbs innovations from its suppliers, sub-contractors, and research 
partners. The Rijkswaterstaat contributes significantly to innovation in the Netherlands in 
its role as a demanding and sophisticated purchaser of engineering services. 
 B. 1798 to 1848 
 In this period the Rijkswaterstaat played a limited role in the provision of 
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infrastructure because of fiscal and human resources constraints, because of a profound 
lack of theoretical insights and authoritative central expertise in water management, and 
because of the lingering tradition of laissez-faire policies of the liberal political and 
economic state which actively discouraged national expenditure on public works 
(Lintsen, 2002; Lonnquest et al., 2014). The driver for the establishment of the 
Rijkswaterstaat, then, was the political imperative of centralization by the new 
government rather than economic needs or the threat from water hazards. Probably the 
most important role of the Rijkswaterstaat in this period was the collection and 
organization of all types of knowledge about the practice of hydraulic engineering as it 
had been carried out by water practitioners (Lintsen, 2002; Lonnquest et al., 2014). 
During this period a cadre of professional engineers was slowly created, which received 
their education in civil engineering at the Military Academy at Breda; however, this trend 
in moving from a craft to a military tradition proved, in hindsight, to be ultimately far 
from satisfactory in overcoming deficiencies in human resources and engineering 
knowledge (Lintsen, 2002; Lonnquest et al., 2014). A turning point in education came in 
1842 when the national program of studies in civil engineering was moved to the civilian 
Royal Academy in Delft.  
 C. 1848 to 1900 
 In this period, the Rijkswaterstaat played an increasing role in the provision of 
infrastructure as the national government became increasingly willing and able to deploy 
public resources for infrastructure projects that supported national development and were 
in the national interest (Lintsen, 2002; Lonnquest et al., 2014). The roles and 
responsibilities of the provinces and the national government became more clearly 
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demarcated with the provinces establishing public works departments and the 
Rijkswaterstaat focusing on national projects that crossed provincial boundaries (Lintsen, 
2002; Lonnquest et al., 2014). Projects of increasingly scale and scope became feasible 
with the application of steam, dredging and excavating technology; and the actual 
construction of many projects was delegated to private contractors, which developed 
indigenous civil and hydraulic engineering capacity (Lintsen, 2002; Lonnquest et al., 
2014). The selection and education of the engineers and supervisors, and the acquisition 
of knowledge, was adapted to modern times: personnel were increasingly recruited 
through competitive examinations, for which the acquisition of theoretical knowledge 
became more important; and for those who wished advancement; and to legitimate their 
authority, the acquisition of formal education became necessary (Lintsen, 2002;  
Lonnquest et al., 2014). Although water resource management remained decidedly Dutch 
in its character, French and German water resource management and engineering sources 
were studied, much trial and error experimentation took place and the results duly 
reported, and Dutch contractors acquired much knowledge and equipment from British 
contractors employed to assist with major projects (Lintsen, 2002; Lonnquest et al., 
2014). By the end of the 19th Century, Dutch knowledge, skills, and innovative ability 
developed to the point that the Rijkswaterstaat no longer needed to employ foreign 
contractors.  
 D. 1900 to 1970 
 In this period, the Rijkswaterstaat was now fully committed to scientific water 
management and had the expertise, political backing, technology, and increasingly the 
resources to put this into practice (Lintsen, 2002; Lonnquest et al., 2014). Dutch 
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hydraulic imagination began to conceive of flood control, navigation, and fresh water 
supply projects and programs of increasingly complexity, scale and scope; new 
technologies, such as steel reinforced concrete and electrical power, were applied and 
their impact carefully studied so that these promising new technologies could be 
effectively and efficiently integrated into the management and organizational structure 
(Lintsen, 2002; Lonnquest et al., 2014).  
 Technical and vocational education was expanded further with the establishment 
of two new technical universities - at Eindhoven in 1956 and Twente in 1961 - and 
several technical colleges. There was a major expansion in flood and storm control 
infrastructure along the coast, polders to create freshwater lakes, and projects to better 
manage and protect the country's fresh water resources (Lintsen, 2002; Lonnquest et al., 
2014). The Rijkswaterstaat also began to develop a more proactive engineering culture, 
but the major floods of 1916 and 1953 provided the powerful political catalysts for 
implementing costly engineering plans. The Zuiderzee Works – a man-made system of 
dams and dikes, land reclamation and water drainage works in the northwest that 
dammed the Zuiderzee from the North Sea - was implemented in phases between 1920 
and 1978; and the Delta Plan - a major flood protection scheme in the southwestern delta 
region - was implemented between 1954 and 1986.  In this climate of political stability, 
respect for authority, general confidence in technical solutions, and a growing 
government budget, the Rijkswaterstaat’s power grew to unprecedented heights (Lintsen, 
2002; Lonnquest et al., 2014).  
 E. 1970 to Present 
 In the period after 1970, environmental and budgetary concerns, and political 
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pressures, forced a shift in the policies and practices of the Rijkswaterstaat (Lintsen, 
2002; Van Den Brink, 2009; Lonnquest et al., 2014). The two traditional pillars of Dutch 
national water management - floods and waterways - were joined by a third, water 
quality; and new, large-scale, engineered projects gave way towards maintenance of 
existing infrastructure, 'soft' solutions, or the application of the lessons from nature to 
solve engineering challenges (Lintsen, 2002; Van Den Brink, 2009; Metz & van den 
Heuvel, 2012; Lonnquest et al., 2014). The prestige that the Rijkswaterstaat had acquired 
in the previous 70 years was undermined, its engineering approach was criticized as 
environmentally and economically unsustainable, the public's general faith in 
modernization, technology and progress was diminished, and the agency personnel 
shrank from 14,000 in 1982 to 9,600 in 1994, but this rose in recent years to about 12,000 
people. The agency was accused of destroying the landscape and harming the 
environment, of operating with a lack of transparency and accountability, and 
manipulating water management and infrastructure in the Netherlands (Lintsen, 2002; 
Disco, 2002; Van Den Brink, 2009; Lonnquest et al., 2014). After 1994 the agency 
underwent a cultural and organizational transformation: its budget and the number of 
personnel began to grow; biologists, ecologists, planners and behavioral experts began to 
take their place alongside engineers; planning and design became more inter-disciplinary 
and integrated; and civil society was once again included in decision-making (Lintsen, 
2002; Van Der Brugge, Rotmans & Loorbach, 2005; Van Den Brink, 2009; Lonnquest et 
al., 2014).  
IV. The Zuiderzee Works 
 The Zuiderzee Works is the largest hydraulic engineering project undertaken by 
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The Netherlands during the twentieth century and is considered by some as an 
engineering wonder of the modern world (Lonnquest et al., 2014). The works were 
performed in several steps from 1920 to 1975 and involved the damming of the 
Zuiderzee, a large but shallow inlet of the North Sea, and the reclamation of large tracts 
of land from the newly enclosed body of water behind those dams (Borger, Kluiving &. 
De Kraker, 2010; Lonnquest et al., 2014). The main purposes of the project were to 
protect the central Netherlands from the North Sea, improve flood protection, and create 
additional land for agriculture works (Lintsen, 2002; Van der Vleuten & Disco, 2004; 
Borger, Kluiving &. De Kraker, 2010; Lonnquest et al., 2014; Lonnquest et al., 2014). 
The works consists of a system of man-made dams, dikes, and water drainage works; and 
it represented the culmination of a battle with water that lasted 700 years (Tol & Langen, 
2000; Lintsen, 2002; E Van der Vleuten & Disco, 2004; Lonnquest et al., 2014). The 
Zuiderzee Works turned the Zuiderzee into a fresh water lake, the IJsselmeer, and allowed 
the creation of 1650 km² of land (Borger, Kluiving &. De Kraker, 2010; Lonnquest et al., 
2014). The losing battle that the Dutch had fought with rivers and the sea to prevent 
floods and reclaim land had prompted proposals to tame and enclose the Zuiderzee as 
early as the seventeenth century; but; the ideas were impractical given the technology 
then available (Lonnquest et al., 2014). 
 The Dutch government started developing official plans to enclose the Zuiderzee 
in 1914; but the breaching in 1916 of several dykes along the Zuiderzee, and subsequent 
flooding of the land behind them, provided the decisive impetus to implement the plans  
(Lonnquest et al., 2014). In addition, the stresses of World War I put food supplies at risk, 
which added to widespread support for the project. In 1918, the Dutch parliament passed 
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the Zuiderzee Act with three goals: flood protection, agricultural expansion and food 
security, and improved management of freshwater resources against saltwater intrusion 
(Lonnquest et al., 2014). Following the damming of the Zuiderzee, large areas of land 
were subsequently reclaimed in the new freshwater lake by means of polders. A polder is 
a low-lying tract of land enclosed by dikes that forms an artificial hydrological entity 
with no natural connection with outside water (Metz & van den Heuvel, 2012). Polders 
can either be reclaimed from formerly submerged land or formed by separating 
floodplains and marshes with dykes and draining the water. Polders are susceptible to 
subsistence, as the soil dries out or settles, or to water infiltration, and constant care must 
be taken to manage the water level as polders face the constant risk of flooding. The 
Zuiderzee Works has reduced the country’s coastline from 3,400 to 650 kilometers, more 
than 350,000 hectares of land have been reclaimed, and an enormous new freshwater 
basin, the IJssel Lake, was created in the heart of the country (Lonnquest et al., 2014). 
The IJssel Lake is fed a continuous flow of fresh water by the IJssel river, itself a 
tributary of the Rhine, which allowed the engineers of the dams to release excess water at 
every low tide, and progressively reduce the lake's salinity (Lonnquest et al., 2014). By 
1936 the Ijssel Lake was declared nominally fresh, just in time to address the challenge of 
the increasing scarcity of non-polluted water sources which was a consequence of 
urbanization, population growth, and industrialization. Despite growing problems 
associated with water quality the focus of the Zuiderzee Works until the 1970s remained 
flood control and land reclamation.   
V. The Delta Works 
 The Delta Works is a series of civil and hydraulic engineering projects in the 
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south-west of the Netherlands. It was constructed to protect a large area of land around 
the Rhine-Meuse-Scheldt delta from the risk of flooding from the North Sea (Borger, 
Kluiving &. De Kraker, 2010; Lonnquest et al., 2014). The works consist of a system of 
dams, sluices, locks, dykes, levees, and storm surge barriers with the main aim of 
shortening the Dutch coastline and reducing the number of dykes that had to be raised 
(Knoester, 1984; Lonnquest et al., 2014). The Delta Works system is both the Netherlands 
and the world's largest flood protection project, with more than 16,500 kilometers of 
levees and 300 structures, and it is responsible for keeping the port of Rotterdam, and 
around four million people in southern Holland, safe from the sea (Borger, Kluiving &. 
De Kraker, 2010; Lonnquest et al., 2014; water-technology.net, 2017; 
dutchwatersector.com, 2016). The project started in 1958 and was largely completed in 
1997 with the inauguration of the Maeslantkering, a storm surge barrier on the Nieuwe 
Waterweg that is one of largest and heaviest moving structures on Earth (Lonnquest et al., 
2014; water-technology.net, 2017). After 1997, new projects are periodically started to 
renovate, renew, and upgrade the Delta Works to meet evolving risks from water. Along 
with the Zuiderzee Works, the Delta Works is the other Dutch engineering wonder of the 
modern world. 
 The Dutch have long contemplated shortening the country's south-west coastline, 
to reduce the risk of flooding caused by North Sea storms and turn the Delta into a group 
of freshwater lakes (Knoester, 1984; Lonnquest et al., 2014). In 1937, the Rijkswaterstaat 
published a study which showed that the sea defenses at that time in the southwest river 
delta were inadequate to withstand a major storm surge (Knoester, 1984; Lonnquest et al., 
2014). The proposed solution was to dam all the river mouths and sea inlets of the Delta 
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thereby shortening the coast. The scale and complexity of the project, and the 
intervention of the Second World War, delayed construction and only two small projects 
were completed in 1950 (Lonnquest et al., 2014). The North Sea flood of 1953 became a 
major driver to speed up the project, and a Delta Works Commission was installed to 
research the causes and develop measures to prevent such disasters in future (water-
technology.net, 2017). What resulted was a comprehensive system of civil engineering 
works throughout south-west Netherlands which included raising 3,000 kilometers of 
outer sea-dikes, raising 10,000 kilometers of inner, canal, and river dikes, and closing off 
the sea estuaries of the Zeeland province (Knoester, 1984; Lonnquest et al., 2014; water-
technology.net, 2017). A main goal of the Delta project was to reduce the risk of flooding 
in the Delta to once per 10,000 years, compared to once per 4000 years for the rest of the 
country; however, unlike the Zuiderzee Works, the Delta Work's purpose is largely 
defensive and not for land reclamation. The Works also have an important economic 
development component to stimulate the economy of the province of Zeeland: the Works 
are combined with road and waterway infrastructure to improve the connection between 
the ports of Rotterdam and Antwerp (Knoester, 1984; Lonnquest et al., 2014). The Delta 
Works was projected to cost the public purse no more than €900 million, but the final cost 
was closer to €5 billion (Meyer, 2009; water-technology.net, 2017). 
 The Dutch have been battling the North Sea and climate change for more than a 
millennial and the Dutch coastline has changed considerably because of natural disasters 
and human intervention. The impact of natural disasters is exacerbated through human 
activity, which works against nature (Disco, 2002; Van Der Brugge, Rotmans & 
Loorbach, 2005). The storm of 1134 caused terrible loss of land and created the 
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archipelago of Zeeland in the south-west; the storm of 1287 affected the Netherlands and 
Germany, killing more than 50,000 people in one of the most destructive floods in 
recorded history; the flood of 1421, and the mismanagement in its aftermath, destroyed a 
newly reclaimed polder, replacing it with a 72 km2 tidal floodplains in the south-central 
region of the Netherlands; and the flood of 1953 which caused the collapse of several 
dikes in the south-west of the Netherlands, killing more than 1,800 people and flooding 
150,000 hectares of land (Tol & Langen, 2000; Lonnquest et al., 2014). A politically 
neutral Delta Works Commission was initiated twenty days after the 1953 North Sea 
flood, and it developed a new risk-based conceptual framework, called the 'Delta norm', 
to guide investments in flood defenses (deltawerken.com, 2004). To ensure a high-quality 
project the Delta Works Law was passed in 1959, new norms have been incorporated into 
the Water Law of 2009, and the Delta Works Commission keeps abreast of evolving 
hydraulic technologies, the expanding engineering and scientific knowledge base, and 
climatic trends that will produce multiple sources of hazard risk from stronger and more 
frequent storm surges, altered rainfall patterns, and increased river run-off (water-
technology.net, 2017). Climate change, expanding economies, and urbanization are 
converging to put the world’s delta populations at increased risk for the foreseeable 
future. Dutch expertise in hydraulic engineering, flood control and protection, foundation 
technology, storm surge barriers and levees, high-tech dredging, coastal and river 
engineering and maintenance, harbor construction, integrated coastal development, river 
basin management and climate adaptive construction is expected to be in great demand 
worldwide.    
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VI. Governance in the Dutch Water Economy 
 A. Overview 
 The Netherlands is a small, densely populated county of almost 17 million people 
organized politically and administratively into 12 provinces and 443 municipalities 
(Marques, 2010). The Netherlands is a decentralized unitary state whose governance is 
characterized by consensual politics and a high degree of participation by citizens in 
decision-making processes: there is generally a reciprocal relationship where the Dutch 
populace cooperates with authorities who, in turn, ensure that people are kept informed of 
and involved in every initiative (Van Der Brugge, Rotmans & Loorbach, 2005; Marques, 
2010). This consensual and participatory political culture evolved over considerable time, 
with roots in the Dutch relationship to its water economy (Lintsen, 2002; Van Der 
Brugge, Rotmans & Loorbach, 2005; Marques, 2010; Lonnquest et al., 2014). According 
to the Global Water Partnership, water governance refers to ‘the range of political, social, 
economic and administrative systems that are in place to regulate the development and 
management of water resources and provision of water services at different levels of 
society’ (Rogers and Hall, 2003).  
 The Netherlands has successfully established a globally respected reputation for 
good water governance, which ensures the universal provision of safe, reliable and 
affordable fresh water, environmental protection through the treatment of wastewater 
water supply, and a high level of public safety against flooding from both rivers and the 
North Sea (Marques, 2010). With the support of the government, Dutch water technology 
and expertise is also being exported around the globe. Given ongoing societal and 
climatic changes, and greater complexity of water problems, the stakeholders in the 
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Dutch water economy place good water governance as the cornerstone of a strong 
economy and a sustainable and resilient environment.   
 The institutional framework for the Dutch water economy is characterized by 
diverse players at all three political scales operating in a decentralized management 
structure, but with policy guidance from the national government (Marques, 2010). The 
national government draws up policy and takes some responsibility for national or 
regional water issues that cross provincial boundaries, while the provincial government is 
responsible for implementing these policies in specific measures and plans. Each player 
in the Dutch water economy has its own areas of responsibility but the complex nature of 
Dutch water resource management requires considerable cooperation, coordination and 
collaboration among the parties (Van Der Brugge, Rotmans & Loorbach, 2005; Marques, 
2010).  
 The national government is responsible for managing Dutch surface water, in 
particular the major rivers, which is important for the drinking water supply, and for 
monitoring water quality and supply security; each provincial governments, using 
national guidelines, are primarily responsible for managing ground water, for determining 
the managing functions and supervising the activities and accounts of the water boards, 
and for representing the municipalities and water boards before the national government; 
other waters come under the responsibility of the provinces, but they normally delegate 
these tasks to local water boards; the water companies are responsible for water 
abstraction, treatment and distribution; the municipalities are responsible for managing 
wastewater collection services; and the water boards are responsible for wastewater 
treatment (Lintsen, 2002; Van Der Brugge, Rotmans & Loorbach, 2005; Marques, 2010; 
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Lonnquest et al., 2014).  This complex institutional framework has been created over 
considerable time through a process of learning and adaptation and it creates the 
conditions for successful water resources management, environmental protection and 
hazard risk reduction (Van Der Brugge, Rotmans & Loorbach, 2005; Marques, 2010).   
 The main stakeholders in the governance of the Dutch water economy at the 
national level include the following (Marques, 2010):  
1. The Ministry for Transport, Public Works and Water Resource 
Management; the Ministry for Housing, Territorial Planning and the 
Environment; the Institute for Water Management and Wastewater 
Treatment; and Directorate-General for Public Works and Water Resource 
Management, the Rijkswaterstaat; the RIONED Foundation; the Dutch 
scientific community; a national consumer protection NGO, the 
Consumentenbond; and the Dutch Union of Water Boards, the Unie van 
Waterschappen. 
2. The Ministry for Transport, Public Works and Water Resource 
Management is responsible for waste-water treatment services and the 
quality of surface water;  
3. The Ministry for Housing, Territorial Planning and the Environment is 
responsible for drinking water supply and for safeguarding its quality;  
4. The Institute for Water Management and Wastewater Treatment is 
responsible for preparing new legislation and regulations, for data 
collection, for research, and the provision of advice to the Rijkswaterstaat; 
the RIONED Foundation is a center focused on waste-water services 
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research which is disseminated to national ministries, municipalities, water 
boards, consultants, and builders;  
5. The Consumentenbond, is responsible for publishing statistical 
information about the water economy to the public; and the Dutch Union 
of Water Boards is a government supported center that acts as a network 
organization with the aim to make better use of Dutch knowledge on water 
governance, both in the Netherlands and abroad.  
6. In addition to the political and policy stakeholders at the national level, 
there are also the associations, which represent the water companies and 
water boards and two banks – the Water Boards Bank and the 
Municipality Bank – which provide the sector with financial support. The 
Water Boards Bank was created in 1954 by the water boards to finance all 
aspects of water-and-wastewater management; and this highly successful 
and very solvent bank has branched out into international markets. 
 Water policy and management is implemented by various public authorities 
(central government, water boards, provinces and municipalities) and the water supply 
companies (Marques, 2010):  
▪ The dunes are managed by the water boards, though drinking water 
companies and conservation organizations also play a role in this 
occasionally. 
▪ Sand replenishment at the coast and on the beach is commissioned by 
Rijkswaterstaat.  
▪ The water boards ensure the safety of small dykes.  
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▪ The Rijkswaterstaat manages the large dams and dykes, such as the 
IJsselmeer Closure Dam. The standards that the dykes are required to meet 
are set down by the Ministry of Infrastructure and the Environment.  
▪ Drinking water is produced and distributed by the drinking water 
companies.  
▪ The Rijkswaterstaat is responsible for the storm surge barriers, such as the 
Maeslant storm surge barrier in the Nieuwe Waterweg and the 
Hollandsche IJssel storm surge barrier at Krimpen aan den Ijssel. The 
Delta Works is managed by the largely independent Delta Commission 
(Knoester, 1984).  
▪ The standards for the quality of surface water are set down by the Ministry 
of Infrastructure and the Environment. The water boards are responsible 
for ensuring that there is enough surface water and that it is clean. The  
Rijkswaterstaat performs this role for the major bodies of water.  
▪ The drainage of rainwater and waste-water falls within the remit of local 
government authorities.  
B. Water Boards 
 The Dutch water boards are the oldest democratic forms of government in the 
Netherlands, going back to at least the 13th century, and are responsible for water 
management at the local level (Lintsen, 2002; Lazaroms & Poos, 2004; Van Der Brugge, 
Rotmans & Loorbach, 2005; Marques, 2010; Lonnquest et al., 2014). The water boards 
are independent local government bodies based on a tradition of local, cooperative and 
participatory governance with the governing principle being that individuals and groups 
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with the greatest role in the management of water are those stakeholders with the greatest 
stake in water (Lazaroms & Poos, 2004; Van Der Brugge, Rotmans & Loorbach, 2005; 
Marques, 2010). The primary scope of the water boards has remained basically 
unchanged over many centuries although their scale has changed and their numbers have 
been significantly reduced to achieve greater administrative and technical efficiency 
(Lazaroms & Poos, 2004; Marques, 2010). In 1850 there were about 3,500 water boards 
in the country although by 2011 mergers eventually reduced the number to 25 water 
boards (Lintsen, 2002; Lazaroms & Poos, 2004; Van Der Brugge, Rotmans & Loorbach, 
2005; Lonnquest et al., 2014). The administrative structure and financial arrangements 
for contemporary water boards are set out in several pieces of legislation: the Surface 
Water Pollution Act of 1969, the Groundwater Act of 1981, the Soil Protection Act of 
1986, the Water Management Act of 1989, and the Water Services Act (1992) (Marques, 
2010). The Surface Water Pollution Act (1969) sets out the framework for preventing and 
monitoring the pollution of water resources (Marques, 2010).  
 Dutch water boards manage local water resources and some aspects of wastewater 
treatment services but are not responsible for the water supply to the general public and 
are therefore not considered a utility (Lazaroms & Poos, 2004; Marques, 2010). Within 
its territory a water board is responsible for the following: management and maintenance 
of water barriers, which includes dunes, dikes, quays and levees; managing the correct 
water level in polders, ditches and canals by means of weirs, locks and sluices, culverts 
and pumping stations, thus enabling water to be drained, retained or let in as necessary; 
ensuring nature conservation and environmental protection; and, in conjunction with the 
municipalities, maintaining surface water quality through wastewater treatment, which 
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today is its most important responsibility (Lazaroms & Poos, 2004; Marques, 2010). The 
water boards together with the Department of Public Works and Water Management are 
responsible for the quality and quantity of regional water in the Netherlands. The Dutch 
are served by about 101,000 kilometers of sewers which covers 99.9% of the population 
(Marques, 2010). The umbrella organization of the water boards is the Association of 
Dutch Water Boards, Unie van Waterschappen.  The organizational structure of the water 
boards is characterized by horizontal integration with the collection of waste water being 
separate from treatment (Marques, 2010). This is considered as an example of direct 
public management.  
 Water boards hold elections, levy taxes and function independently from other 
government bodies (Lazaroms & Poos, 2004; Marques, 2010). Their structures vary, but 
they each have an elected general administrative body, an executive board and a chair. In 
addition to taxes raised by water boards, central government contributes to their finances 
by paying construction and maintenance costs of water barriers and main waterways 
(Lazaroms & Poos, 2004; Marques, 2010). The costs of waste water treatment are 
financed by a water pollution levy, which is based on the polluter pays principle, and an 
operating tax; the costs of impact of human activity on the environment are recovered by 
charges for all discharges, abstractions, impoundments and engineering works that affect 
water quality; and farmers pay the full-cost of drainage for their farms (Marques, 2010). 
The rear instances of deficits are subsidized by the central and local governments.  
 C. Water Supply Companies 
 Dutch water supply services are provided by 10 semi-public bodies (PLCs) which 
are governed by private law and operate as private operators (Schwartz & Blokland, 
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2002; Marques, 2010). The PLCs manage about 116,000 kilometers of mains and are 
responsible for all pipes up to the customer's home water meter, while homeowners are 
responsible for the state of the water supply lines in their homes (Marques, 2010). Dutch 
water companies manage and maintain one of the most reliable and efficient water 
collection, treatment, an distribution supply systems in the world: the PLCs ensure that 
clean, chlorine-free drinking water drinking water flows from the tap 24 hours a day for 
nearly 17 million inhabitants; they have a level of service coverage of 99.9% of Dutch 
households; and they keep water losses to about 6% of the total volume produced, which 
is better than the European average of 12% (Marques, 2010). The Dutch consume about 
124 liters of water a day, which is one of the lowest among developed countries 
(Marques, 2010). The water companies extract water from the ground, rivers, canals and 
lakes, purify it, and pump it to the customer.  The main source of water is groundwater, 
which represents about 60% of the overall production. Water companies and water boards 
work together in some regions as both benefit from clean groundwater, rivers and canals. 
In this framework, water supply services are vertically integrated with all stages from 
abstraction to delivery to households under the control of the PLCs.  
 The Association of Dutch Water Companies, Vewin, represents practically the 
entire Dutch drinking water sector, and works with its membership to help them achieve 
their strategic goals (Marques, 2010). The institutional framework for the PLCs is 
considered as an example of delegated public management; and the decision not to 
privatize this aspect of the water sector was seen by the Dutch government as a strategic 
step to prevent the rise of private monopolies in an essential service, although Dutch 
water companies have their roots in the private sector (Schwartz & Blokland, 2002). An 
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important feature of the PLCs is the financial arrangement which calls for low levels of 
equity and full-cost recovery, allows limited profit sharing as an incentive for 
performance, and which avoids the use of public subsidies (Schwartz & Blokland, 2002). 
The financial and operational performance of the PLCs is widely considered to be good 
and this is largely a result of the its largely independent management, the requirements 
for transparency, and the check and balances that are designed into its governance regime 
(Schwartz & Blokland, 2002).  
D. Legal Framework 
 The national government has over time developed a very robust legal framework 
for managing water supply with the important governing documents being the Water 
Supply Acts of 1957, 1975, and 2000, the Water Services Act of 1992, and the Water 
Ownership Act of 2004 (Marques, 2010). The Water Services Act (1992) strictly prohibits 
the private sector from supplying water to private consumers, although such provision is 
not prohibited to industrial and commercial customers. The success of the water supply 
sector is credited to the balance between the efficiency and effectiveness of private sector 
management practices; and the accountability, legitimacy and transparency of public 
authorities which are disciplined by periodically having to face the electorate which they 
serve (Schwartz & Blokland, 2002; Marques, 2010). Dutch water supply has a history of 
providing an exceptional quality of service which has deterred the entry of the private 
sector into water services and negated the need for independent regulatory oversight.  
 D. Local Government  
  Dutch municipalities play an important role in urban water management. They 
are responsible for providing waste-and-storm water collection services, for supervising 
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or managing the 443 wastewater service operators in the Netherlands, and for town 
planning (Marques, 2010). The level of recycling of industrial waste-water is high, the 
water is of sufficient quality for use in the food and beverage industries, and the energy 
and raw materials being released during the treatment process are increasingly being 
recycled to reduce the environmental footprint and for conservation. Unlike water supply 
to private citizens which is provided by public water companies, private operators 
actively participate in wastewater treatment under contracts from municipalities 
(Marques, 2010). Veolia Water current provides wastewater treatment services for the 1.7 
million citizens of Rotterdam under a 30-year, BOT scheme. The Environmental 
Management Act (1992), which sets out an integrated approach to environmental 
management in the Netherlands, requires municipalities to prepare annual environmental 
and wastewater plans and to publicly circulated drafts to facilitate public consultation. 
The institutional framework for waste-and-storm water collection services is considered 
an example of both delegated public and delegated private management.  
 E. Pricing & Cost Recovery 
 The Dutch water-and-wastewater sector has a successful record of financial 
solvency, which helps to ensure operations are efficient and infrastructure is maintained 
at a high standard. This is partially due to the overall quality of management within the 
water-and-wastewater sector, but also importantly to the fact that the Dutch public pay 
tariffs and taxes on water they consume to ensure both full-cost recovery and 
environmental conservation (Marques, 2010). The solvency of the system ensures that 
infrastructure is well maintained and regularly upgraded. Every Dutch household pays a 
water safety tax and a fee to compensate for water pollution, calculated on the number of 
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occupants. In 1995, the national government introduced a tax on groundwater 
abstractions to discourage excessive consumption of this resource; however, the tax was 
considered too low, some farmers evaded the tax, and the regime facilitated the 
maintenance of inefficient irrigation practices by some farmers (Hellegers et al., 2001). It 
was abolished in 2012. 
 The Netherlands spends generously to ensure a high quality of service. In 2010, 
the Netherlands spent €3.8 billion, or about 0.6% of GDP, on treating drinking water, 
managing the sewer system and treating waste water; and this level of expenditure is 
expected to rise to €4.4 billion by 2020 (hollandtradeandinvest.com). Dutch prices for 
water-and-wastewater services, although high by international standards, are a tiny 
fraction of the total household budget for utilities and local taxes – in 2005 domestic 
water cost €1.69 per cubic meter and in 2015 is was €1.61 per cubic meter (Marques, 
2010; Vewin, 2016). These costs are not considered a burden by European standards 
given the quality and reliability of the service, and there are provisions for remission of 
charges for poor households. The average household pays about 100 Euros a year for 
water-and-wastewater services, which is less than 1% of household income and compares 
favorably to the 1-2% of household income which is the EU average (Bartram et al., 
2002; Vewin, 2016). There is, however, some criticism that the substantial revenues 
raised in the water sector, when they become a surplus, are sometimes committed 
elsewhere by local governments rather than invested back or reserved for the future needs 
of the sector. Netherlands, unlike other parts of Europe, is expecting population increases 
and its water-and-wastewater sector will benefit from a dense population (Statistics 
Netherlands, 2012), which, other things being equal, generally reduces the infrastructure 
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needed and thus the costs associated with delivering a given amount of drinking water 
(European Environment Agency, 2013).  
 F. Reflections on the Governance of the Dutch Water Economy  
 Dutch policies and practices in the water-and-wastewater sectors are considered 
as models of excellence in the water economy and serve as a benchmark for other 
countries. The success of the Dutch water resource model is due to several factors: the 
application of private sector management practices in select areas of operations; the 
commitment to transparency, public accountability, and self-regulation; the practice of 
bench-marking to continuously improve the quality of service and lower costs; the 
application of science and technology; the commitment to full-cost recovery; and the 
culture of continuous learning and adaptation (Schwartz & Blokland, 2002; Lintsen, 
2002; Van Der Brugge, Rotmans & Loorbach, 2005; Marques, 2010; Metz & van den 
Heuvel, 2012; Lonnquest et al., 2014). The local and regional water management in the 
Netherlands is largely decentralized, immune from day-to-day political considerations, 
and almost exclusively focused on water governance and water resource management 
(Schwartz & Blokland, 2002; Van Der Brugge, Rotmans & Loorbach, 2005; Marques, 
2010). In this regime the Water Boards, as the lowest level on the water resource 
governance scale, play a key role as a decentralized functional government authority 
(Schwartz & Blokland, 2002; Van Der Brugge, Rotmans & Loorbach, 2005; Marques, 
2010). Dutch Water Boards keep pace with social, economic, and technological 
developments in society; their organizational and financial structures and their legislative 
framework are continuously adjusted and updated to remain relevant; while their 
essential purpose, elements and governing principles remain intact (Schwartz & 
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Blokland, 2002; Van Der Brugge, Rotmans & Loorbach, 2005; Marques, 2010). This 
balance between institutional change and institutional continuity ensures stability while 
delivering results.  
 The Dutch water economy has both public and private actors and considerable 
attention is given to the appropriate roles and spheres of responsibilities of each. The 
policy of the Dutch Government is that domestic water supply should be a public 
responsibility; however, the private sector is involved in supply to industrial and 
commercial users and in waste-water management and competition is encouraged where 
possible (Marques, 2010). Bench-marking and performance management are considered 
important for maintaining service quality and accountability; while cooperation with the 
private sector through outsourcing and public-private partnerships are encouraged along 
parts of the water chain to keep prices affordable (Schwartz & Blokland, 2002; Van Der 
Brugge, Rotmans & Loorbach, 2005; Marques, 2010). The Dutch Association of Water 
Boards creates benchmarks for its members on the effectiveness and efficiency of 
wastewater treatment. Despite the ability of the Dutch water economy to adapt, change 
was usually reactive rather than proactive, a result of natural disasters, environmental  
and ecological crises, and public health emergencies (Lintsen, 2002; Van Der Brugge, 
Rotmans & Loorbach, 2005;  Lonnquest et al., 2014). Nevertheless, the Dutch at least 
had the human and technical capacity to effect change. 
VII. Dutch Water Technology Innovation Sector 
 A. Water Technology as a 'Top Sector' 
 The water technology innovation sector has been selected by the Government of 
the Netherlands as one of nine ‘top-sectors’ of the Dutch Economy which together 
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currently represent about 80% of the country's R&D and 30% of its value-added and 
employment (OECD, 2014). The water sector is believed to have considerable potential 
to help support and sustain Dutch economic development because of the local and 
international demand for technological and managerial solutions for water resource 
management (Netherlands Enterprise Agency, 2017; dutchwatersector.com, 2017). The 
Dutch water technology innovation sector was chosen specifically because the 
Netherlands is well known for water management skills and because the water 
technology innovation sector can draw on over eight hundred years of experience with 
water management, coastal protection, land reclamation, water supply and water quality 
(Netherlands Enterprise Agency, 2017; dutchwatersector.com, 2017). Water is essential 
for people, industry, agriculture, and the environment, and water technology is therefore 
seen by policymakers and planners as a key element in developing a strong sustainable 
economy, in safeguarding public health, in protecting the health of the natural 
environment, and as a tool of international economic and environmental diplomacy 
(Netherlands Enterprise Agency, 2017). As a matter of public policy, Dutch water 
expertise is designed to provide win-win-win solutions to national and global water issues 
while also balancing planet, people, and profit.  
 The Netherlands is part of a Europe-wide development strategy that has identified 
innovation as one of the pillars of smart, sustainable and inclusive growth, international 
competitiveness, and economic success; and in response cities and regions across the 
Netherlands are organizing their own innovation hubs (Ahonen & Hämäläinen, 2012). 
The economic development model employed by the Dutch government is the 'quadruple 
helix,' which is designed to support cooperation and collaboration between four key 
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stakeholder groups: government, academia/research, business and customers/users (Water 
Alliance, 2016). The goal of the quadruple helix model is to create an 'innovation-
friendly ecosystem' which increases the economic contribution of targeted sectors of the 
economy (Ahonen & Hämäläinen, 2012). The philosophy behind the quadruple helix is 
that innovation is multi-faceted and involves the interplay of technologies, infrastructure, 
organizations, support services, and collaborative networks which co-produce a wide 
range of economic, social, and environmental innovations (Ahonen & Hämäläinen, 2012; 
OECD, 2014). Additionally, an innovation ecosystem needs to be well resourced; all 
partners need to develop their own technical skills and abilities; and all actors need to be 
flexible and adaptable, have the capacity to cope with constraints in social, economic and 
political systems, and be able to reform regulations and restructure organizations as and 
when necessary (Ahonen & Hämäläinen, 2012; OECD, 2014). In the context of the water 
economy, the quadruple helix ensures that government, research institutes, and businesses 
combine and transform their knowledge and expertise into innovative products, services, 
and skills that deliver smart, cost-effective, and commercially viable solutions for the 
management of water resources (Ministry of Economic Affairs, 2017). To further support 
the overarching national framework for innovation, the Dutch government - in 
recognition of the value of foreign startup entrepreneurs to the Dutch economy - 
introduced a startup visa law starting January 1, 2015 so foreign nationals can more 
easily acquire a residence permit in the Netherlands. 
 The Dutch society is one of the most world's most sophisticated and innovative 
and its economy one of the most open, outwardly-focused, and competitive. It is 
recognized, however, that there could be improvements in productivity and 
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competitiveness, more diversification into emerging economic sectors, more 
diversification into new exports markets outside Europe, an increase in entrepreneurship 
and risk taking among small and medium businesses, an increase in domestic R&D, an 
improvement in access to financing, and an improvement in the graduation rate for 
scientists and engineers (OECD, 2014).  The 2015-2016 Global Competitive Report by 
the World Economic Forum placed the Netherlands 5th in economic competitiveness, 3rd 
in education, 3rd in infrastructure, and 10th in institutions (Schawb & Sala-i-Martin, 
2016).  The Dutch Ministry of Economic Affairs estimates that in the water sector there 
are almost 1,500 active water technology companies, with 51,000 full-time employees, 
and 500 delta technology companies (Ministry of Economic Affairs, 2017; 
dutchwatersector.com, 2017a). The Ministry estimates that turnover of the Dutch water 
sector was €16.4 billion in 2008 and €15.6 billion in 2011, of which 57% was earned by 
water technology companies; that exports amounted to €6.5 billion in 2008 and €7.4 
billion in 2011; that 40% of the freely accessible world market for water management is 
in Dutch hands; and that this represented about 2% of GDP (Wijedasa, 2013; Hisham, 
2015; dutchwatersector.com, 2017).  
 The globally competitive position of Dutch water technology and expertise would 
not be possible without heavy investments in water-related innovation, entrepreneurship, 
and R&D by three of the partners in the “helix' - government, academia and business; 
through a well-established system of public-private partnerships that align the interests 
and resources of government, business and research partners; and through the 
development of high-quality human capital with cutting-edge scientific, technological, 
and management knowledge and skills (Netherlands Enterprise Agency, 2017). While 
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Dutch hydraulic engineering expertise has deep historical roots, Dutch water technology 
expertise was largely, and purposely, developed from the 1970s on-wards and now 
includes global leadership in membrane, bioreactor, Anammox microbial, and anaerobic 
water purification technologies. Some of the world leading Dutch research institutes 
include Deltares, MARIN, KWR Watercycle Research Institute, and Wetsus (Netherlands 
Enterprise Agency, 2017). 
 B. Global Reach of Dutch Water Technology Businesses 
 The global reach of the Dutch water technology innovation sector is considerable: 
the global market is receptive to both Dutch goods and services, and for partnerships and 
collaborations with Dutch businesses and research institutions (Wijedasa, 2013). Some 
examples of Dutch innovation, and of the more than 252 current Dutch projects abroad, 
include river basin management in upper Niger, hurricane risk reduction in New Orleans, 
the use of brackish water for potato cultivation in Egypt; relocation of a port in Ho Chi 
Minh City in response to climate adaptation, the removal of iron from well water in 
Moscow, and the use of the natural resistance of oysters to water flow as a defense 
against coastal flooding and erosion, and as a source of food, in Bangladesh (Wijedasa, 
2013). Future projects under investigation include navigable storm surge barriers for New 
York, and Dutch hydraulic experts and officials are increasingly being employed in the 
US to advise the authorities there on flood control (Wijedasa, 2013). Dutch water 
technologies available for export consist of both advanced, high-technology solutions, 
and simple, inexpensive and locally-appropriate technologies that are capable of 
alignment with the social and economic realities, financial and institutional constraints, 
and technological capacities of developing countries.  
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 The Netherlands is home to the world’s ten best engineering firms in the field of 
water and to two world leaders in land reclamation, dredging and coastal construction. In 
water technology, innovative Dutch companies lead the way in the purification and re-use 
of water. There is also a large network of smaller companies which offers cost-effective, 
bespoke solutions. Skilled Dutch NGOs operate worldwide in the field of water and 
international cooperation; and the long-established ecosystem of research institutes, 
universities and local governments sustains a high standard of water resource 
management and a wealth of knowledge and skills. If necessary, Dutch organizations will 
form alliances to deliver tailor-made solutions for clients around the world 
(dutchwatersector.com, 2017a)  
 C. Netherlands Water Partnership 
 The Netherlands Water Partnership (NWP) is an independent body, which 
represents the Dutch water sector on the global stage. This public-private partnership, 
which was started in 1999, is located in The Hague, and consists of approximately 200 
members including private businesses, government, knowledge institutes, and NGOs.  
The partnership represents a comprehensive network that unites Dutch water expertise to 
collectively achieve more in solving global water related challenges; it acts as a one-stop 
center for the exchange of information on Dutch water expertise, policy developments 
and market opportunities; it initiates, coordinates and executes special projects for its 
members, such as trade missions, exhibitions and conferences; and it helps Dutch 
companies increase their world market share for water technology and water management 
expertise (nwp, 2015). The main goals of the NWP are to harmonize the activities and 
initiatives of the Dutch water sector overseas and promote the Dutch water expertise 
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worldwide. The NWP reflects the Dutch philosophy to water, which involves the pursuit 
of integrated solutions that requires multiple disciplines; it offers its members 
networking, knowledge management and diffusion, and greater visibility and influence, 
than could be achieved by any individual member acting alone; and its members work 
together to offer their global client base sustainable, multi-functional water solutions that 
serve 'people, planet and profit' (nwp. 2015).   
VIII. Leeuwarden Water Technology Innovation Cluster 
 A. Leeuwarden.   
 The city of Leeuwarden is the capital and main economic hub of the water-rich 
northern Dutch province of Friesland. Leeuwarden. It is also home to a public-private 
initiative to build a Dutch water technology innovation cluster out of the city's current 
involvement in the field of water technology. Leeuwarden's goal is to become Europe's 
capital of water innovation and technology, and the city is in a province already 
characterized by a relatively high density of independently owned, highly organized, and 
globally exporting water technology companies (Wetsus, 2016; Di Palma & Huizinga, 
2012). At the core of the cluster is an international water technology institute, The 
WaterCampus, which will host Wetsus, the city's leading scientific institute for water 
technology, in addition to several other water technology companies and organizations. 
The city of Leeuwarden is hoping to attract scientists from all over the world to conduct 
research into solutions related to drinking water, waste-water purification, and water 
distribution; to act as a ‘hub’ for a worldwide network of water technology businesses 
and research organizations; and to serve as a central point where knowledge about water 
is collected, where innovation takes place, and where water technology is 
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commercialized (watercampus.nl, 2014).   
 The emergent role of networks and hubs is a good example of Quadruple Helix 
development in the Dutch economy. Stakeholders now expect well-balanced roles 
between government, companies and research institutes to improve local and national 
productivity, and to drive innovation and stimulate business development. A success 
factor in cluster development is the engagement of these multiple stakeholders in 
reaching win-win managerial solutions for patent technology and innovation, by 
combining their complementary skills, for the benefit of entire communities. Friesland 
has a well-deserved reputation in cluster development in the water sector. All players 
contribute to the realization of a common objective: to stimulate and facilitate regional 
economic development.  
 The Leeuwarden cluster is described a serving the function of an anchoring 
milieu, which is a cluster that specializes in specific segments and focuses on the 
development and delivery of dedicated, intermediary products and services (Ebbekink & 
Lagendijk, 2017). The local state plays a critical coordinating role in relevant fields of 
policy-making such as education, training, infrastructure, and business support; and the 
policies and practices of the local state are aligned to the needs of the cluster. Leeuwarden 
is aiming for a critical mass of partners with a focus on knowledge-intensive water 
process technology, as opposed to becoming a large-scale production facility and exporter 
of water-related infrastructure (watercampus.nl, 2014). The city's planners and policy 
makers are putting public resources behind promoting greater innovation and 
entrepreneurship in an existing cluster, and this is seen to both maintain an existing 
competitive position in the market, and further create a competitive advantage in 
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emerging technologies (Di Palma & Huizinga, 2012.). In this conception of cluster-based 
economic development, the dynamics of innovation and entrepreneurship are driven by 
finding a balance of supply and demand: purposely increasing the supply of people with 
technological expertise and the resources for R&D; against an increasing  demand for 
sustainable water innovation that is driven by both growing demand for more fresh water, 
and pressures to meet increasingly stringent water quality standards (Di Palma & 
Huizinga, 2012; Ebbekink & Lagendijk, 2017). Leeuwarden is not the only water 
technology innovation cluster in the Netherlands: Delft also has a cluster anchored by the 
Delft Technical University. 
 B. The Water Campus.  
 The Leeuwarden Water Campus is expected to play a leading role in positioning 
Leeuwarden, and the Netherlands, as a global provider of innovative solutions and new 
techniques to address the growing global demand for fresh water in the face of stressed 
supplies, pollution, and climate change. The role of the WaterCampus is to organize 
cooperation between water-and-wastewater companies, knowledge institutes, and public 
authorities in the water technology sector to create synergy for the innovation, education, 
and entrepreneurship that is necessary to build and sustain a globally competitive water 
technology cluster. The WaterCampus is expected to become the physical core of the 
Dutch water technology sector and it has been designated as a 'United Nations Innovating 
City for Water Technology' (watercampus.nl, 2014).  
 The Water Campus is built from several existing pillars of the Leeuwarden water 
technology cluster: Wetsus, or the Center for Sustainable Water technology, previous 
located nearby at the University of Applied Sciences; the John the Baptist Church, now a 
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business center and incubator; the Water Alliance; the Foundation for Water, Energy, and 
Life Sciences Leeuwarden; the Center of Expertise Water Technology (CEW); the Water 
Application Center; and a specialized water fund, Wetsus. The CEW and Water Alliance 
are the managing partners of the campus which provides partners with unique 
infrastructure to support innovation and entrepreneurship: it has a demo-site and 
laboratories, it provides a meeting place for scientists and businesses from across Europe, 
and its hosts pitching events for its partners to promote their technology (watercampus.nl, 
2017). Located beside the campus is a business estate that will provide additional space if 
the campus outgrows its physical capacity. The total investment in the Water Campus is 
estimated at €36 million, with most of the financing coming from the public partners, and 
the facility is described as a 'club good' designed to improve relational assets, which will 
strengthen the cluster's network of stakeholders (Ebbekink & Lagendijk, 2017). The 
Water Campus also aligns with the sustainable development focus of the regional and 
local governments. The WaterCampus is an innovative ecosystem that facilitates the 
entire innovation chain: it facilitates moving technologies from idea to research & 
development to field-testing and demonstration to launching and, ultimately, to tangible 
business with companies worldwide. 
 C. Wetsus.  
 Wetsus is a not-for-profit foundation established in 2003 but now located at the 
Water Campus in Leeuwarden. The vision of the institute is to become the “European 
Centre of Excellence for Sustainable Water Technology”; and the Mission is to facilitate 
breakthrough technological innovations for water treatment by serving as a facilitating 
intermediary for public and private water organizations engaged in multidisciplinary 
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collaboration at all stages of the innovation-to-commercialization process (Wetsus, 2016,  
2017).  Wetsus' objectives are broadly two-fold: to create a consortium of companies, 
universities and institutions which work together to develop innovative and sustainable 
water technologies that are process-based, emission free, and part of an endless cycle; 
and to introduce these technologies into society through entrepreneurs. Wetsus' 
philosophy is that research must be demand-driven if it is to serve society and be 
commercially viable. To this end, the institute is seeking to increase its interaction civil 
society to gain insights and ideas and ease implementation of technologies. In 2007 
Wetsus was designated by the Dutch government as a 'Technological Top Institute' for 
water technology, and it is part of the Dutch Innovation Program established by the 
Ministry of Economic Affairs. Wetsus also performs a brokerage role since its inception 
in 2003 where the objective is to boost creativity through multi-disciplinary collaboration 
which leads to the development of state-of-the-art water treatment (Di Palma & Huizinga, 
2012). 
 To achieve its Vision, Mission and objectives, Wetsus' main activity is the 
coordination of a world leading research program whose broad network of partners 
include public and private companies, universities, scientific chairs, and European policy 
makers at all political scales (Wetsus, 2016, 2017). Westsus describes their innovation 
model as “jointly implemented, market-driven, application-oriented, multidisciplinary, 
(pre)competitive scientific research in the field of sustainable water technology” (Wetsus, 
2016, 2017). Westsus also believes that physical co-location, the sharing of laboratory 
facilities, and multi-disciplinary research teams have high potential to develop important 
innovations in water technology which today often requires the combined input from 
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different disciplines from biology to chemistry, and from mechanical and electrical 
engineering to material science (Wetsus, 2016, 2017).  
 The institute has received funding of about €70, half of which comes from the 
Dutch Department of Economic Affairs, with the other half coming equally from the 
business community and knowledge institutes in the Netherlands (Wetsus, 2016, 2017). 
Full participating companies pay a membership fee of between €17,000 and €28,000 per 
research theme per year (Wetsus, 2017). Platform participating companies pay an annual 
membership fee of between €3,400 and €7,900 but only have access to Wetsus' 
intellectual property and privileged access to certain information (Wetsus, 2017).  Along 
with fees, a total budget of around €15 million per year is available until 2021 (Wetsus, 
2016, 2017).  Wetsus also intends to eventually establish an investment fund, with the 
financial support of banks and other investment entities, of between €50 and €100 
million, to finance water technology-driven startups that have the potential to create new 
market segments and which show a clear path to commercialization and profitability (Di 
Palma & Huizinga, 2012). 
 The current Wetsus international network has about 125 public and private 
partners from all over the world who join forces to solve the global water problems. This 
includes about 100 water companies that actively participate in the research through 
paying memberships, which gives them the right to define the research program, and 
about 22 participating research institutes and universities known as 'know-how 
participants' (Wetsus, 2016, 2017). There are also about 50 scientific chairs from nine 
European countries who oversee execution of research projects (Wetsus, 2016, 2017). 
The result is a concentration at the Water Campus of a pool of know-how and talent that 
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crosses disciplinary boundaries, who share research and office facilities, and develop a 
multi-disciplinary community of practice in water.  
 The Wetsus research project model involves a team of 5-8 participating private 
and public water companies which assemble under a research theme and jointly 
determine the research program; and the project is executed in the Wetsus' laboratory 
under the supervision of the 3-4 of the participating research institutes and universities 
(Wetsus, 2017).  Each research project is typically carried-out in four-year-long time-
frames, primarily by PhD students and their supervisors; and the results from these pre-
competitive research projects are commercially implemented by the funding and defining 
companies and made accessible to third parties through patents and scientific publications 
(Wetsus, 2017). The research undertaken at Wetsus involves about 15 scientific 
disciplines but focuses on five main research areas in clean water production and waste 
water treatment: new water sources, sustainable water supply, waste water treatment and 
reuse, reuse and production of components and energy from water, and the detection of 
pathogens and micro/nano-pollutants (Wetsus, 2017). One of the most significant 
bottlenecks in the water technology innovation chain is field-testing and scale-up. 
Wetsus, together with Water Alliance and several partners in a radius of 50 kilometers 
around the Wetsus laboratory, provide demonstration sites where new concepts can be 
scaled-up, tested and demonstrated (Wetsus, 2017).   
 In addition to Wetsus’ research role, the institute also develops human capital for 
the water sector through a talent and education program and supports entrepreneurship 
and the development of spin-offs to stimulate the commercialization of water 
technologies (Wetsus, 2017). Since 2003, Wetsus has helped to create 30 spin-off 
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companies of the 110 new water technology companies started in the Netherlands during 
that period (Wetsus, 2016).  Entrepreneurs and innovators are often in need of financial 
support for their research and startups and Wetsus also plays the role of matchmaker 
between financiers and water technology companies in need for capital (Wetsus, 2017). 
 Wetsus places a high value on its researchers and students publishing their 
research in peer-reviewed journals, and the institute is rated in the category of “very high 
impact” for its success with publications. Since 2010, the annual publication rate has 
been about 60 articles - in journals such as Progress in Materials Science, Energy & 
Environmental Science, Water Research, Environmental Science & Technology, 
Bioresource Technology, ChemSusChem, Journal of Membrane Science, and 
Desalination – with a rate of citation on average 2.2 times higher than the world average 
(Wetsus, 2017). Wetsus has a large cohort of PhD students on its doctoral program, about 
65 at any time from all over the world; and the program, with its specialization on water 
technology, has grown in the 10 years of its existence to be internationally respected for 
its rigor and its strong connection between research institutes and industry partners in 
Europe (Wetsus, 2017). Wetsus is also building an extensive knowledge network that 
extends beyond the Water Campus which currently numbers 5,000 persons. These 
members are kept abreast of developments at Wetsus through regular newsletters and 
periodic events (Wetsus, 2017). 
 D. The Water Alliance.  
 The Water Alliance is a non-profit, membership-based industry association, 
located at the Leeuwarden WaterCampus, whose role is to help its members create 
tangible business opportunities through matchmaking, networking, and business 
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development.  Its diverse membership of 85 organizations represent all facets of the 
water-and-wastewater industry, and the network is designed to inspire, stimulate and 
support members to accelerate innovation around sustainable water technology solutions 
(wateralliance.nl, 2017). The Alliance's Vision is to turn the Leeuwarden water cluster 
into the water innovation hub of Europe, with the WaterCampus at its core; its Mission is 
to promote economic development and employment by turning innovative water 
technologies into sustainable economic growth; its strategy is to bring together a 
complete value-chain of innovation in water technology, and to take technologies from 
concept to commercialization (wateralliance.nl, 2017). The membership of the Alliance is 
open only to Dutch public and private companies, government agencies and knowledge 
institutes involved in water technology, but many of these businesses do operate 
internationally. 
 E. The Water Application Center (WAC).  
 The WAC is a fully equipped testing center, located on the Water Campus in 
Leeuwarden. The WAC recognizes that the hardest part within the innovation process is 
often the step from laboratory-testing to pilot-scale applications to implementation with 
the launching-customers. The center therefore provides researchers, innovators, and 
entrepreneurs in water-and-wastewater access to both in-house and external facilities to 
test their water technology on both small and large scales, or have the tests performed for 
them by competent researchers (waterapplicationcenter.com, 2017). The Water Alliance 
has established relationships with several organizations within the local water industry to 
offer their facilities as demonstration sites that cover a wide range of water technologies 
including potable water technologies, municipal and hospital waste water treatment 
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technologies, desalination technologies, and sensor technologies.  
 F. Criticisms of the Leeuwarden Cluster.  
 The cluster vision for Leeuwarden, as articulated by the proponents of the Water 
Campus, has its critics. Many water technology companies located in and around 
Leeuwarden – especially the small and medium enterprises - see no need to relocate to 
the Water Campus and they are concerned that the planners and policy-makers are out-of-
touch with reality. These companies do not feel as if they have been adequately consulted 
by the Water Cluster's planners and policy-makers; they believe that the focus is too 
external and comes at the expense of local engagement; they believe that the projected 
economic growth of the cluster is exaggerated; they believe that the primarily top-down 
strategy is flawed, that the Water Campus has not been marketed in a substantive way, 
and that policy-makers have failed to grasp the actual value-adding mechanisms of the 
cluster; they believe that the selection criteria is flawed and does include the ideal mix of 
organizations; they suspect that many supporters of the cluster are attracted by the 
promise or prospect of public subsidies rather than by a compelling business case for the 
Water Campus; and they perceive that the management of the cluster's development is too 
fragmented or uncoordinated (Ebbekink & Lagendijk, 2017). One of the perennial 
challenges faced by water technology companies are high barriers to entry, particularly in 
terms of access to venture capital, technical requirements, and long lead time to 
commercialization; and these issues are not receiving the priority they deserve as 
planners and policy makers focus on filling the real estate (Ebbekink & Lagendijk, 2017). 
The pursuit of symbolism, such as the signaling of a commitment to sustainability 
through the pursuit of Breaam Excellence Certification for the built infrastructure of the 
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Water Campus, may be an important goal of policy-makers; however, there are concerns 
that such financially costly strategies might dilute the economic focus of the cluster 
(Ebbekink & Lagendijk, 2017).  
 These concerns by some Leeuwarden stakeholders mirror the concerns often 
raised about public intervention in clusters: that policy-makers lack the information and 
cognitive capacity to properly understand the complexity of a cluster; that the state 
should avoid picking winners and exercise caution in how it uses scarce public resources 
as subsidies; that cluster intervention can denigrate into a 'race-to-the bottom' or 'smoke-
stack chasing'; and that politicians and policy-makers lack the strategic patience for 
building and sustaining a cluster which is an inherently a long-term activity (Ebbekink & 
Lagendijk, 2017). These concerns by some Leeuwarden stakeholders also seem to 
suggest that the Leeuwarden cluster lacks the robust 'relational assets' that facilitate the 
flow of information or knowledge sharing that could be translated into specific and 
targeted policies and practices (Ebbekink & Lagendijk, 2017). Many of the water 
technology businesses in Leeuwarden do not feel a sense of ownership for the cluster 
(Ebbekink & Lagendijk, 2017). The development of a cluster in a peripheral region of the 
Netherlands, as opposed to Delft in the heart of the country, is also seen as possibly 
weakening the relational role of a cluster (Di Palma & Huizinga, 2012). Despite these 
concerns, however, the long-term strategic, reputation and symbolic value of a project 
such as the Water Campus should not be discounted, especially if it is targeted at a 
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IX. Competitiveness of Dutch Water Cluster 
 A. Overview 
 The Dutch water economy is one of the best developed and most sophisticated in 
the world, and it is one of the pillars on which the rest of the Dutch economy secures its 
globally competitive position. The Dutch water sector has been selected by the national 
government as one of nine 'Top Sectors' because of its potential to support continued 
growth in employment and output, and to protect the environment (OECD, 2014; Janssen 
et al., 2016). The Dutch water technology sector is globally recognized for its expertise in 
two broad but important areas: delta technology, which involves the protection of land 
and the built environment from floods and storm-water; and water-and-wastewater, which 
involves the delivery of adequate quantities of high quality fresh water to domestic and 
industrial consumers, and well as the ability to treat and re-use water which protects the 
environment and makes the water economy more sustainable. Dutch water knowledge 
and technology is sold worldwide in places as far afield as New Orleans, Russia, 
Bangladesh and Vietnam. The Dutch water sector has several water technology clusters 
and different regions of the Netherlands have different types of expertise: the South is 
noted for a higher concentration of companies with expertise in delta technology, while 
the North is noted for its companies with expertise in water quality, recycling, and re-use. 
Dutch economic development is significantly influenced by its abundant natural 
endowment of water, its proximity to the sea, and its low and flood prone topography; 
however, its competitive advantage in water technology flows from solving the 
challenges that water has posed to the health, safety, and economic security of its people 
rather than a passive reliance on this inherited natural factor.  
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 B. Factor Conditions.  
 In The Netherlands, water is a key economic factor and the country is generally 
well endowed with this inherited, basic, natural resource. Water in its natural state is a 
major input into a limited number of sectors in the Dutch economy, such as agriculture or 
energy; expertise in water resource management and water technology, which are 
advanced and specialized factors that are consciously and proactively created, are key to 
productivity in wide areas the Dutch economy (Porter, 1990; Geels, 2005; Marques, 
2010). Dutch expertise in delta technology is unique in the world and is built on the 
county's historic struggle to manage its rivers, hold back the sea, and preserve land from 
an ocean which has the power to reclaim it at any time. Water resource management and 
water technology are advanced and specialized factors that have taken considerable time 
to develop, have required heavy and sustained investment, and in the case of delta 
technology are hard to duplicate (Lintsen, 2002; Metz & van den Heuvel, 2012; 
Lonnquest et al., 2014).    
 To develop and sustain its specialized and advanced factors the Dutch economy is 
supported by public and private funding for venture capital and R&D; its universities 
produce many competent scientists and engineers; its researchers are highly productive in 
publishing peer reviewed journal articles and in securing patents; and its entrepreneurs 
and innovators have an outstanding track-record in commercializing technologies (Geels, 
2005; Marques, 2010; Hisham, 2015). Despite its relatively small size and population the 
Netherlands has a significant history of invention, innovation, discovery, exploration, and 
contribution to the arts and to ideas, going back to at least the 1500s. The Netherlands 
may have joined the industrial revolution later than some other nations; however, this 
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does not mean that it was an economically or technologically unsophisticated country as 
it was a major seafaring, colonial, trading, and financial power by the mid-to-late 19th 
Century when it began to industrialize (Mokyr, 2000). The contribution to GDP from 
manufacturing is slightly less than 20%, a little lower than the European average; the 
contribution from high-technology manufacturing is about 2%, compared to 2.5% for the 
rest of Europe; and employment in high-technology manufacturing is about 2.5% of the 
workforce, compared by about 5% in the rest of Europe (Janssen et al., 2016). The 
Netherlands has historically had an economy dominated by the service sector, and this 
sector is becoming increasingly knowledge-intensive (Janssen et al., 2016).  
 The Dutch invest less than 2% of their GDP in R&D which is in line with the 
United States, Singapore and the rest of Europe, but about half that of Israel, and this 
totals about €5 billion annually, or a little over €750 per capita (Janssen et al., 2016). The 
comparatively low level of R&D intensity in the Netherlands is because of the 
comparatively large share of GDP taken up by the service sector, the comparatively small 
size of the Dutch high-technology sector, and the high share of large firms that are in 
low-to-medium technology industries (van der Veen, 2010).  The government covers 
about one-third of the investment in R&D, while almost half of the private sector's share 
of R&D is made by the top 2% of firms, with more than 500 employees (Janssen et al., 
2016). Firms with 10-50 employees, which make up 78% of all Dutch firms, contribute 
only about 13% of R&D but represent about 30% of innovation; while half of innovation 
is made by the top 4% of Dutch firms (Janssen et al., 2016). This situation with R&D and 
innovation has implications for water technology firms and water technology startups 
which tend to be small. The nine 'Top Sectors' accounted for more than 80% of R&D 
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expenditure between 2013 and 2016, representing about €1 billion, and about 36% of the 
production and about 25% of added value to GDP in 2012; but the water and the 
environment sector received less than 1% of public R&D provided to the top sectors 
(UNESCO, 2014; Janssen et al., 2016). This suggests that despite the important 
contribution of the water-and-wastewater sector to economic development, human health, 
and environmental protection its ability to command R&D support falls far short of other 
more commercially attractive sectors.  
 The Dutch have one of the strongest venture capital markets in Europe; the 
national government offers incentives to the startups through matching capital injections 
and tax breaks; and in 2016 startups accessed almost €1 billion of funding from the 
market. Although small firms are the largest component of employment growth and are 
more innovative, they have difficulty accessing venture capital; most of the venture 
capital is concentrated in central and southern regions around Amsterdam, Rotterdam and 
Eindhoven; and only a small fraction of venture capital goes to water, wastewater or the 
environment because these have long commercialization periods and investors prefer 
more general purpose technologies that serve a wider market and have faster 
commercialization periods (Janssen et al., 2016; Aquatech, 2015).    
 The Netherlands has 13 research universities whose focus is basic research, and 
37 technical and vocational universities whose focus is more towards applied sciences. 
Dutch research universities are heavily involved in R&D, at a rate almost twice the EU 
average, and are also ahead of private research facilities; but most of this R&D is 
concentrated in a small number of the research universities (Janssen et al., 2016). To 
support entrepreneurship, innovation, R&D, and the commercialization of technology, 
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many Dutch cities are becoming actively involved in cluster programs and provide 
incubators for startups (Janssen et al., 2016). The Netherlands published almost 35,000 
scientific publication in 2014, placing it sixth in the EU, and it was particularly strong in 
the biological sciences and engineering (UNESCO, 2014). Its average rate of publication 
per million inhabitants between 2008 and 2014 was 1,894, which was ahead of the EU 
average of 1,085 and far ahead of the United States average of 998; but the Netherlands 
was behind the Nordic average and far behind top performing Denmark whose 
publication rate stood at 2628. Dutch scientific publications are also among the most 
cited, at 1.48 per publication, compared to the EU average of 1.09 citations (UNESCO, 
2014).    
 C. Related & Supporting Industries 
 The spatial concentration and proximity of upstream and downstream firms within 
an industry creates an organizational structure which facilitates or hinders the exchange 
of ideas and information, determines roles and responsibilities, reflects the relative power 
and influence of member, and depends on as well as reflects the objectives and strategy 
of firms in the cluster (Porter, 1990; Markusen, 1996). The resulting organizational 
structure facilitates or hinders continuous innovation and determines the degree of 
competitiveness of the cluster and its key firms (Porter, 1990). The evolving Leeuwarden 
water technology cluster consists of businesses, research institutes, educational institutes, 
and governments agencies within the water technology sector which have been purposely 
brought together to create synergy for world class innovation, education and 
entrepreneurship related to water technology. Given that the driver for the Leeuwarden 
cluster is a public-private partnership, the Leeuwarden cluster would be best described as 
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an anchored cluster where a non-profit organization dominates the cluster and the 
economic relations between cluster members (Markusen, 1996).   
 The anchor of the Leeuwarden cluster is the Water Campus which consists of 
three managing partners - Wetsus, the Center for Expertise in Water (CEW), and the 
Water Alliance – other key permanent partners – the City of Leeuwarden, the Friesland 
Province regional government, Centre for Innovative Expertise Water (CIV) and Water 
Application Centre (WAC) – and about 70 companies and institutions that are connected 
as a member or partner to the managing partners. The Water Campus uses a model called 
the Water Technology Innovation Chain to support water technology firms to accelerate 
the time to commercialization and increase the rate with which technologies are 
successfully commercialized by bringing together all the supportive institutional elements 
which entrepreneurs and innovators would require throughout the whole 
commercialization process, from idea to business. The Water Campus provides a single 
focal point for education, scientific and technological knowledge, business support, and 
match-making related to water-and-wastewater; Westsus helps firms with demand-driven 
scientific research; the CEW helps firms with applied research to accelerate innovation 
and reduce the time to market for water technologies; the Water Alliance helps with 
business facilitation; and the WAC helps firms test their technologies in sophisticated 
laboratories, and identifies and coordinates with sites across the province to facilitate 
field testing and demonstrations (Water Campus, 2017).   
 D. Demand Conditions 
 Demanding customers and intense local competition puts pressure on firms to 
constantly innovate and improve the quality and functionality of their products which 
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increases the competitiveness of these firms (Porter, 1990). The Dutch water economy, 
over several centuries, has been driven to address water hazards and water quality issues 
– this demanding environment provided fertile ground for the rise of technologically 
capable water technology firms that would be pushed to become internationally 
competitive once local demand was largely satisfied (Lintsen, 2002; Geels, 2005; 
Lonnquest et al., 2014). The Netherlands is a now net-exporter of water and related 
environmental technologies and is the global leader in some water sub-sectors, such as 
delta technology, and shares global leadership in several other water sub-sections, such as 
water-and-wastewater treatment, recycling, and reuse (van der Veen, 2010). About 40% 
of the world market for water management is in Dutch hands (Holland Trade & Invest, 
2017).  
 Water and the environment directly account for a small but important part of the 
Dutch economy. High population density, a high degree of urbanization, and significant 
economic activities have created significant environmental pressure in The Netherlands 
making water critical for public and environmental health and national economic 
competitiveness and performance. In 2010, the Dutch spent about €3.8 billion on treating 
drinking water, managing sewer systems and treating waste-water; turnover for the entire 
Dutch water sector in 2008 was about was € 16.4 billion, of which 57% was earned by 
water technology companies; exports for the sector in 2008 amounted to € 6.5 billion, 
with over €2 billion for water supply and water purification alone; environmental services 
accounts for about 0.66% of gross added value; energy and water utilities companies 
account for about 2.3% of gross added value; and the water economy employs about 
180,000 people (van der Veen, 2010; Holland Trade & Invest, 2017). The indirect impact 
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is far greater than these figures would suggest as water is an input into almost all other 
economic activities. Many leading Dutch industries, such as petrochemicals and 
agriculture, are water intensive or water enabled industries that demand large volumes of 
water (Holland Trade & Invest, 2017). 
 Public procurement and the domestic utility industry are an important source of 
domestic demand. In the 1970s, the Netherlands introduced a levy on water pollution 
which became a financial driver to invest in water treatment facilities. The resulting huge 
investments created a market for new and improved water technologies and sparked an 
upsurge in R&D and innovation which positioned the Netherlands as a leading water 
technology nation (van der Veen, 2010).  
 E. Firm Strategy, Structure and Rivalry 
 Firms operate in a dynamic environment and this encourages firms to increase 
productivity and innovation (Porter, 1990). This dynamic environment is usually created 
by competition with other firms; however, it can also be stimulated in the Dutch case by 
the need to solve important or pressing social or environmental problems, such as 
flooding and storm surges, or by government regulation to improve water quality or 
reduce water use. In The Netherlands science, technology, innovation, and the 
environment have always influenced each other to shape how Dutch society addresses 
water resource management and water hazard risk (Bijker, 2002). For much of Dutch 
history the water economy was managed such that different players and different scales 
of government had specific areas of responsibility: local governments managed local 
water resources, while the regional and national governments managed national and 
regional projects; policy and technical design was determined by the Rijkswaterstaad, 
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while construction was often done by private contractors; and operations or service 
provision was carried out by independent public agencies, public corporations, or private 
firms (Bijker, 2002). Although the balance of power over the water economy shifted 
briefly in favor of the national state following the Second World War, the private sector 
and civil society have historically played a large role along many dimensions to include 
defining problems, identifying solutions, implementing projects, and operating and 
maintaining the resulting water systems (Bijker, 2002).  
 The presence of many technically capable and well-established water technology 
firms does not automatically translate into a competitive or profitable market structure. 
The Dutch water economy has the largest number of water technology firms of any of the 
six clusters studies; however, the Dutch water economy is primarily characterized by 
firms operating under market structures that can be characterized as monopolistic, 
oligopolistic and monopolistic competition, depending upon their segment of the water 
economy. Therefore, at the local, regional and national scales the Dutch water sector is 
generally not characterized by intense inter-firm competition or rivalry; however, at the 
global scale where there are firms from other countries serving similar market segments 
there is more likelihood for Dutch water technology firms to face competition and rivalry.  
 The Dutch have tended to operate an open economy for most of their modern 
economic history, their firms have usually been forced to adapt to external economic and 
political circumstances beyond their control, and the Dutch have been able to build 
internationally competitive firms at various scales (Sluyterman, 2013). There was a brief 
experiment with a protected and managed market-economy in the middle of the 20th 
century; however, by the start of the 21st century the Dutch economy had again become a 
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decidedly open, liberal market-economy (Sluyterman, 2013). This environment means 
Dutch technology firms, many of which are small by international standards, have an 
international outlook and the experience to compete in the international market.  
  Firm structure in the water technology sector is characterized by many small 
firms which in some ways encourages innovation through the independence of the 
entrepreneurs; however, this type of structure creates a fragmented industry with small 
firms not capable of bearing large amounts of risk, or the costs associated with long 
periods of commercialization (van der Veen, 2010). The Dutch water sector consists of 
about 1500 firms, most of which are small-and-medium in size, with only 270 firms 
employing more than 100 persons; and more than 60% of these firms engage in exporting 
(van der Veen, 2010). The increase in popularity of public-private partnerships and the 
rise of contractual arrangements such as Design-Build-Own-Operate (DBOO) favors 
large, multinational water-and-wastewater firms who can build a consortium and carry 
the risk of a large, long-term investment (van der Veen, 2010).   This has been a stimulus 
to the creation of facilitation and cooperation mechanisms such as the Water Alliance, 
Wetsus, and the Netherlands Water Partnership which allows small technology firms to 
network and showcase their technologies and capabilities.  
 Firm strategy in the water technology sector is built largely upon a very strong 
scientific and technological position, home demand which is strong and technically 
demanding, and decades of international experience; firm strategy is hampered by a 
paucity of entrepreneurs, a weak entrepreneurial spirit, a cultural reluctance to take risks, 
and a regulatory regime which does not reward risk taking – these issues are generic to 
the Netherlands, weakens the national and sector innovation systems, and makes it 
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difficult to translate the knowledge and experience to commercially successful business 
ventures (van der Veen, 2010). The scientific and technical capacity to develop 
technologies must be balanced by the entrepreneurial and innovative capacity to 
commercialize these technologies, or investors and venture capitalists will not enter the 
market (van der Veen, 2010). Water technology clusters are ecosystems and they cannot 
function competitively if important elements, like financial intermediaries or trade 
associations, are absent (Moore, 1993, 1996).   
 F. Government & Chance 
 Government and chance can, and often does, serve as a catalyst for innovation, 
entrepreneurship, and competitiveness (Porter, 1990). The Dutch government did this by 
encouraging firms through incentives, pushing them with regulations, by acting as a 
demanding customer through setting high standards for government procurement, or 
intervening in markets to overcome market failure; and chance can do this; while chance 
played a significant role in creating a globally competitive water sector as a byproduct of 
an urgent need to address water quality issues, as well as manage water hazard risks.  
Water as a Dutch 'Top Sector' receives considerable public support through a range of tax 
benefits, innovation credits, and grants that encourage businesses to develop innovative 
products and services (Ministry of Economic Affairs & Climate Policy, 2017). The Dutch 
government also works to raise the profile of the water sector: water technology firms 
may receive national honors and awards for excellence in science, technology, and 
innovation, technological through the biennial National Icons Competition; through the 
biennial Innovation Expo which has become a network comprising 3,000 representatives 
from the private sector, public bodies and knowledge institutions that works together on 
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innovations and technological breakthroughs; through the creation of national data bases, 
blogs, and vlogs to promote the water sector; and through its embassies and business 
attaches; and through its policies, such as the National Science Agenda (Ministry of 
Economic Affairs & Climate Policy, 2017). Here the state is attempting to overcome 
deficiencies in the water economy such as the bounded rationality of economic actors - 
where firms misunderstand market signals or are more risk averse than is socially 
desirable - or imperfect information – where asymmetric or incomplete information 
narrows the range of strategies choices or impeded profitable market transactions (Lescop 
& Lescop, 2013).   
 Policy making and regulation in the Dutch water economy has a long history, but 
it became a significant stimulus for innovation with the introduction in the 1970s of a 
levy on water pollution. This levy was used to finance investments in water purification 
which resulted in cleaner surface water as well as a leading global position for the Dutch 
water purification industry (van der Veen, 2010). Between the 1970s and 1990s the 
Netherlands became a leader in environmental policy making with policies and 
regulations that were considered as highly transparent and flexible; and although 
regulations remain stringent and environmental standards remain high, political and 
policy attention for the environment at the national scale has been superseded by a shift 
in attention to the supranational and global scales which may not be as beneficial to the 
Dutch water technology sector (van der Veen, 2010).  
X. Conclusion 
 The Dutch water technology sector is a product of a long relationship between 
Dutch society and a water dominated environment that has at various times supported and 
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sustained that society and at other times threatened its existence. The Dutch water 
challenge has generally not been too little water, like Singapore or Israel, but too much 
water: extensive tracts of farmlands and the built environment must be protected either 
from storm surges along the coast or flood waters from its many rivers. Many Dutch 
water challenges relate to its geography, geology, low lying topography, and large tracts 
of land that have been reclaimed from former bodies of water that must be constantly 
protected against flooding and subsistence. Another Dutch water challenge relates to 
water quality and environmental protection which is driven by the country’s small size, 
high population density, and high level of urbanization. The Dutch have therefore learned 
how to manage water resources through both trial-and-error, and systematic intellectual 
and scientific inquiry; they have come to the realization that it should be driven by a 
continuous process of innovation that is adaptive and capable of meeting evolving 
challenges; and they have come to understand that it should involve multiple stakeholders 
from the public sector, the private sectors, and civil society rather than being managed 
exclusively by technocrats. This process of learning has fostered a philosophy towards 
water technology that it should be practical, efficient, cost-effective, and sustainable; that 
its development and diffusion benefits from forging mutually beneficial collaborations 
with international partners and experts; and that it should be made available to a global 
water economy that is facing a growing demand for fresh water - for domestic, industrial, 
and agricultural purposes - that is driven by population growth, urbanization, economic 
expansion and climate change. The Dutch have an intimate understanding of many of the 
water challenges facing the planet as The Netherlands has for generations been a densely 
populated, high-urbanized, highly industrialized, and agriculturally intensive society 
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whose natural and built environment faces multiple risks from water-related hazards. 
What started out as a strategic vulnerability for The Netherlands has been turned into a 
strategic advantage with the country now recognized as a global leader in many water 
technology fields from flood control, to chlorine-free potable water supply, to recycling, 
to reuse, and desalination. 
This long history of addressing complex water challenges, and the maturity of the 
Dutch water utility sub-sector, means that the Dutch water technology sector is currently 
in the paradigm of an innovation-driven growth strategy. Most of the 20th century saw 
massive public investments in water infrastructure and complex hydraulic engineering 
projects; while the last three decades of that century saw a shift to addressing water 
quality and water efficiency issues largely related to environmental protection. The 
current innovation driven paradigm is driven by a need to solve emerging problems, and 
old and persistent problems, in new and better ways that are more cost-effective and more 
financially and environmentally sustainable. The Netherlands has developed a globally 
competitive, innovation-driven, and diverse water technology sector with several globally 
competitive clusters spread across The Netherlands, each area having a dominant 
technological specialization or focus. The water technology cluster that is the object of 
this case study, Leeuwarden, specializes in technologies to produce fresh water and treat 
of waste-water. While the delta technology cluster in the south of the country could be 
considered a mature cluster with many large and experienced hydraulic engineering 
firms, the cluster in Leeuwarden could be considered a growing cluster with many 
smaller and newly emerging water technology firms.   
The Dutch water technology sector is one of the largest in the world with much of 
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its current business derived outside The Netherlands. The sector, however, owes much of 
its business to decades of public investment and public initiatives which provided an 
important launching platform for entry into the global water economy. Solving collective 
needs and challenges from flood protection, to navigation, to providing the domestic 
economy with a reliable and affordable water-and-wastewater services through world-
class water utilities became the primary drive behind the Dutch water technology sector. 
Spillover effects meant that Dutch water-enabled and water-intensive industries and 
agriculture also benefitted from an innovative water sector. Although the national 
government took the decision to position water as a ‘Top Sector’ this decision came after 
there were emerging and mature water technology clusters in The Netherlands. The 
creation of this sector was historically the indirect effect of public activities in the Dutch 
water economy; however, given the continued importance of this sector to The 
Netherlands and the export potential of water technologies, the state is seeking to nurture 
and sustain this sector by consistent investment in world-class public water infrastructure, 
a broad-based technological infrastructure, appropriate science and technology policies, a 
network of public and private research organizations, and supportive government 
institutions. Dutch governments at all scales are working to ensure that R&D and 
commercialization take place by the creation of a supportive and facilitative economic, 
technological and institutional landscape along the entire value chain of the water 
industry. Dutch governments and industry associations at all scales participate in the 
process of learning, the diffusion of water innovations, and the acceleration of 
commercialization in several ways: by hosting events which build network and act as fora 
for the exchange of ideas and knowledge; through collaborations and partnerships; and by 
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providing test-bedding opportunities for testing technologies in real-life operating 
conditions at water-and-wastewater works. In this way local competences were built up 
incrementally and systematically. The structure of the Leeuwarden cluster is that of an 
anchor centered around the WaterCampus, which is a public-private partnership 
organized to bring businesses, educational institutes and governments together to 
stimulate innovation and entrepreneurship. Despite public interest in the water 
technology sector, the long history of private sector involvement in the water economy, 
and the considerable global experience of private firms in water technology, ensures that 
The Netherlands has been a net exporter of water technology for several decades, and 
makes the sector ultimately less reliance on government contracts, government funded 
R&D, and government subsidized venture capital. If the Leeuwarden Water Cluster can 
become less dependent of state support this cluster has a high probability of transitioning 
















WATER TECHNOLOGY CLUSTERS IN SINGAPORE 
 
I. Introduction: Water in Singapore 
 Water has always been both a key strategic resource and an economic asset in 
Singapore: first as a constraint on development, when the deficit in water supplies 
threatened to limit economic growth; and second as an enabler of development.  The 
creation of an innovative water sector has resulted in a globally competitive industry that 
generates exports of technologies and expertise, raises the diplomatic standing of 
Singapore in the international community, and re-brands the city-state as a well-managed, 
efficient, aesthetically pleasant, and environmentally responsible city (Wong, 2006; 
Tortajada, 2006a, 2006b; Caballero-Anthony & Hangzo, 2012; Braak et al., 2017; Dhalla, 
2017; Joo & Heng, 2017). This transformation of the Singaporean water economy can be 
traced to good governance, robust institutions, and the application of technology; and 
these three pillars of transformation were the result of a concerted and consistent effort by 
an innovative and entrepreneurial Singaporean government as it addressed a key 
development challenge (Tortajada, 2006a, 2006b; Low, 2012; Tortajada, Joshi & Biswas, 
2013). Singapore has won many awards for its success at water resource management, 
and the Third World Centre for Water Management identifies the city-state as one of the 
best examples in the world of urban water supply and management from which both 
developed and developing countries could draw lessons which could be adapted to their 
contexts (Tortajada, 2006a, 2006b).  
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  Singapore strategy for transforming its water economy required numerous 
specific enablers: (1) a strong political will to create an enabling environment by ensuring 
institutional effectiveness; (2) an effective and efficient legal and regulatory framework; 
(3) an ability to conceive of all sources of water supply in their totality; (4) a concurrent 
emphasis on supply and demand management, and on waste-water and storm-water 
management; (5) an ability to find the right balance between water quantity and water 
quality, between efficiency and equity considerations, and between public sector and 
private sector participation; (6) an ability to find ways to lower production and 
management costs while keeping service quality high; (7) an ability to raise sufficient 
capital to finance necessary infrastructure and to prioritize those projects; (8) a 
commitment to developing a technologically skilled, managerial competent, and highly 
motivated workforce; and (9) its ability to learn from experience and adapt to changing 
circumstances (Tortajada, 2006a, 2006b; Chew, Watanabe & Tou, 2010). The 
development of strategies, the creation of enablers, and the ability to integrate and 
coordinate them in the relatively short time-frame of 40 years, is an indication of the 
existence of a robust governance and institutional framework; while the number of 
strategies and enablers is an indication of the complexity of the challenges that all water 
resource managers must face. The Singapore case also suggests that political will and 
public support often seems to require a crisis driver to create a sense of urgency to solve 
water challenges. Singapore’s example is therefore a sobering warning to other countries 
that the creation of a modern water economy, and a competitive water technology sector, 
cannot take place amid mediocre institutions, weak and uncommitted public and private 
leadership, and unclear priorities (Tortajada, 2006a, 2006b).  
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This chapter will show the following: (1) Singapore’s historical relationship with 
water and how its political leaders recognized that the development of a national water 
economy was critical for underpinning all aspects of political independence and 
economic development; (2) Singapore’s governance and institutional framework and how 
the country’s political leaders eventually developed policies and institutions that 
transformed the country from a water-scarce country to a water independent country; (3) 
Singapore’s water resource management strategy and how the country’s technocrats 
employed science and technology to close the ‘water loop’ from collection, to treatment, 
to disposal, to reuse; (4) Singapore’s innovation and economic development strategy and 
how it created indigenous expertise in water resource management and water-related 
technologies; and (5) Singapore’s competitive position in relations to its water technology 
sector and how the country is a major global exporter of urban storm water, recycling, 
and desalination technologies. Singapore is now an internationally recognized name in 
the global water community where it is perceived as a model for urban water 
management and environmental conservation which supports its desire to become a 
global HydroHub for innovations in water (Caballero-Anthony & Hangzo, 2012). 
II. History of the Singapore Water Economy 
 A. Overview 
 Singapore is a city-state which gained independence twice: from Britain in 1959, 
after 135 years of colonial rule, and then also from the Malay Federation in 1965. The 
history of its water economy can be divided into roughly five periods: (1) the colonial 
period prior to 1959; (2) the immediate post-independence period from 1965 to 1972 
when the new nation was politically stabilized, the initial development vision established, 
 
 383   
  
and its water supplies from Malaysian were secured; (3) the period between 1972 and 
1992 when the legal, regulatory and institutional foundations of the water economy were 
established, and natural local sources exploited to the maximum; (4) the period between 
1992 and 2003 when attention shifted to exploiting unconventional sources; and (5) the 
period since 2003 when the water economy was opened up to the private sector and the 
decision made to make the water sector into a globally competitive HydroHub. 
 B. Colonial & Pre-Independence Singapore.  
 Singapore was founded in 1819 by Sir Stamford Raffles of the British East India 
Company as a free port to capitalize on its strategic location along major Far East 
maritime trade routes. The colony was variously administered by a Municipal 
Commission, established in 1887, with eventual responsibility for piped water, gas, and 
electricity; between 1951 and 1957 by a City Council -  which took over from the 
Municipal Commission – and a Rural Board; and between 1957 and 1959 by the 
Ministries of Local Government and National Development as part of major bureaucratic 
reforms to prepare the city-state for independence and reduce red-tape, bureaucratic 
inefficiency, and corruption (Tortajada, Joshi & Biswas, 2013). In 1963 the Public 
Utilities Board (PUB) was formed to take over implementation and operational 
responsibilities for water, electricity, and gas services: given the developmental 
significance of the PUB's portfolio it was placed under the Prime Minister's office where 
it largely remained until 1971 (Tortajada, Joshi & Biswas, 2013). Singapore's long 
struggle to establish high quality institutions, governance arrangements, and technical and 
managerial capacity would eventually prove central to its ability to address water 
resource management and every other development challenge (Yew, 2012; Tortajada, 
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Joshi & Biswas, 2013). 
 Initially, Singapore was able to supply all the water needs of its small population 
from local sources and the first reservoir was constructed in 1822. By the 1890s well 
water had become contaminated and many were closed down (Tortajada, Joshi & Biswas, 
2013). A second reservoir was constructed - and several times upgraded - between 1867 
and 1922, and a third commissioned in 1910: total supply capacity was now 17.5 million 
gallons per day from a storage capacity of 2,100 million gallons but by 1922 this was 
inadequate for the 400,000 people who lived in the colony (Tortajada, Joshi & Biswas, 
2013). This led to the 1927 agreement with the Sultan of Johor for the construction of 
two reservoirs which were to eventually supply an additional 18 million gallons of water 
per day to Singapore by 1932 (Tortajada, Joshi & Biswas, 2013). The constantly 
increasing volume of regional and global trade ensured the economy flourished and that 
rapid development took place, but this was placing a strain on the water resources of the 
small colony above that for which the authorities made provision: there was essentially 
an absence of long-term planning and it was not until 1950 that the first serious water 
resources study was commissioned (Tortajada, Joshi & Biswas, 2013). In the 1950s 
several water projects were initiated both in Singapore and Johor to expand water supply; 
however; all these projects proved inadequate and during 1961 and 62 Singapore suffered 
severe water shortages from prolonged droughts (Tortajada, Joshi & Biswas, 2013). In 
1961 and 1962 critical water agreements with Malaysia were signed to secure additional 
water from Johor and to secure this supply until 2061; while the government of 
Singapore, with help for the World Bank, was driven to commission another water study 
because of rapidly increasing demand (Tortajada, Joshi & Biswas, 2013). By 
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independence Malaysia controlled 80% of Singapore's fresh water supply 
 C. 1965-1972.  
 The priority in this period was for newly independent Singapore to achieve 
political and economic stability and water played a critical role in achieving these goals. 
In 1965, daily per capita water consumption among the approximately 1.8 million 
Singaporeans was 75 liters and the most immediate impediments to economic growth 
were insufficient water supply, droughts and flooding. The main emphasis of water 
strategy in the 1960s was therefore to secure additional water from Malaysia under the 
Water Agreements - this was the least expensive and most readily available source at the 
time – and to address flooding from which about 13% of Singapore was at risk 
(Tortajada, Joshi & Biswas, 2013). The government also began the process of putting in 
place enabling elements what would become a comprehensive institutional and regulatory 
framework for water resource management: the Environmental Public Health Act of 1968 
and the Clean Air Act of 1971 were passed, and a Water Planning Unit was established in 
the Prime Minister's Office in 1971 (Tortajada, Joshi & Biswas, 2013). This unit began to 
study various options to address Singapore's long-term water problems and in 1972 
produced the city-state's first 20-year Water Master Plan (Tortajada, Joshi & Biswas, 
2013). The Water Planning Unit initially sought the assistance of Tahal Consultants from 
Israel, but their input was limited: Israeli expertise was based on conditions very 
dissimilar to Singapore's and the city-state realized that it would have to quickly develop 
indigenous expertise (Tortajada, Joshi & Biswas, 2013). In the early years there was 
considerable continuity in policies and plans as most of the water supply projects 
implemented in this period were a continuation of plans which were developed by the 
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British in the pre-independence period, in particular the expansion of supply from Johor 
(Tortajada, Joshi & Biswas, 2013). The severe financial constraints during this period 
meant that projects had to be carefully prioritized and resourceful city engineers had to 
come up with innovative, low-cost solutions (Tortajada, Joshi & Biswas, 2013).    
 D. 1972-1992.  
 In this period the emphasis of the water strategy initially shifted to self-
sufficiency and later to environmental remediation, with the cleaning of rivers and 
waterways. Whereas the focus of the previous period was on securing additional supplies 
from Johor, the 1970s focused on increasing local sources of water supply (Tortajada, 
Joshi & Biswas, 2013). It was also the period when comprehensive and centralized 
planning by the state became well-established: in 1971 a Concept Plan with a 40-year 
time horizon was produced whose vision would be implemented by a series on 10-year 
sector-specific Master Plans (Tortajada, Joshi & Biswas, 2013). Three Master Plans were 
of critical importance for the water sector – the Water Master Plan, the Sewerage Master 
Plan, and the Drainage Master Plan – although other Master Plans – such as for housing – 
would also impact water and would have to be coordinated between the agencies 
responsible for water. The 1972 Water Master Plan contained two broad strategies: 
exploit existing sources of water resources more efficiently and effectively; and keep 
under surveillance unconventional sources of water until they become technically and 
economically feasible (Tortajada, Joshi & Biswas, 2013). Because of Singapore's small 
size and high level of urban development, it was recognized that unconventional sources 
such as storm-water runoff, recycling and reuse, and desalination would eventually have 
to be exploited (Tortajada, Joshi & Biswas, 2013).  
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 The priority water development strategy was to exploit surface water sources, 
through extensions of water catchment areas, as this was the quickest and most cost-
effective strategy in the short-to-medium term, although Johor water was still cheaper. 
Many potential catchment areas were heavily polluted and required extensive remediation 
before their potential could be exploited (Tortajada, Joshi & Biswas, 2013). Contrary to 
findings from the 1950 Water Study, the 1972 study determined that ground-water 
potential was very limited due to Singapore's soil and geology, while cloud seeding 
proved unsuccessful (Tortajada, Joshi & Biswas, 2013). The Water Master Plan also 
included plans to extend the city-state's catchment areas from 11% to 75% of land area, 
and to implement pollution controls to improve the quality of water being collected in 
those catchment areas (Tortajada, Joshi & Biswas, 2013).  
 After 1986, when local catchments had been fully exploited, Singapore began to 
seriously examine the unconventional sources of water; by this time some experience at 
recycling wastewater had been developed, as the Ministry of the Environment (EVN) had 
established a pilot plant as far back as 1974, and experience with inter-agency 
coordination on water quality issues had been built-up (Tortajada, Joshi & Biswas, 2013). 
Exploratory work on the possibility of damming the Marina Bay, to create what would 
later become the Marina Barrage, was begun, and negotiations were started with 
Indonesia to import water from that country through an undersea pipe. Recycling and 
desalination would have to wait a few more years before full-scale projects would be 
technically and economically feasible (Tortajada, Joshi & Biswas, 2013). 
 Improved drainage, pollution control and sewerage also began receiving more 
attention from planners and policymakers: pollution affected the quality of water being 
 
 388   
  
collected in the expanded catchment areas and stored in reservoirs, as well as the cost of 
treating water to make it potable. In 1972 a Drainage Department was set up under the 
ENV to protect people and infrastructure from flooding, improve public health, and 
produce a Drainage Master Plan. Over the course of 25 years it would invest S$2 billion 
in drainage infrastructure, in upgrading waterways to facilitate storm-water runoff, and in 
reducing flood prone areas by 95% (Tortajada, Joshi & Biswas, 2013). The Drainage 
Department also became responsible for enforcing several pieces of legislation and for 
issuing development permits relating to drainage.  
The dominant sanitation method traditionally employed in Singapore was the 
night-soil bucket collection service which would remain in use up until the 1980s when it 
was finally superseded by a comprehensive sewerage system (Tortajada, Joshi & Biswas, 
2013). To address sanitation, a Sewerage Master Plan, later renamed Used Water Master 
Plan, was produced in the late 1960s which outlined the creation of a sewerage system 
which was separate from the storm-water system which channeled surface runoff directly 
to rivers and reservoirs. The building of a comprehensive sewerage system was very 
costly, but is made feasible because capital, operating and maintenance costs were 
ultimately recovered from consumers using a cost-recovery mechanism (Tortajada, Joshi 
& Biswas, 2013). To complement the efforts to improve water quality through drainage 
and sanitation, the government in the 1980s also embarked on a concerted effort to clean 
up Singapore's rivers and waterways. This laid the foundation for a shift in emphasis to 
aesthetics in the next period, and this was articulated in the updated 1991 Concept Plan.   
 E. 1992-2003.  
 In this period the emphasis shifted to providing Singapore's citizens and visitors  
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with access to recreation and amenities in both the natural and build environment 
(Tortajada, Joshi & Biswas, 2013). The success of the early supply strategies was 
demonstrated by the water system’s capacity to support domestic water consumption of 
173 litres in 1993, and to meet ever increasing industrial demand (Tortajada, Joshi & 
Biswas, 2013). Policy now shifted to how to contain domestic demand and water 
planners therefore began serious consideration about adding recycled and desalinated 
water to the portfolio - in 1996 consultants were contracted to carry out feasibility studies 
for desalination (Tortajada, Joshi & Biswas, 2013). Storm-water from roads and housing 
estates was also now being tapped, rather than channeled into the sea, and urban areas 
were brought into the catchment system (Tortajada, Joshi & Biswas, 2013).  
A new recycling demonstration plant using the latest technology was constructed 
at a cost of S$14 million, and a decision was taken in 1999 for the PUB to build one 
small desalination plant and invite the private sector to bid to design, build, operate and 
own (DBOO) a large desalination plant, exploiting recent advances in desalination 
technology (Tortajada, Joshi & Biswas, 2013). Between 2000 and 2002 the demonstration 
recycling plant proved the technical and economic feasibility of the recycling water and 
plans were put in place to add recycled water to the water portfolio of the PUB: thus 
NEWater was born and waste-water was re-branded as used water (Tortajada, Joshi & 
Biswas, 2013).  
 F. 2003 and Beyond  
 In this period Singapore committed itself to exploit unconventional sources of 
supply, strengthen sustainable environmental management practices, reduce domestic 
consumption, engage the private sector to leverage their competencies, and make the 
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water sector into a globally competitive, high-technology industry with high investment, 
export and job creation potential (Wong, 2006; Khoo, 2009; Chew, Watanabe & Tou, 
2010; Tortajada, Joshi & Biswas, 2013; Han, 2014). The latest approach to water supply 
is encapsulated in a strategy launched in 2005 known as the 'Four Taps Strategy' which 
focuses attention on the four main sources of water – imported, rain and storm-water, 
recycled, and desalinated – and seeks to find the optimal balance between these sources. 
Success was achieved on all fronts: most of Singapore's land area is used as a catchment, 
the supply from unconventional sources has significantly increased, daily per capita 
domestic water consumption was reduced to 153 liters in 2011, and dependence on Johor 
water has been reduced (Tortajada, Joshi & Biswas, 2013). With regards to 
unconventional sources, the city-state opened two desalination plants, in 2005 and 2013 
respectively, which together meet about 25% of Singapore’s current total freshwater 
needs; there are plans for three additional desalination plants by 2020; and the PUB has 
identified five coastal sites for future plants with the goal for desalination to meet 30% of 
the estimated daily freshwater demand by 2060 (PUB, 2016). Singapore opened its first 
full-scale water reclamation plant in 2003 to produce NEWater, primarily for the 
commercial and industrial sectors which value high-quality water for many industrial 
processes (PUB, 2016). NEWater can also be added to reservoir water where it can 
undergo additional treatment to produce drinking water. Four more NEWater plants were 
commissioned in 2003, 2004, 2007, and 2010 respectively (PUB, 2016). All the 
desalination and NEWater plants are public-private partnerships with design-build-own-
operate (DBOO) contracts (PUB, 2016). NEWater and desalination meet up to 40% and 
25% of Singapore's daily water demand, and plans are under way to boost capacity to 
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increase this to 55% and 30% of water needs respectively by 2060, before the second 
water agreement with Malaysia expires.  
 Several more storage facilities were commissioned in this period. The Marina 
Barrage, Singapore’s 15th and most urban reservoir, was commissioned in 2008; and the 
48 kms of phase one of the Deep Tunnel Sewerage System (DTSS) was completed in 
2008, with the remaining 12 kms of Phase 2 scheduled for completion in 2025 (PUB, 
2016). Two additional reservoirs were opened in 2011 at Punggol and Serangoon 
(Tortajada, Joshi & Biswas, 2013). Singapore's total water infrastructure currently stands 
at 17 raw water reservoirs, 9 treatment works and 14 storage or service reservoirs with a 
capacity to supply the city-state about 1,360 million liters of water per day; and two-
thirds of Singapore's land area is now used as a catchment with plans to increase this to 
90% by 2060 (PUB, 2016). At independence Singapore only had three reservoirs. 
Although Singapore still imports water from Malaysia the city-state is now, theoretically 
at least, capable of self-sufficiency in the supply of fresh water. Singapore is now fully 
connected to sewers, the PUB collects and treats all wastewater; and the PUB has 
constructed separate drainage and sewerage systems to facilitate wastewater reuse on an 
extensive scale (PUB, 2016). There is universal access to drinking water and sanitation, 
100% of consumers are metered, unaccounted for water as a percentage of total 
production is 5%, and there are no illegal connections (Tortajada, 2006a & 2006b). These 
performance results exceed most of the developed world, and far outstrip all of the 
developing world, and represent a sea change from the performance results at 
independence in 1965. 
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III. Singapore's Water: Overcoming a Deficit 
  Although Singapore is located in the tropical-monsoon region of South-east Asia 
and receives one of the highest levels of annual rainfall in the world, the country has very 
limited natural water resources. This is due to its small size, low-lying topography, 
extremely small rivers, absence of natural aquifers, and soil characteristics which result in 
a low rate of absorption of rainwater, limits the surface area available for natural 
catchments and the storage of water (Dhalla, 2017). The UN has ranked Singapore 170th 
among 190 countries in terms of fresh water availability (UNESCO, 2006). With a 
current population of about 5 million citizens in about 700 km2, Singapore water and 
urban planners must reconcile competing land uses such as housing, commerce, industry, 
transport, education, and recreation (Dhalla, 2017). Limited land for water collection and 
storage placed a serious ceiling on the prospects for economic development, good public 
environmental health, and a high quality of life (Wong, 2009; Dhalla, 2017). 
Prior to independence, and the city-state's economic takeoff, water consumption 
levels were much lower than at present, and the inadequate infrastructure and poor water 
supply management sparked water rationing in 1961 and 1963. Singapore's economy in 
the 1960s was dominated by low-end agriculture – pig and poultry farming – and services 
– shipping and trade related services – that were highly polluting and, when combined 
with the lack of sanitation infrastructure, resulted in the city-state's limited bodies of fresh 
water being largely open cesspools (Dhalla, 2017). These industries offered little value-
added and thus little prospect for meaningful and sustainable economic development. In 
the half-century since independence, Singapore has transformed its agricultural-and-
trade-based economy to one that exports high-technology manufactured products, 
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advanced producer services, and tourism (Wong, 2009; Dhalla, 2017). This 
transformation, however, comes at a price: these high-value industries are energy-and-
water-intensive. As the economy and population of the city-state expanded the demand 
for fresh water only kept rising; although increases in overall domestic demand is now 
tapering off, and per-capita domestic consumption is falling because of conservation and 
demographic changes, industrial demand is expected to continue to rise from the 
continuing shift to high-value, water-intensive industries (Wong, 2009; Dhalla, 2017). 
Singapore has had to purposively transform and align its water economy in step with the 
restructuring of the wider economy, but the deployment of recycling and clean production 
technologies would also support the upgrading of the wider economy making it more 
sustainable and competitive.     
 Singapore's current domestic water storage capacity historically only satisfies 
about 50% of the demand for water, with the rest of that demand being met from water 
imported from neighboring Johor state in Malaysia (Wong, 2009).  The combination of 
local and Johor storage caters for about two years supply at the normal levels of usage, 
but in the absence of the Johor supply that buffer is reduced to only about 4 months 
supply from local sources (Wong, 2009). This risk to its water supply has encouraged 
Singapore to diversify its sources of supply to include securing a 100-year S1.5 billion 
agreement with Indonesia to import water; and to make up for the deficit in its storage 
capacity it employs reclamation of used water, desalination, strict demand management 
through full-cost pricing to reflect water's scarcity, and by encouraging conservation 
(Wong, 2009).  
 Solving the many challenges facing the water economy was a high priority for 
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Singapore's government from the earliest days. Political commitment at the highest level, 
and the inculcation of a sense of crisis in the public to secure their support, ensured that 
comprehensive water and waste water infrastructure was given priority in the allocation 
of scarce financial resources (Wong, 2009; Yew, 2012; Dhalla, 2017). Strict zoning laws 
were used to relocate people and industries, public housing used to resettle people in 
estates with water-and-wastewater infrastructure, and carefully spatial planning 
segregated land uses to create green-and-blue spaces to collect storm-water and offer 
recreation to its citizens (Wong, 2009; Yew, 2012; Dhalla, 2017). Political commitment 
and the nurturing of public support also ensured that Singapore approach to a complex 
problem could involve a long-term multifaceted, and holistic approach to water resource 
management. Singapore's strategy was accomplished incrementally, through a process of 
learning and adaptation over several decades (Wong, 2009; Yew, 2012; Dhalla, 2017). 
 Singapore is now in advance of many other countries in the capture, treatment, 
and reuse of waste-and-storm water. Currently, two-thirds of the country now serves as a 
catchment area for drinking water supply, among the highest in the world, and the 
country is almost water independent. This determination to efficiently and effectively 
manage its scarce water resources has also helped create the foundation for a globally 
competitive, high-technology water sector with companies and research facilities that are 
now among the most scientifically and technically capable, and innovative and 
entrepreneurial, in the world. A natural deficit in water became a driver for both public 
and private innovation and entrepreneurship; Singapore has been successful in building a 
diverse, sustainable, and resilient range of water sources; and an internationally 
competitive industrial sector was developed over four decades which where there was 
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initially none (Wong, 2009; Menkhoff & Evers, 2011; Tortajada, Joshi & Biswas, 2013; 
Dhalla, 2017).   
IV. Governance of the Singapore Water Economy  
 A. Overview 
 The sustainability of Singapore's national economy and the competitiveness of its 
industries are contingent upon the sustainable supply of fresh water (Wong, 2006). The 
first two pillars of Singapore's success in solving its water deficit were good governance 
and robust institutions (Low, 2012). These pillars were realized by an integrated strategy 
of long-term comprehensive planning, strong political will, effective laws and 
regulations, efficient institutional arrangements, and practical and effective approaches to 
problems which facilitated reconciling the trade-off between economic development and 
environmental protection (Tortajada, 2006a, 2006b; Wong, 2009; Menkho & Evers, 2011; 
Tortajada, Joshi & Biswas, 2013; Dhalla, 2017). The commitment to these strategies is 
demonstrated by the fact that the government of Singapore allocates approximately 1% of 
its annual GDP to protecting public and environmental health (Tortajada, Joshi & Biswas, 
2013). 
 Singapore's water authorities over time, and through a process of learning and 
adaptation, developed an extensive suite of innovative policies, regulations, and practices 
for the sustainable management of scarce water resources, protection of the environment, 
and support of economic development (Chew, Watanabe & Tou, 2010; Menkho & Evers, 
2011). Singapore's governance philosophy to water and the environment can be summed 
up by the principles of Engineering, Economics, Education, Enforcement, and 
Engagement: engineering represents the hard infrastructure; economics represents the 
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careful use of scarce resources and market pricing; education represents changing 
people's behavior for the common good; enforcement represents sanctions for 
irresponsible behavior; and engagement represents making the average citizen accept  
ownership for achieving sustainable environmental outcomes (Tan, Lee & Tan, 2009). 
This governance approach is both holistic and integrated and includes policy instruments 
and regulations, management, technology, and human capital development.  
One strategy for achieving the universal provision of affordable, sustainable and 
resilient water supply services to both domestic and commercial customers employs the 
concepts of 'addition' and 'multiplication.' This two-pronged strategy addresses both 
supply and demand: addition is a supply strategy which involves the capture and storage 
of storm-water and desalination of sea water; multiplication is both a supply and demand 
strategy which involves the reclamation of used water and the reduction of demand 
through pricing, behavior changes and the deployment of more efficient technologies 
(Wong, 2006). The 'Four Taps Strategy' introduced in 2005 to diversify sources of water 
is an important component of this framework.   
The Singapore philosophy supports the goal of managing water resources as a 
'closed loop' because policymakers and planners concluded that the solution cannot rely 
on indefinitely expanding supply, which is ultimately fixed (Wong, 2006; PUB, 2016). 
The new water paradigm of a 'closed loop' works toward balancing supply with demand 
through sustainable conservation practices and the employment of advanced technologies 
(Wong, 2006; PUB, 2016). Such a paradigm, however, shift requires the highest level of 
water governance, which in the case of Singapore is achieved through the high steering 
power and efficiency of government, the technical and managerial competence of elite 
 
 397   
  
groups, and the outstanding planning and organizing competencies of public sector 
agencies tasked with realizing water and environmental goals (Menkho & Evers, 2011). 
 B. Institutional & Regulatory Framework 
 The government of Singapore has gradually developed, and regularly updates and 
amends, a comprehensive framework of policies, legislation, regulations, codes of 
practice, and best-practices to govern the water-and-wastewater sector; it carefully 
allocates roles and responsibilities between public and private partners; and it provide an 
enabling environment for sustainable economic development (Wong, 2006; Tortajada, 
Joshi & Biswas, 2013). Planners and policymakers from across agencies regularly and 
systematically work together to update regulations to reflect the latest scientific 
knowledge, technologies or management practices, and land is rezoned and re-purposed 
to higher-value uses in a timely manner (Tortajada, Joshi & Biswas, 2013).  
The institutional framework is underpinned by a collection of technically 
competent public agencies which developed comprehensive and integrated policies, 
carefully implemented them, and rigorously monitored and enforced regulations to 
protect Singapore's water resources and her environment (Tortajada, Joshi & Biswas, 
2013). The Ministry of the Environment and Water Resources (MEWR) which was 
formed out of the Ministry of the Environment in 2004 to manages water as a strategic 
national resource; the Public Utilities Board (PUB) manages the country’s water supply, 
water catchments, and used water in an integrated way that support economic 
development; the National Environment Agency is responsible for implementing 
environmental policies established by the MEWR; the Environment and Water Industry 
Development Council (EWI), which was formed in 2006, is charged with turning the 
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environment & water industry into a strategic growth area; local public universities train 
personal and carry out basic and applied research; the Agency for Science, Technology 
and Research (A*STAR) has the primary mission of raising the level of science and 
technology competency in Singapore; the Economic Development Board (EDB) helps 
grow local companies, encourage R&D to develop cutting-edge technologies, and then 
helps export Singapore’s capabilities to growing markets around the globe; and the 
Singapore Water Association (SWA) promotes Singapore as a point of reference for all 
water technologies and services (Menkho & Evers, 2011). The work of these agencies is 
well coordinated, and their plans carefully integrated, and occasional conflicting goals 
and a lack of consensus between these agencies are resolved at the level of the Cabinet 
(Tortajada, Joshi & Biswas, 2013). The success of these agencies demonstrates that 
Singapore's policymakers and planners have successful integrated the work of these 
agencies along horizontal and vertical dimensions (Marques, 2010).  
As early as 1965 the government declared that water, sanitation, and 
environmental protection would be high priorities and demonstrated its commitment in 
1968 with the Environmental Public Health Act, in 1971 with the Clean Air Act, and in 
1975 with the Water Pollution Control Act: water, sanitation, and environmental 
considerations were to be an integral part of economic and spatial planning; the 
development, infrastructure, and environmental agencies coordinate their planning and 
decision-making; and policy and practice requires pollution prevention strategies over 
environmental remediation (Tortajada, Joshi & Biswas, 2013). The Water Pollution 
Control and Drainage Act of 1975 was an important step in rationalizing an increasingly 
complex and fragmented legislative and regulatory framework affecting water quality 
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(Tortajada, Joshi & Biswas, 2013).  
 Anti-pollution units were formed in 1970 and 1972 respectively and they carry 
out rigorous inspections and strictly enforce regulations using command-and-control 
processes: Singapore does not permit moderate levels of pollution like many other 
countries, it requires industries to adhere to strict norms, and it understands that water 
quality is significantly impacted by poor sanitation, pollution, and littering practices 
(Tortajada, Joshi & Biswas, 2013). In the early years thousands of people were 
prosecuted and fined for breaches of the environmental laws; however, over time, the 
number of prosecutions has been minimal, or even none at all, as compliance with 
pollution regulations became the national norm (Tortajada, Joshi & Biswas, 2013). Strict 
enforcement is complemented by public education and information provision and as early 
as 1969 the government initiated the 'Keep Singapore Clean' campaign to change norms 
around littering and the discharge of pollution into waterways (Tortajada, Joshi & 
Biswas, 2013). By 1992, Singapore has managed to reduce pollution to WHO accepted 
levels, completed the remediation of all its major polluted sites, and reduced regulatory 
breaches by potential polluters to a small fraction of its early levels, despite undergoing 
massive urbanization and industrialization and becoming a developed country (Tortajada, 
Joshi & Biswas, 2013; Braak et al., 2017).  
 Important recent updates to legislation were made in 1999 with the Wastewater 
and Drainage Act and the Environmental Pollution Control Act, which together replaced 
or consolidated several earlier pieces of legislation such as the Environmental Public 
Health Act of 1968, the Clean Air Act of 1971, and the Water Pollution Control and 
Drainage Act of 1975 (Tortajada, Joshi & Biswas, 2013). From the Wastewater and 
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Drainage Act (2002) come several codes of practice: the Code of Practice on Wastewater 
and Sanitary Works, the Code of Practice on Surface Water Drainage, and the Code of 
Practice for Water Services. These codes contain information on the minimum 
requirements and best-practices for planning, building and operating water-and-
wastewater infrastructure, and for the provision of water-and-wastewater service. The 
Environmental Pollution Control Act of 2002 sets standards for water quality in terms of 
the acceptable temperature, the concentration of organic compounds, the concentration of 
suspended and dissolved solids, the pH values, and numerous other parameters for 
effluents. In 2008 the Wastewater and Drainage Act of 1999 was replaced by the 
Environmental Protection and Management Act which provides a more comprehensive 
legislative and regulatory framework for environmental pollution control and the 
promotion of resource conservation (Tortajada, Joshi & Biswas, 2013).  
 Collectively this comprehensive legal and institutional framework for water-
waste-and-stormwater management and environmental protection is designed to re-brand 
Singapore as the 'Garden City,' and despite the high standards foreign direct investment 
has not been deterred (Tortajada, Joshi & Biswas, 2013). In fact the high environmental 
standards have encourage the establishment, by entrepreneurs and innovators, of many 
water-and-wastewater management, research, testing, consultancy, and technology 
manufacturing businesses; the pristine environment which replaced the slums and 
degraded environment sends a strong signal to investors about the competence of the 
state; and high standards of public and environmental health in the present reduce future 
costs for remediation (Tortajada, Joshi & Biswas, 2013). The government of the city-state 
over the years has closely followed the development in water, sanitation, and 
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environmental policy and regulations in other jurisdictions – namely the United States, 
United Kingdom, and New Zealand - but the process of policy transfer was tempered 
with learning and adaptation to local conditions (Tortajada, Joshi & Biswas, 2013).   
 Despite the comprehensive legal and institutional framework that has been put in 
place to govern the water economy, there is no sector-specific, independent regulatory 
agency explicitly responsible for setting tariffs, ensuring the quality of public service, and 
for meeting service obligations, except for the high priority area of water quality which is 
the responsibility of the NEA (Marques, 2010; Tortajada, Joshi & Biswas, 2013). The 
primary means for guaranteeing these service obligations is self-regulation, although the 
Singapore water sector does have a professional association which plays a very important 
role in self-regulation and in disseminating best practices by keeping the sector appraised 
of the latest international developments in water technology and management (Marques, 
2010). Although the levels of water tariffs are high by international standards the cost of 
water-and-wastewater services is a small portion of the average person's budget; and 
given that the quality of service is very high and consistent, there is little public or 
political pressure for independent regulatory oversight. Singapore's water policy makers 
and managers have also enthusiastically and faithfully employed economic tools and 
techniques to develop water and environmental policies and legislation, to guide decision 
making in the face of financial constraints, to set fair and equitable prices for consumers, 
to set prices which also reflect full environmental and production costs, to address market 
failures and introduce competition, and to create incentives for conservation and pollution 
control (Tan, Lee & Tan, 2009). This rational approach to water resource planning, 
though not perfect, is disciplined, consistent, and transparent which ensures a high degree 
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of faith in public policy, public decision-making, and the credibility of water governance 
(Tortajada, Joshi & Biswas, 2013).  
 The city-state currently operates an institutional framework with a mixed system 
where the relative core competencies of both the private and public sectors determines 
whether direct public management or delegated private management is used (Tortajada, 
2006b;). (Wong, 2009; Chew, Watanabe & Tou, 2010; Menkho & Evers, 2011; Tortajada, 
Joshi & Biswas, 2013; Dhalla, 2017). Since the government officially introduced public-
private partnership (PPP) schemes in 2003, private sector participation in service 
provision is increasingly important in a sector previously the preserve of the public sector 
(Wong, 2009). Delegated public management is the preferred arrangement for new water-
and-wastewater facilitates, usually taking the form of 15-30-year Build-Design-Own-
Operate (BDOO) contracts, as the government moves from a public utility model for the 
water sector to an industry ecosystem model. Through PPPs, the public sector is seeking 
to deliver the most cost-effective services, and rather than directly owning and operating 
assets the government focuses on accountability for the services (Wong, 2006). Through 
PPPs, the public sector is also seeking a means to overcome technological, economic, 
financial, and management constraints within the public sector, leverage private sector 
expertise, and open business opportunities for the private sector so that the private sector 
can exploit economies of scale in applying new high-tech water technologies for service 
delivery (Wong, 2006).  
 C. Public Utilities Board (PUB).  
 Water-and-wastewater services were historically provided by the public sector 
exclusively through publicly owned and managed facilities using direct public 
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management. The public sector agency responsible for providing these water services is 
the publicly owned PUB, which over the period of about 30 years was able to provide 
Singaporeans with universal coverage in water-and-wastewater services - one of the 
highest rates of coverage in the world – and offer its citizens one of the highest levels of 
service quality (Marques, 2010). This is a remarkable achievement in a relatively short 
time and a great improvement from the situation at independence: then there was an 
almost total absence of a sewerage system, waterways were highly polluted with human 
and industrial waste, the majority of citizens accessed water from public stand-pipes, and 
much of the city was at risk from flooding (Totarjada, 2006a, 2006b; Tan,  Lee & Tan, 
2009). The level of sophistication and innovation of the PUB's programs and projects is 
impressive. 
 The Public Utilities Board (PUB) was formed in 1963 as a statutory authority to 
take over the provision and supply of electricity, water and piped gas from the Singapore 
City Council (Khoo, 2009; Low, 2012). The PUB also adopted its first Water Master Plan 
in 1972 and aggressively developed several water supply schemes so that by the late 
1970s water rationing was consigned to the past: a reliable and clean water supply system 
was created which was less dependent on the vagaries of weather (Khoo, 2009; Low, 
2012). At the same time, stringent pollution control strategies and measures were adopted 
and enforced. In 2001, the PUB underwent a major transformation where it fully 
relinquished its energy portfolio but assumed responsibility for sewerage and drainage in 
addition to water supply: the PUB was therefore reconstituted to become the national 
water agency overseeing the holistic management of Singapore’s entire water system – 
from fresh, used, storm, NEWater, to desalination - thereby ‘closing the water loop’ 
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(Irvine, Chua and &. Eikass, 2014). Since 2003 there has been an increase in private 
sector activity in water services - largely in treatment, NEWwater, and desalination - 
which represents a shift to delegated private management. The organizational structure of 
the PUB is therefore characterized by both horizontal and vertical integration of both 
water-and-wastewater services (Marques, 2010).  
 The PUB approach to water resource and environmental management is both 
comprehensive and holistic and comprises two dimensions – the hardware and the 
software – and is also encapsulated in the PUB’s corporate tag-line: 'Water for All: 
Conserve, Value, Enjoy' (Khoo, 2009). ‘Water for All’ is an example of the hardware 
dimension and refers to the supply strategy to ensure a diversified and sustainable supply 
of water for Singapore. ‘Conserve, Value, Enjoy’ is an example of the software dimension 
and describes water demand management that consists of appropriate water pricing, 
mandatory water conservation measures, public education and efficient management of 
the water distribution system. 'Conserve' specifically refers to several strategies, both 
mandatory and voluntary, to promote water conservation through good water-saving 
habits and measures, and regulations such as those which require the use of low-capacity 
flushing cisterns and constant flow regulators. Conservation strategies have been 
successful as between 2003 and 2015, households cut their daily per-capita water use 
from 165 litres to 151 litres, which the PUB plans to lower further to 140 litres by 2030 
(PUB, 2017). The current daily level of about 150 litres of treated water every day, which 
is well above the 50-100 liter minimum recommended by the World Health Organization 
(PUB, 2016).  
 Guided by a long-term Water Master Plan, the PUB has taken an integrated water 
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management approach: managing water, used water and drainage as an interconnected 
system, with the aspiration to collect every drop of water, reuse water endlessly and 
desalinate more seawater (Low, 2012; Irvine, Chua and &. Eikass, 2014). With this 
strategy, PUB “closed” the water loop and established a diversified and sustainable water 
portfolio comprising four National Taps, it strengthened Singapore’s water resilience and 
bolstered it against extreme weather events such as droughts and floods, and it used 
technological developments to increase water availability, improve water quality 
management and steadily lower production and management costs (Irvine, Chua and &. 
Eikass, 2014; Braak et al., 2017). The PUB also has world-class in-house research and 
development support with about 50 expert staff members in its Centre for Advanced 
Water Technology, which ensures that the agency and country has local knowledge and 
expertise (Tortajada, 2006). 
 Maintaining a high quality, world-class service is a critical component of the 
mission of the PUB. The PUB employs performance management to maintain the quality 
of service and has a robust system for monitoring and evaluating performance through 
the collection of performance data and the development of performance indicators 
(Marques, 2010). There are two important aspects of quality of service: one relating to 
operational efficiency, effectiveness, and reliability; and another relating to customer 
service (Khoo, 2009; Marques, 2010; Low, 2012). High quality customer service fits into 
an emerging Singaporean governing philosophy of public education and consultation that 
is designed to build public trust in public services and public institutions and to gain 
public support for key complementary strategies such as conservation. The result is that 
the level of public awareness about water management and environmental issues among 
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the citizens of the city-state is very high by international standards (Khoo, 2009; 
Marques, 2010; Low, 2012). The customer service system used by the PUB is known as 
the CARE model - Call, Action, Response, and Evaluation – which merges customer 
relationship management with the latest information and communication technologies to 
address service problems and to maintain a relationship of trust and confidence with the 
public (Marques, 2010). Unlike most countries for which water-and-wastewater systems 
are hidden infrastructure, the emerging strategy in Singapore is to render waterworks 
visible to the public, resulting in a sense of attachment between people and the 
infrastructure and involving civil society in its protection. 
 The operational efficiency, effectiveness, and reliability of the PUB's system is 
world-class with current water losses being less than 5%, down from about 10% in the 
mid-1980s (Khoo, 2009). This level of unaccounted for water is one of the lowest rates in 
the world, better than many developing countries where water systems can lose as much 
as 60% of the water produced, and better than most of the United States; and it is 
achieved by universal and accurate metering and an aggressive program to keeps leaks in 
the pipe network to a minimum (Tortajada, 2006). The PUB has successfully developed a 
model for accurate water demand forecasting serves two main purposes: capacity 
planning and cost and revenue projections. The water demand forecast model requires 
active consultation with other national agencies in Singapore - such as the Economic 
Development Board, Ministry of Trade and Industry and the Urban Redevelopment 
Authority – to draw on their expertise in land-use planning and economic development, 
and to get the most accurate possible inputs for the model (Khoo, 2009).  
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 D. Pricing & Cost Recovery.  
 The strategy employed by Singapore's government to price water, and the motives 
behind that strategy, has undergone several changes since independence in 1965. Pricing 
has variously been employed as a tool for cost recovery - to ensure the financial resources 
for expanding supply and operating the water-and-wastewater system at the highest levels 
of efficiency and reliability – and as a tool for demand management – to encourage 
conservation to reduce the need to expand supply indefinitely (Tortajada, 2006a, 2006b; 
Marques, 2010; Tortajada, Joshi & Biswas, 2013). For much of the 20th century most 
countries, to include Singapore, have concentrated on expanding supply and many 
observers have taken increased water demand by domestic and industrial consumers as a 
sign of economic growth and an improvement in welfare (Tortajada, Joshi & Biswas, 
2013). The governments that have traditionally been the owners and managers of public 
utilities and suppliers of water-and-wastewater services to the public often supplied those 
services at a reduced price, practiced cross-subsidization with industrial and commercial 
consumers paying a higher tariff than domestic consumers, and in extreme cases even 
failed to collect tariffs at all (Tortajada, Joshi & Biswas, 2013).  
 The official motivation behind these pricing and cost recovery strategies has been 
to protect the welfare of the poor; however, the primary motivation is political with tariff 
regimes controlled by elected officials who mostly resist increases to advance various 
vested interests (Tortajada, Joshi & Biswas, 2013). These practices have been self-
defeating and shortsighted, especially since water-and-wastewater services are one of the 
few public services that are capable of financial self-sufficiency by generating their own 
revenues (Tortajada, Joshi & Biswas, 2013).  Low levels of tariffs are incompatible with 
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metering, cannot cover the cost of service provision, have little impact in managing 
demand, usually end up subsidizing the middle and upper-classes who consume more 
water than the poor, and ensure that the poor receive an inadequate quantity and quality 
of water (Tortajada, Joshi & Biswas, 2013). Providing water-and-wastewater services that 
are efficient and reliable is costly: the annual cost to the PUB to run Singapore's system - 
collecting used water, treating water, producing NEWater, desalination, and maintaining 
water pipelines - was about S$500 million in 2000, but by 2015 this had risen to S$1.3 
billion (Yangchen, 2017). As the demand for fresh water from naturally occurring sources 
has fallen behind the supply from those sources, those pricing and cost recovery 
strategies are being called into question and some countries have adopted pricing and cost 
recovery strategies guided by sound economic principles (Tortajada, Joshi & Biswas, 
2013; Yangchen, 2017).  
 The current cornerstone of Singapore's water pricing policy is Long Run Marginal 
Cost (LRMC) pricing, where the water tariff is set at the level of the highest cost of 
production, which in the case of Singapore is desalination (Yangchen, 2017). Marginal 
cost pricing sends the strongest signal about the value of water, has the greatest impact on 
demand, and ensures that the water utility raises the level of revenues needed to cover the 
cost, and provide supply, from the most expensive source. Singapore's did not always 
employ marginal cost pricing, and for many years its tariff was set at a level to cover the 
cost of building and maintaining the infrastructure and covering operations (Tortajada, 
Joshi & Biswas, 2013). While this policy ensured that the PUB had the financial 
resources to build out the water-and-wastewater system, it did little to manage demand 
and influence conservation. The result was that demand for water rose with expanding 
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economic activity and as the standard of living increased; and it also meant that when 
droughts occurred rationing was the strategy employed to manage demand (Tortajada, 
Joshi & Biswas, 2013). The drought of 1971, and the later exhaustion of potential sites 
for reservoirs, changed the outlook of the government on pricing policy and gradually, 
over two decades to 1997, the tariff structure was adjusted until it reached its current 
regime (Tortajada, Joshi & Biswas, 2013).    
 The government of Singapore revised the water tariff ten times between 1965 and 
2012. During the 1960s consumers were charged a flat rate based on volume with a fixed 
monthly charge for meters and one-time charges for connections to the water supply 
system (Tortajada, Joshi & Biswas, 2013). The first revision since the rate was set in 
1954 came in 1966. Domestic rates were increased from S$0.13 to S$0.18 per thousand 
litres, government rates were increased to between S$0.22 to S$0.33, while commercial 
and industrial rates were increased from S$0.29 to S$0.33 (Tortajada, Joshi & Biswas, 
2013). Higher rates prevailed for supplies to ships and water re-sellers. The public 
position of the government in 1966 was that the increase in the tariffs was largely for cost 
recovery as the production cost per thousand liters had moved from approximately 
S$0.16 in 1962 to S$0.17 in 1967 (Tortajada, Joshi & Biswas, 2013). In 1969 the decision 
was taken for the universal provision of sanitation and the domestic tariff was raised 
again in 1970 to cover the cost of the loans (Tortajada, Joshi & Biswas, 2013). These 
increases meant that the monthly water bills for domestic consumers would rise between 
S$0.20 to S$2.00, which was a small proportion of the average household budget.  
 In 1973 a new pricing regime was introduced. The domestic tariff rate was 
adjusted from a flat volumetric rate to an increasing cost block tariff rate, and 
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conservation was now added as a goal of the pricing strategy (Tortajada, Joshi & Biswas, 
2013). In 1975 both the domestic and non-domestic tariff rates were revised upwards to 
address both rising demand and rising costs (Tortajada, Joshi & Biswas, 2013). After the 
1973 and 1975 tariff revisions the rate of increase in demand for water was reduced. In 
1981 the domestic increasing block tariff was simplified from four to three blocks; while 
the flat volumetric non-domestic rate was revised to an increasing block tariff (Tortajada, 
Joshi & Biswas, 2013). By this time the government adopted the position that rationing 
by price was a more effective and efficient strategy than traditional rationing in the face 
of rising demand and continuing constraints on supply (Tortajada, Joshi & Biswas, 2013). 
In 1983 both the domestic and non-domestic tariff rates were again increased to cover the 
costs of constructing new reservoirs and treatment plants while the tariff structure was 
again adjusted. In 1986 the number of categories were simplified to four – domestic, non-
domestic, shipping, and water producers - and the non-domestic tariff rates simplified 
with all non-domestic consumers charged at the rate of the highest block (Tortajada, Joshi 
& Biswas, 2013).  
 In 1991 a conservation tax was added to water bills as an explicit attempt to 
encourage conservation: the government now actively sought ways to encourage and 
facilitate continued economic growth without higher water use, especially imported water 
(Tortajada, 2006a, 2006b; Tortajada, Joshi & Biswas, 2013). The most significant 
restructuring of the tariff regime came in 1997 when the government adopted water 
pricing based on principles of economic efficiency, and the tariffs and conservation tax 
became a uniform flat rate for all consumers (Tortajada, Joshi & Biswas, 2013). This 
strategy was phased in over three years and saw the tariff set to reflect the higher cost of 
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alternative supply sources. In addition, the water conservation tax is charged on all water 
supplied; domestic blocks were reduced from three to two; and volumetric sewerage fees 
aligned with the volume a wastewater generated (Tortajada, Joshi & Biswas, 2013). The 
domestic tariff in 2000 was S$1.17 and S$1.40 per thousand liters and the non-domestic 
tariff was S$1.17 per thousand liters (Tortajada, Joshi & Biswas, 2013). The Conservation 
Tax on domestic consumption in 2000 was an additional S$0.30 and S$0.45 per thousand 
liters, while the tax on non-domestic consumption was S$0.30 per thousand liters. This 
tax is collected by the PUB but is paid over to the Consolidated Fund. The water pricing 
and cost recovery measures are designed to eventually close of the water loop and get 
consumers to see potable and used water as a single product by moving towards charging 
the same price for both potable water and used water in the longer term (Khoo, 2009). 
 The conservation measures, which consist of a combination of pricing, public 
education, and technical measures have been a moderate success: per capita daily 
domestic consumption which was 172 liters in 1995 was reduced to 153 liters in 2011 
(Tortajada, 2006a, 2006b; Tortajada, Joshi & Biswas, 2013; Yangchen, 2017). The 
government, however, intends to take this down further: many European countries have 
daily domestic water consumption rates of 100 liters so continued savings are still 
possible. The impact of these reductions can be seen at the macro scale in total annual 
water demand, which increased steadily from 403 million m3 in 1995 to 454 million m3 in 
2000 but declined to 440 million m3 in 2004. The impact of the pricing strategy can also 
be seen in the average monthly water bill which has about doubled, from about S$15 to 
S$30 per month, during the period 1995 to 2000 (Tortajada, 2006a, 2006b; Tortajada, 
Joshi & Biswas, 2013; Yangchen, 2017). This still represents less than one percent of the 
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average household budget which is affordable for most consumers and in line with 
international rates.  
 To protect low-income consumers the government offers rebates on water bills, 
which are usually credited to the customers’ utility account, but are designed to be 
decoupled from water consumption to prevent over consumption through the creation of a 
perverse incentive to consume water (Tortajada, 2006a, 2006b; Tortajada, Joshi & 
Biswas, 2013). This represents a move away from 'lifeline' tariffs where the first block of 
water use is subsidized under the assumption that the poor cannot afford to pay normal 
tariffs. The main disadvantage of 'lifeline tariffs' is that instead of providing a targeted 
subsidy only to those who cannot afford to pay, these subsidies also subsidize water 
consumers who can afford to pay for the quantity of water they actually consume 
(Tortajada, 2006a, 2006b; Tortajada, Joshi & Biswas, 2013). Singapore's current tariff 
structure is considered efficient and effective in socio-economic terms: the poor do not 
subsidize the rich, and commercial and industrial users do not subsidize domestic users 
(Tortajada, 2006a, 2006b; Tortajada, Joshi & Biswas, 2013). 
 The water pricing and cost recovery strategy of the Singapore government has 
been successful in providing the considerable financial resources required over the past 
four decades to build out the city-state's water-and-wastewater infrastructure. Between  
2000 and 2015, for instance, the PUB invested S$7 billion in water infrastructure and 
expects to double this by 2021 to strengthen the third and fourth Taps, to build, repair, 
and upgrade pipes and pumps, to meet higher costs of manpower, materials and 
chemicals, and to carry out increasingly expensive engineering works, such as having to 
dig deeper underground to lay pipelines (Yangchen, 2017). 
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IV. Four Taps Strategy 
 A. Overview 
 Singapore’s drive for water self-sufficiency - and a sustainable and resilient water 
economy that can support economic development - are underpinned by synergy between 
effective governance, an appropriate institutional, legal and regulatory framework, and 
engineering and technological solutions that supports economic development and ensures 
water security (Wong, 2006; Chew, Watanabe & Tou, 2010; Tortajada, Joshi & Biswas, 
2013; Joo & Heng, 2017). The current guiding framework for achieving the universal 
provision of affordable, sustainable and resilient water supply services to both domestic 
consumers and businesses is known as the 'Four Taps Strategy.' This new strategy was 
introduced in 2005 and the 'Four Taps' represent Singapore's four current sources of 
water: water received from Johor in Malaysia, water collected in storm-water reservoirs, 
water obtained from recycling, and water received from desalination (Khoo, 2009; PUB, 
2016). Singapore's dependence imported water has been reduced from 80% of its water 
needs at the time of its independence to its current level of about 40%, but the city-state's 
current storage capacity can only satisfy about 50% of the current demand for water and 
this drives the effort to increase the total land area used as a water catchment, and the 
proportion of water that comes from recycling and desalination (Khoo, 2009; PUB, 
2016). By 2060, Singapore plans to supply 80% of its water from recycling and 
desalination, and 20% from local catchments; and, were it not for unusually low rainfall 
in several recent years, the city-state from 2011 could theoretically have been able to 
supply all its water needs from the three national taps, the same year the 1961 water 
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agreement with Malaysia ended (Khoo, 2009; PUB, 2016).  
B. Singapore-Malaysia Water Treaty.  
 Singapore’s first tap is water from Malaysia. In 1927 the British colonial 
government’s solution was to establish an agreement with the neighboring British colony 
of Johor (Malaysia) for the supply of water to Singapore which was delivered from 1932 
through pipes which ran under the causeway bridge that connected Singapore to 
Malaysia. The supply of Johor water was further guaranteed by two agreements signed 
with Malaysia in 1961 and 1962, which were to terminate in 2011 and 2061 respectively. 
Based on the agreements, Singapore was required to build and maintain waterworks in 
Johor, it had "the sole and absolute right" to a fixed amount of raw water at a fixed price 
of 3 Malaysian cents per 1,000 gallons until the agreements expired, and was obligated to 
sell back some of the treated water to Johor (Wong, 2006; Caballero-Anthony & Hangzo, 
2012). Singapore registered the two agreements in the United Nations Charter Secretariat 
Office in June 1966, they are therefore governed by international law, they contain 
specific provisions on when the price can be revised and how the revisions should be 
computed, and they cannot be unilaterally renegotiated (Wong, 2006). 
 Long-term water security has therefore been an important consideration for the 
newly independent nation, in their ensuing relationship with Malaysia, and on water 
policy and planning (Tortajada, Joshi & Biswas, 2013). The economic development and 
social stability that Singapore achieved in the immediate post-independence would not 
have been possible without the guaranteed supply of Johor water (Menkho & Evers, 
2011). Re-negotiations of the contracts have proved difficult, and although both countries 
always honored the agreements Malaysia has issued several veiled threats about 
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curtailing supplies - the Government of Singapore allowed the 1961 agreement to lapse 
when it expired in 2011 and sought alternative solutions to its water supply risk (Wong, 
2006; Caballero-Anthony & Hangzo, 2012). Because of the uncertainty over Johor water, 
Singapore aggressively developed new plans for increasing water security and self-
sufficiency during the post 2011-period. These included increasingly more efficient water 
management, the formulation and implementation of new water-related policies, heavy 
investments in desalination, extensive reuse of wastewater, improved catchment 
management, and other similar actions (Tortajada, Joshi & Biswas, 2013). 
 C. Rainwater Harvesting & the Catchment System  
 Singapore's second tap is from catchments, the collection of rain and storm-water, 
and its conversion to potable water. Despite having one of the highest levels of rainfall in 
the world the geography and geology of Singapore limits the available amount of ground 
and surface water. This has led the PUB to develop additional new sources of water, 
including through an improved ability to collect and store raw water. This is done by 
harvesting rainwater through a comprehensive network of drains, canals, rivers and 
storm-water collection ponds and then channeling this water into the city-state's 17 
reservoirs. In 1970 the total land area utilized for water catchment was 11%, but by 2011 
this was increased to 60% with plans to utilize 90% of Singapore’s total land area for 
water catchment by 2060 (Khoo, 2009; PUB, 2016).  Singapore was among the first cities 
in the world to obtain drinking water from estuary reservoirs and urban catchments in the 
1970s and 1980s, and one of the few countries in the world to harvest storm-water on a 
large scale. The recent completion of the the Punggol and Serangoon reservoirs, the 
Marina Barrage and the Deep Tunnel Sewerage System were significant additions to 
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reserve capacity (Khoo, 2009; PUB, 2016).  
 The Marina Barrage, which was commissioned in 2008, is Singapore’s 15th 
reservoir and it was formed by building a dam at the confluence of five rivers and across 
the mouth of the Marina Channel. It is the result of earlier efforts to clean up the 
Singapore River and it now serves as an unpolluted source of rainwater that can be 
harvested for drinking, as a tidal barrier for flood control purposes, and as a place for 
recreation (Khoo, 2009; PUB, 2016). The Marina Barrage is in the heart of the city and at 
10,000 hectares (100 km2) is the equivalent to one-sixth of Singapore land area: it is the 
city-state's largest and most urbanized reservoir (Khoo, 2009; PUB, 2016).  
 The Deep Tunnel Sewerage System was conceived by the PUB in the 1990s as a 
cost-efficient and sustainable long-term solution to Singapore’s used-water needs and an 
integral part of Singapore’s strategy to manage the entire water loop as a closed system 
(Khoo, 2009; PUB, 2016). Phase one of the DTSS, which was completed in 2008, is a 48 
km long network of two tunnels that crosses the entire city-state 20–50m below ground. 
It is used to divert used water from the eastern, northern and central parts of Singapore 
and channel this water by gravity to one of three coastal water treatment and reclamation 
plants (WRPs) at the south-eastern end of Singapore where it can be turned into 
NEWater. Phase 2 is scheduled for completion in 2025 and will see the network increase 
to about 60 kms. The DTSS system will streamline how Singapore collects, treats, 
disposes, or reclaims used water, it will improve environmental management, it will 
shrink the land occupied by used water infrastructure by 50% due to the closing of some 
plants, and it will free up this precious land for higher value uses (Khoo, 2009; PUB, 
2016).  
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 D. NEWater.   
 Singapore's third tap is NEWater, the conversion of waste-water to potable water. 
In 1974 the PUB developed a pilot plant to turn waste-water into potable water but did 
not scale up the project at the time because the cost of reclaiming water was found to be 
prohibitive and the technologies unreliable (Khoo, 2009; PUB, 2016). By 1998, however, 
the technology had advanced to a stage where production costs had become low enough 
to make the reclamation of used water economically and technologically viable. In 1998 
the PUB and the MEWR conducted the Singapore Water Reclamation Study to determine 
the suitability of using reclaimed water to supplement Singapore's water supply and a 
full-scale demonstration plant was commissioned in 2000 to undertake extensive studies 
on the quality of reclaimed water and the reliability of membrane technology. Singapore 
subsequently opened its first full-scale water reclamation plant in 2003 and named the 
product from that plant NEWater.  By 2010 the number of NEWater plants had increased 
to five - two plants were commission in 2003, a third in 2004, a fourth in 2007, and the 
fifth in 2010. The first four plants have a combined capacity equivalent to 15% of 
Singapore's total water demand, while the fifth brings that capacity up to 30% of 
Singapore's total freshwater water demand, with that figure projected to increase to 50% 
by 2060.  
 The first three plants were designed, built and operated by the PUB; however, the 
fourth and fifth plants were design-build-own-operate (DBOO) contracts awarded to the 
private sector. The first three factories were built using foreign technologies; however, the 
government intended that future plants should reflect indigenous technological capacity. 
The opening of the fourth plant represented the successful shift to both indigenous 
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technology and public-private partnerships (PPPs), with Singapore's Keppel Integrated 
Engineering being the private partner. The contract for the fifth plant was awarded to 
Sembcorp as a DBOO project. These PPPs are considered as examples of delegated 
private management. The dominance of Singapore's water technology sector by 
international firms such as Veoila and Suez was gradually and systematically replaced by 
local firms such as Hyflux, Keppel and Sembcorp (Chew, Watanabe & Tou, 2010). 
NEWater is a reliable source of high-quality water supply which is targeted at the 
commercial and industrial sectors. It is ideal for certain types of industrial manufacturing 
processes, like semiconductors or pharmaceuticals, which require ultra-pure water, 
although it can also be added to reservoir water where it can undergo additional treatment 
to produce drinking water.  Quality and public safety is maintained through rigorous and 
comprehensive physical, chemical and microbiological testing (Khoo, 2009; PUB, 2016). 
During development, an international panel of experts in engineering, biomedical 
science, chemistry and water technology was formed to provide independent advice on 
the water reclamation study and to evaluate the suitability of NEWater as a source of 
water for potable use; and the media was a key partner in the successful acceptance of 
NEWater by the public (Khoo, 2009; PUB, 2016).   
NEWater is currently the jewel of Singapore’s water supply diversification 
strategy, and the pride of its engineering, scientific and technological strategy (Khoo, 
2009; PUB, 2016). NEWater requires high levels of engineering, scientific, and 
technological sophistication in water; but it must also be supported and complemented by 
other industries, such as the information and communication technology sector (Khoo, 
2009; PUB, 2016). The successful implementation of NEWater is the result of an 
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important paradigm shift in public policy, public relations, and water resource 
management: re-branding waste-water as used water as an important renewable resource, 
to be recycled and re-used rather than treated for discharge into the sea (Khoo, 2009; 
PUB, 2016). 
 E. Desalination.  
 Singapore's fourth tap is desalination, the conversion of sea water to potable 
water. The city state's first desalination plant opened in 2005, and its second in 2013, and 
these two sources meet about 25% of Singapore’s current total freshwater needs. By 2020 
three additional desalination plants will be added to the national system, and the 
government has identified five coastal sites for future plants with the projection for 
desalination to meet 30% of the estimated daily freshwater demand by 2060 (PUB, 
2016). As a small, water-scarce island surrounded by the sea, desalination is a natural 
option for Singapore; however, it only became an economically and technologically 
viable option because of advances in membrane and reverse osmosis technology.  
 The first desalination plant, Singspring Desalination Plant in Tuas, was built by 
Hyflux and Ondeo of France through a competitive 20-year DBOO contract at a cost of 
S$200 million. With a daily production capacity of 30 million imperial gallons (140,000 
m3) it is largest reverse osmosis seawater desalination plant in the tropics, and the second 
largest in the world, it is one of the most energy efficient, and it meets 10% of 
Singapore's water needs (Wong, 2006; Khoo, 2009). The contract to design, build, own 
and operate Singapore's second desalination plant, the Tuaspring Desalination Plant plant 
also located at Tuas, was also won by Hyflux in 2011, and the plant was put into 
operation in 2013. Tuaspring has a capacity of 70 million imperial gallons (320,000 m3) 
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per day. These contractual arrangements are an example of delegated private 
management. The five NEWater plants and two desalination plants together have the 
capacity to supply more than half the city-state's water demand reducing dependence on 
rainfall and importation and boosting the resilience of the national water system (PUB, 
2016). 
 Desalination is the most expensive and energy-intensive of the Four National 
Taps: the cost to produce desalinated water is about S$0.78/m3 compared to S$0.30/m3 
for NEWater. The first-year cost to produce water for the latest plant in Marina East, set 
to open in 2020, is estimated at $1.08/m3 - an increase of some 40 per cent. (Yangchen 
2017). Because Singapore is a net energy importer, the city-state must continue to invest 
in R&D to find better and less expensive ways of desalting seawater: PUB’s goal is to cut 
in half desalination’s energy use (PUB, 2016). The employment of technology has 
reduced Singapore's dependence on external water sources, and increased its internal 
supply through reclamation and desalination, but it has made the city-state more energy 
dependent: NEWater production requires about five times, and desalination about 20 
times, as much energy as conventional treatment. As the demand for freshwater grows 
with economic development, and as Singapore shifts towards reclamation and 
desalination, the energy required for water treatment in 2060 could be as much as four 
times the current demand with current technology. The current process of reverse osmosis 
process pushes seawater through membranes that filter out dissolved salts and minerals, 
resulting in pure drinking water; however, the PUB and its partners are currently 
experimenting with electric-deionisation, and have pilot-tested this technology, which 
could significantly reduce desalination’s energy use and cost. Containing the cost of 
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water is necessary to continue to keep Singapore a competitive place to do business and 
open up major opportunities for export earnings.  
V. HydroHub – Singapore's Water Technology Innovation Cluster 
 A. Overview 
 In 2004 the government of Singapore announced the launching of three initiatives 
together - the HydroHub, the Singapore Water Association (SWA) and the Water Network 
- as part of an economic development strategy to capture 3 to 5% of the global water 
industry market, worth an estimated S$430 million annually, and another 5 to 10% of the 
global membrane market, worth an estimated S$500 million annually (Wong, 2006). In 
Asia alone, the market for water infrastructure to 2020 is estimated at S$500 billion and 
Singapore also intends to capture a share of this market (Han, 2014). Between 2003 and 
2015, Singapore's water sector grew from S$0.5 billion, or 0.3% of GDP, to S$1.7 billion, 
or 0.6% of GDP; and the number of professional and skilled people employed in the 
sector is expected to reach 11,000, or 0.5% of employment (EWI, 2011; Han, 2014). The 
number of water companies has grown from 50 to about 180; the number of public and 
private R&D centers conducting research in various areas of water technology is 
currently 28; and the accumulated value of international projects involving Singaporean 
companies since the launch of the HydroHub totals around S$10 billion (Han, 2014; 
PUB, 2016).  
 To support the growth of the water-and-wastewater sector and help establish the 
HydroHub the Ministry of Environment & Water Resources (MEWR) established the 
Environment and Water Industry Programme Office (EWI) in 2006 as an inter-agency 
body led by the PUB, the national water agency. The EWI also includes the Economic 
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Development Board (EDB), International Enterprise Singapore (IES), and SPRING 
Singapore (EWI, 2011). The EWI received an initial grant of S$100 million to support its 
institutional facilitation role (Chew, Watanabe & Tou, 2010). Its mission involves 
attracting foreign water companies to Singapore, providing R&D funding, and helping 
Singapore-based companies and research institutes develop and commercialize water 
technologies for the global marketplace (Chew, Watanabe & Tou, 2010; Caballero-
Anthony & Hangzo, 2012). The WaterHub is based in the Water Center of Excellence, 
which is located beside the Ulu Pandan NEWater factory, and it is home to the IWA, the 
SWA, the Centre for Advanced Water Technology (CAWT), and the research arms of 
several international water companies such as Siemens, Konzen, and Nitto Denko (Chew, 
Watanabe & Tou, 2010; EWI, 2011). As part of the HydroHub's overall ecosystem, the 
Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy at the National University of Singapore 
established an Institute of Water Policy in 2008  
 The EWI's strategy to develop the HydroHub involves three components: 
capability development, cluster development, and internationalization (EWI, 2011). The 
first strategy, capability development, involves building a strong scientific and 
technology base through investing in R&D, developing talent, assisting companies in 
marketing and building networks with potential partners, and making water facilities 
available for testing technologies (Chew, Watanabe & Tou, 2010; EWI, 2011). With 
regards to networking, the SWA gathers local water companies and related organizations 
to work closely with government agencies - such as PUB, EDB and Institute of Engineers 
of Singapore - on water technology development, skills acquisition and industry 
missions; while the Water Network is a platform for the people, private and public sectors 
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(3Ps) to meet, network, share information and give views to the PUB on policies and 
programs concerning all aspects of the city state's water.  
 With respect to R&D investment and talent development, Singapore commitment 
is based on the belief that water technology serves as a driver for economic growth and as 
a foundation for the city-state's long-term competitiveness (EWI, 2011). The water 
industry has core capabilities that are common within and across industries and an 
investment in the water sector creates synergies at the firm and industry levels (Wong, 
2006). To support R&D, the government established the National Research Foundation 
(NRF) in 2006 to drive R&D efforts in Singapore and approved initial funding of S$5 
billion to undertake its work between 2006 and 2010, of which S$330 million was to 
promote R&D in the field of environmental and water technology (Khoo, 2009). In 2011 
the NRF allocated a further S$140 million to promote R&D to this sector (EWI, 2011). 
This public investment in R&D is part of an ongoing strategy aimed at raising 
Singapore's technology development capability: between 1991 and 1995 S$2 billion was 
provided through the National Technology Plan (1991-1995) and between 1996 and 2000 
S$4 billion was provided through the National Science and Technology Plan. The EWI 
oversees two competitive R&D project funding schemes: one for the public sector, the 
Incentive for Research & Innovation Scheme (IRIS); and one for Singapore-based private 
sector companies, the Innovation Development Scheme (IDS) (EWI, 2011). Singapore's 
two major universities are globally recognized leaders in water technology and are key 
players in the HydroHub. These universities have established several international 
partnerships to advance science and technology in the water sector: Nanyang Technical 
University, for example, established a partnership with DHI; and Singapore National 
 
 424   
  
University established a partnership with Delft Hyudralic (Chew, Watanabe & Tou, 
2010). The EWI also helps to develop local talent by providing scholarships for 
scientists, technologists, and water managers to pursue Masters and PhD degrees and 
often places these individuals in research facilities (EWI, 2011).  
 With respect to testing and commercialization, the CAWT, a wholly-owned 
subsidiary of the PUB, helps water companies develop commercially viable technologies 
and conducts training courses with the HydroHub for both public and private 
organizations. Between 2007 and 2011, PUB facilities were made available for over 107 
new test-bedding projects (EWI, 2011). EWI’s Technology Pioneer (TechPioneer) scheme 
assists with accelerating the commercialization of new environment and water 
technologies through their early adoption in Singapore; while start-up companies can 
compete for a publicly funded incubation grant known as the Fast-Track Environmental 
and Water Technologies Incubator Scheme (Fast-Tech) (EWI, 2011). 
 The second strategy, cluster development, involves the development of the 
industry by attracting major international water companies to locate headquarters, 
manufacturing, consultancy, engineering, and R&D facilities in Singapore, and to use the 
city-state as a test-bedding and piloting base for new water technologies and for 
expansion into the region (Chew, Watanabe & Tou, 2010; EWI, 2011). The EWI, EDB, 
and the PUB have worked to attract major players from the US, such as GE and Black & 
Veatch, from Japan, such as Nitto Denko and Toray, from Germany, such as Siemens, 
from France, such as Veolia and Suez, and from Israel, such as Desalitech (Khoo, 2009). 
GE Water will invest S$130 million over 10 years and employ 100 top-tier researchers; 
Siemens Water Technologies will invest in a S$50 million global water R&D and 
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engineering center over 5 years and work with PUB on three R&D projects; and Nitto-
Denko will invest S$6 million to set up a water R&D center, the first such Japanese 
venture to be set up in Singapore (Khoo, 2009). The government also actively works to 
develop local water technology companies to include Hyflux, Keppel, and SembCorp 
Industries. Public-private, public-public, and private-private partnerships are a key 
feature of the Hydrohub and so the government actively cultivates a strong private sector 
component (Chew, Watanabe & Tou, 2010; EWI, 2011). 
 The third strategy, internationalization, involves the IES and the PUB working to 
help Singaporean water companies export their technology and expertise (Chew, 
Watanabe & Tou, 2010; EWI, 2011). These agencies facilitate the internalization process 
by the creation of networks through trade missions, conferences and bilateral agreements 
for water research and consultancy projects. Singapore, for example, hosts international 
water events such as the Singapore International Water Week (SIWW) which has grown 
from 8,500 participants in 2008 to 20,000 participants from 118 countries in 2014. 
Internationalization represents the economic re-positioning of water from a survival 
challenge to be overcome to an international growth industry motivated by profit, and 
built on a proven track record of solving urban water problems in Singapore that many 
other countries share (Joo & Heng, 2017); it represents the normative re-positioning of 
Singapore with respect to environmental sustainability, sustainable economic 
development, sustainable urban planning, and climate change; and it represents the 
diplomatic re-positioning of the small city-state by increasing its standing in the 
international community through the sharing of its technology and expertise with 
international agencies, and through its humanitarian work (Caballero-Anthony & 
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Hangzo, 2012). With respect to humanitarian work, Singapore assisted the Maldives with 
water filtration equipment when it was hit by a tsunami in 2005, and Thailand and 
Cambodia when it was hit by flooding in 2011, and it supplied water to Johor state in 
Malaysia when that region was hit by a drought in 2015 (Wong, 2006; Caballero-
Anthony & Hangzo, 2012). Through processes of entrepreneurship and innovation, 
efficient and effective governance, good water resource management, and sustained 
investment in infrastructure and R&D, a water shortage and national security risk has 
been transformed by government intervention and private sector participation into a tool 
of economic development, environmental stewardship, and international diplomacy 
(Caballero-Anthony & Hangzo, 2012). 
 B. Separation Technologies.  
 Singapore's consistent and focused investments in infrastructure and in R&D for 
water-and-wastewater have made it a global leader in separation technologies. Separation 
technologies are crucial mechanical and chemical processes that have wide industrial and 
medical application and a significant impact on efficiency, cost, waste reduction, and 
waste reuse (National Research Council, 1998; Dhalla, 2017). Separation technologies 
have the potential to increase productivity of firms and industries and thus national 
competitiveness (National Research Council, 1998). The government of Singapore is 
helping to address the commercialization challenges faced by the firms and research 
facilities involved in developing separation technologies and the full-scale deployment of 
technologies. One way the government achieves this is through support for testing at pilot 
scales in actual application settings. To this end it has established the S$30 million 
Separation Technologies Applied Research and Translation (START) Center at Nanyang 
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University as a national-level, public-private testing facility to develop and 
commercialize innovative separation and filtration technologies (Nanyang Technological 
University, 2016). START will pull together the pool of scientists, technologists, industry 
experts, and intellectual property which has been built up over the decades in Singapore's 
water-and-wastewater ecosystem. 
 C. Hyflux.  
 Hyflux is a Singaporean water technology company that represents the emergence 
of an indigenous water industry as well as the success of the government's efforts to 
foster indigenous innovation and entrepreneurship in the private sector. Since its 
establishment in 1989, Hyflux now competes on an equal footing with other 
internationally recognized water treatment and desalination firms and this is evidenced by 
its partnership with more than 200 clients in Asia, Africa, and the Middle East (Wong, 
2006). Since 2004 Hyflux has been a major player in the Chinese market for both 
treatment and desalination technologies (Wong, 2006); it has been awarded major 
contracts in Dubai and Oman, and in Saudi Arabia where in 2015 Hyflux signed a US$48 
million contract to build a desalination plant (Chew, Watanabe & Tou, 2010); and it is 
currently building the world’s largest seawater desalination plant in Algeria worth 
US$468 (Chew, Watanabe & Tou, 2010; EWI, 2011). The internationalization of Hyflux's 
business was critical to cushioning the firm's sales during the 1997 Asian recession which 
also affected the firm's domestic market in Singapore (Wong, 2006).  
 Because of both domestic and international business, the scale of Hyflux's growth 
has been impressive - between 2000 and 2004 the firm’s revenue rose five-fold from 
S$17 million to S$88.7 million – and so has been the scope of its growth – and in 2000 it 
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extended its businesses beyond water treatment to involvement in related industries such 
as life sciences and pharmaceuticals (Wong, 2006). Hyflux offers filtration and 
purification technologies that caters to the domestic water consumption market; however, 
the water treatment and recycling technologies also offered by Hyflux are important to 
the cost-effective and environmentally sound operations of a range of high value-added, 
water-intensive industries – such as wafer-fabrication, paper and pulp, petrochemical, 
pharmaceuticals, textiles and dyes - which are the future of the emerging Singaporean 
economy and the main source of Singapore's ever increasing demand for water (Wong, 
2006; PUB, 2016). The expansion of Hyflux into overseas markets has necessitated a 
change in the firm’s structure with respect to its regional division of labor: it has 
relocated the manufacturing of peripheral components to China while keeping production 
of the core technologies in Singapore. Hyflux has demonstrated its ability to identify and 
acquire the relevant technologies and apply them where demand arises, as well as the 
ability to move up the value-chain to the development of its own technologies and 
processes as it learns (Wong, 2006); and it now has the second largest R&D facility for 
membranes and materials in Asia outside Japan (EWI, 2011).  
IX. Application of Porter’s Diamond to Singapore’s Water Technology Cluster 
 A. Overview 
 The Singapore water economy is one of the best developed and most sophisticated 
in the world, its governance and institutional arrangements are held up as an example for 
other countries, the water technology sector is positioned as a key pillar supporting 
Singapore’s national competitiveness, it is being developed specifically as a globally 
competitive industry, and it is being used as a tool for global diplomacy (Wong, 2006; 
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Tortajada, 2006a, 2006b; Caballero-Anthony & Hangzo, 2012; Joo & Heng, 2017; 
Dhalla, 2017). The Singapore water technology sector is globally recognized for its 
expertise in several areas: recycling and reuse, urban catchments and storm-water 
management, desalination, and separation technologies (Khoo, 2009; Low, 2012). The 
Singapore water economy is globally recognized for its ability to reliably deliver high 
quality water at an affordable price, for its absence of illegal connections and nonrevenue 
water, for is low level of losses to leaks, and the ability of its utilities to operate in a 
financially sustainable manner (Khoo, 2009; Low, 2012). Singapore is also globally 
recognized for its successful environmental transformation from a polluted city to a clean 
city filled with ‘green and blue’ spaces, and for its expertise in environmental engineering 
and sustainable urban design in which water plays a leading role (Tan, Lee & Tan, 2009; 
Tortajada, Joshi & Biswas, 2013). Singapore water knowledge and technology are 
increasingly sold worldwide in places as far afield as North Africa, the Middle East, and 
China. Singapore’s resilient and increasingly sustainable water economy has been built 
despite a severe water deficit, and it has seen the city state transformed from water 
dependency to increasing water independence based primarily on both technological 
innovation and institutional restructuring (Low, 2012; Yew, 2013; Tortajada, Joshi & 
Biswas, 2013).  
Singapore’s knowledge base and expertise in water resource management, and its 
competitive advantage in water technology, flows from solving severe and urgent water 
related challenges that have at various times posed a risk the public health and safety, 
national security, and economic security; it does not arise from a passive reliance on an 
inherited natural factor. Singapore is one of the few countries that has successfully closed 
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the water loop, and the whole water cycle is managed as a system: there is the collection 
of rainwater from catchments, drains, canals and ponds that is stored in 17 man-made 
reservoirs from where it is treated and distributed as potable water; and there is an island-
wide sewerage system which collects all used water for treatment and reuse (Low, 2012; 
Irvine, Chua & Eikass, 2014). This holistic and integrated management of water is 
supplemented by one of the most advanced seawater desalination programs in the world 
(Low, 2012; Irvine, Chua & Eikass, 2014).  
B. Factor Conditions 
In Singapore water is a key economic factor despite the country not being well 
endowed with this normally inherited, basic, natural resource. Singapore is so deficient in 
natural resources that it must import almost all its food and energy and half its water; yet 
despite this deficit the country has become a post-industrial society with an economy 
focused on advanced manufacturing, finance, and tourism. Beyond domestic demand, the 
growing number of these water-enabled and water-intensive industries means that water 
is a major input into a growing number of sectors in the Singaporean economy where its 
reliable supply increases productivity, lowers costs, reduces waste, and protects the 
environment (Wong, 2006; Khoo, 2009; Dhalla, 2017; Joo & Heng, 2017). The city-state 
has invested heavily in developing expertise in integrated water resource management 
which has become vital to ensuring a reliable supply of potable water and for treating 
waste-water. Singapore’s water resource management and water technology are both 
advanced and specialized factors that have been consciously and proactively created; and 
Singapore has developed global leadership in holistic and sustainable urban storm-water 
management, in the design and construction of urban ‘green’ and ‘blue’ infrastructure, 
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and in low-impact and water sensitive urban development (Tan, Lee & Tan, 2009; Irvine, 
Chua & Eikass, 2014; Lim & Lu, 2016). These advanced and specialized factors have 
been developed in a relatively short time by visionary leadership, and through heavy and 
sustained public investment in both infrastructure and people (Yue, 2001; Koh & Wong, 
2005; Tan, Lee & Tan, 2009; Chew, Watanabe & Tou, 2010).    
 The basic statistics that provides a picture of a country’s technological capabilities 
are the expenditure on R&D as a percentage of GDP, the number of research scientists 
per 10,000 labor force, the number of scientific articles published, as well as the number 
of patents filed and granted. While investment in R&D is an important factor in the 
development of innovation capabilities, innovation performance also depends critically 
on conditions that foster technology entrepreneurship, the availability of technical talent, 
and well-functioning product and capital markets (Koh & Wong, 2005). The appropriate 
policies and infrastructure that stimulate technological creation and innovation are a 
mixture of human capital, technical talent, institutions, incentives, hardware, policies, and 
investments. Collectively, they shape a nation’s capacity to create and maintain its 
competitive advantages in innovation and technology creation; and Singapore has worked 
hard to build the institutional and technological infrastructure to support these indicators. 
To develop and sustain its specialized and advanced factors the Singapore water 
economy is supported by considerable and sustained public funding for R&D; its world-
class universities produce a large number of competent scientists and engineers; its 
researchers are becoming increasingly productive in publishing peer reviewed journal 
articles and in securing patents; and its entrepreneurs and innovators have a short but 
outstanding track-record in commercializing technologies (Yue, 2001; Chew, Watanabe & 
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Tou, 2010). Despite its relatively small size and population, Singapore in a single 
generation became a scientifically and technologically capable society because of a 
public focus on training and developing scientists, engineers and technologists to support 
economic development (Low, 2001; Koh & Wong, 2005; Yew, 2012). Singapore is 
exploiting its excellent human capital in combination with its central location and history 
of integration into the global trading system to propel and sustain its economic 
development (Low, 2001; Yew, 2012).  
Singapore is increasingly becoming a knowledge-based economy with many 
globally competitive technology firms. High-technology startups already contribute a 
small but rapidly growing portion of GDP that could soon rival accommodation and food 
services; however, the city state is yet to produce a global leading startup in any area of 
technology (Yue, 2001; Chew, Watanabe & Tou, 2010; PWC, 2016; Dhalla, 2017). The 
contribution to GDP from manufacturing is about 18%, or S$270 billion, which is 
roughly in line with Israel, the Netherlands, and the United States; while utilities directly 
contribute about 1% to GDP, which is again roughly in line with these three countries 
(PWC, 2016; Singapore Department of Statistics, 2017). Manufacturing also employs 
about 15% of the workforce, or almost 400,000 people (PWC, 2016; Singapore 
Department of Statistics, 2017). The manufacturing sector is quite diversified and 
currently about half of this sector consists of high-technology industries including petro-
chemicals, semi-conductors, consumer electronics, machinery, transport equipment, and 
ships. The government is attempting to support the ongoing restructuring of 
manufacturing by shifting manufacturing towards increasingly high value-added sectors 
such as aerospace, precision engineering, and the life sciences, particularly bio-
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technology, medical equipment, and pharmaceutics. Many of these industries have a high 
demand for high quality water.  
Singapore’s government views R&D as a key driver for economic growth and a 
strategic investment in the city state’s long-term competitiveness. Singapore’s 
government has supported high-technology sectors, to include water technology, with 
strong, sustained, and increasing public R&D investment and the institutional framework 
to allocate this support in a targeted and strategic manner. Singapore invests about 2% of 
its GDP in R&D, which is in line with the United States and the rest of Europe, but about 
half that of Israel; and in 2015 this totaled about S$9.5 billion annually, or about S$2,000 
per capita (A*STAR, 2016; Singapore Department of Statistics, 2017). The 2015 level of 
R&D investment is a significant increase from S$6.5 billion in 2010 (Singapore 
Department of Statistics, 2017). A significant portion of R&D is funded by the 
Government of Singapore, at about 0.9% of GDP, which translates to about S$16 billion 
for the first half of the current decade; while the government has committed another S$19 
billion between 2016 and 2020 (A*STAR, 2016). Much of the private sector investment 
in R&D is a result of the presence of multi-national firms which Singapore has actively 
attracted to strengthen the local technology sector (UNESCO, 2015; Singapore 
Department of Statistics, 2017; Sagar, 2017). The R&D, innovation, and entrepreneurship 
landscape has implications for water technology firms, but this sector remains highly 
dependent on R&D support from government and purchases from public utilities.   
 Singapore has five public autonomous universities, two of which are world-class 
research universities, and one comprehensive private university; there are five 
polytechnics providing specific skills for the workplace; there are ten branch campuses of 
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foreign higher education institutions offering industry-specific courses of study; and there 
are two private institutions that provide post-secondary education in the arts. The largest 
proportion of students graduate with degrees in math, science, technology, engineering, 
and medicine providing Singapore a large pool of scientifically and technologically 
competent workers, which is vital in a country with a relatively small labor pool and 
looming labor shortages (UNESCO, 2015). Singapore has about 50,000 scientists and 
researchers, or 11 per thousand employees, which is ahead of the United States and the 
Netherlands, but behind Israel (UNESCO, 2015). Around 880 private domestic and 
multinational companies report R&D activity, and this is complemented by several public 
organizations involved in research which can roughly be grouped in institutions of higher 
learning and other public research institutes (Partners in Science, 2015). A*STAR is a key 
institution in public research: it is both a major research funder and a major research 
performer, and it overseas a consortium of 18 institutes (A*STAR, 2016). In 2015 
Singapore’s scientific publication output was 16,351 journal articles and the city state 
registers about 1,000 patents per year (Partners in Science, 2015; Singapore Department 
of Statistics, 2017). 
    Venture Capital activity in Singapore was a miniscule US$20 million in 1983 
but it has increased rapidly over the past 10 years into a multibillion industry (Ahlstrom 
& Bruton, 2006; PWC, 2016). Venture capital is a small fraction of the amount invested 
in R&D, but it may be two to three times more effective in helping to get technologies 
patented and commercialized than other forms of capital: this makes it an important 
complement to other forms of capital (Kortum & Lerner, 2001). The venture capital 
industry in Singapore is different from this industry in much of the rest of Asia in its 
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willingness to fund high technology startups; however, there is a need for more growth-
stage capital as funds are not properly spread across the startup lifecycle (PWC, 2016). 
Singapore’s surge in venture capital fundraising reflects growing interest in Southeast 
Asia’s startups as international investors seek opportunities beyond the United States and 
China (Ahlstrom & Bruton, 2006; PWC, 2016). Singapore’s government has invested 
heavily in the upgrading its startup ecosystem by strengthening the institutional 
framework, by providing incentives to attract entrepreneurs and venture capitalists, by 
cutting regulatory red tape, by helping to protect intellectual property, and by allocating 
public money for early investments. 
C. Demand Conditions 
More than four decades of successfully addressing pressing and challenging 
domestic water resource management issues has enabled Singapore to strategically 
position itself to become a ‘hydrohub,’ which is an international center for water 
technology and integrated urban water resource management where technologies are 
researched, tested, commercialized, and marketed globally (Schnoor, 2010). Domestic 
demand conditions form the second broad determinant of national competitive advantage, 
and the growing international success of Singaporean water technology firms is a direct 
result of domestic demand conditions, which in turn has a direct impact on the formation 
of specialized and advanced factor conditions and on the pace and direction of innovation 
and technology development (Porter, 1990). While the size of Singapore’s domestic 
market is small, the need to urgently address a severe water deficit, polluted waterways, 
and flooding forced the city-state to develop sophisticated skills in integrated urban water 
resource management, to learn how to adopt and integrate foreign water technologies, 
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and more recently to develop and commercialize indigenous water technologies (Khoo, 
2009; Tan, Lee & Tan, 2009; Chew, Watanabe & Tou, 2010; Low, 2012; Dhalla, 2017; 
Sagar, 2017; Joo & Heng, 2017). The growing export success of Singaporean water 
expertise and water technology demonstrates that the city-state’s water technology is 
becoming internationally competitive (Wong, 2006; Yangchen, 2012; Han, 2014).  
The complexity of the water challenges facing Singapore rather than the size of 
the domestic market were the drivers for the development of a sophisticated and 
demanding local market. Addressing these challenges gave Singaporean innovators and 
entrepreneurs - first public and later private sector - an early market lead in integrated 
urban water resource management that would eventually provide Singaporean water 
technology firms the knowledge and experience to compete internationally. The initial 
domestic market base was largely domestic public water utilities, and the main suppliers 
of engineering and technical services were initially public; however, as the domestic 
water sector evolved the state actively encouraged and supported the growth of domestic 
water technology firms, and as the wider economy evolved the demand for water 
technologies by water-intensive and water enabled firms has also grown to diversify the 
domestic market (Khoo, 2009; Wong, 2009; Dhalla, 2017; Sagar, 2017; Joo & Heng, 
2017; Braak, 2017; Yangchen, 2012). The public sector was initially instrumental in 
developing Singapore’s water sector and water technology industry; nevertheless, in the 
long-run, the dominance of the water sector by public sector and public utilities could 
become a hindrance to the long-term international competitiveness of the sector (Low, 
2012). Given the relatively small domestic market Singapore’s water technology 
industries will need to earn most of their revenues overseas and face stiff competition 
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from foreign firms if they are to continue to innovate, remain competitive, and meet the 
goal of capturing 3% of the global water market.  
D. Firm Strategy, Structure & Rivalry 
 The strategy and structure a firm adopts and the domestic rivalry it faces, helps to 
explains how a sector forms and evolves, and how it is structured and managed, which 
ultimately offers insights into how the sector achieves sustained competitive advantage 
(Porter, 1990). The degree of competition within a sector or industry, especially domestic 
competition, is extremely important to competitiveness because rivalry forces firms and 
industries to raise productivity to compete, and competitiveness is especially important 
for international success (Porter, 1990). The degree of cooperation within a sector and 
industry also affects how knowledge is diffused, and how costs and benefits of public 
goods are shared, which also determines both firm and industry success (Porter, 1990). 
The aims, strategies, appetite for risk, and methods of managing and organizing firms 
vary widely among nations, and national advantage emerges from a good harmony 
between these factors rather than firms adopting a universal approach or standard (Porter, 
1990). The Singaporean water technology industry, at less than 200 firms, is small; many 
of the domestic firms are new and the international firms newly located to Singapore; the 
sector does not face intense domestic rivalry; and given the small size and population of 
Singapore it is unlikely to ever face significant domestic rivalry. The sector also tends to 
be largely an outgrowth of public sector initiatives to address water scarcity and water 
quality, is heavily dependent on government procurement for sales and government 
resources for R&D, is highly regulated and monitored by the government, and is now 
characterized by significant public-private partnerships for the supply of potable water 
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(Wong, 2009; Low, 2012; Dhalla, 2017). Although Singapore’s public sector has been 
remarkably innovative and entrepreneurial, these public entities still have a tendency 
towards conservatism and risk aversion (Low, 2012). Given that the major risks from 
water scarcity and pollution have been addressed, the pressure on the public sector for 
innovation may be potentially waning, making the need to increase the private sector role 
in the water sector ecosystem more critical. The sector can, therefore, be best classified as 
emerging. 
  Experience suggests that a competitive market environment is crucial for 
stimulating and supporting entrepreneurship and innovation, and this competitive 
environment encourages firms to invest in efficiency-enhancing technology, provided 
they can expect sufficient returns from their investment (OECD, 2000). In the case of 
Singapore, the driver for an efficient water sector was the need to support the 
competitiveness of the rest of Singapore’s economy; and the process of continually 
upgrading the economy stimulated and justified significant public investments in 
technologically advanced water infrastructure and water technology R&D (Koh & Wong, 
2005; Low, 2012; Tortajada, Joshi & Biswas, 2013; Yangchen, 2012 & 2017). The PUB 
has developed deep knowledge in water resource management, world-class expertise in 
hydraulic engineering became a corporate strength; and the public utility sub-sector of the 
water economy has been restructured so that the entire water cycle and water value chain 
is managed as a closed loop by the PUB, under the Ministry of Environment and Water 
Resources (Low, 2012). Innovative and entrepreneurial public policies, innovative and 
entrepreneurial management practices by public utilities, and the development by the 
public sector of a robust water sector ecosystem have enabled Singapore to move from an 
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investment-driven to an innovation-driven water industry that is increasingly exporting 
innovative technologies and best practices in water management (Koh, 2005; Koh & 
Wong, 2005; Wong, 2005; Dhalla, 2017).  
 Although the public sector has taken a leading role in Singapore’s water economy, 
and the water economy is dominated by public utilities for water-and-wastewater, 
companies from the United States and Europe have been active in Singapore for several 
decades (Schnoor, 2010; Braak, 2017). The Environment and Water Industry Programme 
Office (EWI) – the public sector, inter-agency body for driving the water technology 
industry – has been leading the effort to develop Singapore’s water cluster through three 
strategies: technology development, cluster development, and internationalization which 
supports local companies and attracts high-technology foreign firms and highly skilled 
foreign workers to build the critical mass to create a dynamic water cluster. The foreign 
firms that been established in Singapore span the value chain from R&D to equipment 
suppliers to system integrators to project developers and financiers, and their presence is 
expected to create synergies and foster partnerships which would allow firms to develop 
and deliver integrated water solutions to a global water marketplace (Dhalla, 2017; Joo & 
Heng, 2017; Lide, 2017). Initially these multinational companies were involved in the 
transfer of foreign technologies into Singapore - which the city-state absorbed and 
adapted to their local needs - which was typical of the investment-driven growth strategy 
of the early years; more recently these multinational water firms have opened global 
research or business technology centers in Singapore and are increasingly involved in 
water R&D and technology commercialization within the water ecosystem (Koh, 2005; 
Schnoor, 2010; Chew, Watanabe & Tou, 2010; Dhalla, 2017; Braak, 2017). Although 
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these foreign firms are an important part of the Singaporean water ecosystem, the 
eventual goal is the development of an indigenous water technology capability, and 
domestic water technology firms such as Hyflux, Keppel, Seghers and Sembcorp Utilities 
owe much of their success to the willingness of public utilities to enter with them into 
public-private partnerships for water supply.   
E. Supporting & Related Industries 
The nature and strength of the relationships between supportive and related 
industries and water technology firms in a water technology cluster create synergies that 
are crucial to the competitiveness of that cluster (Porter, 1990). Building competitive 
advantage requires firms to manage the horizontal and vertical dimensions of the entire 
value system which includes networks of suppliers, buyers, trade associations, 
universities, and research centers that jointly create or share knowledge, transfer 
technology, and create positive spillovers that increases innovation and accelerates 
commercialization (Porter, 1990). Vertical relationships within a water technology cluster 
exist between trading partners involved in successive stages of production, including 
suppliers that provided specialized inputs such as trained technologists, and customers 
that buy water technology such as water-and-wastewater utilities, (Wong, 2006; Chew, 
Watanabe & Tou, 2010; Tortajada & Joshi, 2013; Joo & Heng, 2017: Dhalla, 2017). 
Robust vertical relationships give water technology firms early access to inputs that may 
represent the latest technology or lowest cost, such as desalination and recycled water in 
Singapore, and it tends to encourage improved product quality (Wong, 2006; Tortajada, 
2006a; Yangchen, 2012; Low, 2012; Lide, 2017). Horizontal relationships exist between 
firms at the same stage of production that sometimes compete but may also cooperate in 
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joint ventures. Examples of horizontal relationships include firms with different 
specializations collaborating to build a desalination plant, or in the supply of capital to 
finance water projects (Koh & Wong, 2005; Koh, 2005; Wong, 2006; Chew, Watanabe & 
Tou, 2010). Dynamic horizontal relationships strengthen water technology clusters - such 
as through the presence in Singapore of strong computer, electronic, software, bio-
technology, and chemical industries - as these industries complement the water 
technology sector with related technologies whose integration helps to solve water 
complex problems, which produces spillovers for other sectors of the economy, and 
which strengthens competitiveness.  
Fewer firms today have large internal markets and many firms now outsource or 
subcontract non-core functions to specialist firms (Porter, 1990). Competitive water 
technology firms thus require close linkages among a diverse range of organizations 
within the sector to ensure that new technologies are commercialized into marketable 
products that can find a global market. Government, universities and technical colleges, 
research institutes, infrastructure providers, utilities, standard-setting agencies, and a host 
of other organizations are critical components of the ecosystem required for technology 
creation, and these are all present in the Singapore water technology ecosystem (Koh & 
Wong, 2005; Wong, 2006; Yangchen, 2012; Lide, 2017; PUB, 2017; Dhalla, 2017; Joo 7 
Heng, 2017). A dynamic water innovation ecosystem with globally competitive firms 
requires strong linkages between universities, industry, and government which creates 
synergies that are crucial in fostering an innovative and entrepreneurial culture; and the 
Singapore government, through public policy and targeted investment in R&D and 
venture capital, has built an emerging ecosystem (Low, 2012; Menkhoff & Evers, 2011; 
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Lide, 2017; Sagar, 2017). The PUB is an example of a government agency that operates 
simultaneously at multiple point along the value chain and along both horizontal and 
vertical dimensions (Low, 2012). The PUB conducts research, it fosters and supports 
startups, it provides testing facilities, it organizes networking opportunities to connect the 
local and international water technology community, it enters into public-private 
partnerships, and it collaborates with the private sector to improve water supply 
efficiencies, explore new approaches to water resource management, and export 
Singapore’s water technologies (Low, 2012; Lide, 2017). The government in its 2005 
National Science identified the water industry as one of the key sectors in the new 
knowledge economy; and the PUB used its considerable knowledge and experience in the 
search for alternative sources of water, and strong research culture into water technology, 
to play a key role in growing the emerging water industry (A*STAR, 2005; Khoo, 2009; 
Low, 2012; Lide, 2017).  The extended interaction which the PUB encouraged with the 
private sector was designed to make the utility more efficient as well as facilitate access 
each other’s expertise and experience (Low, 2012; Lide, 2017). The work of the PUB is 
closely coordinated with other government agencies - such as EWI and NERI - that also 
affect the water technology sector at multiple points along the value chain by facilitating 
rather than just regulating, by providing funds for R&D, and by nurturing Singaporean 
startups (Low, 2012; Lide, 2017). 
F. Government & Chance 
Government and chance are exogenous to Porter’s Diamond but have the capacity 
to either positively or negatively influence how the diamond functions, with the 
government influencing primarily through regulations and the overall institutional 
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framework (Porter, 1990). The government of Singapore has acted as both catalyst, 
through its investment in infrastructure and R&D, and as challenger with its regulations 
requiring the country to meet high environmental standards (Tortajada, 2006a & 2006b; 
Tan, Lee & Tan, 2009; Khoo, 2009; Low, 2012; Lide, 2017). The Singapore government 
has actively and proactively taken steps to stimulate innovation, entrepreneurship, and 
technological progress in the water technology sector in several ways: attracting foreign 
water technology firms to locate their regional manufacturing and research facilities in 
Singapore, particularly in the high-tech sector; attracting high quality professional talent, 
by implementing regulatory and fiscal changes to make it easier to start a businesses; 
setting up venture capital funds to encourage startups; funding R&D at universities and 
research centers across the entire water value chain; establishing a network of public 
agencies to support innovators and entrepreneurs; applying and integrating water 
technologies into its domestic water management practices; ensuring a strong intellectual 
property protection regime; strong state involvement in labor, land, and industrial 
development policies; ensuring fair competition for both local and international firms; 
and providing a stable macroeconomic environment with steady growth and low inflation 
(Low, 2001; Koh, 2005; Khoo, 2009; Low, 2012; Lide, 2017). This significant public role 
can be justified because of the existence of market failure in the water economy: the 
application of new ideas or technologies may also take a long time to be realized, thus 
raising the level of commercialization risk; private enterprises often fail to invest 
sufficiently in water R&D because social returns may exceed potential private returns, 
and private enterprises cannot capture all the private gains from R&D; and many water 
technology firms are too small to individually make a large capital-intensive investment 
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with an uncertain outcome and a long gestation period (Koh, 2005; Koh & Wong, 2005).  
Under a series of science and technology plans where water technology has been 
identified as a key growth sector, Singapore’s development model is being adapted from 
the traditional model of technological catch up to one where the economy can compete 
close to the technological frontier of the global knowledge economy based on its ability 
to engage in technology creation (Koh & Wong, 2005; A*STAR, 2015).These strategies 
have also enabled the government to deliver an efficient, safe and sustainable water 
supply; deliver a clean, healthy, and pleasant environment; and create a vibrant water 
technology cluster (Tan, Lee & Tan, 2009; Tortajada, Joshi & Biswas, 2013; Lim & Lu, 
2016). These strategies were part of the Government of Singapore’s key drivers in 
supporting a shift from an investment and efficiency-driven growth strategy to an 
innovation-driven growth strategy, of which clean technologies such as water were to 
play an important role.  
The strategy to build an economically sustainable water cluster is still, however, 
incomplete because of the following: the private firms in the water technology cluster are 
still dominated by international companies; local water technology firms are mainly still 
at the stage of acquiring and improving on existing technology, or importing and adapting 
foreign technologies; and local firms remain highly dependent on support from 
Singapore’s public sector to grow and sustain their firms (Koh, 2005; Koh & Wong, 
2005; Lide, 2017). The Government of Singapore government is taking steps to remake 
the institutional and technological infrastructure of the water economy to foster an 
environment conducive to innovation and technology creation; and they were careful to 
avoid the mistakes of other countries by tailoring its policies to local realities and 
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inherent advantages (Koh & Wong, 2005). Despite the success of public policy towards 
the water economy of Singapore the government must guard against undermining 
decades of work in building its water sector by failing to wean the private sector off 
public support which could stifle private sector initiative and creativity as the water 
industry matures. 
X. Conclusion 
Economic development in Singapore has been significantly shaped by the 
resource constraints that the city-state has faced, water scarcity being the most significant 
of these constraints. Resource constraints meant that a growth strategy driven by factors 
such as raw materials was simply not an option for Singapore, and the city-state was 
forced to move quickly from an investment-driven growth strategy, through an 
efficiency-driven growth strategy, to an innovation-driven growth strategy. Securing a 
reliable supply of fresh water from limited local sources, ensuring flood protection from 
high levels of rainfall and monsoons, and protecting the densely populated city-state from 
waste-water and pollution required considerable innovation and entrepreneurship, with 
the public sector of Singapore leading the way. Singapore's severe water constraints 
forced the government to look to institutional and technological solutions that improved 
supply, increased the efficiency of water use, and reduced pollution. In a period of 
approximately four decades from independence in 1965, Singapore was able to solve its 
water-and-wastewater challenges; and in the process developed the foundation for a 
globally competitive water technology cluster.  This decision led to the water economy 
becoming an important source of competitive advantage for Singapore, with world-class 
water utilities providing the domestic economy with a reliable and affordable water-and-
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wastewater services, and the water technology sub-sector through the HydroHub 
providing an important launching platform for entry into the global water economy. What 
started out as a strategic vulnerability for Singapore has been turned into a strategic 
advantage with the city-state now recognized as a global leader in all aspects of the water 
technology value-chain from catchment, to storage, to recycling, to reuse, and 
desalination.  
The Singapore water economy is largely a creation of state planning, investment 
and management to build a suitable institutional framework and encourage the 
development and diffusion of innovative water technologies. It was established, nurtured, 
and sustained by significant and consistent investment in world-class public water 
infrastructure, a broad-based technological infrastructure, appropriate science and 
technology policies, a network of public and private research organizations, and 
supportive government institutions. The technological infrastructure encompasses a 
world-class public education and research system, a legal framework that supports 
contract enforcement and protects intellectual property rights, and a technology policy 
that provides the incentives to develop and diffuse technologies and encourage innovation 
and entrepreneurship. This business-friendly environment encouraged foreign investment 
in the water economy. The diffusion of foreign technologies into Singapore stimulated 
and supported a process of learning by the indigenous players in the water sector, first by 
public sector utilities and later by private sector firms. Singapore’s government ensured 
that this diffusion and learning took place in a very specific economic, technological and 
institutional landscape, and that it also took place along the entire value chain of the 
water industry. Singapore's public agencies, and the utilities they manage, participate in 
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the diffusion of water innovations and the acceleration of commercialization in several 
ways: by hosting events which build network and act as fora for the exchange of ideas 
and knowledge; through collaborations and partnerships; and by providing test-bedding 
opportunities for testing technologies in real-life operating conditions at water-and-
wastewater works. In this way local competences were built up incrementally and 
systematically and Singapore thus moved up from being a net importer of water 
technology to a net exporter of water technology.  The next challenge for Singapore’s 
water policymakers as the HydroHub goes global, is to wean the private sector in the 
emerging water technology cluster from a reliance on government contracts, government 
funded R&D, and government subsidized venture capital. If the HydroHub can become 
more independent of state support Singapore’s water technology cluster has a high 
probability of transitioning to a growing cluster in the coming decade given the high 

























WATER TECHNOLOGY CLUSTERS IN ISRAEL 
 
I. Introduction 
 Israel is at the forefront of water resource management, water policy, and water 
technology. It has been able, in the face of a severe scarcity of fresh water resources, to 
deliver clean and safe water to a rapidly growing population and economy in the 60 years 
following its independence. Its water economy has benefited over many decades from the 
existence of a series of public and private innovators and entrepreneurs who have 
transformed the institutional environment, developed complex infrastructure, 
sophisticated technologies, and effective policies and management practices (Feitelson, 
2013; Siegel, 2015; Marin et al., 2017). Israel's journey to water security and sustainable 
water resource management has not been without its challenges, and its fair share of 
policy and engineering mistakes. For several decades its water policies and practices 
were correctly criticized as outdated, inefficient, ineffective, economically unsustainable, 
detrimental to the environmental, and unfair to its Arab neighbors (Tal, 2002, 2006, 2007; 
Feitelson, 2013). Entrenched economic and political interests and a Zionist-socialist 
ideology which privileged a narrow form of economic development divorced from a 
wider and more sustainable model of development retarded the pace of reform of the 
water economy, particularly between 1964 and 2000 (Rouyer, 1996; Tal, 2007).  
 Israel's water economy has evolved through several discernible periods which can 
be differentiated by a set of evolving issues, goals, discourses, approaches, and actors 
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which have interacted to shape policy and practice (Rouyer, 1996; Tal, 2007; Feitelson, 
2013; Siegel, 2015). Institutional and technological developments often coevolve. In each 
period the development and diffusion of water technologies has played a central role in 
the water economy, often enabling change institutional change. Technology was first 
employed on large and complex engineering projects to find, extract, and move large 
volumes of water from natural sources to water deficient regions in the south (Tal, 2002, 
2006, 2007; Siegel, 2015). Technology was later employed to increase the efficiency of 
water use, improve water quality, and reuse wastewater (Tal, 2002, 2006, 2007; Siegel, 
2015). Technology more recently has been used to again expand supply, but this time 
from unconventional sources (Tal, 2002, 2006, 2007; Siegel, 2015). Israel's water 
resource portfolio now includes recycled sewage and desalinated seawater. In each period 
several social, economic, and climatic drivers influenced how water resources were 
exploited, where the distribution network was built, and who received this scarce 
resource (Raphaeli, 1965; Sadan & Ben-Zvi, 1987; Menahem, 1998; Tal, 2006, 2007; 
Feitelson, 2013; Siegel, 2015; Marin et al., 2017). Each driver was met by a different 
response, but each successive driver also required increasingly complex solutions which 
raised the marginal investment cost for each additional unit of water produced (Raphaeli, 
1965; Sadan & Ben-Zvi, 1987; Tal, 2006, 2007; Feitelson, 2013; Siegel, 2015; Marin et 
al., 2017).  Addressing increasingly challenging problems with increasingly complex 
solutions also required an appropriate institutional framework: legislative, administrative, 
and regulatory measures had to be devised to assure the regular supply of safe water at 
reasonable prices (Raphaeli, 1965; Sadan & Ben-Zvi, 1987; Tal, 2006, 2007; Feitelson, 
2013; Siegel, 2015; Marin et al., 2017).  
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 Israel's water economy has been significantly restructured over the last 60 years: 
the contribution from various water sources has significantly changed; the philosophies 
around the relative importance of water to economic development and environmental 
conservation have shifted in favor of conservation; the relative power of key stakeholders 
in Israel's water sector have shifted towards those who favor market-based solutions; 
water security and resilience is now much more dependent on employing technology than 
exploiting sources; and water has started to become a potential tool of diplomacy for 
building better relationships with neighbors, and less a trigger for conflict (Tal, 2006, 
2007; Feitelson, 2013; Siegel, 2015; Marin et al., 2017). Trial and error and conscious, 
comprehensive planning have both played a role in helping Israel to finally put its water 
future on a more sustainable path thanks to a combination of 'hard' engineering and 
technological innovations, and 'soft' regulatory programs and economic tools that produce 
better incentives for the water sector (Sadan & Ben-Zvi, 1987; Tal, 2006, 2007; Feitelson, 
2013; Siegel, 2015; Marin et al., 2017).  
This chapter will show the following: (1) Israel’s historical relationship with 
water and how development of a national water economy was critical for underpinning 
all aspects of political independence and economic development; (2) Israel’s governance 
and institutional framework and how the country’s political leaders and technocrats 
eventually developed policies and institutions that transformed the country from a water-
scarce country to a water independent country; (3) Israel’s water resource management 
strategy, how it evolved exclusively from a supply orientation to include demand 
management, and how the country’s technocrats employed science and technology to 
diversify its water resource portfolio; (4) Israel’s innovation and economic development 
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strategy and how it created indigenous expertise in water resource management and 
water-related technologies; and (5) Israel’s competitive position in relations to its water 
technology sector and how the country is a major global exported of drip irrigation and 
desalination technologies. The Israeli experience suggests that sustainable national water 
economy requires planners and policy makers to consider the following: (1) the mix of 
policies and strategies needs to be carefully selected and complementary; (2) the policies, 
strategies, and technological prescriptions are to a great extent determined by unique 
local factors; (3) the policies and strategies need to be tailored to local social, economic 
and environmental conditions; (4) water reformers need to overcome conservative 
tendencies to maintain a status quo that may no longer be relevant; and (5) policies and 
strategies need to be properly supported with financial resources, and technical and 
institutional capacity (Raphaeli, 1965; Sadan & Ben-Zvi, 1987; Menahem, 1998; Tal, 
2006, 2007;  Feitelson, 2013; Siegel, 2015; Marin et al., 2017). 
II. History of Israel's Water Economy 
 A. Pre-independence.  
 The modern Israeli water economy predates the State of Israel and started in the 
period between the First and Second World Wars when the British ruled Palestine. During 
this period the British authorities used the region's shortage of water as one justification 
to curtail Jewish immigration to the territory, pacify an increasingly restive Arab 
population who were increasingly opposed to Jewish immigration, and with war 
imminent in Europe avoid tying down large numbers of troops (Rouyer, 1996; Siegel, 
2015). The water economy of Palestine was characterized by limited water resources and 
virtually non-existent water infrastructure, and what infrastructure had been built by the 
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Romans had been allowed to deteriorate by the former Ottoman rulers (Rouyer, 1996).  
The British policy was articulated in a White Paper on the conditions in Palestine which 
was published in 1939. To counter Britain's restrictive policy towards Jewish 
immigration, Zionist leaders needed to demonstrate that British estimates of the 
demographic and economic carrying capacity of Palestine's water economy were 
incorrect, and that the regions waters had great economic potential if there were 
significant changes in the way in which the water economy was governed, and how water 
was exploited. The Zionists did not change British policy, but they did change the way 
they conceived how water would be managed when they eventually founded the Jewish 
state (Siegel, 2015).  
 The Zionist agenda to settle Jewish immigrants in Palestine depended on access to 
water and large-scale irrigation, and Zionist representatives at the 1919 Paris Peace 
Conference attempted to extract formal access to northern sources of water from the 
victorious European powers who now ruled the Middle East (Thomas, 2009). It was 
recognized that the survival of any future Jewish state depended on access to the waters 
of the Jordan and Litani Rivers and the Sea of Galilee: this would guarantee any future 
Jewish state a water resource base for a strong economy, but it also accommodated 
historic and geographic considerations which were important to Zionist ideology 
(Rouyer, 1996). Despite the lack of success in Paris, the Zionist movement proactively 
began creating or expanding pre-state institutions in Palestine. One important institution 
was the Jewish National Fund (JNF), an organization founded in 1901 to help establish 
Jewish communities in Palestine. The JNF supported water, agricultural and 
environmental projects; it became a major land owner in Palestine-Israel, which would 
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help to evolve a pattern of collective rather than private land ownership in the new state; 
and it would grow from a small-scale operation to have a deep and lasting impact on 
Israeli land, water, and natural resource policy and practice (kkl-jnf.org, n.d. a; Rouyer, 
1996). Between the wars 96% of the wells and most other water infrastructure developed 
in Palestine were built by Jews and funded by the JNF (Rouyer, 1996). Another important 
institution was Mekorot, the future water supply company, which was conceived in 1935 
and founded in 1937, and was partially owned by the JNF. Merkorot was responsible for 
water exploration, well drilling, and water transportation to ensure that an adequate 
supply of water would exist for new immigrants and the growing number of farming 
communities. As the demand for water increased, and the scale and scope of Mekorot's 
operations grew, greater innovation was required from its engineers and planners. The 
water system that emerged prior to independence was small-scale, fragmented and 
located close to easily accessible supplies along the Mediterranean coast and in the north, 
which was a pragmatic response to limited financial resources and the absence of 
centralized political authority. The Zionist vision, however, also included incorporating 
the larger Negev desert in the south into the wider economy and society.  
 Simon Blass produced the first Water Plan in 1939 and would update it regularly 
for 20 years (Siegel, 2015). Blass' draft would eventually become Israel's Water Master 
Plan, but his first draft contained all the elements of the future Israeli Water Economy. 
Blass proposed a three-phase approach to national self-sufficiency: (1) searching for 
water beneath the Negev desert, (2) pumping water from central Israel to the Negev in the 
south, and (3) building an underground water conveyance that would bring water from 
the north to the rest of Israel, including the Negev in the south.  During the Second World 
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War Blass surveyed all of Palestine's water resources and continued to refine his plans 
with ideas gleaned from water projects in the United States. He considered using storm-
and-waste water and proposed bringing water from the Mediterranean to the Dead Sea 
whose drop would also generate hydroelectric power. Blass also considered untapped 
sources at the edge of the Palestinian territory – the Yarmouk River on the border with 
Trans-Jordan and the Litani River on the border with Lebanon – which at that time 
drained into the Jordan River and Mediterranean Sea respectively. These rivers would 
eventually come under Israeli control as prizes of Arab-Israeli wars.  
In 1947 Blass' water plan would also prove useful in presenting the Zionist case 
for an independent Jewish state to a United Nations committee whose mission was to 
examine the division of Palestine into Jewish and Arab states. Blass' water plan 
challenged the British claims regarding the economic and environmental carrying 
capacity of Palestine which were used to justify restricting Jewish immigration to the 
territory. In the end the UN committee was persuaded by Blass and his associates and 
they recommended the partition of Palestine and the creation of a Jewish state. By the 
time of independence for the Jewish state in 1948, the Zionist leadership had conceived 
of a comprehensive water framework from which they could begin supporting the 
development of the new state (Siegel, 2015). 
 The Zionists also got support from an unlikely source, an American water expert, 
Walter Lowdermilk. Lowdermilk surveyed the region's water resources and its 
agricultural potential in the late 1930s and in 1944 he published a book based on his 
findings, Palestine, Land of Promise. Lowdermilk challenged the findings of the 1939 
British White Paper on several points and suggested that the region's water challenges 
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could be solved with the application of science, technology, and sound water resource 
management (Siegel, 2015). The basis of the Lowdermilk plan was a regional approach to 
the problem of water scarcity with holistic management of all the region's water resources 
(Rouyer, 1996). The Lowdermilk Plan was followed in 1948 by a detailed engineering 
study prepared by an American engineer and consultant, James Hays. This plan, entitled 
T.V.A. On the Jordan, provided an eight-stage blueprint to realize Lowdermilk's overall 
conception for a Jordan Valley Authority based on the Tennessee Valley Authority 
(Rouyer, 1996).        
 A key strategy of the Zionist leadership was the settling of the sparsely populated 
Negev desert in the period leading up to independence (Rouyer, 1996). This was done 
with the financial support of the JNF. The Negev was strategically important for both 
defensive depth and its potential economic value. Three experimental settlements were 
constructed in the Negev in 1943, 11 more in 1946 and five in 1947 (Rogers, 2003). 
Blass, who was also the Director of the JNF's Hydrology Department, successfully drilled 
wells at Gvar Am and Nir Am and devised a plan to connect several other farming 
communities to this source of ground water through a network of pipes eventually built in 
1946. The innovative and entrepreneurial Blass acquired high-quality steel pipes as war 
surplus from London where they were installed during the Blitz to supply water for 
firefighting (Siegel, 2015). The money for this expensive procurement came from the 
JNF (kkl-jnf.org, n.d.).  
 B. 1948-1964.  
 The State of Israel received its independence on 14 May 1948 and was 
immediately attacked by six Arab armies. The conflict lasted for about one year. When 
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the armistice was signed the State of Israel had extended its borders by about 30% 
beyond the 1947 UN Partition Resolution and increased its water resources, a fact which 
remains a source of conflict between Israel and many of its Arab neighbors to the present 
day (Isaac & Shuval, 1994). These expanded boundaries would ultimately permit Israel to 
implement much of the Lowdermilk-Hays Plan, but on a largely unilateral basis (Rouyer, 
1996).  
The immediate need for defense and resettling refugees consumed considerable 
financial resources of the new state; however, water and agriculture remained a national 
priority as food was in short supply. Agriculture would provide a source of employment 
for the growing number of refugees, and a rural-agrarian life fit the Zionist-socialist 
ideology of the Jewish leadership (Rouyer, 1996; Tal, 2007). In 1953 Israel started 
receiving reparations from Germany and one of the priority areas for these reparations 
was water infrastructure (Siegel, 2015). Water and water infrastructure became decisive 
elements in nation building and in building the national character of the people of the 
new state.  
 Water would play a central role in both conflict and peace between the State of 
Israel and its neighbors. The War of Independence meant that many key sources of 
regional water now fell in demilitarized zones, legal access to which would have to await 
a future peace treaty (Thomas, 2009). Although efforts by the United Nations and the 
United States for the joint development and control of the water resources of the Jordan 
Valley was unable to realize wide international agreement, both Israel and Jordan 
undertook in 1955 to abide by their allocations under the Johnston Unified Water Plan as 
a treaty of allocation rights (Bailey, 1985; Thomas, 2009). Israel began to exploit the 
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water resources of what was now northern Israel within the framework of the agreement 
until the June 1967 war brought the Golan Heights and West Bank under Israeli control 
(Rogers, 2003). Although Jordan and Israel have managed to work together on water 
issues of mutual concern, Israel and its other Arab neighbors have also employed a range 
of military and diplomatic strategies to address their strategic water concerns from 1948 
to the present.   
 Blass' water plan was systematically implemented during the 1950s with 
considerable donations from American Jewry (Siegel, 2015). The key components were 
the supply of water to the Negev from the Yaron River in central Israel, inaugurated in 
1955, and the construction of the National Water Carrier which would bring water from 
the North of Israel to the Negev (Siegel, 2015). The National Water Carrier was a major 
undertaking for the young state because of its technical complexity, its high cost, and its 
demand on scarce resources: it remains to this day the largest and most costly 
development project executed in Israel at about 420 million Israeli Pounds (IL) in 1964 
values (Cohen, 2008; Siegel, 2015). The planning for the project began in 1953, the 
detailed plans were approved by the government in 1956, construction began in 1959, 
and the 130 kilometers system was completed in 1964. The National Water Carrier was 
designed by Tahal and constructed by Mekorot. The National Water Carrier remains the 
centerpiece of Israel's water supply system as most of the water works in Israel are 
combined with this network (Cohen, 2009).  
 The 1950s also saw other important developments in the water economy of Israel, 
especially in terms of the legal, regulatory and institutional framework. A series of water 
laws were passed in the 1950s which were to become a central part of Israel's water 
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supply and water-conservation success (Siegel, 2015). In 1955 two laws were passed: one 
law prohibited any drilling for water anywhere in the country, even by the owner on his 
private land, without first obtaining a license to do so; and the second law prohibited any 
distribution of water unless that supply was done through a meter. In 1957 a law was 
passed to control all surface water, rainwater and sewerage. None of these types of water 
could be diverted without government permission. The Water Law of 1959 consolidated 
these emerging legal principles and confirmed water as public property subject to state 
control and compelled all citizens to use water sparingly and efficiently. Even with the 
entry of private companies into the water economy, water remains common property 
highly regulated by the state (Siegel, 2015). In 1953 Israel drafted the world’s first set of 
standards for wastewater reuse, and effluent recycling would eventually emerge as a 
central element of Israeli domestic water policy. In 1962 the Knesset passed the Local 
Authorities (Sewerage) Law to allow local authorities to build and own sewerage works 
within their jurisdictions (Laster & Livney, 2009).  
 C. 1964 to 1990.  
 This period was dominated by two developments: (1) the recognition that all 
potential sources of natural water supply in Israel were fully exploited, and (2) the 
politico-hydraulic consequences of Israel's victories in the Six Day War of 1967 which 
brought the sources of much the region's surface and ground water under Israeli control 
(Menahem, 1998; Feitelson, 2013). Given that the limit of further exploitation of Israel's 
natural sources had been reached, and the reality that desalination was not yet technically 
and economically feasible, attention gradually shifted to improving the management of 
existing resources (Menahem, 1998; Tal, 2007; Feitelson, 2013). The state of water 
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resources was provided in a 1972 report to the Minster of Agriculture by an international 
team of renowned water experts (Menahem, 1998). Recycled water and drip irrigation 
technology now became more attractive and in combination saved both water and 
fertilizer. Nevertheless, the use of recycled water and water from the Sea of Galilee, 
increased the salinity of water used for irrigation with negative environmental 
consequences. Increasing concerns over water quality led to a 1971 amendment of the 
Water Law of 1959 to require the Water Commission to also take water quality issues into 
consideration (Feitelson, 2013).  
Despite evidence of the unsustainable nature of Israel's existing water policy, the 
increasing use of recycled water may well have reduced the urgency to substantially 
reform the water economy to protect and preserve natural sources (Menahem, 1998; Tal, 
2002, 2006; Feitelson, 2013). Planning became increasingly short-term, the fiscal space 
became increasingly tight, policy change was reactive and characterized by incremental 
decision-making (Menahem, 1998). None of the long-term plans prepared by Tahal in the 
1960s and 1970s were implemented and Tahal began to shift its planning services to the 
private sector and international clients (Menahem, 1998). Even the Water Master Plan 
which was produced following a water crisis in 1985 was intentionally suppressed.  
There was, nevertheless, a gradual shift in agricultural policy away from food 
self-sufficiency, water intensive crops, maximizing agricultural exports, centralized state-
led water planning, and subsidizing the agricultural sector towards more market-based 
approaches (Tal, 2007; Feitelson, 2013). The traditional model of collectivist and family 
farms was replaced by commercial farming driven by profits. New farms were larger, 
employed fewer people, applied more capital and technology, and achieved increasing 
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economies of scale (Tal, 2007; Feitelson, 2013). These changes in agriculture were part 
of a restructuring of the wider Israeli economy, and a shifting of economic power, which 
allowed the economy to grow while maintaining the overall output of the agricultural 
sector (Tal, 2007; Feitelson, 2013).  The agricultural sector, however, continued to place 
unsustainable demands on natural water sources and this period thus ended with the first 
major drought crisis in 1989.   
 D. 1990 to 2005.  
 This period was dominated by a re-evaluation of Israel's water policies and the 
institutional framework for water resource management; and it saw the public becoming 
increasing involved in the water discourse that was traditionally the preserve of 
politicians, water technocrats, and agricultural interests (Tal, 2007; Feitelson, 2013; 
Siegel, 2015). The drivers for this shift were three major water crises, which were the 
result of increasingly severe droughts, the huge influx of Russian Jews, and the prospects 
of a peace deal with Arab neighbors which would undoubtedly lead to greater water 
allocation demands from Palestinians, Jordanians and, perhaps, Syrians (Starr, 1991; 
Menahem, 1998). The droughts led severe water shortages and rationing which affected 
agricultural, industrial, and domestic consumers; (Feitelson, 2013; Siegel, 2015). The 
Water Commission continued to allow the water reserves to reach critical levels as 
demand outstripped the rate of replenishment and a report by the State Comptroller which 
was critical of the Water Commissioner led to his dismissal (Feitelson, 2013). These 
events provided a window for political action that finally triggered far-reaching policy 
reforms.  
 Around this time concerns for the environment also came to the forefront of the 
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discourse around water (Tal, 2006 & 2007; Feitelson, 2013; Siegel, 2015). Natural 
systems to include waterways and nature reserves were increasingly discovered to be 
under stress. The reality was that the codex of the four key water laws developed in 
previous decades did not explicitly recognize ecological and environmental concerns 
outside the context of securing the supply of water (Tal, 2002, 2006, 2007; Feitelson, 
2013). There were also no specific laws protecting the natural environment, those which 
had been proposed were never passed by the Knesset (Laster & Livney, 2009). A 2004 
amendment of the Water Law of 1959 recognized ecological support as a legitimate 
purpose to which water could be allocated (Laster & Livney, 2008; Feitelson, 2013).  
Secondary and advanced level treatment of waste-water increasingly became standard 
after 1990 and the increase in recycled water made more water available for substitution 
in agriculture and for stream rehabilitation (Feitelson, 2013). By 2000 almost all cities 
and towns were connected to at least secondary levels of treatment.  
The drought crises of the 1980s and 1990s had exposed fissures within the policy 
community with some committed to the traditional socialist model of water resource 
development and allocation, and others committed to more market-based approaches to 
resource allocation and utility management (Feitelson, 2013; Siegel, 2015). Those who 
advocated for more market-based and neo-liberal approaches to water resource 
management argued that traditional policy encouraged over-extraction beyond the natural 
rate of replenishment; what was required was the adoption of price as a demand-
management mechanism, and full-cost recovery to ensure high-quality service, reliable 
infrastructure, and financially sustainable utilities (Tal, 2007; Feitelson, 2013; Marin et 
al., 2017).  
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Until 1996 the Ministry of Agriculture was the lead ministry for the water sector 
and this set the policy tone: the ministry's priority was to supply natural water resources 
to meet all water demands; agriculture remained the main user of water; and the 
agricultural lobby wanted to keep the tariff for agricultural water artificially low 
(Feitelson, 2013). By the start of the 2000s, the agricultural sector produced less than 5% 
of Israel's gross national product but still drained more than 70% of the country's water. 
The Ministry of Finance in contrast wanted to stop water subsidies as a precondition for 
supporting desalination (Feitelson, 2013). It was not until about 2000 that some level of 
consensus on the way forward was achieved by the various actors and Israeli farmers 
were forced to accept a one-third reduction in water for certain crops (Feitelson, 2013; 
Siegel, 2015). 
The drought of 1999 to 2000 shifted the positions of both the finance and 
agriculture lobbies and a compromise on key issues was reached to facilitate the 
development of desalination (Feitelson, 2013; Siegel, 2015). The changes brought about 
by events in the 1990s led to a surge in entrepreneurial and innovative activity relating to 
desalination technology, and ultimately to breakthroughs which reduced production costs 
and energy usage (Siegel, 2015). It also accelerated a trend in irrigation where sprinklers, 
which used to irrigate over 80% of Israel's irrigated land, were replaced as the primary 
source of irrigation by drip technology, which used to irrigate 10% but now represents 
almost 80% of irrigated land (Davis, Maks & Richardson, 1980; Reisman, 2005). 
In 2000 the Government of Israel began the process of gradual change in the 
policy for water sector management to transition the country to a more sustainable 
approach to water resource management which guaranteed Israel's water security. A 
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Parliamentary Investigation Committee of the Water Sector was established and its 
findings, which were published in 2006, led to the gradual establishment of a more 
modern and relevant institutional framework for water resource management. The era of 
cross-subsidization by sectors was to come to an end, and some on the policy fringes 
even advocated that Israel should get out of agriculture given that the economy was 
evolving from an industrial to a post-industrial stage (Tal, 2007; Feitelson, 2013). 
 E. 2005 to Present.  
 This period begins with the inauguration of the first large-scale desalination plant 
at Ashkelon in 2005, and this represents the single most decisive shift towards a more 
sustainable supply system for water (Tal, 2006; Feitelson, 2013; Siegel, 2015; Marin et 
al., 2017). Desalination signifies the emergence of a third pillar in Israel's water portfolio, 
and this new source strengthens the country's position as a global player in water 
technology beyond the confines of drip irrigation and recycling. In addition to providing 
a reliable, climate independent source of water, desalination helps to solve one of the 
most important environmental problems facing Israel's water resource managers – the 
salinity of the country's water supply (Tal, 2006; Feitelson, 2013; Siegel, 2015). In 
addition, higher standards for wastewater, combined with the higher quality water from 
desalination entering the waste stream, will improve the quality of recycled water 
supplied to agriculture which reduces some of the environmental problems of recycled 
water (Tal, 2006, 2007; Feitelson, 2013; Siegel, 2015). No advance is, however, without 
its drawbacks: desalination increases the energy requirements of Israel, the country's 
carbon footprint, and it requires that brackish water be discharged back into the sea (Tal, 
2006; Feitelson, 2013; Siegel, 2015).  
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 This period also signifies the continued shift in governance towards more neo-
liberal policies in the water economy through pricing, ring-fencing, the creation of quasi-
markets, and the use of public-private partnerships (PPPs) for implementation and 
operations (Feitelson, 2013; Siegel, 2015; Marin et al., 2017). As part of the neo-liberal 
turn in Israel's water economy, most water-and-wastewater services are now supplied 
through local public corporations or PPPs. By 2009, most Israeli communities are served 
by these restructured service providers and the intention is to have all communities 
served by this business model rather than directly by municipalities (Feitelson, 2013; 
Siegel, 2015; Marin et al., 2017).  
 The passage of the Water and Sewerage Corporation Law of 2001 was 
instrumental in signaling this shift in the governance and management of a major sub-
sector of the water economy, and it facilitates increased entrepreneurship and innovation 
in the related water technology sub-sector. The new governing regime was further 
strengthened in May 2006 when the Knesset enacted a further fundamental change to the 
governance and management structure of the water sector: the establishment of the Israel 
Water Authority (IWA) to replace the Water Commission (Siegel, 2015; Marin et al., 
2017). Since the Water Law of 1959 the management of water resources was primarily 
entrusted to the Water Commissioner; however, as water's governing framework evolved 
through the passage of additional legislation and the establishment of practices, the level 
of competing and conflicting political claims on water prevented the Water 
Commissioner from independently exercising his functions (Feitelson, 2013; Siegel, 
2015; Marin et al., 2017). 
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III. Israel's Water: Overcoming a Deficit 
  Israel is one of the most water-scarce countries in the world; it is also part of the 
most water-scarce region of the world with the greatest water disparity between 
neighbors; and within its pre-1967 borders there are no further unexploited natural water 
resources (Roudi-Fahimi, Creel & De Souza, 2002). Water scarcity has been fundamental 
in shaping the development of the Israeli water economy over the last six decades, 
forcing the country to develop a series of innovations in water governance, managerial 
practices, technologies, and institutions. 
 Subtropical Israel is located on the southeastern coast of the Mediterranean 
between relatively wet Lebanon to its north, and relatively dry Egypt to its south. Its area 
of 20,000 kms2 is spread across four distinct geographic regions that vary in elevation 
and topography: the Mediterranean coastal plain, the western and central hills, the Jordan 
Rift valley in the east, and the Negev desert in the south. This makes for considerable 
climatic variation within a small geographic space with a radius of only about 200 
kilometers (Cohen, 2008). Most of Israel has a semi-arid climate; however, the country 
has climatic transition characteristics which range from wet sub-tropical in the north, 
with an average annual rainfall of 600 millimeters, to dry sub-tropical desert in the south, 
with an average annual rainfall of 150 millimeters (Cohen, 2008). Extreme variations in 
precipitation between years are normal, and multiple years of drought are not uncommon. 
Annual rainfall in Galilee in the north can reach 1,100 millimeters; the range in the desert 
south is between 30 millimeters in the Arava and Iehuda deserts and 200 millimeters in 
Beer Sheva; while the mountains around Jerusalem and the Mediterranean coast fall in 
between (Cohen, 2008).  
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 As is characteristic of the Mediterranean, the rainy season lasts for 3 to 4 months 
of the year during winter, with 75% of annual precipitation falling between December to 
February. Occasional heavy rains during this period can produce short but intense floods 
that contain up to 9% suspended solids, making it difficult to store and reuse flood waters 
(Cohen, 2008). Of the quantity of precipitation that reaches the soil, 60% evaporates, 
10% to 25% infiltrates the soil and gets to the aquifers or remains in the soil to support 
vegetation and crops, and 5 to 10% drains into the valleys (Cohen, 2008). All the major 
water resources of Israel depend on local rainfall, and most are concentrated in the 
northern regions of the country around the Mount Hermon basin where the single most 
important water resource is the Sea of Galilee and the Jordan River and its tributaries. 
These sources are the only natural fresh surface water in the region, and it provides 
approximately 20% to 30% of the Israel's total fresh water supply and one-third of its 
renewable supply (Tal, 2006; Cohen, 2008). 
 Israel has a water resource deficit with annual water resources potential of under 
2000 million cubic meters a year while current annual demand exceeds 2150 million 
cubic meters (Cohen, 2008). Israel's water resources are divided roughly as follows: 52% 
from underground and seasonal sources, 31% from surface sources, 12% from used and 
recycled waters, and 5% from flood waters (Rogers, 2003; Cohen, 2008). With respect to 
groundwater resources, Israel has access to three major aquifers, two renewable and one 
non-renewable: the Yarkon-Taninim Aquifer that lies beneath north central Israel and the 
West Bank territory of the Palestinian Authority; the Coastal Aquifer that lies beneath the 
west central coastal plain along the Mediterranean Sea down to an including all of the 
Gaza Strip; and the fossil water aquifers of the Negev Desert, where the water is found at 
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a great depth and was collected in prehistoric times when there were large quantities of 
water in region (Rogers, 2003; Cohen, 2008). About 70% to 80% of the effective 
recharge area of the Yarkon-Taninim Aquifer theoretically lies beneath the West Bank; 
but, the recharged waters flow westward toward the coastal plain. Since the mid-1960s 
the Israelis have tapped 25% to 45% of their agricultural water from this aquifer, causing 
a gradual but sustained depletion and increasing salinity (Starr, 1991; Rogers, 2003). 
Israelis living in the West Bank are prohibited from engaging in extensive farming, and 
there are strict restrictions on overuse or free drilling by both Palestinians and Israelis 
(Davis, Maks & Richardson, 1980; Starr, 1991). The Coastal Aquifer is another important 
source of groundwater, but sea water intrusion has become a growing problem, 
preventing withdrawals within 40 to 80 meters of the surface (Rogers, 2003).  
 In 1949 Israel was consuming 17% of its proven renewable water resources; in 
1968, 90%; in 1976, 98%; in 1978, 95%; and at the end of the century is was still 
utilizing more than 90% of its water potential (Davis, Maks & Richardson, 1980; Elke, 
1998). Between 1948 and 1998 the country over-drafted its water resources between 15% 
and 20% beyond the recharge capacity (Cohen, 2008).  Although groundwater recharge 
efforts increased significantly in recent decades, demand and extraction still outpaced 
supply (Cohen, 2008), and aquifer recharge is also further threatened by urbanization and 
the proliferation of paved surfaces (Tal, 2002; Tal, 2006). The large increase in cultivated 
land and harvests in the country’s semi-arid regions has also exacerbated the salinity of 
soils and raised turbidity levels in water that is already naturally high in chloride 
concentrations and suspended solids (Tal, 2002, 2006). The water level of the Dead Sea, 
the lowest and saltiest lake on the planet, has been falling at an average annual rate of 1.2 
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meters per year largely because of the diversion of one billion cubic meters of water per 
year of the natural flow from Lake Kinneret and the Jordan and Yarmoukh rivers (Tal, 
2002; Tal, 2006).  
The internationally recognized Falkenmark indicator sets the minimum annual 
volume of water per capita at 1000 cubic meters per person, and the absolute scarcity 
level below which countries experience water stress at 500 cubic meters per person 
(Falkenmark, Lundqvist & Widstrand, 1989). Israel's total volume of renewable water 
stands at 276 cubic meters per year, which by international standards defines a situation 
of extreme water shortage (Tal, 2006; Marin et al., 2017). In 2007, average annual per 
capita household consumption was 61.2 cubic meters, whereas in 2009, it was 52.4 cubic 
meters (Kislev, 2001).  
Israel’s natural deficit has been exacerbated by human intervention. The region’s 
long history of agriculture and resource exploitation - that consisted of overgrazing, 
primitive subsistence farming practices, and deforestation - have created a country whose 
modest precipitation leaves about 80% of its land unsuitable for agriculture without 
extensive irrigation (Rouyer, 1996; Tal, 2007). Between 1948 and 2007 the Israeli 
economy grew almost 6-fold per capita in real terms, its resource base grew 38-fold, and 
its population grew almost 8-fold; it has moved from an agricultural economy to an 
industrial and service economy, and it had to accommodate successive waves of refugees 
and immigrants from Europe, the Middle East and the Soviet Union (Starr, 1991; cbs, 
2007). The post-independence policy response was initially short-sighted human 
intervention in favor of expanding water supply which privileged economic development 
and supported demographic growth over water conservation and environmental 
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protection. The only way that Israel, the West Bank, and Gaza can meet their water 
requirements is through a combination of the sustainable exploitation of its natural 
resources combined with an aggressive program to exploit sewage, desalinated water, or 
imported water, all of which are increasingly costly (Starr, 1991, Tal, 2006). Israel's 
economic, social, and security future therefore critically depends on either the tapping of 
new water sources and the preservation of existing resources, and both require the 
development of new technologies and new institutions (Davis, Maks & Richardson, 
1980).  
 In the 60 years since Independence, Israel gradually implemented a suite of 
policies that includes the following six major elements: (1) the development of a national 
bulk water conveyance infrastructure, (2) the use of aquifers as reservoirs, (3) strong 
demand management, (4) the reuse of treated wastewater for irrigation, (5) the 
development of large-scale desalination of seawater and brackish water, and (6) 
institutional reforms that ensure a sustainable financial model for the water-and-
wastewater sector and that removes political decision-making from the day-to-day 
management of water resources (Siegel, 2015; Marin et al., 2017). The last four reforms, 
which were instituted largely between 1998 and 2006, has allowed Israel to gradually 
reduce over-exploitation of aquifers through a massive increase in the volume of 
wastewater reuse and seawater desalination; and the water economy has become more 
resilient given that the total amount of water production in 2014 has been maintained 
broadly at the 1985 level, despite a sharp drop in natural water supplies caused by 
droughts (Siegel, 2015; Marin et al., 2017).  
 The water economy of Israel has therefore evolved considerably over the past 60 
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years in response to changing economic, political, social, and environmental factors at 
various scales. Important innovations in socio-technological niches, regimes and the 
landscape emerged, coalesced, and diffused to create paradigm shifts in the landscape of 
the Israeli water economy. At the macro-level, urbanization, economic and demographic 
expansion, a shift towards a post-industrial economy, and climate change have acted as 
drivers of innovations within the socio-technical landscape (Tal, 2002, 2006, 2007; Marin 
et al., 2017). The water economy has been restructured with water being gradually 
reallocated from agricultural activity towards higher value economic activities; resources 
have shifted away from building large complex systems to convey water for irrigation 
towards water and sewerage infrastructure; and water systems now tend to be more 
decentralized and in the private rather than public sector (Marin et al., 2017). A critical 
landscape constraint has been the tightening of public finances which helped to shift the 
dominant governing ideology away from socialism and centralized planning and 
management, towards neo-liberalism and New Public Management; and power from 
engineers and agriculturalists to economists, capitalists, and private entrepreneurs (Laster 
& Livney, 2008; Feitelson, 2013).  
 At the meso-level, changes in water technologies, environmental and ecological 
values and attitudes, industry structures, and ideologies related to political-economy have 
acted as drivers of innovations within socio-technical regimes. The recurring and 
worsening droughts between 1986 and 1998 changed attitudes about the relative value of 
water, and its social and economic role, and created a sufficient level of public pressure to 
overcome political and institutional inertia (Siegel, 2015; Marin et al., 2017).  Solving the 
quantitative and qualitative problems of water supply stimulated a demand-pull for new 
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and more efficient water technologies, and for greater investment in sewerage and 
recycling infrastructure which provided an economic incentive for private sector 
entrepreneurship and innovation. The acceptance of market-capitalism and New Public 
Management has facilitated the rise of public-private partnerships and greater private 
investment in the water sector (Rouyer, 1996; Laster & Livney, 2008; Feitelson, 2013).   
  At the micro-level, the development and diffusion of technologies for the 
construction of large-scale, civil engineering water storage and conveyance systems, like 
the National Water Carrier, and the drilling of deeper and deeper wells to exploit fossil 
aquifers, acted as enablers of innovations within technological niches during the 1950s 
and 60s (Siegel, 2015). This supported the policy of expanding water supply. This was 
later superseded by the development and diffusion of new technologies in drip irrigation, 
which was perfected in the 1960s and 1970s, in the reuse of waste-water, which was 
facilitated by advances in recycling technologies in the 1970s and 1980s, and 
desalination, which became technologically and economically feasible in the 1990s (Tal, 
2002, 2006. 2007; and Siegel, 2015; Marin et al., 2017). With demand still outpacing 
natural supply, this supported the policy shift towards the efficiency use of water, 
improvements in water quality, and efforts to find new supplies and unconventional 
sources.  provided the solution.  
IV. Governance of the Water Economy 
 A. Overview 
 People experience their water-and-wastewater system through the quality of its 
governance, that is the ways the rules, norms and practices that guide the interaction and 
decision-making among the actors in the system are structured, sustained, regulated and 
 
 472   
  
held to account (Bevir, 2013). Although water has always been a high development and 
security priority for the pre-and-post independence leaders of Israel (Morag, 2001), the 
quality of its water governance has not always adequately supported the Israeli water 
economy nor served the needs of its citizens (Galnoor, 1978; Siegel, 2015; Marin et al., 
2017). Much of the success of the Israeli water economy can be attributed to the quality 
and foresight of its water engineers and planners, and the independence and technical 
competence of its regulators; however, many of the challenges faced by this sector can be 
attributed to politicians and policy makers who have used control over the water 
economy for political gain, turf building, or a highly ideological commitment to 
economic development and the settlement of outlying regions (Galnoor, 1978; Siegel, 
2015).  
 The water economy of Israel that developed in the decade after Independence was 
more a reflection of short-term political, ideological, and social realities unique to Israel 
than a reflection of the country's long-term economic, environmental and ecological 
realities or imperatives (Laster & Livney, 2009; Feitelson, 2013; Siegel, 2015). Most 
water engineers, water technocrats, and agrarian interests, for many decades preceding 
and following independence, were largely affiliated with the ruling Labour Party which 
gave these stakeholders access to the centers of power and a role in water policy-making 
(Rouyer, 1996; Menahem, 1998).  Although the proportion of Jews who lived and worked 
on collective farms was always a small percentage of the Israeli population, they exerted 
a disproportionate influence on politics and culture and were disproportionately 
represented in among the ranks of politicians, civil servants, and military leaders (Rouyer, 
1996; Menahem, 1998; Tal, 2007; Laster & Livney, 2009; Feitelson, 2013).  
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 As a matter of policy, water was an economic resource to be exploited in the 
interests of national development and self-sufficiency, and as a strategic resource with 
geopolitical and security consideration (Rouyer, 1996; Menahem, 1998; Tal, 2007). 
Israel's unique system of land law has also meant that many Israeli's see land and water in 
a collectivist manner. As a matter of policy most land in Israel ended up as collective 
property in the hands of either the State or the Jewish National Fund, where it remains to 
this day. Water and agricultural policy were essentially the same for decades, long after it 
became a highly questionable, economic paradigm (Menahem, 1998). Elements of this 
institutional structure remains to this day to influence the water economy even though the 
structure of the economy and public policy has shifted significantly towards market-
capitalism (Rouyer, 1996; Menahem, 1998; Tal, 2007; Laster & Livney, 2009; Feitelson, 
2013; Siegel, 2015). 
 Between 1948 and 1996 water was under the portfolio of the Ministry of 
Agriculture. This institutional arrangement reflected the initial political priority that had 
been given to agriculture in early economic development policy; and it also reflected the 
reality that the agriculture sector, for most of Israel's history, consumed 80% of the 
country's water. The governance of the water economy in the first several decades after 
independence largely reflected the power structure in Israel and the central historic role of 
the agriculture, even though by the 1970s and 1980s that sector had declined in 
importance relative to the rest of the economy. Agriculture's share of GDP, which was 
30% in the 1950s, declined to 1.6% in 2007 (Rogers, 2007); and agricultural products as 
a percentage of exports, which was 30% in its heydays in the 1960s, declined to a mere 
2.4% in 2009 (Felder, 2009). Between 1996 and 2000 responsibility for water briefly 
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became the portfolio responsibility of the Ministry of Infrastructure, which was partially 
in recognition of the fact that water increasingly had to serve a wider set of social, 
economic, and environmental needs (Feitelson, 2013).   
 The water governance regime that emerged between 1948 and 2000 was a 
complex, inefficient, reactive, and fragmented system where key stakeholders often had 
competing agendas: the Ministry of Finance set prices for domestic and industrial 
consumers; the Ministry of Agriculture set prices for farmers; the Ministries of 
Infrastructure and Environmental Protection were jointly responsible for sewerage, water 
quality and safety; the Ministry of the Interior controlled distribution; the Ministry of 
Justice adjudicated water disputes; the Ministry of Defense was responsible for water 
resources in the Occupied Territories after 1967; and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was 
responsible for sharing water with the Kingdom of Jordan (Laster & Livney, 2009; 
Feitelson, 2013; Siegel, 2015). Although the framework in this period created much 
friction over authority, the allocation of resources, and the distribution of benefits and 
burdens, there was some countervailing balance by the role played by the country's three 
main water technocrats – the Water Commission and the Directors of Tahal and Mekorot 
– who together through bargaining and compromise implemented Israel's water policy, 
although in a sub-optimal manner (Galnoor, 1978). The result of this institutional 
arrangement, and its sub-optimal operation, were water resources that were over-
exploited, inefficiently allocated, underpriced, and under-valued which threatened the 
sustainability and resilience of the water economy (Galnoor, 1978; Marin et al., 2017).  
 Water governance in the period between 1959 and 2000 was theoretically 
dominated by the independent Water Commission and the multi-stakeholder Water Board. 
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Although the Water Commission was managed by a Water Commissioner, and overseen 
by a Water Board, in practice the Commissioner was effectively an administrator and 
politicians and agricultural interests played an active role until the reforms of the 2000s 
(Laster & Livney, 2009). The Water Commission did introduce marginal changes in 
pricing, and a limited public education campaign to encourage conservation, but nothing 
sufficient to address the underlying problem of over-exploitation of water and the 
continued allocation of water to economic activities of lower value (Galnoor, 1978). The 
Water Board was supposed to create a built-in mechanism of structured public 
participation and consultation in major decisions affecting the nation’s water resources, 
and its 27 to 39 members government appointed members were drawn from government, 
the Jewish Agency and civil society, with the latter supposed to make up two-thirds of the 
Board and representing different groups of water consumers (Raphaeli, 1965). The Board 
was, however, dominated by agricultural interests and those who favored subsidized 
prices and expanded supply (Menahem, 1998; Laster & Livney, 2009; Feitelson, 2013). 
Without a crisis driver to create serious political pressure, politicians and technocrats 
seemed incapable of establishing new national goals and priorities around water and 
piecemeal or marginal changes were small in scale and scope (Laster & Livney, 2009; 
Feitelson, 2013).   
 The marginal changes in water governance between the 1948 and 2000 could be 
seen in retrospect as a gradual shift from tendencies of centralization to fragmentation to 
decentralization as the economic and demographic structure, and the dominant 
ideological frame of reference of its leaders evolved (Laster & Livney, 2009; Feitelson, 
2013). The opening of the National Water Carrier in 1964 represented the reality that 
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Israel has successfully exploited all its available natural water sources under centralized 
management. This was followed by a shift to fragmentation where water increasingly 
became a resource subject to many competing claims from several ministries representing 
urban and industrial constituencies whose demand for water was also increasing 
(Galnoor, 1978; Laster & Livney, 2009 Feitelson, 2013). The response during the period 
of fragmentation was to increase the efficiency of use of existing water resources and 
later to preserve its quality. The shift from fragmentation to decentralization occurred in 
the 1990s with the rise of neo-liberalism and New Public Management. This shift in 
organizational management did not, however, initially result in a fundamental shift in 
resource management – the realization of a paradigm shift in water policy required the 
intervention of nature, and the pressure of a series of drought induced crises, for 
politicians to gain the political will to undertake ambitious water reforms and guide a 
reluctant populace to a new regime of water governance (Marin et al., 2017). Post-1998 
water policy thus shifted from providing access to water to managing water in the face of 
scarcity, and a new governance framework was developed accordingly (Galnoor, 1978; 
Marin et al., 2017).   
In the early 2000s the new institutional framework for water resource 
management got politicians out of the day-to-day management of water and a series of 
far-reaching reforms in water resource management has allowed Israel to achieve water 
security while at the same time drastically reduce over-exploitation of aquifers (Siegel, 
2015; Marin et al., 2017). In 2000 water became the portfolio responsibility of the 
Ministry of Energy and Water. This important move in policy oversight for water was 
followed by a series of significant reforms. In 2001 a law was passed requiring ring-
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fencing of municipal water services (Marin et al., 2017). Ring-fencing is a legal or 
financial arrangement which separates the activities, assets and liabilities, revenues and 
costs of municipal water supply operations from the local government to which it 
supplies its water services. In 2002 a Parliamentary Investigation Committee for the 
water sector was launched and in 2006 it pushed for changes to the 1959 Water Law 
which led to the creation of the Israeli Water Authority (IWA) to replace the Water 
Commission. In the current governance regime, the Water Authority regulates the water-
and-wastewater sector; Local Authorities are responsible for water supply and wastewater 
removal; the Ministry of Environmental protection is responsible for the quality of water 
resources; the Ministry of Agriculture is responsible for agricultural water, soil 
conservation and the Drainage Authorities; the Ministry of Health is responsible for water 
quality; and responsibility for sewerage treatment and reuse is shared by the Ministries of 
Health and Environmental Protection, the Water Authority, and local authorities (Kislev, 
2011; Marin et al., 2017). 
 The post 2006 reforms have approached Israel's water scarcity on several policy 
fronts that combines institutional and regulatory reforms with demand management and 
massive infrastructure investment (Siegel, 2015; Marin et al., 2017). The reforms have at 
least six main elements: (1) strong demand management to increase the efficiency with 
which water is used; (2) using aquifers as reservoirs by recharging them with treated 
wastewater during low-demand months; (3) reuse of treated wastewater for irrigation to 
replace and release scarce fresh water for domestic and industrial uses and to safeguard 
the environment; (4) large-scale desalination of seawater and brackish water to supply 
almost all potable water that municipal and regional utilities distribute in the country; (5) 
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modernizing the national bulk water conveyance system to optimize the distribution of 
water across the country from various sources depending on demand; and (6) major legal 
and institutional reforms, chief among them pricing policies to approach financial 
sustainability of the water sector as a whole, corporatization of service providers and the 
establishment of a strong national regulator (Marin et al., 2017).  
 Some of the reforms have necessitated years of implementation, followed by 
refinement, to optimize results. This required some difficult political decisions along the 
way, such as with the sharp rise in domestic water tariff in the aftermath of another major 
drought in 2008. It also stimulated a series of innovations that succeeded in gradually 
restoring a sustainable water balance. As of 2017, the availability of quality water in 
Israel is deemed to be enough to meet the foreseeable needs of the country, even 
accounting for steady population growth and the foreseeable effects of climate change 
(Siegel, 2015; Marin et al., 2017). Future growth in domestic and industrial demand is 
expected to be met through desalination, generating an equivalent increase in the amount 
of treated wastewater available to farmers for reuse. 
 B. Legal, Institutional & Regulatory Framework 
 In the years from 1955-1959 a codex of four laws were enacted to establish the 
institutional framework upon which the water sector was to be governed (Siegel, 2015; 
Marin et al., 2017). The principles behind the legislation could be summarized as follows: 
(1) water resources are exclusively public property with property rights vested in the 
State of Israel; (2) every person has the right to a water allocation for recognized 
purposes; (3) water scarcity requires that the uses to which water resources of varying 
quality are put should be prioritized; (4) the authority for that allocation would be 
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centrally vested in the State of Israel to ensure an optimal use of the limited water 
resources; (5) water consumers, through their political representatives, have a right to 
provide their input in the determination of Israel’s national water policy and on the rules 
relating to allocations, priorities and tariffs; and (6) the government had a duty to take 
action for the prevention the pollution of water resources (Siegel, 2015; Marin et al., 
2017). The first piece of the legislation was the Law for Water Measurement of 1955, 
which required the metering of all water to enable water management, control of water 
flows and uses, and detailed data collection. The Law stipulated that each consumer, even 
a self-supplying consumer, was required to have a water measuring device. The 1955 
Water Measurement Law was a first step into the creation of an administratively 
regulated water sector, and it allowed water resource managers to manage both for 
allocation and conservation purposes (Laster & Livney, 2008; Siegel, 2015; Marin et al., 
2017).   
 The second piece of the legislation was the Law for Supervision of Water Drilling 
of 1955 which established centralized national control over the production of the water 
from groundwater sources (Laster & Livney, 2008; Siegel, 2015; Marin et al., 2017). This 
law was a recognition that even before the establishment of Israel, part of the coastal 
aquifer had already been depleted, and saline intrusion was occurring, threatening long-
term damage to the aquifer. The law regulated the drilling and installation of wells by 
instituting a permitting scheme, requiring that a measuring device be installed on all wells 
to measure all water extracted, and establishing that ownership of the land did not create 
a right to the water resources below its surface. An applicant for a drilling permit had to 
meet several requirements: (1) specify the drilling location, (2) the depth of the well, (3) 
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the quantity of water to be drawn from the well, (4) the intended life of the well, (5) the 
results of any trial extractions, and (6) whether the proposed well is a replacement for an 
existing well or a new well (Laster & Livney, 2008; Siegel, 2015; Marin et al., 2017).  
 The third piece of the legislation was the Law for Drainage and Flood Prevention 
of 1957, which was enacted to help reduce and prevent floods due to the rapid 
urbanization (Laster & Livney, 2009; Siegel, 2015; Marin et al., 2017). This Law 
regulates flood control and drainage activities for the protection of Israel’s land and 
surface water resources, and stipulates that surface waters, including drainage waters, 
may not be diverted from or to a waterway without a government permit. The Law also 
calls for the formation of a National Drainage Board that determines drainage policy, 
reviews and approves local drainage plans, and, together with regional, basin-based 
drainage authorities, regulates flood and drainage flows and the construction of drainage 
systems (Laster & Livney, 2009; Siegel, 2015; Marin et al., 2017). Historically, 12 out of 
the 20 members of the Board were non-governmental members representing the 
agricultural sector.  
 The fourth piece of legislation was the Water Law of 1959 which became the 
cornerstone of Israel’s legal water framework, setting the overall principles for managing 
the sector and establishing the mechanisms for the allocation of water rights (Laster & 
Livney, 2009; Siegel, 2015; Marin et al., 2017). It was most recently amended in May 
2006. Although earlier laws recognized private rights in water, this law specifies that all 
water resources, even on or beneath private land, were public property controlled, but not 
owned, by the state: the state controls, manages and allocates water resources as a trustee 
for the benefit of the citizens of Israel and to facilitate the development of the land 
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(Laster & Livney, 2009). Water became common rather than private property in Israel, 
there are no private or state water rights or resources, and water resource management 
became highly centralized. The 1957 law also facilitates the collection of data on water 
consumption patterns for planning of both supply and demand by water technocrats, and 
the right to use water is limited in time and space and according to a specific purpose. 
Israel's water sector may include both public and private entities, but both are subject to 
regulation and oversight. The law also required that the planning for supply infrastructure 
consider the unique character and needs of each project. After that more than half a 
century since being enacted, these four fundamental laws are still in place with only 
minor modifications, indicating their continuing relevance to water resource management 
in the Israeli context (Laster & Livney, 2009; Siegel, 2015; Marin et al., 2017).  
Nevertheless, given the neo-liberal and market-orientated turn in Israeli governance, it is 
highly unlikely that the type of 'paternalistic' legislation Israel passed in the 1950s would 
be passed today (Laster & Livney, 2009; Feitelson, 2013).  
 Two other pieces of legislation also require mention. The first is the Streams and 
Springs Authorities Law of 1965. This law regulates the creation and operation of 
authorities for the management of streams and springs, but it also introduced an element 
of decentralization of certain water resources management functions: it allowed the 
assignment of some functions to local authorities that are granted jurisdiction over the 
drainage basin of a stream or other water source. This law must be read in conjunction 
with the Drainage and Flood Control Law since a Drainage Board may be entrusted with 
the functions of a Stream Authority as well. By combining the two functions, all relevant 
aspects of river basin management are regulated by a single body. It should be noted that 
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this law did not have ecology or conservation as its focus (Siegel, 2015). No river 
authority was created until 1988 and no drainage authority received the powers of a river 
authority until 2001 (Laster & Livney, 2009). 
The second piece of legislation is more recent. The Municipal Water and Sewage 
Incorporation Law of 2001 requires local authorities and municipalities over a 10-year 
period to establish public ring-fenced corporations to manage local water supply and 
sewage services (Siegel, 2015; Marin et al., 2017). Prior to the enactment of this law the 
municipalities were statutorily obliged to supply water and sewerage services within their 
municipal boundaries. The 2001 law also signaled a first step in the transformation of the 
administratively managed water sector to a more commercially oriented sector by 
providing for the gradual transfer of water and sewerage services from the municipalities 
to corporate entities. The objectives of the Law include improving the operational 
efficiency and effectiveness of utilities, ensuring a high level of customer service, 
keeping tariffs affordable, and ensuring their financial sustainability to guarantee 
sufficient income to finance maintenance and infrastructure investments; the law was also 
was designed to enable private sector investments in infrastructure and involvement in 
operations, through public-private partnerships (PPP’s) (Siegel, 2015; Marin et al., 2017).  
 Israel operates a Water Court or Water Tribunal as a court of first instance for 
matters relating to the water laws with appeals being referred to the Supreme Court 
(Raphaeli, 1965; Laster & Livney, 2009). It is presided over by a magistrate and two lay 
members. This court mainly focuses on appeals to decisions made by the respective 
ministries and agencies that govern water allocation and water quality; while the 
government seeks redress to its legal issues regarding water through the Magistrate or 
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District Courts (Dellapenna & Gupta, 2009). Since the increase in environmental 
awareness which came about in the 1990s, there have been more prosecutions for 
violations of water and environmental law with the new Ministry of the Environment 
leading the process, particularly for non-compliant local authorities (Dellapenna & 
Gupta, 2009).   
 C. Israel Water Authority (IWA) 
 The key reform to come out of the 2006 recommendations of the Parliamentary 
Investigation Committee of the Water Sector was the establishment in 2007 of a new 
Governmental Authority for Water and Sewerage, to be called the Israel Water Authority 
(IWA), to replace the previous Office of the Water Commissioner.  The IWA was to be a 
strong, independent government agency responsible for all the elements of the water-and-
wastewater value-chain to include potable water and sanitation, irrigation, water 
resources management. The IWA combines planning of overall water investments - that 
were formally the responsibility of Tahal - regulatory responsibilities – such as allocating 
and supervising water rights and regulating tariffs - and supervising the performance of 
services providers – to ensure they meet service standards for their customers and 
maintain financial viability (Marin et al., 2017). The IWA was designed to overcome 
weaknesses of the water sector and address the water crisis by reducing the number of 
entities involved in the management of the water sector, clarifying the division of 
responsibilities, and removing the political decision-making from day-to-day 
management of water resources and the water-and-wastewater sector (Marin et al., 2017). 
For the first time the entire water economy - urban and non-urban - now falls under one 
agency (Kislev, 2011). The IWA is headed by a Director who is nominated by the Cabinet 
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for a period of five years. 
 To ensure oversight of the IWA, to ensure inter-ministerial coordination following 
the consolidation, and to ensure that the interests of the transferring entities are preserved, 
the 2006 reforms also included the formation of a Water Authority Council which is 
comprised of eight members: the Director of the Water Authority, who heads the council; 
representatives from the ministries of Agriculture and Rural Development, Environmental 
Protection, Interior, Infrastructure, and Finance; and two independent members who are 
appointed by the government - one on the recommendation of the Ministry of 
Infrastructure, and the other on the recommendation of the Ministries of Agriculture and 
Interior (Kislev, 2011; Marin et al., 2017). The Council is the body authorized to 
determine tariffs and levies – which were previously the responsibility of Knesset 
Committees, first Agriculture and later Finance - and many issues under the 
administration of the Water Authority are to be brought before the Council for 
consideration. The council is obligated to give the public a fair opportunity to air its 
concerns before it sets rules on tariffs and other matters, and since its formation has held 
public hearings on various issues. The formation of the Water Authority Council is 
considered the main organizational change of the reform and the element specifically 
designed to overcome the fragmentation in the previous water regime (Kislev, 2011).   
 D. Mekorot & Tahal 
 The National Water Authority of Israel, or Mekorot, is Israel’s bulk water supplier. 
It is responsible for managing the country's water resources, developing new sources of 
water, building, operating and maintaining water facilities, granting of licenses to various 
sectors for the use of water, and ensuring regular delivery of wholesale water to all urban 
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communities, industries and agricultural users. It also supplies water to Jordan and the 
Palestinian Authority in accordance with the peace accord. It is a corporate entity owned 
and controlled by the government, whose main statutory functions are to establish and 
manage the National Water System, also known as the National Water Carrier. Mekorót is 
a non-profit, public corporation founded in 1936 by the Jewish Agency and the Histadrut 
Labour Federation to supply water to Haifa Bay and the Yizre'el Valley. After 
independence the company expanded its activity to the rest of the country where it built 
and controls most of Israel's water infrastructure. Since 1967 it also controls all surface 
and underground water in the occupied territories. The Israeli government has a 33% 
share, with the remainder divided between the General Federation of Workers, or 
Histadrut, the Jewish Agency, and the Jewish National Fund - the latter two holding a 
controlling share (Davis, Maks & Richardson, 1980) 
 In addition to managing the National Water Carrier, Mekorót operates a seawater 
desalination plant in Eilat, on the Red Sea, and several smaller desalination plants in 
other places.  It currently supplies 70% of the total quantity of water in Israel, and 80% of 
the water to urban areas, with the remainder provided through privately-owned facilities. 
This translates to 1,380 million cubic meters of water, of which 745 million cubic meters 
were supplied for irrigation, 540 million cubic meters for domestic use, 94 million cubic 
meters for industry and 27 million cubic meters to replenish over-pumped aquifers. The 
National Water Carrier system, which conveys water from the water-rich north to the 
areas deficient in water in the south, alone has a capacity to annually transport 400 
million cubic meters of water which is produced from a blend of surface and 
groundwater. The National Water Carrier supplies a total of 1,000 major consumers, 
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including 18 municipalities and 80 local authorities. Mekorót’s current operations 
contribute about 5 billion new Israeli Shekel (NIS) a year to the Israeli economy, or about 
1% of GDP, it has about 2,300 employees, it operates about 10,000 kilometers of water 
lines, and it owns about 4,000 wells and other installations, and 80 regional water 
projects across Israel, all of which are incorporated into the National Water Carrier 
system.  
 Developing and ensuring the sustainability of an infrastructure of such magnitude 
and strategic importance has required a financially solid operator. Mekorot has been able 
to maintain, so far, a healthy financial situation with total revenues of approximately 
US$1 billion per annum and a AAA national rating (Ma’alot Standard & Poor, 2015). As 
a regulated public utility owned by the state and operating as a monopoly in a strategic 
sector, Mekorot has been able to raise as much as NIS 6,661 million (US$1,800 million) 
of commercial debt through its balance sheet, with a debt gearing ratio of about 67 
percent and a rate of return on equity of only 3.2 percent (Ma’alot Standard & Poor, 
2015). This has allowed Mekorot to raise on average approximately US$300 million each 
year for investment over the last decade, at low interest rates through issuance of 
nonnegotiable bonds to institutional investors (without any explicit government 
guarantees). Also, corporatized regional utilities as well as Mekorot are now financed 
through commercial debt with private banks or bonds issuances, without sovereign 
guarantees. 
 For many decades Mekorót's accounting and financing operated like the 
traditional public-sector entity: government financed its investments, the tariff that it 
charged were set by Knesset committees, and budgetary shortfalls were covered by the 
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Ministry of Finance (Kislev, 2011). This financing arrangement proved problematic: 
investment in the water system was dependent on the national budget and not on the 
needs of the water economy, much energy and resources were expended in lobbying the 
Ministry of Finance rather than in improving efficiency and productivity, Mekorót had 
the incentive to  accumulate reserves to protect itself rather than support investments, its 
financial statements did not always reflect all its activities, and its financial practices 
were not transparent (Kislev, 2011). To address these deficiencies a new regime for 
financial management, cost recovery and organizational restructuring was developed in 
1993 but not signed until 2002. Financial management and cost recovery are now done in 
accordance with rules laid down by the Council of the Water Authority (Kislev, 2011). 
Mekorot tariffs are now set annually by the IWA based on five-year business plans, which 
incorporate performance targets to foster incentives for efficient operations, tariffs reflect 
the price of the actual costs of production and bulk transportation of water, and tariffs 
must fully reflect capital expenditures and private financing costs (Marin et al., 2017). 
Mekorot was therefore strongly impacted by the reforms of 2006: it went from being a 
government-owned monopoly operating in a cost-plus environment to becoming a 
regulated public-sector monopoly, still owned by the government but operating 
completely as a commercial entity. 
  Seventy years of addressing significant engineering, environmental and security 
challenges, and the employment of continual research and experimentation, have made 
Mekorot one of the most innovative and technologically advanced water companies in the 
world, and a leader in water project engineering, desalination, water reclamation, water 
safety and water quality (Kislev, 2011; Marin et al., 2017). Mekorot’s mandate as an 
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integrated national water utility provides it a unique combination of experience and 
know-how with innovative technologies and processes for the management, operation 
and treatment of all types of water resources, whether its source is derived from surface, 
underground, brackish, seawater or effluents (Kislev, 2011; Siegel, 2015; Marin et al., 
2017). Mekorot has increasingly leveraged this experience and know-how in the global 
water economy, its international business has generated several hundred million dollars of 
water technology export business, and it has built and is operating plants in Cyprus and 
Argentina (Rabinovitch, 2012). Beyond the economic benefit to Israel of Mekorot's 
growing global presence are the diplomatic benefits from economic and technological 
engagement with other countries, including its Arab neighbors in the region (Rabinovitch, 
2012; Siegel, 2015) 
 The Water-Planning for Israel Company, or Tahal, was founded in 1952 a non-
profit government corporation with ownership divided between the Israeli government at 
52%, and the Jewish Agency and the Jewish National Fund at 24% each. Tahal was 
Israel's water planning authority charged with providing the government with research 
and consumption forecasting, planning services for the Water Commission, and 
engineering advisory services for water projects being constructed by Mekorot. At its 
height in the 1970s it employed 1,000 persons (Kislev, 2011). Upon completion of the 
large projects in the National Carrier system in the 1960s, Tahal began working abroad 
and became a large international firm. Also, as the number of independent hydro-
engineers increased, the Water Commission increasingly gave work to experts outside 
Tahal. At the end of the 1980s the Water Commission opened its own planning division, 
which has since leaned heavily on these outside experts. Tahal lost its monopoly and in 
 
 489   
  
1996 it was privatized when the state sold its shares in Tahal.  Tahal remains the largest 
and more experienced water planning company in Israel and it currently employs about 
500 professionals and is engaged in dozens of projects in Israel and abroad, many of them 
as a partner (Menahem, 1998; Kislev, 2011).  
 E. Municipal Water Corporations 
 The municipal water and sewerage departments of Israel's local governments were 
historically responsible for providing water-and-wastewater services to urban 
communities. Although Israeli's generally received a reliable and affordable supply of 
potable water, the performance of these municipal utilities was considered disappointing: 
politically motivated financial management led to poor operational and investment 
decisions, and tariffs were sometimes used to pay general expenses (Kislev, 2002, 2011; 
Laster & Livney, 2009; Marin et al., 2017).  Despite years of pressure from the Ministry 
of Finance these utilities did not improve performance and infrastructure began to decay 
(Kislev, 2011). The performance of water-and-wastewater utilities depend heavily on the 
level and timing of expenditure on maintenance and upgrading of infrastructure, and 
municipalities often failed to make these expenditures (Kislev, 2002).  
Beginning with the enactment of the Municipal Water and Sewage Incorporation 
Law of 2001, the government began a decade long process to implement an ambitious 
program of reform of municipal water and sanitation services (Kislev, 2011; Marin et al., 
2017). The 2001 law, approved under the auspices of the Ministry of Interior, directs 
local governments to establish public ring-fenced municipal water corporations to 
manage local water supply and sewerage services. Municipal water and sanitation utilities 
can be owned and operated by local municipalities, private companies, or public-private 
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partnerships, but Mekorot is excluded from entering this market (Kislev, 2002). These 
utilities are regulated under licenses granted by the IWA, and they have been gradually 
transformed into utilities run along corporate lines. A 2004 amendment to the law made 
the formation of these corporations obligatory.  
 Today about 56 Municipal Water Corporations provide services to 187 of Israel’s 
210 municipalities and local councils serving a combined population of over five million 
(Kislev, 2002, 2011; Marin et al., 2017). The process of reform has been slow, there have 
been teething problems as the agents in this new institutional regime move along an 
inevitable learning curve, and the Superintendent of the Corporations is trying to reduce 
the number of utilities to produce a less fragmented and more efficient system (Kislev, 
2002, 2011; Marin et al., 2017) 
 The existence of municipal water and sewerage departments, and now municipal 
water corporations, meant that Israel actually had two interdependent yet separately 
administered water economies: one was the national system containing the water sources 
and their reservoirs, the National Water Carrier and the national water supply system, the 
desalination plants, and the effluent recycling systems; the other was the urban water 
sector containing intra‐urban water supply, sewage removal, and the treatment facilities 
(Kislev, 2011). The two water economies have separate issues as problems they deal with 
differ: the national water economy deals with questions of sustainable resource 
management, the development of water supply utilities for distribution and recycling, and 
desalination; the urban water economy deals narrowly with water distribution and sewage 
collection in each urban center or cluster; and in terms of administrative scale, the two 
water economies are fundamentally separate (Kislev, 2011). The creation of the IWA 
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should help to overcome this history of fragmentation and improve coordination. 
 The independent Municipal Water Corporations have so far performed better than 
their politically run predecessors (Laster & Livney, 2009; Siegel, 2015). The new 
incentive structure created by the IWA has led to increased investment in facilities, 
greater willingness to employ cutting edge technologies, and evidence of an increase in 
entrepreneurship and innovation - unlike the traditional governance structure for utilities 
which encourage risk-averse behavior (Siegel, 2015; Marin et al., 2017). Between 2006 
and 2015 these newly constituted utilities have been able to reduce unaccounted-for-
water from an average of 16% to less than 5% of water produced. The utilities now work 
more closely with water technology companies to employ the latest technologies to save 
energy, reduce leaks, and maintain water quality, a practice reinforced by the 70% 
subsidy they receive for the employment of new water technologies; and cash flows have 
improved because municipalities, who rarely paid for the water under the old regime 
when politicians controlled the utilities, now pay like all other customers (Siegel, 2015).  
To oversee these new utilities, two regulatory agencies were formed that were later 
assimilated into the IWA: the Public Utilities Authority (PUA) for Water and Sewage, 
which would be responsible for the quality of the services and the tariffs; and the 
Superintendent of the Corporations, whose job it was to license these companies, to 
monitor the agreements between them and the local governments they served, and to 
approve their development plans (Kislev, 2011).  
 F. Municipal Utilities Association 
 Regulatory supervision of the provision of potable water and sanitation services 
by municipalities is the responsibility of the Municipal Utilities Association (MUA). 
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After passage of the Municipal Water and Sewage Incorporation Law of 2001, initial 
progress in establishing the newly constituted utilities was slow, but the pace of reform 
improved in 2009 when the MUA was transferred from the Ministry of Interior to the 
IWA. Since it was transferred to the IWA, the MUA has taken a proactive role in helping 
these utilities improve their governance and overall operational performance and to 
encourage them to become incubators for technological innovation. The MUA has 
created a framework of actions which combines financial incentives and technical 
guidance with strong supervision of utilities including performance targets and sanctions 
enforcement.  
 A major reform relates to tariffs and financing and the MUA uses the tariff-setting 
process as a regulatory tool by establishing the portion of the national water tariff that 
each utility can keep (Marin et al., 2017). Tariff revenues have become the sole source of 
financing for each utility which allowed the MUA to introduce financial incentives for 
operational performance. Any efficiency gains achieved by the utility’s management are 
automatically translated into the utility’s bottom line, which the regulator allows to be 
transferred from the utility to the municipal budget—providing obvious financial 
incentives for local governments and mayors to support the performance improvement of 
their respective utilities (Marin et al., 2017). The MUA also approved a steep rise in tariff 
levels in 2009 because of the application of the principle of full-cost recovery. In 
conjunction with this move towards financial independence, almost all investment is now 
funded through commercial debt financing (Marin et al., 2017). In theory this should 
ensure that investments are financially viable. Significant improvements have been 
achieved in bill collections, in network maintenance, and in reducing non-revenue water 
 
 493   
  
levels; and many water utilities are now generating a small operating profit (Kislev, 2011; 
Marin et al., 2017). 
 Another important strategy of the MUA is to reduce political interference in 
staffing, make the hiring of staff more demanding than those of local authorities, and to 
ensure that salaries are competitive to attract competent people (Marin et al., 2017). 
Historically many local utilities, especially small utilities, lacked technical capacity. 
Managerial positions must now meet specific requirements set at the national level with 
respect to professional credentials and undergo periodic reviews by a dedicated 
appointment committee at the national level. The MUA has also been regularly issuing 
technical guidance and detailed standards on operational issues as well as employing 
bench-marking, which are key to improving the efficiency of these utilities (Marin et al., 
2017). The MUA has developed a long list of key performance indicators relating to a 
wide range of operational efficiency and customer relations matters. The MUA regularly 
audits each water utility and has started to make public the results, grading individual 
utilities along a scale (excellent, very good, good, requires significant improvement, fail). 
Finally, the MUA has not shied away from its supervisory role, which includes imposing 
sanctions and enforcing them, whenever necessary. Some of the technical guidelines and 
key performance indicator targets are mandatory, and not achieving them can lead to 
sanctions. 
 G. Public-private Partnerships 
 The private sector in Israel has long played a role in the water economy. In terms 
of the public utility sub-sector these relationships have come to play an increasingly 
important role in recent years, especially since the neo-liberal turn in Israeli policy and 
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governance in the 1980s and the push to expand desalination and reform municipal water-
and-wastewater services in the 2000s. Partnerships contracts with Israel's private sector is 
an important feature of the Israel’s corporate-style reforms of water utilities and are seen 
as a tool to improve operational performance, reduce costs, raise private funding for 
infrastructure investment, ensure the financial sustainability of major infrastructure, and 
increase access to expertise in an increasingly complex water economy which employs 
increasingly complex technologies (Marin et al., 2017). Subcontracting arrangements are 
in place for a wide variety of operational tasks.  
Although Merkorot has long been involved in desalination projects, and has long 
operated several smaller plants, the seawater desalination program of the 2000s has been 
largely implemented through Build-Own-Transfer (BOT) or Build-Own-Operate (BOO) 
schemes in which private concessionaires entirely finance the investments and are 
responsible for operation and maintenance for these facilities for 25 years (Marin et al., 
2017). The amount of private investment raised under the first four desalination BOT-
BOO projects with private concessionaires (Ashkelon, Palmachim, Hadera and Sorek) 
totaled of about US$1,300 million (Marin et al., 2017). One example of an innovative 
PPP is the 2016 independent power production (IPP) contract put in place for biogas 
production at the wastewater treatment plant of Kfar Saba- Hod Hasharon, a town of 
160,0000 in the center of Israel. The biogas produced by the anaerobic digestion process 
provides about 80 percent of the electricity needed by the plant, saving about 20 percent 
of the overall energy costs of that facility (Marin et al., 2017). 
 H. Pricing & Cost-recovery 
 Under the direction of the IWA a new financial and governance framework has 
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been gradually instituted to place the Israeli water economy on a course toward financial 
viability, and to improve the efficiency with which water-and-wastewater services are 
provided (Kislev, 2002, 2011; Marin et al., 2017).  All the utilities providing water-and-
wastewater services will be corporatized: Mekorot has been transformed into a regulated 
public company, and municipal water and sanitation services have been gradually 
transformed into corporate-style regional utilities. Two key principles of the reforms are 
full-cost recovery through tariffs, which is the price assigned to water supplied by a 
public utility, for the entire water value chain; and performance managements backs by 
both incentives and penalties. Water tariffs have been gradually increased for all users to 
approach full-cost recovery and direct budget subsidies to the sector have gradually been 
phased out - although there remains significant cross-subsidies between water uses and 
the central government has invested heavily in recent years in sewage systems (Kislev, 
2002, 2011; Marin et al., 2017). A uniform tariff level and structure has been instituted 
for the country, with all potable water and sanitation customers paying the same price. 
The uniform tariff is the basis for cross-subsidies between consumers as those who live 
farther away require additional pumping which raises costs (Marin et al., 2017). The 
reforms indicate the shift in power to those who advocated market-orientated practices as 
well as the strong political will to implement the reform (Laster & Livney, 2009; 
Feitelson, 2013 Marin et al., 2017). The reforms led to improvements in efficiency by the 
regional utilities in the period between 2009 and 2013 and this allowed the IWA to start 
reducing the tariff levels in 2014, gradually passing back part of the savings to consumers 
(Marin et al., 2017).  
 In 2017 the uniform average tariff for potable water and sanitation for the urban 
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sector was NIS8.92 (US$2.4) per cubic meter. The national tariff for potable water and 
sanitation services is based on a two-tier increasing- block structure designed to support 
demand management through conservation, while still ensuring that people have access 
to a minimum consumption volume at an affordable price (Marin et al., 2017). The tariff 
for the first block, corresponding to consumption up to 3.5 cubic meter per capita per 
month, or 115 liters per capita per day, is NIS6.56 (US$1.8) per cubic meter; while the 
tariff for the second consumption block is NIS10.56 (US$2.85) per cubic meter. 
Approximately 75 percent of residential consumption is billed at the lower tariff. The 
tariff is allocated among services providers with 44% going to the water utilities for water 
distribution and sewage collection, 22% going to Mekorot for bulk water transport and 
freshwater production, 18% percent going to cover sewage treatment costs, 16% going to 
cover desalination costs, and 4.5% going to subsidies.  
The tariff structure for irrigation is different from water and sanitation services but 
it is also moving toward full-cost recovery (Marin et al., 2017). The price for irrigation 
water in Israel is among the highest in the world, but this supports more efficient water 
practices and promotes the production of higher value crops. Tariffs for irrigation water 
vary widely depending on the source of the water, the region, and the time of the year; 
while extraction levies vary with the site and season during which the water is withdrawn 
(Marin et al., 2017).  Freshwater prices range between NIS0.8 (US$0.22) and NIS2.6 
(US$0.70) per cubic meter; brackish water  prices range between NIS0.9 (US$0.24) to 
NIS1.6 (US$0.43) per cubic meter; and treated waste-water prices range between NIS0.8 
(US$0.22) to NIS1.25 (US$0.34) per cubic meter, which is highly subsidized to 
encourage farmers to use it. 
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 As of 2017 the Israeli water sector has achieved almost full financial autonomy - 
except for wastewater reuse and desalination - almost all the costs of investing and 
operating water infrastructure are now covered by users through tariffs; and Israel is 
theoretically able to meet all future demand from multiple users (Marin et al., 2017). The 
ability of the water sector to move toward self-financing is a remarkable achievement 
given the fact that Israel's water scarcity and its topography makes water particularly 
expensive to produce and deliver to users (Rapheli, 1965; Marin et al., 2017). The 
establishment of a single, independent regulator for all water-and-wastewater services 
capable of overseeing the water economy in an integrated and holistic manners has been 
important in achieving what for decades the previous governance regime failed to 
achieve.    
Although tariffs designed to ensure full-cost recovery have been effective in 
moving water utilities towards financial sustainability, the effectiveness in practice of 
price as a tool of demand management is less certain (Kislev, 2002, 2011). In the urban 
sector the historical record shows a large overall increase in water use by urban 
consumers, of about 0.6% per year, but the increase in water consumption was far less 
than the increase in disposable income (Kisvel, 2011). In the agricultural sector the 
historical record in Israel shows a large overall decline in water use (Kisvel, 2011). In the 
industrial sector the per capita increase in water use in industry remained flat because of 
greater efficiency in water use (Kisvel, 2011). The increases in urban water use are far 
more closely correlated with increases in industrial output and population, with per capita 
water consumption remaining relatively flat, despite an almost three-fold increase in the 
consumption of goods and services by Israeli consumers (Kislev, 2011). Most economic 
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analyses suggest that urban demand for water is highly inelastic, and thus not responsive 
to price regulation. The evidence challenges the use of price as the sole means to achieve 
sustainability and suggests the need to also consider public education and the availability 
of water efficiency technologies (Tal, 2006; Kislev, 2011; Siegel, 2015). Pricing seems to 
be a more powerful and relevant tool when it is employed to ensure the financial 
sustainability of water-and-wastewater utilities through full-cost recovery. 
 H. Reflections on the Governance of Israel's Water Economy 
 Marin et al (2017) have identified several lessons that can be drawn from Israel's 
experiences in the process of developing a sustainable water economy that may be 
relevant to other water-scarce countries.  
1. It is important that there is public awareness about the scarcity of water, 
and a national consensus around its social and economic value which 
should be aligned with the need for sustainable water resource 
management (Rouyer, 1996; Menahem, 1998; Marin et al, 2017). The 
national consensus around sustainable water management should be 
reinforced by pricing water at its actual cost (Marin et al, 2017), but any 
subsidies should be explicit, transparent, and economically justifiable 
(Kisvel, 2002 & 2011; Laster & Livney, 2009; Feitelson, 2013). 
2. The governance of water-and-wastewater utilities and infrastructure 
should also achieve financial sustainability as efficient and effective 
utilities require regular maintenance, upgrades, and expansions; and this 
should be achieved through tariffs that achieve full-cost recover (Kislev, 
2002; Marin et al., 2017).  
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3. All water-and-wastewater projects should go through rigorous project 
appraisals; and only projects that show a positive net present value and 
positive internal rate of return should be able to access project financing, 
preferably from private investors and without a sovereign guarantee.  
4. In the event of extreme water scarcity, strong control and enforcement of 
water allocations may be necessary to complement pricing incentives 
(Marin et al., 2017); however, the governance framework must be 
structured to prevent its control by narrow sectoral interests as occurred in 
Israel through its agricultural lobby (Menahem, 1998; Laster & Livney, 
2009; Feitelson, 2013).  
5. Sustainable and integrated management of the entire water cycle requires 
the comprehensive and timely collection of data, and the technical 
capacity to use that data to create models, forecasts, and performance 
targets (Marin et al., 2017). This level of sophistication in data 
management requires the creation of an appropriate legal, institutional, 
and technical framework (Laster & Livney, 2008; Siegel, 2015).  
6. In the context of extreme water scarcity, especially in a geographically 
small country, a centralized and integrated water carrier may be more 
efficient and effective in managing the entire water cycle than a 
decentralized water carrier (Siegel, 2015; Marin et al., 2017). The 
governance framework of centralized institutions must, however, be 
structured to prevent its control by narrow sectoral interests (Menahem, 
1998; Laster & Livney, 2009; Feitelson, 2013).  
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7. The private sector should be brought in to carry out specific functions 
outside the sphere of competence of the public sector, to help contain 
costs, increase access to financing, and spread or reduce project risk 
(Siegel, 2015; Marin et al., 2017). Israel’s water sector has had 
considerable success with PPPs that have helped to stimulate a globally 
competitive water technology industry (Rabinovitch, 2012; Siegel, 2015).  
8. There should be a clear division of labor and responsibility between the 
political, policy, regulatory, and operational management functions that 
serve the water economy; and there must be mechanisms for transparency 
and accountability (Menahem, 1998; Laster & Livney, 2009; Feitelson, 
2013; Siegel, 2015; Marin et al., 2017). In the specific case of Israel this 
seems to have been achieved through the recent establishment of the IWA 
(Marin et al., 2017).  
9. Finally, reforms in the water economy are a long, difficult, and continuous 
process which requires careful planning and implementation, strong and 
sustained political will, a mix of incentives and penalties, and a minimum 
degree of consensus among key stakeholders (Menahem, 1998; Laster & 
Livney, 2009; Kislev, 2011; Feitelson, 2013; Marin et al., 2017). 
V. National Water Strategy 
 A. Overview 
 Israel's national water strategy has gone through several iterations between 1948 
and 2010 where each iteration has seen a dominant focus: the expansion of supply from 
natural sources, the management of existing resources, management of water quality, the 
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expansion of supply from unconventional sources, and demand management to achieve 
sustainability. Prior to 1964 the water strategy was to primarily source supply locally; 
after 1964 the primary strategy became to source water nationally. The national water 
strategy has included several innovative principal national investments designed to either 
increase water supply or increase the efficiency in use of existing supplies. The first was 
the integrated management of the Sea of Galilee and the groundwater aquifers, which 
feed into an integrated national water grid increasing water supply; the second was 
wastewater treatment and reuse for irrigation; and the third was desalination of seawater 
and brackish groundwater; while a parallel strategy of water harvesting and waste-water 
storage via a network of reservoirs represents a more recent local level strategy (Tal, 
2006).  
 The discussion of strategy might seem to suggest that Israel had a coherent water 
strategy which policy makers and planners rolled out over time – this was not the case as 
many of the water plans produced by technocrats were largely ignored until crisis forced 
political action (Menahem, 1998; Kislev, 2011). Over the years hundreds of plans for 
water projects of all scales were drafted; four Water Master Plans were prepared in the 
three decades up to 2010; and although the effort invested in these plans enriched the 
knowledge and understanding of the water professional, they generated little interest from 
their intended political audience (Kislev, 2011). The 1988 Water Master Plan 
recommended a reduction in water to the agriculture sector, but this was successfully 
challenged by agricultural interests both inside and outside government; while the 1997 
Water Master Plan recommended the reopening of consideration for desalination, but this 
was dismissed by the incoming Water Commissioner in favor of the continued 
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exploitation of natural sources (Kislev, 2011). In 2002, in the wake of the water crises, 
the Director of the Water Authority presented a Water Master Plan which represented a 
return to long-term water planning. The 2002 strategy recommended developing a water 
supply that was independent of rainfall, climate resilient, and environmentally 
responsible; that significantly reduced the allocation of water to agriculture by 
encouraging greater water efficiency in that sector; and that eventually requires the 
agriculture sector is to pay the same rates for water as domestic and industrial users 
(Laster & Livney, 2009; Kislev, 2011; Marin et al., 2017).  The latest Water Master Plan, 
published in 2012 by the Water Authority, outlines a strategy to ensure water availability 
until 2050; which assumes a rise in annual water demand from 2,131 million cubic 
meters in 2010 to 3,571 million cubic meters in 2050; a drop in natural water availability 
of 10-15% due to climate change; and a compensatory increase in the production of 
alternative water sources such as desalination and treated wastewater (Water 
Commission, 2012). The latest plan calls for major investments and adjustments in policy 
and practice, and concerns have been raised of the political will to implement these 
recommendations (Kislev, 2011). 
 B. National Water Carrier.  
 Israel has three main natural water sources: the Sea of Galilee (Lake Kinneret), 
the Mountain Aquifer and the Coastal Aquifer. Although their relative importance has 
declined in the last two decades with the rise of reclaimed water and desalination they 
remain an important part of Israel's water economy with a legacy that will last for 
generations (Tal, 2006; Cohen 2008; Kislev, 2011; Marin et al., 2017). These sources 
were incorporated into Israel's water economy through an integrated water conveyance 
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system - the National Water Carrier - which opened in 1964; and the water is allocated 
primarily through an administrative process to various sectors by the Water Authority 
(Kislev, 2011). This complex system of aqueducts, tunnels, reservoirs and large pumping 
stations transports large amounts of water from one region to another – initially from the 
relatively wet northern Galilee to depleted central aquifers and to the arid south; but 
recently from the South to the North as the addition of desalination has realigned Israel's 
water portfolio (Tal, 2006; Dreizin, Tenne & Hoffman, 2008; Cohen 2008; Marin et al., 
2017).  It is the main water project of Israel, and to date its largest civil engineering 
project, and its construction involved considerable technical challenges as it traversed a 
wide variety of topographical and geologic conditions (Cohen, 2008; Siegel, 2015). The 
system and it consists of giant pipes, open canals, tunnels, and reservoirs, and large-scale 
pumping stations. The original goal of the National Water Carrier was to provide 
irrigation water to Negev. Although the Carrier provided 80% of Israel's water, 80% of 
that water was utilized for irrigation and the remainder for domestic consumption; 
however, today this ratio is reversed as the use of reclaimed water and more efficient 
irrigation technologies have changed the country's pattern of water demand (Tal, 2002, 
2006, 2007; Kislev, 2002, 2011).  
 Most of the water infrastructure in Israel is integrated into the National Water 
Carrier and the main components of this network extend for about 130 km from the Sea 
of Galilee to the edge of the Negev desert. The Sea of Galilee system feeds into a 168 
square km lake which contains 4 billion cubic meters of water from which is annually 
pumped approximately 500 million cubic meters out of Israel's annual demand of 2 
billion cubic meters (Tal, 2006; Cohen 2008).  The Sea of Galilee lies below sea level, 
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and the point from which the water is pumped lies approximately 209 meters below the 
sea. From this depth the water is pumped to a point 44 meters above sea level where it 
flows by force of gravity through a canal carved into the rock (Cohen, 2008). Sea of 
Galilee is Israel's largest source of potable water; however, to satisfy the increasing 
demand water from the neighboring aquifers was added to this reservoir (Tal, 2006; 
Cohen 2008). The integrated nature of the National Water Carrier means that about 95% 
of the country's proven reserves are controlled by one water network (Davis, Maks & 
Richardson, 1980). While this centralized and integrated organizational arrangement 
might increase operational efficiency from economies of scale, it also presents several 
risks to Israel's water system. 
 The National Water Carrier has come under criticism from several directions, 
including for its negative environmental consequences (Davis, Maks & Richardson, 
1980; Tal, 2006). Water from the Sea of Galilee is relatively salty, transporting an 
estimated 170,000 metric tons of chlorides to the soils and groundwater in the center of 
the country; it also has high levels of turbidity which raises the suspended solid levels in 
the water supply leading to aesthetic and health concerns; and the diversion of water to 
the National Carrier has reduced the amount of water which flows through the lower 
Jordan and into the Dead Sea which is drying up (Tal, 2006; Cohen 2008). To address the 
sediment and pH issues a long delayed new system of sand filtration and treatment for the 
reservoirs of the National Water Carrier finally began operation in 2006: this is supposed 
to reduce the corrosive characteristics of the water and minimizing chemical reactions 
with other water sources (Tal, 2006). There are also plans for an expensive project to 
bring water from the Red Sea to recharge the Dead Sea while generating hydro-electric 
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for Israel, Jordan and the Palestine Authority.  
 One of the most remarkable innovations of Israel water resource management is 
the use of aquifers as storage reservoirs for the national water system (Marin et al., 2017). 
Through the National Water Carrier, Mekorot uses the storage capacity of the Sea of 
Galilee and the Coastal and Western Mountain aquifers to provide the base load to meet 
the country's water needs. These three sources, however, became over-exploited and were 
no longer being naturally replenished by rainfall (Tal, 2006). With the advent of 
desalination and the reclaiming of most urban waste-water, these aquifers can now be 
recharged and used as storage reservoirs. Where the integrated nature of the National 
Water Carrier facilitated over-exploitation of the aquifers, this integrated capacity now 
allows Mekorot to integrate and optimize the various sources of natural and 
unconventional water to ensure that water is stored underground to provide a buffer in the 
event of any future shortfall. Aquifers are more secure than surface reservoirs and less 
water is lost to evaporation, and they can be used to provide natural filtration for water of 
marginal quality (Siegel, 2015; Marin et al., 2017).   
 C. Wastewater & Irrigation.  
 In regions of the world with abundant water resources, where long retention times 
enable the degradation of some pollutants, moderate amounts of pollution can be 
absorbed by nature and naturally treated as it moves through the water cycle. In an arid 
country like Israel, which suffers from a shortage of water, where water resources are 
exploited to their maximum capacity, where retention times are short, and where there are 
few large bodies to dilute pollutants, waste-water treatment becomes very important for 
protecting environmental health and water quality (Friedler, 2000). These negatives of 
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waste-water in arid regions must be balanced against some potential positives: waste-
water is a reliable source of potentially usable water as it tends to be produced at a 
relatively constant rate throughout the year, and it is almost constant between years with 
the tendency to increase with an expansion in population and economic output, which has 
been the case in Israel (Friedler, 2000). Wastewater recycling and reuse practice therefore 
becomes critical for maintaining or enhancing the quality of conventional water 
resources; and the challenge for water resource managers is to ensure that treated waste-
water meets quality and safety requirements for use in agriculture and for environmental 
and ecological purposes (Tal, 2006; Friedler, 2000).   
 Although many Israeli communities build waste-water treatment facilities in the 
1950s and 1960s they were not well supervised, and sometimes poorly managed, they 
rarely went beyond primary treatment, there was no universal coverage, and many 
communities dumped waste-water into streams and gullies (Kislev, 2011; Marin et al., 
2017). This state of waste-water mismanagement led to a series of publicly embarrassing 
events. In the 1970s and 1980s bathing beaches along the Mediterranean, used by both 
locals and tourists, had to be closed because sewerage pumped out to sea washed up back 
on shore (Kislev, 2011). In 1970 there was an outbreak of cholera, and in 1988 an 
outbreak of polio, and both were attributed to contaminated water (Kislev, 2011). In 1997 
several athletes attending the international Macabiah Games died from exposure to toxic 
pollutants after falling into the Yarkon River when the bridge they were crossing 
collapsed (Siegel, 2015). The first water crisis that occurred in 1985 also became a major 
driver for an expansion in recycling and reuse of waste-water (Kislev, 2011; Marin et al., 
2017).  
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 Israel is today one of the few countries in the world that has managed to almost 
entirely close the urban water cycle. In the 1960s, Israel recycled less than 10% of its 
waste-water, or about 130 million cubic meters, and most of the water supplied to the 
agriculture sector was of drinking water quality, compared to 2015 when 500 million 
cubic meters were recycled (Kislev, 2011; Marin et al., 2017). Israel presently recycles 
about 90%, and reuses almost 87%, of the total domestic sewage production of the 
country: which is far ahead of most other countries, such as Spain which recycles about 
12%, and the United States which recycles only about 2.5% of its total domestic sewage 
production (Tal, 2006; Marin et al., 2017). Israel is served by about 67 large, modern 
waste-water treatment facilities and the use of reclaimed water now constitutes about 
one-fifth of the country's total water supply (Tal, 2006; Kislev, 2011; Marin et al., 2017). 
Reclaiming urban water is an important strategy for expanding supply in regions with 
limited water resources and where increasing urban water demand is usually met by 
reducing water supply for irrigation, which causes social and economic hardship in the 
rural sector (Friedler, 2000). Reclaimed water is capable of being used as a substitute for 
conventional potable water which is sometimes used for irrigation, or for other purposes 
that do not require water of drinking quality, while releasing some of the pressure on the 
conventional water resources (Friedler, 2000). Reclaimed waste-water helps Israel close a 
negative water balance in a country where all the conventional water resources are 
exploited to their maximum capacity (Friedler, 2000). 
 Agriculture has been important to Israel's economic development, but it has 
historically made heavy demands on Israel's limited water resources. This has changed 
with the increased use of reclaimed and other marginal water which accelerated in the 
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mid-1980s. In the 1960s agriculture used about 80% of Israel's available water 
production, while agriculture today uses about 50% of Israel’s available water.  
Agriculture's demands on freshwater is smaller now because of the increased use of 
reclaimed wastewater which supplies more than 40% of the country’s irrigation needs 
(Kislev, 2011; Marin et al., 2017).  In the early 1960s waste-water diverted to agriculture 
constituted only 4% of the quantity of water used in the urban sector; today the 
proportion of waste-water diverted is about 55%. What this means is that over the past 40 
years the volume of water demanded by the agricultural sector has not grown 
significantly, although agricultural output has grown several-folds due to more efficient 
or intensive use of water, pesticides, and fertilizers (Kislev, 2011). This level of 
agricultural productivity in an arid or semi-arid country like Israel with a growing 
population and expanding non-agricultural economy would not be possible without the 
increasing use of reclaimed water.     
 Desalination. Israel considered adding desalinated seawater to their water 
resource portfolio as early as the 1960s, but major investments in this source were not 
pursued at that time because it was not technically and economically feasible (Kislev, 
2011; Siegel, 2015; Marin et al., 2017). Mekorot, however, established the first seawater 
desalination facility in 1965 to address the chronic water shortages facing the city of 
Eilat, a resort town located at the extreme southern tip of Israel on the Red Sea (Spiritos 
& Lipchin, 2013). The technology Mekorot employed at Eilat was vaporization 
technology which is a highly energy-intensive process, and Mekorot began the search for 
an alternative, energy-saving process which it eventually found in reverse osmosis. In the 
early 1970s Mekorot began installing small-scale brackish water reverse osmosis-
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desalination plants, for small isolated southern agricultural communities not served by the 
National Carrier (Kislev, 2002, 2011; Garb, 2010; Spiritos & Lipchin, 2013). About 39 of 
these brackish water desalination plants are in operation.   
 It was not until the water crises of the 1980s and 1990s when desalination 
technology had advanced to the point of being technically and economically feasible, and 
a consensus was reached that Israel that faced structural water scarcity, that the 
government found the political will to add significant seawater desalination capacity to 
the country's water portfolio (Kislev, 2011; Siegel, 2015; Marin et al., 2017). A Master 
Plan was prepared in 1997 to chart the integration of large-scale seawater desalination 
plants within the existing national water supply system at minimal additional cost (Tenne, 
Hoffman & Levi, 2013). The aim was to add enough capacity in next two decades to 
ensure that most of the water supply for municipal consumption would come from 
desalinated water, to ensure the country’s water security and to allow the natural water 
reserves in the aquifers to be restored (Kislev, 2011; Marin et al., 2017). This decision to 
make the substantial investment in new infrastructure became politically and 
economically feasible because of the simultaneous discovery offshore of large reserves of 
natural gas which for the first time provided Israel with a domestic energy supply (Siegel, 
2015; Marin et al., 2017). Since 2005 Israel has built five large desalination plants along 
the Mediterranean Coast based on seawater reverse osmosis with a total capacity of 585 
million cubic meter per year, or about 85% of domestic urban water consumption and 
40% of the country’s total water consumption (Kislev, 2011; Siegel, 2015; Marin et al., 
2017). The long-term goal for seawater desalination is to increase total annual production 
to 1.75 billion cubic meters (BCM/year) by 2040 (Tenne, 2010). 
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 Four of the five seawater desalination facilities were developed through PPPs 
with private concessionaires under build-operate-transfer (BOT) and build-operate-own 
(BOO) contracts; while the fifth was built by Mekorot. In 2000 a tender was issued for 
building the first desalination plant in Ashkelon, south of Tel Aviv. In 2001 the VID 
Desalination Company consortium received rights to build and operate for 25 years a 100 
million cubic meters per year facility (Kislev, 2011; Siegel, 2015; Marin et al., 2017). 
Construction began in 2002 on the $250 million plant which became operational in 
August 2005, providing approximately 15% of the Israel's needs. At the time of its 
opening, the Ashkelon facility was the largest reverse-osmosis seawater desalination plant 
in the world. The Palmachim facility was opened in 2007, it is operated by Derech 
HaYam, and it has capacity of 90  million cubic meters; the Hadera facility was opened in 
2010 it is operated by IDE and Shikun U’Binui, and it has capacity of 127 million cubic 
meters; the Sorek facility was opened in 2013, it is operated by 25 years IDE and Veolia, 
and it has capacity of 127  million cubic meters; and the Ashdod facility was opened in 
2016, it is owned and operated by Mekorot, and it has a  capacity of 100  million cubic 
meters per year (Marin et al., 2017). Mekorot's Ashod facility has, however, been plagued 
by delays, technical problems and cost overruns (Kislev, 2011; Marin et al., 2017).  
  Ashkelon, the first facility, has the highest cost of production at US$0.78 per 
cublic meter, while Sorek, the fourth and largest facility, has the lowest cost of production 
at US$0.54 per cublic meter (Marin et al., 2017). The relatively low cost of Israel's 
desalinated water has been key to ensuring the financial viability of the whole system so 
that desalinated water remains affordable for customers despite applying full cost 
recovery through tariffs (Garb, 2010; Spiritos & Lipchin, 2013; Marin et al., 2017). The 
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low cost structure has been achieved through a combination of factors: financial risk was 
kept low  by the scale and operational mode of the new desalination plants, and by the 
PPP contracts, which allowed the private sector operators to secure large amounts of 
private financing on the best possible terms; Israeli desalination plants operate on a 24/7 
basis which makes it possible to achieve significant economies of scale and absorb large 
fixed costs, compared to most other countries which use desalination for peak-load 
demand only; the presence of an integrated National Water Carrier allows the number, 
size and location of the facilities to be tailored to achieve economies of scale in 
production and a lower costs for distribution; and the use of Israeli natural gas means that 
the plants have a relatively clean, reliable, locally available supply of relatively low-cost 
energy  (Garb, 2010; Spiritos & Lipchin, 2013; Marin et al., 2017). Energy costs, 
typically represents about half to two-thirds of the price of desalinated seawater (Tenne, 
2010). Brackish water desalination is typically about half the cost of seawater 
desalination and this is produced at roughly $0.30 per cublic meter (Tal, 2006); and plans 
are to increase annual production of water from brackish water from roughly 30 million 
cubic meters to 90 million cubic meters by 2020 (Tenne, 2010).  
 The addition of seawater desalination to Israel's water portfolio brings many 
wider costs and benefits. There are social, environmental and health considerations: there 
are concerns about seawater desalination facilities creating a loss of public coastal open 
spaces; there are concerns about the long-term cumulative impact of concentrated brine 
discharges into a  limited area of the sea; there are concerns about the additional 
greenhouse gases from the higher energy requirements of desalination; and there are 
concerns that desalination is too effective at removing minerals from water, some of 
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which are needed and have to later be added back (Tal, 2006; Tenne, 2010; Garb, 2010). 
On the other hand there are benefits to the national economy as a whole, to domestic and 
industrial consumers of water, and to the environment: water produced from desalination 
is softer than most other water sources, and this reduces wear and tear on any equipment 
that uses water; and the low lower concentrations of chloride and sodium in water from 
desalination will have a lower environmental impact when it is used for agriculture and 
recharging aquifers (Tenne, 2010; Garb, 2010; Tenne, Hoffman & Levi, 2013).  
 The Israeli experience with desalination is being closely watched around the 
world for its technological attributes that have achieved high levels of energy efficiency 
and low operating costs; as well as for its sophisticated fiscal and institutional 
arrangements of private sector involvement (Garb, 2010; Marin et al., 2017). The 
addition of desalination to Israel's water portfolio was an exercise in managing 
complexity and required the ordination of numerous policy-based, technological, 
engineering, architectural, economic, social, and managerial factors before Israel could 
claim to have some of the world's most energy-efficient and cost-efficient in the world 
large-scale desalination facilities (Tenne, 2010; Marin et al., 2017).  
 D. Stabilization Reservoirs.  
 Israel has aggressively developed an extensive network of more than 200 small-
scale reservoirs that annually collects about 260 million cubic meters of surface runoff 
and partially treated sewerage water which today provides about half of the water 
consumed by Israeli agriculture (Shelef, Juanico & Vikinsky, 1987; Friedler, 2001; Tal, 
2006). At first the reservoirs were constructed to dam and impound floodwaters, with the 
primary objective of replenishing groundwater, but this source varies considerably 
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between years. Most of the more recently constructed reservoirs are stabilization 
reservoirs constructed to hold the increasing volume of treated waste-water which is 
collected year-round for agricultural use during the summer and autumn dry seasons (Tal, 
2006; Marin et al., 2017). Stabilization ponds have been used in Israel for decades, but it 
was not until the 1970s that their construction began on a large scale (Shelef, Juanico & 
Vikinsky, 1987). Reforestation is also an important part of capturing floodwaters and 
Israel has increased tree cover from 2% in 1948 to 8% of its land area in 2014 (Marin et 
al., 2017). The major force behind this water and reforestation initiative is the Jewish 
National Fund (JNF) which is responsible for the construction of most of these reservoirs 
since the 1980s, and they considerable expand the water resources of some of Israel's 
most arid regions (Tal, 2006). 
 When stabilization ponds were initially introduced they were conceived 
exclusively as storage reservoirs; however, with concerns about water quality growing in 
the 1970s and 1980s, their capacity to treat wastewater soon became evident (Shelef, 
Juanico & Vikinsky, 1987; Tal, 2006). Stabilization ponds use solar energy, which is 
abundant in Israel, and they cost far less to operate than mechanical or chemical waste-
water treatment systems but are effective and safe enough to produce irrigation water for 
many types of crops while reducing the need for fertilizer (Shelef, Juanico & Vikinsky, 
1987). With a design life-span of more than 40 years the annual repayment for capital 
recovery should be low; and when combined with the low production cost of water from 
this source, reservoirs are a cost-effective option for those farming communities that can 
afford the investment (Friedler, 2001). 
 Although stabilization reservoirs might seem low-tech when compared to drip 
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irrigation and desalination, the construction and maintenance of these facilities adds to 
the capability of the water technology industry. To guarantee that the water they store is 
not a threat to the environment and to public health, reservoir technology has become 
more sophisticated and effective over the years because of the accompanying research 
and development, and decades of actual experience in building and operating these 
facilities reservoirs in past decades (kkk-jnf.org., undated). Stabilization reservoirs 
require sophisticated engineering technology to prevent embankments from collapsing, 
sealing technology using plastic sheets, water pipes, filters, pumps, irrigation systems, 
control systems and fences (kkk-jnf.org., n.d.).  
VI. Innovation, Entrepreneurship & Technology in Israel's Water Economy  
 Technology has long been an important enabler of Israel's water economy, 
providing the country's engineers and technocrats with tools and techniques to exploit 
scarce water resources, to use that water with increasing degrees of efficiency and 
effectiveness, and to protect the quality of that water and the environment from which it 
comes (Tal, 2007; Kislev, 2011; Siegel, 2015). Enabling water technologies increases the 
economic value-creation potential of water resources which in turn helps to increase 
output in agriculture and industry, protects public and environmental health, saves the 
economy money, and makes the economy more productive and competitive (Tenne, 
Hoffman, Levi, 2013). To address its water scarcity Israel has employed several 
technological solutions, not all of which were successful. At various times the country 
attempted to drill deep into the earth to find fossil water, to seed clouds and modify 
weather, to develop water saving technologies and reclaim sewage, and the desalinization 
of sea water.  
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  Some of the areas of expertise in which Israel has developed world-class 
capability include water infrastructure for conveyance and storage, recycling and 
reclamation of waste-water, bio-filters for purifying runoff, efficient irrigation and 
fertigation, rehabilitation of polluted streams, soil conservation, dry climate agriculture, 
desert reforestation, seawater and brackish water desalination, deep well drilling, water 
data analytic software, geology and hydrology (Tal, 2007; Megersa & Abdulahi, 2015; 
Siegler, 2015). The creation of a flourishing and globally competitive water technology 
sub-sector is a result of a combination of both public and private sector entrepreneurship 
and innovation, public policy and public investment, and government incentives. The 
heavy public investments by Israel's water-and-wastewater utilities provides a market and 
testing ground for local technology which often gains a local foothold before being 
offered on the world market. This world leadership in water technology is both a source 
of export income from equipment and services, and a tool of international diplomacy and 
goodwill (Siegel, 2015; Marin et al., 2017).   
 Israel tops the world for R&D intensity and the bulk of Israel's economic growth 
is linked to R&D investment, innovation and entrepreneurship in key high technology 
sectors (UNESCO, 2015). Israel spends one of the highest proportions of GDP on civilian 
R&D at about 3.5%, is ranked as one of the most innovative countries in the world, has 
one of the highest per capita publication rates for scientific articles and for patent filing, 
outspends most countries on education, has one of the highest ratios of scientists and 
engineers to the general population, has the world's highest concentration of R&D 
centers, has several of the world's top ranked research universities, has the world's highest 
ratio of Nobel Laureates with eight in the sciences, and leads the world in access to 
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venture capital for start-ups with almost US$2,400 million in 2013 alone; and it is far 
ahead of the United States on all of these measures of innovation and entrepreneurship 
(UNESCO, 2015). The basis for the global scientific leadership has to do with Israel's 
unique circumstances – its unique challenges, a highly educated population, and a 
government willing to invest in key areas of national importance (DeHaan, 2008). Many 
of the sectors for which Israel has industrial, scientific, and technological leadership are 
directly build on public investments, such as the defense industry and water resource 
management (UNESCO, 2015).    
 Israel's public and private sector have made a concerted effort in recent years to 
promote innovations and entrepreneurship in the water sector and have established a 
'triangle of innovation' that bring together private industry, water utilities and university 
research centers into an ecosystem to support the development and commercialization of 
innovative water technologies (Siegel, 2015; Israel New Tech, 2017). Each element of the 
triangle brings a different contribution to the ecosystem. The private sector provides most 
of the entrepreneurs,  new ideas and technologies, and the majority of the capital to 
finance the R&D to commercialization process; public and private utilities provide a 
large domestic market for water technologies, and facilities for real-world testing; the 
government provides considerable funds to support R&D, and several government 
agencies manage programs to support the development of innovative water technologies; 
and the universities collaborate with all the other actors in the ecosystem by training 
world-class scientists and engineers and assisting with R&D (DeHaan, 2008; UNESCO, 
2015). The public-sector support for innovators and entrepreneurs is considerable: Office 
of Chief Scientist under the Ministry of Economy provided NIS254 million between 2007 
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and 2015; the IWA provided NIS 94 million since 2008; the Chief Scientist of the 
Ministry of Energy and Water provides NIS20 million per year for the R&D and pilot 
stages of innovation and commercialization (Marin et al., 2017). 
 B. Water Technology Companies 
 There are currently about 600 companies in Israel involved in some aspect of 
water technology that together annually earn about US$2 billion and provide thousands 
of jobs (Ben-Zoor & Priampolsky, 2016; Israel New Tech, 2017). Many of these 
companies were able to establish themselves initially through the Israeli domestic market 
but now do most of their business globally. The government of Israel invests heavily in 
R&D and supports innovators and entrepreneurs in many areas of clean technology and 
water technology because these sectors are important engines of economic growth 
(Lemarchand, Leck & Tash, 2016).  The following are examples of water technology 
companies that have benefited from public assistance through funding for R&D and other 
supportive policy measures:  
 1. Netafim. This firm is considered by some to be Israel's most successful water 
 technology business. Netafim was founded in 1965 and became a pioneer in drip 
 irrigation, a technology that increases the efficiency of water use in irrigation. 
 Israel is now a global leader in drip irrigation, with 30% of the global market, and 
 Netafim is its largest participant in that market with a global workforce of 2,800 
 people and annual sales of about US$800 million, of which 80% is exported 
 (Siegel, 2015; Ben-Zoor & Priampolsky, 2015). Israel's drip irrigation industry 
 alone is a US$2.5 billion industry.   
 2. Chromagen. This company was founded in1962 and became a pioneer in solar 
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 thermal water  heaters, a technology which saves energy, and for which Israel is a 
 global leader (Siegel, 2015).  
 3. IDE Technologies. This company was founded in 1965 and became a global 
 leader in water treatment solutions. IDE specializes in the design, construction 
 and operation of desalination facilities and industrial water treatment plants and 
 has built 400 desalination plants around the world (Siegel, 2015). 
  The following are some more examples of globally competitive water technology 
companies are at the forefront of bringing Israeli technology to the global marketplace: 
 1. TaKaDu. This company was founded in 2009 and is a pioneer in water network 
 management systems which offer water utilities Internet-based solutions to 
 improve network efficiency and planning decisions through the real-time, 24/7 
 analysis of water data. TaKAdu's technology helps save water by monitoring the 
 state of water infrastructure and the early detection of leaks in pipes (Ben-Zoor & 
 Priampolsky, 2015). 
2. Arad Technologies. This company was founded in 2000 and is a pioneer in the 
development, manufacture, and marketing wireless automatic meter reading 
systems worldwide. The Arad Group was founded in 1941 and since then has sold 
millions of water meters around the world and the company manufactures over 
500,000 units a year, which had made Arad into one of the leading  companies in 
the global water measuring industry (Ben-Zoor & Priampolsky, 2015).  
 3. Amiad Water Systems. This company was founded in 1962 and is a pioneer in 
 water filtration solutions for industrial, municipal, and agricultural use. Amiad's 
 water filtration technologies environmentally-friendly and self-cleaning and use a 
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 process that employs no chemicals nor polymers with a level of efficiency that 
 wastes less than 1% of the water that goes through the process (Ben-Zoor & 
 Priampolsky, 2015). 
4. Aqwise. This company was founded in 2000 and is a pioneer in wastewater 
 treatment for the industrial and municipal markets. Aqwise’s solutions have been 
 successfully installed in over three hundred municipal and industrial plants in 
 more than 35 countries, serving a variety of  industries including food & 
beverage, pulp & paper, pharmaceuticals, and oil & gas (Ben-Zoor & 
Priampolsky, 2015).  
Israel's domestic success and its global experience prompted the World Bank and 
the Israeli Ministry of Economy in 2015 to sign an agreement to assist developing 
countries facing complex water challenges. The Ministry of Economy committed 
$500,000 to the World Bank Group’s Water Global Practice to support this initiative, 
which will also encourage the export of Israeli water technologies to these countries 
(Ben-Zoor & Priampolsky, 2016; Israel New Tech, 2017). 
 D. Israeli Incubator Program.  
 In 1991 the Ministry of Industry and Trade, now Ministry of Economy, through 
the Office of the Chief Scientist (OCS), established an incubator program which 
eventually spawned 28 technological incubators across Israel (Frenkel, Shefer & Miller, 
2008; Siegel, 2015; Israel New Tech, 2017b). The launch of the program coincided with 
the flood of technically and scientifically competent Russian Jewish immigrants who 
needed to be settled in Israel (DeHaan, 2008; Berry & Wasserteil, 2014). These 
incubators have successfully supported more than 200 projects in electronics and 
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communication, software, medical devices, new materials, biotechnology, renewable 
energy, and, of course, water. The OCS is responsible for implementing the government's 
policy of encouraging and supporting industrial research and development in Israel, its 
annual budget of about US $300 million supports about 1,000 projects undertaken by 500 
companies, and its support of innovators and entrepreneurs have helped make Israel a 
major center for high-technology businesses. The OCS supports R&D projects of Israeli 
companies by offering conditional grants to partially fund the approved R&D expenditure 
for a period of 2 to 3 years after which the start-up or project must be financially self-
sustaining. Start-ups that have commercially successful projects will be under an 
obligation to repay the grant by royalty payments of 3% to 5% of its future revenues 
(Israel New Tech, 2017b).   
 In 1992, the government began providing venture capital to support high 
technology start-ups given the absence of a private venture capital market at that time 
(DeHaan, 2008). The fund was called Yozma and it was provided $100 million in 
government money. Since then Israel has become the country with the most venture 
capital available per citizen with most of this money coming from the private sector and 
Yozma has been privatized (DeHaan, 2008). The government also offers tax breaks and 
numerous other incentives to support foreign and local investment and R&D (Berry & 
Wasserteil, 2014). One of the strengths of Israel's public incubator and venture capital 
policies has been the practice of the government refraining from picking winners and 
allowing the selection of projects to be primarily merit-based (DeHaan, 2008; Siegel, 
2015). The program has also been successful in its rate of graduation – about 85% - and 
its rate of survival after graduation – about 75% - which suggests that the selection 
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process is rigorous; and incubators have become more financially self-sustaining over 
time (Frenkel, Shefer & Miller, 2008; Siegel, 2015).  
   Starting in 2000 the incubators were 'privatized' because venture capital funds 
became more willing to invest in technology start-ups - although the government 
continues to provide financial support for start-up R&D in key economic sectors and 
maintains shares in many of the incubators, so they are essentially public-private 
partnerships (Frenkel, Shefer & Miller, 2008; Berry & Wasserteil, 2014; Siegel, 2015; 
Israel New Tech, 2017b). Government support for the remaining 24 incubators, and the 
start-ups they support, is still considered necessary because private capital still prefers to 
invest in technologies with lower risks and shorter commercialization periods (Frenkel, 
Shefer & Miller, 2008); and because evidence suggests that businesses which are 
nurtured in incubators have a higher survival rate (Berry & Wasserteil, 2014). Around the 
same time the government started to privatize their incubators, several private incubators 
began operation. These incubators can also access funds from the OCS but most of their 
resources come from the private sector. They differ, however, from the public incubators 
in the amount of money they invest in projects, the type of projects in which they invest, 
the background of the entrepreneurs and innovators, and their focus on private rather than 
national goals (Frenkel, Shefer & Miller, 2008). In Israel the amount of private sector 
direct investment and venture capital channeled to water and other clean technologies is 
smaller than all other high technology sectors (Berry & Wasserteil, 2014). A publicly 
supported incubator for water and clean technologies fills a gap in the private investment 
market which probably exists because of the long commercialization period for these 
technologies and their narrow markets.  
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 The Kinrot Ventures incubator was founded in 1993 is the only Israeli start-up 
incubator to focus solely on water technologies. It is also the largest investment body in 
the world in the water sector, in terms of the number of technology companies supported 
is a rarity in the group of Israeli incubators, since it is the only incubator focused 
exclusively on the water sector, and essentially it is Israel’s water incubator. Kinrot 
Ventures was privatized in 2006 but is was later acquired by Hutchinson Water's Israeli 
subsidiary in 2012 and renamed Hutchison Kinrot and has now expanded into the broader 
field of Clean Technology. Hutchison Water Israel E.P.C Ltd operates the incubator under 
a franchise from the Israeli Innovation Authority and has agreed to invest at least $25 
million in the incubator and in its portfolio companies over eight years (Israel New Tech, 
2013) The Israel Innovation Authority is an independent public entity that implements 
Israel's innovation policy and supports Israel's innovation infrastructure and knowledge 
economy, and it was established in 2016 to replace the OCS that was under the Ministry 
of Economy (Israel Innovation Authority, 2017). Kinrot Venture's competitive selection 
process looks for companies that ideally have experienced managers, a clear or unique 
business model, a solution that meets a significant market need, a technology that has 
universal or very wide applicability, and capable of being protected by robust intellectual 
property rights. In addition, unlike some incubators in Europe and the United States, 
Kinrot Ventures in heavily involved in the management of the start-ups to ensure that 
experienced guidance is provided to the young business (Israel New Tech, 2017b). 
 E. The Entrepreneurship & Partnership Center for Water Technologies 
 (WaTech).  
 In 2004, Mekorot established the WaTech to leverage the company's decades of 
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experience in operating complex water systems by supporting innovators and 
entrepreneurs from both start-ups and mature companies locate, develop, test, and 
commercialize new technologies for both the Israeli and the international markets. By 
establishing a center with this type of focus Mekorot also hopes to develop its own 
human capital, find new business and research partners, identify and meet its own 
emerging technological needs, identify new sources of income, and expand its own 
commercial presence across the globe. Mekorot is itself deeply involved in R&D which is 
carried out in the operational systems of the company and four R & D centers at its 
disposal: Eshkol Central Laboratory, which is the center for surface water purification 
and monitoring technologies; Shafdan, which is the center for advanced wastewater and 
effluent technologies;  Ashdod, which is the center for seawater desalination 
technologies; Sabcha (Eilat), which is the center for desalinated brackish and seawater 
desalination technologies. WaTech has research relationships with four major Israeli 
universities: Ben-Gurion University, Hebrew University, Technion, and Tel Aviv 
University.  WaTech is designed to bring together various actors in the Israeli water 
economy – water companies, research institutes and universities, technology incubators, 
investors and venture capital funds – who work together to collaboratively find solutions 
to existing and emerging water problems (Merkorot.co, 2017). WaTech further supports 
this work by establishing a system for information and knowledge management, and by 
helping to get the resulting technologies patented to protect intellectually property rights 
so that its commercial value can be properly captured (Merkorot.co, 2017).  
 Some of the specific support WaTech offers innovators and entrepreneurs includes 
access to experimental sites at Merkorot facilities where they can conduct studies in the 
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alpha and beta phases of testing and commercialization; access to Merkorot's experienced 
project planning staff who help innovators and entrepreneurs build a systematic 
experimenting program to test innovative technology, develop products, and choose the 
right applications to support their R&D; access to experienced engineering and technical 
staff who assist in integrating the experiments into Merkorot's facilities during the alpha 
and beta phases of testing; access to the business development center where contact can 
be made to potential investors, partners, and clients from Merkorot's wide international 
network; support in validating technologies at the end of the testing process; and access 
to financing to support commercialization of the technology (Merkorot.co, 2017). 
WaTech's innovators and entrepreneurs have access to Merkorot's international partners 
which include major global water companies such as Veoila, Suez, Thames Water 
Utilities, and DOW. To date WaTech has tested more than 1,000 proposals for water 
technology projects and projects, has contracted with several dozen start-up companies, 
and conducts about 40 studies a year locate, develop, and commercialize new water 
technologies (Merkorot.co, 2017). 
 F. Water Technology and Environmental Control Exhibition & Conference 
 (WATEC).  
 In 2009 Israel hosted the first Water Technology and Environmental Control 
Exhibition & Conference to allow water stakeholders from around the globe to share their 
experiences regarding the current and future trends of the water economy. WATEC Israel 
attracts water professionals, entrepreneurs, and innovators, manufacturers, researchers, 
investors, academics, purchasers and policy makers from around the world; and the 
companies which are represented are both Israeli and International. WATEC Israel is a 
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biennial exhibition taking place over three days at the Israel Tel Aviv Convention Center; 
but WATEC conferences have also been held in Peru in 2014 and Italy in 2016 and 2017. 
The format of WATEC includes an exhibition and a professional conference, it provides 
an opportunity for those who attend to advance cooperative activities and arrange new 
business endeavors, and it serves to boost Israel’s presence in the global water technology 
market. The theme of WATEC 2017, which was held in September, was water in the 
digital age, where information and communication technologies, which increases speed 
and agility, 'big data,' cyber security, transparency and optimization are reshaping the 
industry and opening new opportunities for Israeli companies to drawn on other areas of 
Israeli high-technology excellence (WATEC, 2017). Many of the emerging water 
technology firms are being started by entrepreneurs and innovators from the computer 
industry, proving the value of networking across disciplines and multi-disciplinary 
collaboration for solving complex water problems (The Economist, 2011).  
 C. Distant Meter Reading Technology.  
 This is one example of the employment of multiple technologies to water resource 
management. This allows water usage to be tracked in real time, analyzed by 
sophisticated software, and unusual patterns of water use immediately identified and 
addressed. A water profile can be created for each customer and unusual patterns of usage 
identified. The result is an immediate response to leaks which traditionally go undetected 
for long periods of time, a reduction is water use, and smaller bills for customers (Siegel, 
2015). This is the same type of technology used to detect credit-card fraud. It is gradually 
being implemented by Israeli utilities and Israeli water technology companies are betting 
that this technology will become a global standard within one to two decades (Siegel, 
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2015).  
Other Israeli water technologies include robots that patrol water and sewerage 
mains to monitor their condition and identify places within the network where proactive 
maintenance is required (Siegel, 2015). This type of technology reduces unaccounted-for-
water and maintains water quality by reducing leaks from sewerage mains.  
 G. Drip Irrigation & Seeds.  
 The most significant increase in water use efficiency has occurred in the 
agricultural sector. Given that agriculture is still the biggest user of water in Israel, and 
irrigation the single biggest use, it is understandable that it is to this sector, and this 
specific activity, that most attention must be directed in the effort to have a significant 
impact on the Israeli water economy (Davis, Maks & Richardson, 1980, Tal, 2006, 2007; 
Siegel, 2015). The ability and willingness of Israel's agricultural sector to maximize its 
use of water saving technologies depends both on the availability of these technologies 
and the economic and financial incentive which government offers Israeli agriculture to 
affect such a conversion (Davis, Maks & Richardson, 1980, Tal, 2006, 2007).   
 During the last 60 years while Israel's population grew by a factor of 7, and 
agricultural production expanded by a factor of 16, the proportion of high-quality fresh 
water allocated to farmers steadily declined, largely due to the introduction of during the 
1960s which increased agriculture's output per unit of water (Tal, 2006; Isenberg, 2010). 
Drip irrigation solves several vexing problems for farmers: by decreasing overall water 
delivery, it reduces residual salts and minimizes water usage; by delivering nutrients to 
the root zones at optimal intervals for their use by growing plants, it reduces soil 
pollution and helps maintain a dry soil surface; and it allows crops to be grown in 
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marginal soil because water and nutrients are delivered to the roots (Tal, 2006; Isenberg, 
2010).   
 The dominant method of irrigation around the world is flood irrigation, and this 
has been the case since the agricultural revolution thousands of years ago, follows by 
sprinklers – both highly inefficient and ineffective methods of irrigation which are 
dependent on a cheap and reliable supply of water (Solomon, 2010; Megersa & Abdulahi, 
2015). Flood irrigation loses more than one-half of the water through evaporation or 
runoff, and great amounts of energy are required to deliver great amounts of water 
through large and complex water networks; while sprinklers lose at least one-third of the 
water (Siegel, 2015).  Up until at least the 1950s flood irrigation and sprinklers were still 
the dominant means of irrigation in Israel and agriculture used 70% of the country's water 
supply, just as does most of the rest of the world; today 75% of Israeli fields employ drip 
irrigation and the remaining 25% use sprinklers (Siegel, 2015). Globally only about 5% 
of the world's fields benefit from drip irrigation, another 15% use other methods of 
irrigation, and 80% of the world's crops still rely on rainfall (Siegel, 2015). This small 
percentage of irrigated fields still outperform rain-fed fields by supplying about 40% of 
the world's crops (Megersa & Abdulahi, 2015). Drip technology may ultimately have the 
greatest global impact in a world where growing water scarcity and a growing global 
population threaten to result in a food crisis in the coming decades if innovative solutions 
are not found (Siegel, 2015; Megersa & Abdulahi, 2015). 
 Drip irrigation is the most energy and water efficient of all the irrigation systems 
(Megersa & Abdulahi, 2015). Drip irrigation can deliver savings of water for irrigation of 
between 40% to 70% of water since soil evaporation, surface runoff, and deep percolation 
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are greatly reduced or eliminated; it can reduce the amount of fertilizer and energy 
needed to produce crops, which saves money and reduces pollution; it improves the 
quality of the output; it increases yields between 100% to 500% per unit of land for a 
given among of water and fertilizer; and it allows marginal land to be brought into 
agricultural production (Siegel, 2015; Megersa & Abdulahi, 2015). Drip irrigation is both 
commercially and environmentally advantageous; however, the reluctance of many 
farmers to adopt this method of irrigation is primarily the result of institutional inertia or 
a failure to achieve technology translation. An example of institutional inertia is the 
continuing practice of providing farmers with market-distorting subsidized water, which 
Israeli farmers were able to secure since 1948 (Kislev, 2012; Siegel, 2015); while an 
example of failed technology translation is the failure to create an enabling environment 
through the transfer of requisite knowledge or the absence of technical support, which is 
what Blass faced in the 1960s on the road to commercialization of this technology from 
entrenched academic and bureaucratic interests at Hebrew University and in the Ministry 
of Agriculture, and risk adverse manufacturers of agricultural technologies (Garb & 
Friedlander, 2014; Siegel, 2015). This institutional inertia almost succeeded in defeating 
Blass; however, Blass found partners among the Negev farmers, whom he had helped 
several decades earlier, who needed this technology for their own farms as well as for 
additional source of revenue through their manufacture (Siegel, 2015). The socialist 
collective farms of Israel became incubators for a major industry, and socialist farmers 
became entrepreneurs and innovators from a revolutionary water technology, building on 
the pioneering and risk-taking spirit that they had as pioneer farmers and settlers decades 
earlier. 
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 To complement its global leadership in water efficiency technology, Israel is also 
a leader in seed production with Hazera, Israel's largest seed producer, having annual 
sales of about US$200 million (Reisman, 2005; Amit, 2015). Israel's innovative strains of 
seeds are designed to produce plants that can grow using less water as well as plants that 
are designed to thrive in brackish water (Siegel, 2015). This way water and energy 
savings can be realized from multiple sources.         
VII. Application of Porter's Diamond 
 A. Factor Conditions. 
 The competitive basis of Israel's economy is significantly shaped by the country's 
ability to overcome its scarcity in fresh water. The traditional base sector of the Israeli 
economy, agriculture, and the current base sectors of the economy, such as high-
technology and tourism, are all heavily dependent on the availability of a reliable supply 
of fresh water. Despite the critical role of water in the economy, Israel is one of the most 
water scarce countries in the world. Israel in general is deficient in basic factors except 
for sunlight, which is not yet competitive as a general source of energy, and now offshore 
natural gas, which is being used to provide energy for the desalination of seawater. More 
important than basic factors, with which a country is naturally endowed, are specialized 
and advanced factors which a country must create for itself such a critical mass of high- 
quality human capital that is innovative, entrepreneurial, and technological capable, high 
quality infrastructure, and a sufficient pool of financial capital. 
 The Israeli economy is built primarily on advanced and specialized factors, many 
of which are an outgrowth of its water scarcity and the agricultural and defense sectors. 
Water scarcity helped to develop expertise in civil engineering, geology, and hydrology 
 
 530   
  
as Israel's water technocrats had to find water in deep and difficult places under the 
ground and move water over difficult terrain from water surplus to water deficient 
regions (Cohen, 2008; Siegel, 2015). Water scarcity forced the agricultural sector to 
eventually adopt drip irrigation, climatically controlled greenhouses; and used water to 
decrease the demand for fresh water, and fergitation to minimize contamination of soil 
and groundwater (Kartin, 2001; Tal, 2006, 2007; Siegel, 2015). The defense sector 
developed capacity in specialized and advanced factors such as software and robotics that 
were relevant to agriculture, the water-and-wastewater, and water technology sectors 
(Siegel, 2015). Israel is one of the most scientifically and technologically advanced 
countries and its specialized and advanced sectors are always being upgraded to remain 
competitive (Breznitz, 2007; Berry & Wasserteil, 2014; UNESCO, 2015)     
 To develop and sustain its specialized and advanced factors Israel's economy is 
well supported by public and private funding for venture capital and R&D; its 
universities produce a large number of competent scientists and engineers; many of its 
national servicemen leave the armed forces with technological and management skills; 
and its researchers are highly productive in publishing peer reviewed journal articles and 
in securing patents; and its entrepreneurs and innovators have an outstanding track-record 
in commercializing technologies (Peled, 2001; Frenkel, Shefer & Miller, 2008; DeHaan, 
2008; Isenberg, 2010; UNESCO, 2015; Ben-Zoor & Priampolsky, 2016). Israel's 
scientific, technological and economic achievements since the reforms of the 1980s and 
1990s is impressive: almost half of Israel's exports come from high-technology sectors 
such as information and communication technology, life sciences, chemicals, 
pharmaceuticals, robotics, defense, and water technology; it has been the most research 
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intensive country in the world for many years with the private sector committing almost 
4% of GDP to R&D,  about twice the level of the Unites States, the Netherlands, and 
Singapore; its foreign direct investment inflow is over 4% of GDP; the country had over 
77,000 full-time researchers; more than one-third of bachelor degrees and more than half 
of doctoral degrees were in science, technology, engineering and math; three Israeli 
research universities rank among the global top 75 in mathematics and four among the 
top 200 in physics and chemistry; its rate of journal article publication is about 1,400 per 
million inhabitants, which is higher than the United States but somewhat lower than 
Singapore and the Netherlands, and the vast majority of these are in science, technology, 
and engineering; the country attracts more venture capital per capital than any other 
country and it has 70 active venture capital funds, of which 14 are international   
(Aharoni, 2014; UNESCO, 2015). The government, both directly and indirectly, played a 
significant role in the upgrading of factors to the benefit of the water sector and the wider 
economy. 
 B. Related & Supporting Industries 
 Israel water technology sector has worked hard to create a water technology 
ecosystem comprised of businesses, universities, research centers, financiers, business 
incubators, and governments ministries and agencies (DeHaan, 2008; Isenberg, 2010; 
Ben-Zoor & Priampolsky, 2016). The presence of a business environment comprising 
related suppliers, competitors and complementary firms is regarded as highly supportive 
for an industry to build competitive advantages. Such a geographical concentration of 
companies, suppliers and supporting firms is a classic example of an industrial cluster. 
These players in the water technology ecosystem are examples of the related and 
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supporting industries along the water value chain that facilitate innovation through 
exchanging ideas, co-creating of knowledge, supporting R&D and field testing, and 
facilitating commercialization of technologies. The higher the quality of the water sector's 
related and supporting industries, such as through their global competitiveness, the more 
innovative and entrepreneurial will be the players in the water sector. Israel's relatively 
small size, and relatively large number of water technology firms, allows its water 
technology players and their related and supporting industries to easily network and 
collaborate. This was the case with drip irrigation and the collaboration between several 
Kibbutz to develop and manufacture this product. As such Israel's water sector can be 
considered a mature water technology cluster with an industry that has adopted a 
financially sustainable business model, and water technology firms that are no longer 
dependent on the local market for the bulk of their revenue.  
 The highly developed agriculture sector would require a high degree of 
technological sophistication to grow crops on marginal land that were competitive based 
on both price and quality (Tal, 2007). The water technology industry and various trade 
associations also promote the sector.  
 C. Demand Conditions 
 All Israeli water technology firms gained an initial market foothold in the 
domestic market. Demand conditions relate to the size and nature of the market such as 
its growth rate, the complexity of customer requirements, and the mechanisms that 
transmit domestic preferences to foreign markets. This is a significant driver of 
innovation and product improvement, especially when the local market is particularly 
demanding as this prepares firms to globally competitive. The scarcity of water, its 
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uneven geographical distribution, its inconsistent temporal availability, and the geological 
challenges that had to be surmounted to access water and transport it to where it was 
needed, forced water engineers to be innovative. The willingness of the government to 
invest heavily in water infrastructure, such as the National Water Carrier, provided a 
guaranteed initial market; and when local market demand was satisfied, or as more 
players entered the market, water firms were able to offer their expertise and technologies 
overseas (Isenberg, 2010; Siegel, 2015; Ben-Zoor & Priampolsky, 2016).  
 Israeli water technology firms are located along almost the entire water value 
chain, and this is the result of Israel's water economy history. The water economy was 
initially interested in expanding supply, so the initial demand was for civil and hydraulic 
engineering; later the water economy became interested in efficient water use and 
improved water quality, so this drove demand for drip irrigation and recycling; and when 
the water economy again needed to expand supply, this drove demand for desalination 
technologies. Israel is a world leader in each of these areas (Cohen, 2008; Siegel, 2015). 
As the market in Israel became saturated, these firms would all eventually look beyond 
the country's relatively small domestic market. 
 D. Firm Strategy, Structure and Rivalry 
 The performance of Israel's water technology firms in terms of innovation and 
competitiveness is strongly linked to the degree of rivalry, the strategies, and the structure 
of the firms in that sector. This element of the diamond relates to the firm-based theories 
of internationalization that focus on the actions of individual firms. Israel's water 
technology industry with up to 600 firms is the largest of the six clusters examined – the 
Netherlands may nationally have more firms in the water sector, but these are spread 
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across several clusters in a larger geographic space, and there is distinct regional 
expertise or competencies in the Dutch case. Competition or inter-firm rivalry plays a big 
role in driving innovation and the subsequent upgrading of competitive advantage and 
most technologies have several firms competing in the Israeli market. Israel Science & 
Technology Directory (2017) lists 14 firms currently in the irrigation business. 
Consequently, many water technology firms in Israel generate most of their sales, in 
many cases as much as 75%, outside Israel. 
 E. Role of Government and Chance 
 Governments can play a role in developing and supporting clusters through 
procurement of advanced technologies, setting high product standards, supporting 
specialized factor creation, and encouraging competition, the government of Israel has 
supported and nurtured the water technology industry in several ways and both directly 
and indirectly. Public utilities were initially, and still remain, both a major producer and 
purchaser of Israeli water technology (Cohen 2008; Siegel, 2015). Probably the most 
important role the government played was in the support for the creation of specialized 
factors. The government initially supported the water technology sector with venture 
capital and business incubators when the private sector did not offer these in Israel - 
although in the last two decades the private sector has taken over the lead with both types 
of facilitation (Frenkel, Shefer & Miller, 2008). The government, through the Office of 
Chief Scientist (OCS), has been careful to only support those startups and projects with 
the best chance of success, as demonstrated by the quality of their proposals and their 
proposed business models. The OCS also provided funds to support research and 
development and many of the firms receiving this support were able to commercialize 
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their technologies. The government was also the main enabler in the development of 
human capital through the public universities which trained generations of competent 
scientists, technologists and engineers (UNESCO, 2015); but Israel’s high-technology 
capabilities and impressive economic achievements can also be traced to the important 
role played by defense and military sector (Peled, 2001). The military served as a training 
ground for many of Israel's innovators, entrepreneurs and technologists; and defense-
related R&D had important spillover effects as electronics, software, and robotics all 
played a role in today's more complex water technology environment (Peled, 2001).  
 Various ministries of government also promote the water technology industry, 
through information placed on their websites or through more active promotion. Some of 
these public initiatives are done in conjunction with the private sector. An example is the 
Israel Export and International Cooperation Institute (IEICI). The IEICI is a public-
private partnership established and funded by the government and the private sector 
whose task is to promote Israel's high-technology and consumer goods industries around 
the world and which bills itself as the “premier gateway for doing business with Israeli 
companies” (IEICI, 2017). IEICI has more than 50 years expertise in penetrating foreign 
markets to promote Israeli technology, in product scouting, in providing professional 
information, in drafting business plans, in organizing incoming and outgoing delegations, 
in participation in exhibitions and international conferences around the world, and in 
establishing joint ventures and strategic alliances between foreign clients and Israeli 
companies (IEICI, 2017). The IEICI has a dedicated Water Sector as well departments 
dedicated to closely related industries such as agro-technology and clean technology. 
IEICI engages in extensive marketing activities around the world with the support of the 
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commercial attaches in Israeli embassies and contracted professional consultants.  
 The Government of Israel was initially slow to strengthen environmental 
regulations and demand greater water efficiency; however, more stringent regulations for 
pollution and waste-water, higher water prices, and regulations requiring the introduction 
of water saving devices and technologies have stimulated innovation and made it easier 
to commercialize. The early requirement that all water customers must be connected to a 
meter to receive water stimulated the local manufacture of water meters: for a number of 
years there was a guaranteed market. Once the Israeli market was satisfied these firms 
had to look overseas and Israel is now one of the world's leading manufacturers of water 
meters. 
 The early socialist governments of Israel were initially poor in using regulations 
to encourage competition; and the lack of competition was exacerbated by government 
ownership of large segments of the economy, the close relationship between government 
and the trade unions, and the small domestic market (Aharoni, 2014). Although Israeli 
utilities were initially all owned by government, the water technology sector was not, 
however, owned by the state. Entrepreneurship and innovation in the water technology 
sector, as in many other technology sectors, was driven by competition for a share of the 
international market, while domestic stimulants of innovation were related to Israel's 
severe water scarcity. 
 Chance also played an important role in stimulating Israel's water technology 
sector and providing entrepreneurs and innovators with both opportunities and incentives.  
VIII. Conclusion 
 Israel possesses a sophisticated and globally competitive water technology cluster 
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which is characterized by a high degree of entrepreneurship and innovation from both 
public and private players. The public sector at first played a leading role in developing 
Israel's water sector through major public infrastructure works which tapped natural 
water sources and redistributed this water across regions. The private sector now 
dominates the water technology sector; and public-private partnerships now dominate the 
supply of water, through desalination, and recycling, through the water-and-wastewater 
utility sector.  
Civil and hydraulic engineering at first dominated the water technology sector, 
and in the early decades the Israeli water economy was an investment-driven sector when 
the National Carrier was being constructed. Later the Israeli water economy shifted to an 
efficiency-driven sector as finite water resources, a growing population, and growing 
economy required a greater quantity of water from finite stocks. Efficiency became a 
driver for recycling, reuse, and conservation through drip irrigation. More recently the 
need to desalinate seawater to meet growing demand and overcome stressed natural 
supplies became a driver for a shift to an innovation-driven water economy. Today the 
industry is dominated by devices and instruments increasingly related to water and 
energy efficiency, water quality, purification, and desalination. Scarcity was the main 
driver stimulating entrepreneurship and innovation in the water sector over the entire 
period; however, pollution, environmental protection, and climate change have now 
become important drivers as well.  
 Given Israel's geographic and demographic characteristics the water technology 
cluster should be considered a national scale cluster; and given the continued growth of 
the sector – domestically through recycling and desalination, and internationally through 
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the full range of technologies – the cluster should be considered as transitioning from a 
growing to a mature cluster. As an emerging cluster, Israel's water technology industry is 
still experiencing growth, especially from international sales. As a mature cluster Israel's 
water technology firms have been able to withstand downturns through exports, and the 
continuing demands to expand Israel's domestic water supply through non-conventional 
sources. Israel’s water economy and its water technology sector offers important lessons: 
there is an important role for the public sector as innovator, entrepreneur, regulator, 
investor, and venture capitalist; water utilities must adopt financially sustainable business 
models, and this provides the financial resources for upgrading the sector and supporting 
technological innovation; and because the domestic water economy is subject to various 
market failures, is dominated by monopsony utilities, and is structurally fragmented it 
requires a carefully constructed institutional framework that coordinates and aligns the 
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CHAPTER 11 
DISCUSSION & ANALYSIS 
I. Introduction 
Whether or not a water technology cluster becomes an integrated part of an 
economic system, develops into a competitive network of interdependent firms and 
supporting organizations, and is able to develop and diffuse innovative technologies, 
depends in part on the economic and institutional context in which the cluster emerges. 
This statement leads back to the study’s six research questions: (1) Do governments 
intervene to promote the development of industrial clusters for water technology firms? 
(2) What public policies and strategies do governments employ to support the 
development or expansion of water technology innovation clusters? (3) What are 
examples of successful clusters in which specific strategies of government intervention 
can be used as good practices? (4) What are the roles and responsibilities – or the division 
of labor – between public and private partners in developing or expanding water 
technology innovation clusters? (5) Do individual or organizational champions facilitate 
the development and diffusion of water-related technologies and enhance the 
competitiveness of water technology innovation clusters? (6) Does the institutional 
setting of a jurisdiction affect the development and diffusion of innovative water-related 
technologies?  
One dominant position on the role of government is that the rise and functioning 
of clusters and the diffusion of innovations are processes driven primarily by market 
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forces. Governments should not interfere with market forces outside a limited range of 
interventions designed to facilitate the smooth and dynamic functioning of markets, 
namely policy instruments that create favorable framework conditions and reduce market 
imperfections (Porter, 1998; OECD, 2009). This position constrains public policy and 
shifts strategy from direct intervention – such as being an institution builder - to indirect 
inducement – such as being a facilitator of networking, a provider of incentives, a 
corrector of market failures, and a remover of systemic and market inefficiencies and 
imperfections.  
The processes driving institutional and technological change and the 
characteristics of both institutions and technology, act as either constraints or enablers on 
the emergence of competitive water technology innovation clusters, and the development 
and diffusion of water technologies. Clusters are organizational units of interrelated firms 
within a geographic region that emerge from a particular social, economic and 
environmental context; clusters operate under a governing institutional framework that 
constrains or enables its functioning; and clusters evolves a structure and approach to 
strategy which supports diffusion of innovations and determines its competitiveness 
(Porter, 1998; Markusen, 1996). Technological and institutional innovations – meaning 
the development, application, diffusion, and utilization of new knowledge, technology, 
social and political practices - play a major role in reinventing water and wastewater 
regimes. Technological and institutional innovations include changes to a broad range of 
physical infrastructure for water delivery and treatment that drives greater efficiency and 
improved environmental outcomes; but political, cultural, social, and economic factors 
that serve as the contextual backdrop also hinders or enables such changes. If innovators, 
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entrepreneurs and the water technology clusters in which they operate are to solve 
challenges in the water economy, the intertwined nature of the technologies, institutions 
and the social and political systems that control change, must be understood if policy 
makers are to influence them (Kiparsky et al., 2013) 
To stimulate the development and diffusion of water-related technologies the EPA 
has put forward nine strategies for the development of water clusters. The strategies 
involve bringing together a wide cross-section of stakeholders – including businesses, 
academia, researchers, and public utilities - to develop a portfolio of policies, regulations, 
and financial instruments that, when taken together, will institutionalize and promote 
water technology innovation along the entire continuum from development, to testing and 
validation, to deployment (EPA, 2012). These strategies will be validated by being 
critically examined in a robust conceptual framework grounded in well-established 
theories from economics and the social sciences. The conceptual framework is built 
primarily around theories related to clusters and competitiveness (Porter, 1998), 
institutional change and economic performance (North, 1990), and diffusion of 
institutional innovations (Rogers, 2003). The conceptual framework uses inductive 
reasoning which allows for generalization or extrapolation from the six chosen cases 
studies to reach general conclusions about the efficacy of the EPA’s nine cluster 
development strategies. Institutions and institutional performance are considered 
important to cluster development: institutions can vary widely in their impact on 
economic performance from those that produce growth and development to those that 
produce stagnation; they provide a structure to guide human behavior and reduce 
uncertainty involved in human interaction; they help to create the incentive structure in a 
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cluster and economy; they determine transaction, production and agency costs which 
impact competitiveness; and they influence the diffusion of knowledge, skills, and 
practices that shape the direction and rate of social, political and economic change, which 
in turn gradually alters the original institutional framework.  
The nine strategies for cluster development are built on several premises that 
clusters have several beneficial characteristics that justify public policy intervention and 
the employment of specific strategies to support their development. These premises are: 
(1) that industry clusters within an economically connected region promote positive 
spillovers, labor market specialization, and the sharing of industry-specific inputs; (2) 
that thriving regional innovation ecosystems create institutions that build social capital 
and networks which improve communication and knowledge sharing; and (3) that the 
cumulative effect of these synergistic relationships are productivity growth, cost or 
technological advantages, and increased competitiveness (Porter, 1990, 1998, 2000; 
Porter & Kramer, 2011; Wessner, 2012). The cluster development strategies identified by 
the EPA for inclusion in economic development policy at all scales of government are as 
follows: (1) the design and implementation of appropriate policies, regulations, and 
procedures by federal, state and local governments to encourage innovation and 
entrepreneurship and facilitate the commercialization and adoption of technologies; (2) 
the encouragement and leveraging of R&D by federal laboratories, universities or other 
research institutions; (3) the facilitation of technology transfers from the public to the 
private sector; (4) the creation of networks for facilitating communication and knowledge 
diffusion and cross-agency cooperation; (5) the encouragement of champions and cluster 
leaders; (6) the encouragement of more public-private partnerships; (7) the development 
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of new relationships with the investment community and the leveraging of private capital 
from private capital markets; (8) the nurturing of technology start-ups; and (9) the 
partnering with established water-technology, water-intensive, and water-enabled 
businesses (EPA, 2012; Fieldsteel, 2013) 
II. Analytical Framework 
A. Policies, Regulations, and Procedures.   
Governments at all scales can play significant facilitative and simulative roles that 
support the development of clusters, encourage innovation and entrepreneurship in water 
technology, and influence the processes that lead to the development, commercialization, 
diffusion, and adoption of water technologies. In all six case studies governments have 
been an active, and sometimes even the leading, stakeholder in setting the governance 
and operational practices of the water technology clusters through the design of policies, 
regulations, standards, and systems of permitting. Governments have four major means of 
leverage to support R&D and innovation, namely regulation, public procurement, fiscal 
instruments and information provision (Grotenbreg and van Buuren, 2017; De Vries et 
al., 2016; Selviaridis, 2016; Edler and Georghiou, 2007). The four types of public support 
do not have to be employed by one single public actor; rather, different public authorities 
can complement each other as long as there is alignment.  
This strategy supports the assertion by Porter (1998) in the Diamond Model that 
governments play an important role in encouraging and stimulating the development of 
competitive industry clusters. This strategy also supports the assertion by Douglass North 
(1990) that formal rules guide economic and social interactions, when rules are well 
designed they promote order and certainty in a socio-economic system, and by extension 
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give rise to institutional arrangements that create efficient markets with low monitoring 
and transaction costs. 
In the United States formal rules at both the federal and state levels are meant to 
facilitate and simulate innovation and entrepreneurship in water-related technologies. The 
federal government, primarily through the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and 
Small Business Administration (SBA), has been actively supporting the creation of a 
rule-based institutional framework that stimulates the development of water technology 
clusters. There are numerous pieces of legislation designed to promote innovation and 
entrepreneurship, encourage R&D collaborations between the federal government, 
universities and the private sector, and improve the process for the commercialization of 
water technologies. The federal government also plays a critical role in encouraging 
innovation and entrepreneurship by setting environmental standards and controlling water 
pollution. The Clean Water Act (CWA), for example, established the basic structure for 
regulating pollutant discharges into U.S. waters, setting wastewater standards for 
industry, setting water quality standards for all contaminants in surface waters, and 
funding the construction of sewage treatment plants under the construction grants 
program. These federal and state policies and regulations attempt to support water 
technology clusters because clusters with competitive firms will promote local economic 
development, directly by building water technology firms and indirectly by supporting 
water-enabled or water-intensive industries that are dependent on a reliable supply of 
water. 
The facilitative and simulative roles of government have been even more 
pronounced in the three other countries studied. The Dutch water economy is governed 
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and managed at multiple scales and good water governance is the cornerstone of a strong 
water economy and a sustainable and resilient environment. The institutional framework 
for the Dutch water economy is characterized by diverse players at national, regional and 
local scales operating in a decentralized management structure, but with robust policy 
guidance and legislative and regulatory support from the national government. The 
national government draws up policy and takes some responsibility for national or 
regional water issues that cross provincial boundaries, while the provincial government is 
responsible for implementing these policies in specific measures and plans. Each player 
in the Dutch water economy has its own areas of responsibility but the complex nature of 
Dutch water resource management requires considerable cooperation, coordination and 
collaboration among the parties. The study highlighted at least two strengths of the 
institutional framework of the Dutch water economy. One strength, especially as 
exemplified by the Rijkswaterstaat, has been its ability to undergo numerous changes in 
role, organization, and practice over the last 200 years in response to social, political, 
economic, environmental, demographic, and technological changes in The Netherlands 
(Lintsen, 2002; Van Den Brink, 2009; Lonnquest et al., 2014). Another strength has been 
a successful record of financial solvency which helps to ensure operations are efficient 
and infrastructure is maintained at a high standard. The success of the Dutch water 
resource model is due to several factors: the application of private sector management 
practices in select areas of operations; the commitment to transparency, public 
accountability, and self-regulation; the practice of bench-marking to continuously 
improve the quality of service and lower costs; the application of science and technology; 
the commitment to full-cost recovery; and the culture of continuous learning and 
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adaptation (Schwartz & Blokland, 2002; Lintsen, 2002; Van Der Brugge, Rotmans & 
Loorbach, 2005; Marques, 2010; Metz & van den Heuvel, 2012; Lonnquest et al., 2014). 
Public procurement and the domestic utility industry are an important source of domestic 
demand.  
The facilitative and simulative roles of Singapore’s government led to the 
transformation of the Singaporean water economy and the development of a viable water 
technology cluster built on a framework of good governance established by a politically 
strong-willed, innovative and entrepreneurial government. The government championed 
an integrated strategy of long-term comprehensive planning, promulgated effective laws 
and regulations, established efficient institutional arrangements, and pursued practical 
and effective approaches to water problems. The policies to protect Singapore's water 
resources and her environment were carefully implemented, and the regulations 
rigorously monitored and enforced, by a collection of technically competent public 
agencies. The government of Singapore regularly updates and amends this 
comprehensive framework of policies, legislation, regulations, codes of practice, and 
best-practices; it carefully allocates roles and responsibilities between public and private 
partners; and it provide an enabling institutional environment for sustainable economic 
development. Some of the most important policies implemented by the government in 
Singapore have related to pricing which has variously been employed as a tool for cost 
recovery - to ensure the financial resources for expanding supply and operating the water-
and-wastewater system at the highest levels of efficiency and reliability – and as a tool 
for demand management – to encourage conservation to reduce the need to expand 
supply indefinitely (Tortajada, 2006a & 2006b; Marques, 2010; Tortajada, Joshi & 
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Biswas, 2013). Another significant policy has been to encourage private sector 
investment in the water economy and public-private partnerships which has been critical 
to the strategies of expanding water supply through reclaimed water and desalination.  
The Israeli water governance regime that emerged between 1948 and 2000 was 
initially innovative but as the water economy evolved it proved complex, inefficient, 
reactive, and fragmented system where key stakeholders often had competing agendas, 
and water allocation was by politically motivated state fiat rather than market price or 
highest value use. The result of this institutional arrangement, and its sub-optimal 
operation, were water resources that were over-exploited, inefficiently allocated, under-
priced, and under-valued which threatened the sustainability and resilience of the water 
economy (Galnoor, 1978; Marin et al., 2017). The reforms in the 2000s led to the creation 
of the more politically independent Israeli Water Authority (IWA) to replace the Water 
Commission, required ring-fencing of municipal to water services, introduced greater 
economic and financial discipline into the water economy, made both utilities and all 
consumers face the true environmental and economic costs of supplying fresh water and 
treating waste water, encourage greater private sector investment and management into 
the water economy, and stimulated a series of innovations that succeeded in gradually 
restoring a sustainable water balance (Siegel, 2015; Marin et al., 2017). 
 The strategy of government designing and implementing appropriate policies, 
regulations, and procedures to encourage innovation and entrepreneurship in clusters and 
facilitate the commercialization, diffusion, and adoption of water-related technologies 
answers research questions one and two: (1) governments do intervene to promote the 
development of industrial clusters, and (2) they employ a suite of public policies and 
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strategies to support the development or expansion of water technology innovation 
clusters. Table 11.1 below provides a sample of policies, regulations & procedures which 
governments in the six clusters employed and this validates the first of the EPA’s nine 
strategies for cluster development.    
 
 







Table 11.1. Sample of Policies, Regulations & Procedures to Support Water Technology Clusters 
Country  Innovation Legislation     Environmental Legislation  Policy/Plan  Agency 
USA (Federal) US Federal Technology     Federal Water Pollution   Strategy for American EPA 
         Transfer Act (1986)     Control Act (1948)  Innovation  SBA 
  Small Business Technology Control Act (1948)  Clean Water Act (1972) 
  Technology Transfer Act (1992)    Water Resources & Development  
   Small Business Research & Act (2013)  Act 
  Water Development Enhancement Act (1992) 
  Water Resources Development Act (2016) 
 
Cincinnati           RUN Agreement 
 
Milwaukee            Milwaukee 7 Framework MMSD 
 
Tacoma  Innovation Partnership Zone   Growth Management Act (1990)  Puget Sound Water  Puget Sound 
             Quality Plan  Water Quality 
                 Authority 
 
               Tacoma  
               Environmental 
                Services 
 
Netherlands       Groundwater Act (1981)  Top Sector Alliance for  
        Surface Water Pollution Act (1969) Innovation and Knowledge 
        Soil Protection Act (1986)  
        Water Management Act (1989)      
        Water Supply Acts (1957) 1975& 2000     
        Water Ownership Act (2004).  
        Water Services Act (1992)  
Singapore Government Procurement Act (1997)         PUB 
 
Israel  Water and Sewerage Corporations Law of 2001 Water Law (1959)      Water Authority 
               Water Board 
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B. Research and Development.  
The sustainability and competitiveness of the emerging water economy is heavily 
dependent on the development and commercialization of water technologies that increase 
the efficiency of water use, reduce the amount of energy that are required to treat and 
move water, and reduce the levels of pollution that enter the water cycle from human 
activities. A critical role of water technology clusters is the development and 
commercialization and diffusion of new water technologies and adoption of existing 
technologies developed elsewhere. All six clusters governments have established formal 
policies, systems, and processes to encourage and leverage R&D undertaken by a 
network of government laboratories, universities or other research institutions to facilitate 
the development, commercialization and diffusion of water-related technologies.  
This strategy supports the assertion by Porter (1998) in the Diamond Model that 
upgraded and advanced factors play an important role in encouraging and stimulating the 
development of competitive industry clusters and that governments can facilitate 
upgrading factors by supporting R&D. It also supports the assertion by North (1990) that 
the kinds of skills and knowledge which are developed will shape the direction of change 
and gradually alter the institutional framework of a socio-economic system. Government 
support for R&D can influence the speed, direction, and magnitude of institutional 
change. This strategy also supports the assertion by Rodgers (2003) that an innovation-
diffusion process should reduce uncertainty about an innovation and speed up its rate of 
adoption. Public support for R&D can increase knowledge of an innovation’s existence 
and its observability to potential adopters, thus reducing uncertainty and speeding up its 
rate of adoption.   
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In the United States both the federal government and private universities lead the 
engagement into water technology research. The EPA provides funds for R&D to help 
attract technology firms to water technology clusters, while the SBA provides other 
technical support that encourages the diffusion of the innovations that result for these 
collaborations. Most US clusters water technology have emerged in cities with 
universities engaged in water-related research, large pools of engineers and scientists, 
water intensive and water enabled industries, and challenges related to fresh, waste, and 
storm water. At the cluster level both the Global Water Center and the Center for Urban 
Waters have facilities to support a limited R&D capability. The R&D framework in each 
US cluster has also garnered considerable experience addressing local problems 
especially in the areas of urban stormwater, pollution of freshwater and estuary systems. 
The local environment provides a unique real-life laboratory for addressing many water 
quality issues affecting urban centers and the natural environment. The R&D, innovation, 
and entrepreneurship landscape in the United States has implications for the US securing 
global technological leadership in the water technology industry, which justified public 
intervention: the US water technology landscape already suffers from a low rate of entry 
of young people into science, engineering and technology fields, especially 
environmental disciplines; water technology does not attract significant amounts of 
funding, both public and private, for R&D; and too much of the research into the water 
economy is closer to social science than the basic or applied science and technology 
which is required to build a viable technology sector (Miller, 2017).  
The globally competitive position of Dutch water technology industry would not 
be possible without public, private, and academic investments in water-related 
 
 552   
  
innovation, entrepreneurship, and R&D. Dutch universities produce many competent 
water scientists and hydraulic engineers; its researchers are highly productive in 
publishing peer reviewed journal articles and in securing patents; and its entrepreneurs 
and innovators have an outstanding track-record in commercializing water technologies. 
Despite the technological standing of the Dutch water technology and environment 
sectors, the level of funds available for R&D falls far behind other ‘Top Sectors’ which 
are more commercially attractive.  
In Singapore the government views R&D in its high-technology sectors as a key 
driver for economic growth and a strategic investment in the city state’s long-term 
competitiveness. The government supports water technology with sustained public R&D 
investment and the institutional framework to allocate this support in a targeted and 
strategic manner. The institutional framework for R&D is underpinned and led by several 
key public agencies which ensures that the country builds and maintains local knowledge 
and expertise. Singapore’s public universities are producing a cadre of competent water 
scientists and technologists and they have ample opportunity to practice their craft in both 
the public and private sectors. The challenge for the sector is that it remains highly 
dependent on R&D support from government and purchases from public utilities; and 
much of the private sector investment in R&D is a result of the presence of multi-national 
firms which Singapore has actively attracted to strengthen the local technology sector 
(UNESCO, 2015; Singapore Department of Statistics, 2017; Sagar, 2017).  
Israel is the world’s most research-intensive country, and this is linked to its 
investments in R&D and to innovation and entrepreneurship in its water technologies. 
Both the public and private sectors have considerable experience in an increasingly 
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complex water economy which employs increasingly complex technologies to address a 
growing water deficit. Both public and private R&D play a key role in upgrading factors 
in the water sector whether through drip irrigation, recycling and reuse of used water, or 
desalination. Israel’s researchers are highly productive in publishing peer reviewed 
journal articles and in securing patents and its entrepreneurs and innovators have an 
outstanding track-record in commercializing water technologies. To develop and sustain 
its specialized and advanced factors Israel's water economy is well supported by public 
and private funding for R&D; and its universities produce a large number of competent 
scientists and engineers (Peled, 2001; Frenkel, Shefer & Miller, 2008; DeHaan, 2008; 
Isenberg, 2010; UNESCO, 2015; Ben-Zoor & Priampolsky, 2016).  
The strategy of government establishing an institutional framework of formal 
policies, systems, and processes to encourage and leverage R&D undertaken by 
government laboratories, universities or other research institutions to facilitate the 
development, commercialization and diffusion of water-related technologies answers 
research questions one, two, and six: (1) governments do intervene to promote the 
development of industrial clusters, (2) they employ a suite of public policies and 
strategies to support the development or expansion of water technology innovation 
clusters, and (3) the institutional setting of a jurisdiction does affect the development and 
diffusion of innovative water-related technologies. Table 11.2 below provides a sample 
the network of R&D partners which governments in the six clusters helped build; and this 
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Table 11.2. Research & Development Partners in Water Technology Clusters 
Country  Research Centre   Universities  Industry Partners 
USA (Federal) Andrew W. Breidenbach         
  Environmental Research Center 
Cincinnati     Universitiy of Cincinnati  Northern Kentucky  
Universitiy of Dayton  Sanitation District 
Universitiy of Northern  Duke Energy 
Kentucky 
 
Milwaukee Global Water Center  School of Freshwater Veolia 
      Sciences, UWM 
 
Tacoma  Center for Urban Waters  UW, Tacoma  Parametrix 
   Institute for Environmental  Washington State  GeoEngineers and  
  Research and Education  University  CH2M HILL 
   
    
 
Netherlands TTIW Wetsus   Wageningen University  Wetsalt   
  UNESCO – IHE   University of Twente  Vitens Innovation 
  Water Application Center  University of Groningen Sentec 
      TU Delft 
      VHL University 
 
Singapore Public Utilities Board   Nanyang Technology  PWN Technologies 
      University  Hyflux 
      Singapore National     
      University 
 
Israel  Grand Water Research Institute Technion  TAHAL 
  Center for Water Sensitive  Ben-Gurion University Merkorot-  
  Cities    Tel Aviv University  WaTech 
      Birziet University 
      Hebrew University 
 
C. Supporting Technology Transfers and Commercialization.  
The public sector is both a major developer and consumer of water technologies 
through its historic responsibility for water infrastructure. The public sector is also a 
regulator of the water sector through its historic responsibility for the protection of public 
and environmental health. This requires that the public sector have policies and an 
institutional framework to facilitate the transfer of technology between key stakeholders, 
especially from the public to the private sector given that the scale and scope of the role 
of the latter is increasing in the emerging water economy. All six clusters have 
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established formal policies, systems, and processes to facilitate the transfer of technology 
between key stakeholders, and in most cases this institutional framework was created 
initially by the public sector.  
This strategy supports the assertion by Porter (1998) in the Diamond Model that 
related and supporting industries can stimulate other companies in the water value-chain 
to upgrade their factors and innovate, and that government can influence each of the five 
other forces in the Diamond model to encourage and stimulate the development of 
competitive firms and industry clusters. North (1990) points out that well-established 
socio-economic systems are hard to change and display tendencies towards path 
dependence. Change requires entrepreneurs who change the incentive regime as well as 
promote new skills and knowledge. This strategy also supports the assertion by Rodgers 
(2003) that the innovation-diffusion process goes through five distinct stages from 
‘knowledge’ to ‘confirmation’ with each stage having an uncertainty bottleneck to clear 
before adoption can be considered complete.  
In the United States the federal government is taking a lead role in supporting the 
transfer, commercialization, and diffusion of water technologies. The EPA in Cincinnati, 
for example, carries out research projects and develops methods, models, and tools that 
help states and communities assess environmental risks and make decisions to safeguard 
the environment, public water systems, and public health. This research is of technical 
and commercial value to innovators and entrepreneurs and can positively impact local 
economies. The EPA also partners with local utilities to facilitate the commercialization 
of technologies by making it easier for companies to try out their innovations in 
controlled, government-approved settings. In addition, the three US industry associations 
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studied all formally support water innovators, entrepreneurs, and universities in the 
transfer and commercialization water technologies for industrial, utility, and 
environmental markets.  
Confluence, through its multistate memorandum of understanding between 
regulators from Ohio, Kentucky and Indiana, has facilitated a process designed to 
simplify and expedite the commercialization process of water technologies by allowing 
startups and firms to get water innovations approved by all three states at once. The 
Water Council, through its Innovation Commercialization Exchange (ICE) Institute, 
identifies and evaluates promising and emerging water technologies from across the full 
spectrum of the water R&D community and connects these technologies to water related 
industries - including utilities, agriculture, and manufacturers. The Center for Urban 
Waters is building on the nationally and globally recognized expertise of the City of 
Tacoma in environmental remediation and storm-water management, much of which 
comes from experience built up from the clean-up and restoration of the former 
Superfund site at Commencement Bay. The Center provides a repository for this 
scientific knowledge and technical expertise, a world-class research center, and a 
collaborative intellectual environment where a diverse mix of environmental scientists, 
analysts, engineers and policymakers develop policy and design and implement creative 
and sustainable solutions to restore and protect the Puget Sound.  
In The Netherlands there exists institutional mechanisms for the transfer of 
technology between stakeholders and the commercialization of water technology at both 
national and local levels. At the national level the Rijkswaterstaat, through its historic 
role of knowledge management and information dissemination, and as a demanding and 
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sophisticated purchaser of engineering services, contributes significantly to innovation 
and entrepreneurship in the Dutch water economy (Lintsen, 2002; Lonnquest et al., 
2014). Current Dutch national economic policy employs the concept of the quadruple 
helix which ensures that government, research institutes, and businesses combine and 
transform their knowledge and expertise into innovative products, services, and skills that 
deliver smart, cost-effective, and commercially viable solutions for the management of 
water resources.  
At the cluster level, the Water Campus in Leeuwarden employs a model called the 
Water Technology Innovation Chain to support water technology firms accelerate the 
time to commercialization and increase the rate with which technologies are successfully 
commercialized. This is achieved by bringing together in a single, central location all the 
supportive institutional elements which entrepreneurs and innovators would require 
throughout the whole commercialization process, from idea to business. The Water 
Campus provides a single focal point for education, scientific and technological 
knowledge, business support, and match-making related to water-and-wastewater.  
At the firm level, Dutch water technology firms benefit from a combination of a 
very strong scientific and technological position, strong and technically stringent demand, 
and decades of international experience; however, the scientific and technical capacity for 
Dutch firms to develop technologies is not well supported by the entrepreneurial and 
innovative capacity to commercialize these technologies due to a paucity of home 
entrepreneurs, a weak entrepreneurial spirit, a cultural reluctance to take risks, and a 
regulatory regime which generally does not reward risk taking. These are issues which 
are generic to innovation in The Netherlands, weakens the national and sectoral 
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innovation systems, and makes it difficult to translate knowledge and experience to 
commercially successful business ventures (van der Veen, 2010).  
In Singapore the public, private and academic stakeholders in water technology 
cooperate closely under a robust institutional framework established by the government 
to attract foreign water companies to Singapore, provide R&D funding, and help 
Singapore-based companies and research institutes develop and commercialize water 
technologies for the global marketplace.  
Israel’s flourishing and globally competitive water technology sub-sector is a 
model of the successful transfer and commercialization of water technologies. This was 
not always the case. In the decades prior to 1990, the transfer and commercialization of 
water technologies in Israel suffered from a weak institutional framework to support 
innovation and entrepreneurship, and the transfer and commercialization of water 
technology was shaped by public policies that focused the industry on expanding supply 
to the politically powerful agricultural stakeholders through exploration, well drilling, 
and water transportation from water endowed regions to water deficient region of the 
country. Organizations which were early in recognizing the unsustainable nature of 
Israel's existing water policy were initially ignored until water shortages in the 1990s, but 
this unreceptive environment encouraged water innovators and entrepreneurs to look 
overseas to develop markets for their technologies. When the water innovation 
environment changed from the 1990s onwards, in response to both politico-ideological 
shifts and severe droughts, the water technology industry was sufficiently mature to 
overcome its early fragmentation and build networks that better integrated public sector, 
private sector, and academic stakeholders and dramatically improve the institutional 
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arrangements for the transfer and commercialization of water technologies. Within the 
Israeli water economy, innovation, entrepreneurship, technology transfer, and technology 
commercialization occurs through a 'triangle of innovation' that integrates all 
stakeholders into a water technology ecosystem. Each element of the triangle – the 
private sector, government, public and private utilities, and universities - brings a 
different contribution to the ecosystem.  
The strategy of government establishing an institutional framework of formal 
policies, systems, and processes to facilitate the transfer of water-related technologies 
between key stakeholders answers research questions one, two, and six: (1) governments 
do intervene to promote the development of industrial clusters, (2) they employ a suite of 
public policies and strategies to support the development or expansion of water 
technology innovation clusters, and (3) the institutional setting of a jurisdiction does 
affect the development and diffusion of innovative water-related technologies. Table 11.3 
below provides a sample of the channels for supporting the transfer, commercialization, 
and diffusion of water technologies which governments in the six clusters helped build; 
and this validates the third of the EPA’s nine strategies. The channels include networks of 
public sector research institutions, regulatory agencies, public-private partnerships of 
various kinds, private incubators and accelerators, industry associations, and public and 









   






Table 11.3. Sample of Channels for Supporting the Transfer, Commercialization, and Diffusion of Water Technologies 
Country  Public     Public-Private    Private   Industry Associations Utilities 
USA   Andrew W. Breidenbach             
  Environmental Research Center 
Cincinnati           Confluence 
Milwaukee           Water Council    MMSD 
Tacoma  City of Tacoma   Center for Urban Waters         City of Tacoma 
  Economic Development Board Institute for Environmental         Environmental 
      Research and Education         Services 
 
Netherlands Rijkswaterstaat   Water Technology Innovation       
      Chain, Leeuwarden  
 
Singapore Public Utilities Board   HydroHub     IWA    
  Economic Development Board  Water Center of Excellence   SWA    
  International Enterprise Singapore Center for Advanced Water 
  SPRING   Technology 
  Environment and Water Industry         
  Programme Office    
 
Israel  Water Authority   Israel Export and International  Kinrot -  IWA    Merkorot- 
  Water Board   Cooperation Institute   Incubator     WaTech 
      Tahal 
      Israel Tech Transfer Organization  
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D. Facilitating Communication and Diffusing Knowledge.  
Communication, through networks, personal relationships and community ties, is 
vital for the success of organizations and institutions (North, 1990; Porter, 1998; 
Rodgers, 2003). The highly fragmented water economy and water technology industry 
requires the creation of robust networks for facilitating communication and knowledge 
diffusion. The diffusion of knowledge is a fundamental function of a socio-economic 
system. Water stakeholders need a wider range of detailed information about regulatory 
requirements and technology performance, and the characteristics of stakeholders, such 
as who is connected to whom. The type, quantity, and speed with which information 
flows all impact the performance of the industry. Water technology networks are 
complex social systems made up of heterogeneous stakeholders who must cooperate and 
coordinate their activities and learn from each other. This suggests the need for 
distributed or organic networks rather than traditional hierarchies. All six clusters have 
established formal policies, structures, and processes to facilitate communication and 
knowledge diffusion, and in most cases this institutional framework was created initially 
by the public sector.  
This strategy supports the assertion by Porter (1998) in the Diamond Model that 
industry structure, related and supporting industries, and government can influence 
communication and knowledge diffusion and stimulate the development of competitive 
industry clusters. This strategy would align with North’s (1990) suggestion that robust 
institutional arrangements for collaboration, coordination, and information sharing are 
important in the water technology industry because stakeholders need more information 
to make decisions and reduce information asymmetries to minimize transaction and 
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agency costs. This strategy would also align with Rodgers (2003) five-stage model for 
innovation-diffusion in that the structure for communication and diffusion of knowledge 
and innovations are central to the efficiency of the water technology industry and thus its 
competitiveness.  
In the United States the creation of networks and communication channels that 
better integrate the water technology value-chain and facilitate water technology 
commercialization and diffusion have been key to building water technology clusters. At 
the national level one of the key goals of the EPA’s cluster program has been to build 
networks and facilitate communication. The EPA does this through active support for the 
creation of industry associations to connect key stakeholders across organizational and 
disciplinary boundaries within the water industry. More robust connections between 
water stakeholders create synergies that increases the economic potential of the entire 
water industry. The EPA has also supported the publication of market analysis and 
technology reports on the companies and market trends shaping innovation the U.S. 
drinking water sector. These strategies are repeated at the local level in all three US water 
technology clusters through multiple strategies: establishing of regional networks, hosting 
of conferences, building bridges with other water clusters around the world, developing 
green infrastructure to promote sustainability, and conducting public education, facility 
tours and presentations on water quality issues and the impact of climate change. 
In The Netherlands the institutional arrangements for facilitating communication 
and diffusing knowledge occurs at multiple levels. At the national level the 
Rijkswaterstaat’s role of 'knowledge creator and diffuser' and 'knowledge absorber' has 
been well institutionalized. The Rijkswaterstaat is a knowledge intensive agency that 
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creates and supplies innovations to its sub-contractors and to water resource partners at 
lower political scales; and it also absorbs innovations from its suppliers, sub-contractors, 
and research partners. The Rijkswaterstaat is staffed by highly trained and experienced 
technical and policy personnel in possession of a ‘hydraulic imagination’ and with a 
willingness to experiment, which are key preconditions for communication and 
knowledge diffusion. The Netherlands is also a top performer in the production of 
scientific publications, far ahead of the EU and the United States. The Dutch government 
also works to raise the profile of the water sector: water technology firms may receive 
national honors and awards for excellence in science, technology, and innovation. Public 
efforts at communication and knowledge diffusion are complemented by the work of 
other organizations such as the Netherlands Water Partnership (NWP) which is an 
independent body which represents the Dutch water sector on the global stage. The NWP 
is committed to solving global water related challenges through the exchange of 
information on Dutch water expertise, by supporting water policy developments, and by 
expanding market opportunities for its members through trade missions, exhibitions and 
conferences. At the local level the city of Leeuwarden, through The Water Campus, is 
hoping to act as a ‘hub’ for a worldwide network of water technology businesses and 
research organizations and to serve as a central point where knowledge about water is 
collected, where innovation takes place, and where water technology is commercialized 
(Ebbekink & Lagendijk, 2017).   
In Singapore inter-agency coordination and public outreach have long been 
strengths of the institutional framework for water resource management, and this has 
facilitated communication and knowledge diffusion among key stakeholders involved in 
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environmental protection, public health, and water-and-wastewater management. The 
network of public agencies and private associations help water companies in marketing 
their products and services, in building networks with potential partners, and in 
facilitating local water companies and related organizations to work closely with 
government agencies on water technology development, skills acquisition and industry 
missions. The Water Network, for example, employs a networking strategy that provides 
a platform for the people, private and public sectors (3Ps) to meet, share information and 
give views to the PUB on policies and programs concerning all aspects of the city state's 
water. Singapore’s institutional arrangements for facilitating communication and 
diffusing knowledge about water, sanitation and environmental considerations goes 
beyond that of any other cluster studied and includes companies developing water 
technologies, other players in the water economy, and the general public.  
In Israel the water technology sector initially lacked robust formal mechanisms 
for effective and efficient communication and knowledge diffusion of its water 
technologies, especially for technologies and expertise developed in the public sector. For 
many years detailed water studies and water plans were produced but largely ignored due 
to the development priorities and political influence of a narrow segment of the water 
economy, namely agricultural interests and their allies in government. After economic 
liberalization in the 1980s and the water crisis of the 1990s, better institutional 
arrangements for communication and knowledge diffusion in both the public and private 
sectors emerged. In 2004, Mekorot established WaTech to carry out R&D, support 
innovators and entrepreneurs from both start-ups and mature companies and find 
solutions via cooperation and collaboration with different water stakeholders both 
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nationally and internationally. WaTech is responsible for developing and registering 
patents as Mekorot’s intellectual property, and in applying information and database 
management to enrich the professional knowledge at the disposal of the Mekorot group 
and its industry and academic partners. Israel’s water and wastewater industry has also 
hosted in Israel several three-day biennial Water Technology and Environmental Control 
Exhibition & Conferences, as well as in Peru and Italy. Israel’s researchers are also 
highly productive in publishing peer reviewed journal articles and in securing patents. 
The strategy of government establishing an institutional framework of formal 
policies, systems, and processes to facilitate communication between key stakeholders 
and knowledge diffusion answers research questions one, two, and six: (1) governments 
do intervene to promote the development of industrial clusters, (2) they employ a suite of 
public policies and strategies to support the development or expansion of water 
technology innovation clusters, and (3) the institutional setting of a jurisdiction does 
affect the development and diffusion of innovative water-related technologies.  
Table 11.4 below provides a sample of the channels for facilitating diffusion of 
knowledge and increasing communication among water stakeholders which governments 
in the six clusters helped build; and this validates the fourth of the EPA’s nine strategies. 
The key channels identified were industry, professional, and technical publications, 
capacity building mechanisms, conferences and workshops for dissemination of 



















Table 11.4. Sample of Channels for Facilitating Diffusion of Knowledge & Increasing Communication among Water Stakeholders 
Country  Publications   Capacity Building  Conferences  Associations/Partnerships 
USA (Federal) U.S. Drinking Water Innovation      EPA Annual Drinking    
   Vendor Outlook Report       Water Conference    
   Mapping Report on Proposed      EPA Annual WTIC    
  Water Cluster in Cincinnati Region     Leaders Meeting  
          WH Water Summit 
 
Cincinnati     Confluence Water Research Groundwater Conference Confluence Regional  
      Consortium       Utility Network   
Milwaukee     Coaching/Mentoring of  Global Water Conference Leeuwarden/Monpelier 
      Innovators/Entrepreneurs     Tianjin 
      MMSD-Public Education/Tours        
 
Tacoma  Encyclopedia of the Puget  Collaborative Research,  Wellspring Conference Center for Urban Waters 
  Sound    Policy Making &         
  Puget Sound Institute   Environmental Projects 
 
Netherlands Dutch Water Sector   Rijkswaterstaat    WEFTECH  Netherlands Water                
Partnership  
    
Singapore Innovation in Water - PUB Public Utilities Board  Singapore International HydroHub 
  Environment and Water   Water Week (SIWW)  Singapore Water  
  Industry Programme       Association 
 
Israel  Water Technology in Israel- KLL-Jewish National Fund Water Technology& Merkorot-WaTech 
  Bank Leumi   IsraAid/MASHAV  Environmental Control  Israel Tech Transfer  
      Merkorot-WaTech  Exhibition & Conference Organization 
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E. Cluster Champions 
Champions are critical to the facilitation of the cross-agency cooperation that is 
necessary to build and sustain a business cluster. The formation of individual business, 
industries and clusters are often formed because of the vision, persistence, and magnetism 
of individuals or small groups who invest significant time and personal capital in building 
the social capital which will ultimately sustain the firm or industry. Champions can come 
from the private or public sectors and volunteer or are selected to facilitate change and 
communication. All six clusters have had champions but not all were individuals nor 
industry leaders: where the public sector played a leading role the cluster champion was 
often a politician or a public entity.  
This strategy recognizes that the pressure to strive for competitive advantage 
often arises from leadership which recognizes the need for change, embraces change, and 
promotes innovation and the upgrading of factors; and leaders help harness and amplify 
systemic forces of the diamond (Porter, 1990). This strategy aligns with North (1990) 
who asserts that the need for change creates opportunities for entrepreneurs who 
recognize the benefits that could flow from institutional changes, but he cautions that 
there exists a tension between those who seek to promote change and those who seek to 
maintain the status quo which results in path dependence for a socio-economic system. 
The strategy also supports Rodgers (2003) assertion that innovativeness and the 
innovation-diffusion process are both socially-constructed and different groups have 
different rates at which they are willing to adopt innovations. Champions are themselves 
often innovators and entrepreneurs who act as gatekeepers and facilitate innovations 
being brought into a socio-economic system. 
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In the United States champions have been important in pulling together a coalition 
of stakeholders that is required to build and sustain water technology clusters. These 
champions have included politicians, policy makers, planners, business leaders, 
researchers, and academics. At the federal level the EPA’s Sally Gutierrez has emerged 
as the national champion for the water technology industry and the focal point for federal 
support for emerging water technology clusters. At the cluster level the membership of 
the board of directors for Cincinnati’s Confluence is drawn from across the tri-state 
region and is composed of a variety of leaders and experts from industry, government and 
academia. Allan Vicory, the first Chairman of Confluence, is a national and international 
leader on water quality and water resource management issues with 40 years’ experience 
in river basin management. For 24 years, Vicory served as the Executive Director and 
Chief Engineer of ORSANCO, an eight-state agency established to control and abate 
water pollution in the Ohio Basin. Vicory currently works with Stantec, where he 
manages regulatory interface, watershed planning, and water quality initiatives. The 
champions behind the formation of The Water Council were the chief executive officers 
of two Milwaukee water technology companies, Rick Meeusen of Badger Meter and Paul 
Jones of A.O. Smith, who took up a latent idea and made it a reality. In 2006 Meeusen 
and Jones convened a meeting of local business, civic, and academic leaders to formulate 
a vision, work out a strategy, identify resources, and prepare a plan to make Milwaukee 
into a regional and global center for freshwater expertise and technologies.  
On the other hand, Tacoma’s water technology cluster lacks the type of 
champions found in Cincinnati and Milwaukee, especially from the private sector. The 
water technology industry in Washington State is much more fragmented and 
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geographically dispersed than Milwaukee or Cincinnati and it lacks an industry 
association to match Confluence or the Water Council. Public sector agencies and 
academic institutions provide most of the staffing and operational support for the Tacoma 
IPZ at the Center for Urban Waters. The main figures to champion Tacoma’s water 
technology cluster are therefore from the public sector and academia which reflects the 
nature of the work which dominates the agenda of the cluster, the restoration and 
protection of the Puget Sound. Tacoma’s cluster has also suffered from a high rate of 
turn-over of key leaders in several of its member agencies. Nevertheless, the leadership at 
the Center for Urban Waters have been engaged in building on the Tacoma’s assets, 
crafting a strategy for growing the cluster, and achieving the center’s vision and mission 
of creating a world-class research facility dedicated to finding solutions to the problems 
of urban living and its impact on the environment. The leading role of private sector 
champions is most U.S. clusters is reflective of the preeminent role of the private sector 
in economic life and the country’s strong culture of entrepreneurship.   
In The Netherlands the champions of the water industry also come from both the 
public and private sectors, however the public sector has historically played a particularly 
central role at both the national and local levels. At the national level the Rijkswaterstaat 
has for 200 years provided leadership, technical support, coordination, and knowledge for 
the Dutch water sector primarily through major public infrastructure works. The 
Netherlands is a water-centered society and the Rijkswaterstaat, the single most powerful 
Dutch public institution, is at the cultural and technological heart of the country. In the 
city of Leeuwarden, the city's planners and policy makers are active champions for the 
water technology cluster centered at the Water Campus.  
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The Dutch water industry has recently seen the emergence of several strong 
associations that work closely with the public sector to support the water sector. The 
Netherlands Water Partnership (NWP), located at the International Water House in The 
Hague, is a partnership of public and private, profit and non-profit organizations, and 
knowledge institutions that support the water sector, primarily in export and international 
cooperation. The NWP was founded in 1998 by Jeroen van der Sommen who, after a 
long career in managing water supply projects on behalf of organizations such as the 
World Bank and the European Union, built the association into a partnership of 200 
organizations. The goal of the NWP is to offers its members networking, knowledge 
sharing, visibility and influence. The Water Alliance, founded in 2010 in the Northern 
Netherlands, is another partnership of Dutch public and private companies, government 
agencies and knowledge institutes involved in water technology. The goals of the Water 
Alliance are to supports the progress of the Dutch water technology sector through 
networking, and to reinforce the development of the Leeuwarden Water Campus as the 
physical core of the Dutch water technology industry. Its Supervisory Board is made up 
of leading figures from the regional governments, knowledge institutions, and water 
industry and it is located at the Water Campus in Leeuwarden. ENVAQUA is a Dutch 
trade association for 125 suppliers and producers of environmental and water 
technologies with a combined worldwide turnover of EUR 4.2 billion and 20,000 
employees. ENVAQUA’s goal is to connect Dutch technology companies with customers 
around the world, increase export opportunities of its members, and support 
collaborations with its partners to promote innovation and knowledge development. It 
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was formed in 2015 from the merger of two industry associations that were themselves 
formed in the 1980s.  
In Singapore the main champions of the water sector were historically from the 
public sector beginning with its first prime minister, Lee Kwan Yee, who recognized that 
water was a strategic resource that was key to economic development, public and 
environmental health, and national security. During his tenure he closely supervised the 
water sector. Singapore’s case suggests that a combination of strong political will, 
sustained public support, and a sense of urgency are required to marshal the resources 
and maintain the focus over the decades that are often required to solve water challenges. 
The vision of Lee helped to create a sustainable and comprehensive institutional 
framework which is underpinned by several important public agencies. The Ministry of 
the Environment and Water Resources (MEWR) manages water as a strategic national 
resource; the Public Utilities Board (PUB) holistically manages the country’s water 
supply, water catchments, and used water; the National Environment Agency implements 
the environmental policies established by the MEWR; the Environment and Water 
Industry Development Council (EWI) turned the environment & water industry into a 
strategic growth area; local public universities develop human capital to carry out basic 
and applied research; the Agency for Science, Technology and Research (A*STAR) 
raises the level of science and technology competency in Singapore; the Economic 
Development Board (EDB) turns local companies into internationally competitive high-
technology enterprises; and the Singapore Water Association (SWA) for promotes 
Singapore as a point of reference for all water technologies and services. 
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In Israel two key figures, Levi Eskhol and Simcha Blaas, were critical to the early 
development of the country’s water economy; but individual personalities have become 
less important as champions of the water economy as water institutions and institutional 
arrangements have become more established. Levi Eskhol and Simcha Blaas began 
laying the foundations for Israel’s water institutions and water economy in the 1930s and 
developed a comprehensive philosophy and strategy to address the problem of water 
supply. This approach led to institutions and institutional arrangements dominated by the 
public sector and political priorities. These men helped to create and lead organizations 
such as Mekorot Water Company and Tahal, and Levi Eshkol served as head of Mekorot, 
Minister of Agriculture and Development, and Prime Minister, and he was also active in 
the promotion of industries that were necessary to support and sustain the development of 
water projects. Shima Blass, a hydraulic engineer, was a key figure in designing the 
Israeli National Water Carrier, an innovator and entrepreneur in drip irrigation, and 
founder of Netafim Irrigation Company in 1965 which now employs 3,000 people and 
operates in 150 countries through 37 subsidiaries, with 13 factories. Blass had struggled 
for years to both perfect drip irrigation and overcome institutional resistance and 
intellectual skepticism to this technology. 
The changing political, economic, demographic and environmental landscape 
from the 1980s has seen the Israel’s water economy evolve and restructure, the private 
sector increase the scope and scale of its involvement, reforms in the legal framework, 
and the rise of new water institutions and institutional arrangements. The current context 
lacks individual champions such as Eshkol and Blass, but the industry is now represented 
by an increasingly robust public-private institutional framework reflective of its 
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increasing maturity. The Israeli water industry is represented by the Israeli Water 
Association (IWA) which was founded in 2001 as an interdisciplinary professional body 
representing institutions and organizations involved in water and the water industry. The 
goals of the IWA include the dissemination of information that helps solve water 
problems, influencing decision-makers in government and institutions to use evidence-
based policy that supports the continuous optimization and improvement of Israel's water 
economy, and maintaining Israel’s links to leading international organizations such as the 
International Water Association (IWA) and the American Water Environment Federation 
(WEF).  
The strategy of government encouraging or supporting champions who 
facilitation of the cross-agency cooperation necessary to build and sustain water 
technology clusters answers research questions one and five: (1) governments do 
intervene to promote the development of industrial clusters, and (2) individual or 
organizational champions do facilitate the development and diffusion of water-related 
technologies and enhance the competitiveness of water technology innovation clusters. 
Table 11.5 below provides a sample of the champions for water technology clusters; and 
this validates the fifth of the EPA’s nine strategies. All six clusters had champions and 
they played instrumental roles in every case: some were individuals while others were 
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Table 11.5. Examples of Water Technology Cluster Champions 
Country  Political  Public Sector     Private Sector Industry Association 
USA     Sally Guiterrez  
Cincinnati      Allen Vickory Melinda Keuyer 
Milwaukee Mayor     Rick Meeusen Dean Amhaus 
       Paul Jones 
 
Tacoma    Tacoma IPZ   
 
Netherlands   Rijkswaterstaat    Jeroen van der Sommen/ 
Water Campus     Netherlands Water  
          Partnership 
         Water Alliance 
         ENVAQUA 
 
Singapore Lee Kwan Yee Ministry of the Environment   Singapore Water  
and Water Resources    Association 
Public Utilities Board 
Environment and Water  
Industry Development Council 
A*STAR 
Economic Development Board 
 
Israel  Levi Eskhol  Simcha Blaas    Israeli Water Association 
    Merkorot 
 
F. Public-private partnerships 
Water and sanitation services are universally accepted as a public good whose 
universal provision supports public and environmental health, local economic 
development, and an internationally competitive economy. Water and sanitation 
providers must provide high quality, reliable services at affordable prices while facing 
complex challenges and ensuring the alignment with diverse stakeholder’s objectives, 
often with conflicting expectations. The universal provision of this public good requires a 
good governance framework, significant financial capital for infrastructure provision and 
upgrading, a sustainable revenue stream to ensure financial viability, increasingly 
sophisticated technologies to minimize water losses and energy use, and sound 
management to ensure efficient service delivery to both domestic and commercial 
 
 575   
  
customers. Public sectors increasingly lack the resources and expertise to equally address 
all these challenges in an optimal manner and are increasingly turning to public-private 
partnerships (PPPs) as a desirable model to develop, improve and sustain water and 
sanitation services. PPPs allow governments who are ultimately responsible for the 
provision of water and sanitation services to allocate or delegate responsibilities for 
planning, designing, financing, constructing, and operating to the party optimally 
positioned to manage specific components of a water or sanitation project. PPPs also 
enable the public sector to access types of knowledge and skills it does not possess and to 
introduce innovation and entrepreneurship into project implementation and management 
that a purely public undertaking would find difficult. All six case studies demonstrate the 
increasing importance of PPPs, as well as both public and private sector innovation and 
entrepreneurship, to the delivery of water and sanitation services.  
This strategy supports the assertion by Porter (1998) in the Diamond Model about 
the important role of government in setting the institutional framework for cooperation 
and competition, and also the role of industry structure and strategy, or how firms set 
goals and objectives, and are organized and managed, are all critical to competitiveness. 
This strategy of optimally allocating roles and responsibilities through PPPs addresses the 
concern of North (1990) for institutional and governance arrangements that increase 
cooperation and coordination and reduce transaction and agency costs. This strategy also 
reflects the concern of Rodgers (2003) for complexity and its negative impact on the 
innovation-diffusion process. An innovation will not be adopted unless stakeholders 
understand ‘how’ and ‘why’ an innovation works and this requires a thorough 
understanding of ‘how-to-knowledge’ and ‘principles-knowledge’ related to the 
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innovation. Excessive complexity is negatively correlated with the rate and speed of 
adoption of innovations, and well-structured PPPs can introduce governance 
arrangements that reduce complexity, and technical and management arrangements to 
ensure that it is used correctly.   
In the United States governments at all levels are becoming increasingly 
entrepreneurial as a strategy to encourage local economic development and provide 
traditional public services in the most efficient and effective manner. Public-private 
partnerships are increasingly a key component of this entrepreneurial strategy. In 
Cincinnati the city government, local public utilities, local businesses, local universities, 
non-profits in economic development, venture capitalists, and universities involved in 
education and research enter partnerships to implement projects such as the MetroWest 
Commerce Park, to attract high-volume, high-water-quality users to Cincinnati, and 
Pipeline H2O, a business incubator which specializes in advanced manufacturing and 
clean technologies. In Milwaukee The Water Council actively brings together research 
entities, existing businesses, start-ups, and government agencies to commercialize 
technology, promote water entrepreneurship, and increase access to capital; while the 
Milwaukee Metropolitan Sewer District maintains a PPP with Veolia Water to operate 
and maintain the city’s two sewage treatment plants and other facilities while the MMSD 
retains ownership. Tacoma’s Center for Urban Waters is a collaboration of the City of 
Tacoma, Port of Tacoma, Economic Development Board for Tacoma‐Pierce County, 
Washington Economic Development Commission, University of Washington Tacoma, 
and Washington State University, it was financed with tax-exempt 63-20 bonds, and its 
board it made up of members from the public and private sectors and academia. The 
 
 577   
  
Center houses offices, laboratory space, and water research and testing facilities, and 
researchers from the University of Washington and Puget Sound Partnership, and the 
City of Tacoma’ Environmental Services Division labs and offices staff.  
In The Netherlands the public and private sectors have always collaborated in the 
water economy. Traditionally the public sector served as contractor and developer of 
infrastructure which the private sector built; however, the allocation of roles and 
responsibilities has evolved as the water economy has become more complex and water 
technology has become more sophisticated. Public-private partnerships (PPPs) as an 
organizational structure and contractual arrangement are becoming increasingly 
important as evidenced by the increase in the scale and scope of industry associations, 
business and technology incubators, and research facilities. In the province of Friesland, 
the municipality of Leeuwarden has brought together the Water Alliance, and research 
institutes Wetsus and CEW, under The Water Campus. The various Dutch water industry 
associations such as the NWP, the Dutch WA and ENVAQUA are all PPPs. Public-
private partnerships in the form of contractual arrangements such as Design-Build-Own-
Operate (DBOO) are used in the Netherlands for water-and-wastewater infrastructure and 
services because this structure has demonstrated the ability to build a consortium, carry 
the risk of large, long-term investments, and apply appropriate technological solutions to 
urban water problems. The Delfland Water Board, responsible for wastewater treatment 
for The Hague, was the first city to opt for a PPP in the Dutch water sector. The Delfluent 
PPP is considered a model for encouraging good governance and public accountability in 
water services because the contractual arrangement allows for independent verifications 
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and audits, performance monitoring, parliamentary oversight, and independence from 
conflicting commercial interests. 
In Singapore, water and sanitation was historically the preserve of the 
government. In 2003 the government officially introduced PPP schemes and private 
sector participation in service provision and it has become increasingly important in the 
water economy. The institutional framework for the water economy now includes various 
public-private and private-private relationships to complement traditional public-public 
arrangements. For PPPs, delegated public management is the preferred arrangement for 
new water-and-wastewater facilitates, usually taking the form of 15-30-year Build-
Design-Own-Operate (BDOO) contracts. The scope of PPPs in water and wastewater in 
Singapore is not, however, as great as in other sectors because the severe scarcity of 
water makes it a strategic resource over which the government must maintain 
considerable direct control. Delegation to the private sector and the use of PPPs have thus 
been confined to NEWater and desalination plants. 
In Israel the public sector at both national and local scales traditionally dominated 
the water economy and the provision of water and sanitation services. The private sector 
has long played a role in the water economy, particularly in the water technology sub-
sector. In recent years the private sector has also become increasingly involved in service 
provision in the utility sub-sector in response to an increasingly complex water economy 
which employs increasingly complex technologies. This shift in policy has largely been 
driven by a neo-liberal turn in Israeli policy and governance which has been underway 
since the 1980s and which has accelerated since the 2000s with the expansion of 
desalination and reforms to municipal water-and-wastewater services. PPP contracts are 
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an important feature of the corporatization of water utilities and are designed to improve 
operational performance, reduce costs, raise private funding for infrastructure investment, 
ensure the financial sustainability of major infrastructure, and increase access to 
technology and expertise.   
The strategy of government increasingly encouraging or supporting PPPs  to 
optimally allocate roles and responsibilities within an increasingly complex water 
economy answers research questions one, two, four, and six: (1) governments do 
intervene to promote the development of industrial clusters, (2) they employ a suite of 
public policies and strategies to support the development or expansion of water 
technology innovation clusters, (3) they are increasingly strategic about the allocation of 
roles and responsibilities – or the division of labor – between public and private partners 
in developing or expanding water technology innovation clusters, and (4) the institutional 
setting of a jurisdiction does affect the development and diffusion of innovative water-
related technologies.  
Table 11.6 below provides a sample of the PPPs employed in each water 
technology clusters; and this validates the sixth of the EPA’s nine strategies. All six 
clusters employ PPPs and they play instrumental roles in every case; however, the way in 
which PPPs are employed does vary across jurisdictions. The United States and The 
Netherlands use PPPs much more broadly than Singapore and Israel, which partially 
reflects the traditionally stronger role of a well-established private sector. Israel and 
Singapore are newly independent states which emerged in the post-World War II era 
when state-led development was the dominant development model; and both countries 
faced water shortages which were strategic and immediate security risks which 
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necessitated greater government control. The Israeli institutional framework is 
increasingly evolving to resemble what exists in the US and The Netherlands as the 
private sector becomes more established. In all the clusters, however, PPPs are an 
increasingly favored organizational structure and contractual arrangement for water and 












Table 11.6. Sample of Public-Private Partnerships in Water and Wastewater 
Country  Research  Economic Development  Business Facilitation  Incubators    Utilities 
USA   Andrew W. Breidenbach             
  Environmental Research  
Center  
 
Cincinnati    MetroWest Commerce   Confluence   Pipeline H2O  RUN 
Park project 
       
Milwaukee School of Freshwater     The Water Council The Water Council MMSD-  
   Sciences             Veolia 
 
Tacoma  Center for Urban  Center for Urban   Center for Urban 
  Waters    Waters    Waters 
 
Netherlands  Water Campus   Water Campus   Water Campus   Water Campus               Delfluent 
  Wetsus       Water Alliance 
  CEW-Leeuwarden     NWP 
         ENVAQUA 
Singapore    HydroHub                                Sembcorp 
                                       NEWater   
                          Keppel  
                           NEWater 
                           Hyflux  
 
Israel                           Ashkelon 
                Palmahim                                         
               Hadera  
                Sorek  
                                      Ashdod 
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G. The Investing Community and Private Capital Markets. 
The global market for water technologies offers huge economic opportunities; 
however, exploiting these opportunities requires access to appropriate sources and forms 
of finance. The ability of innovators and entrepreneurs to access appropriate sources and 
forms of finance depends on the governance frameworks and culture, the legal and 
regulatory environment, the nature and types of risk in the water economy, and the 
reward structures that are present. The water economy faces a number of challenges and 
bottlenecks: (a) financial flows from the private investment community into the water 
economy tend to be insufficient, (b) public spending on water is usually a small share of 
the budget, (c) profitability of utilities is often weak due to traditionally inadequate 
systems for cost recovery linked to pricing methodologies and practices, (d) utilities are 
capital intensive industries with long payback periods and a desire to recover sunk costs 
before investing in new technologies, (e) innovators and entrepreneurs find it difficult to 
field test and scale up technologies, (f) utilities are risk averse due to public health 
concerns and thus slow to adopt new technologies; (g) and startups and small firms do 
not have the resources to respond to market opportunities, nor the capacities to access 
already available sources of funding. This means that water technologies go through long 
cycles from R&D to commercialization, and that financing is dominated by government 
grants, loans, or public subsidies, or reliant on foreign aid in the case of developing 
countries. An innovative and entrepreneurial water economy, and water technology 
subsector, requires knowledge about access to finance and the development of new 
relationships between private funders, industry, technology firms, and research 
organizations to foster innovation. It also requires government, regulators and utilities 
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committed to sustainable financial models based on full-cost recovery for water and 
wastewater services and which factor in a cost to reflect the scarcity value of water.   
This strategy supports the assertion by Porter (1998) in the Diamond Model about 
the important role of government in setting the institutional framework, and also the 
importance of creating advanced factors such as efficient financial systems to support and 
sustain competitiveness. One reason why innovators and entrepreneurs struggle to raise 
adequate financial capital is incomplete or asymmetric information in the water economy. 
According to North (1990) institutional arrangements that improve the observability of 
human behavior and facilitate credible, third-party enforcement of contracts can help to 
improve the quality and quantity of information and the timeliness of its flow, which 
should in turn help increase the quantity of financial capital available and lower 
transaction and agency costs. 
In the United States financing of utility investments, R&D, and technology 
commercialization usually come from quite different sources such as debt, grants, and 
venture capital with different payback periods and risk profiles. Capital improvements in 
municipal water systems, which can often require substantial investments, are usually 
financed with low-cost, long-term debt; the development and commercialization of water 
technologies, which are designed to save water, reduce energy consumption or prevent 
pollution, are more often financed out of retained earnings and grants from larger 
technology companies; and smaller technology companies usually seek grants, angel 
investors, and venture capital. Utility investments carry low risk despite long investment 
payback periods because water tariffs provide a steady revenue stream; while technology 
investments carry greater risk because of a long and uncertain commercialization process. 
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Many of the technology investments, such as smart metering, leak detection, storm water 
capture, and water recycling are smaller capital investments for which traditional bond 
issues may not be financially feasible. Access to venture capital varies considerable 
across the United States and this form of investment tends to flow to industries which 
offer a quick and potentially large return. Ohio, Wisconsin, and Washington State all 
have small venture capital markets. Partnerships between water technology companies 
and local water and wastewater authorities, which help with R&D, field testing and 
commercialization, and which are mediated and facilitated by industry associations, can 
be particularly productive in accelerating the pace of commercialization and diffusion. 
The Netherlands has one of the strongest financial markets in Europe, to include 
venture capital; and the national government offers incentives to the startups through 
matching capital injections and tax breaks. Despite this favorable overall environment 
small firms, which are the largest component of employment growth and are more 
innovative, have difficulty accessing venture capital; most of the venture capital is 
concentrated in central and southern regions around Amsterdam, Rotterdam and 
Eindhoven; and only a small fraction of venture capital goes to water, wastewater or the 
environment because these have long commercialization periods and investors prefer 
more general purpose technologies that serve a wider market and have shorter 
commercialization periods. The long-term health of the Dutch water technology industry 
remains significantly tied to the investment cycles of the water and wastewater utilities.    
In Singapore the government is the single largest provider of funds for R&D and 
other investments in the water economy, through agencies like A*STAR which is both a 
major research funder and a major research performer, and a builder of networks through 
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the consortium of 18 institutes which it overseas. Singapore’s government has invested 
heavily in the upgrading its startup ecosystem by strengthening the institutional 
framework, by providing incentives to attract entrepreneurs and venture capitalists, by 
cutting regulatory red tape, by helping to protect intellectual property, and by allocating 
public money for early investments. Private capital markets in Singapore, to include 
venture capital, have grown exponentially over the past half-century into a multibillion 
industry. Singapore’s venture capital industry is different from much of the rest of Asia in 
its willingness to fund high technology startups; however, there is a need for more 
growth-stage capital as funds are not properly spread across the startup lifecycle, and 
venture capital is a small fraction of the overall amount invested in R&D, though its 
effective over other forms of capital in helping to get technologies patented and 
commercialized make it an important complement to other forms of capital.  
The strategy of government creating for water technology innovators and 
entrepreneurs the institutional framework to improve access to appropriate sources and 
forms of finance answers research questions one, two and six: (1) governments do 
intervene to promote the development of industrial clusters, (2) they employ a suite of 
public policies and strategies to support the development or expansion of water 
technology innovation clusters, and (3) the institutional setting of a jurisdiction does 
affect the development and diffusion of innovative water-related technologies.  
Table 11.7 below provides a sample of the level and sources of funds which water 
technology innovators and entrepreneurs can access; and this validates the seventh of the 
EPA’s nine strategies. In all six clusters governments attempt to create or improve the 
institutional framework to improve access to appropriate sources and forms of finance; 
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however, without governments grants or strong investments in water and waste water 
utilities to drive demand for water technologies, technology firms struggle to access 
funds from private sources including venture capital.   
Table 11.7. Level of Contribution of Funds by Source for Water Technology  
Country  Public Grants Private Grants  Venture Capital  Crowdfunding 
Cincinnati Low  Low   Low   Negligible 
Milwaukee Low  Low   Low   Negligible 
Tacoma  Low  Low   Low   Low 
Netherlands Medium  Low   Low   Negligible  
Singapore High  Medium   Low   Negligible 
Israel  High  Medium   Medium   Negligible 
 
H. Nurturing Technology Startups.  
Water technology innovators and entrepreneurs require a sustained enabling 
institutional framework if they are to successfully complete the cycle from R&D to 
commercialization. The water economy is a traditionally fragmented and conservative 
sector and the best institutional framework brings together academia, industry, finance, 
regulators, and utilities to mentor and coach startups, increase the probability of the 
successful commercialization of their innovations, and increase the probability of 
survival when the direct support is discontinued. This institutional framework is normally 
provided by accelerators and incubators which often begin life as public-private 
partnerships or are sustained under the umbrella of an industry association. The existence 
of accelerators and incubators provide recognition that startups need more than a great 
idea and financial capital: they need management advice to develop a resilient and 
sustainable business model; marketing and sales advice to identify problems and needs 
that have been validated in the market; legal advice to protect intellectual property; 
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access to a network of industry experts and prospective partners who can help them to 
test, deploy, scale-up and commercialize their innovations; and, above all, customers who 
see them as credible suppliers of solutions to their problems over the life-cycle of those 
problems rather than purveyors of one-time transactions. This complex but robust 
institutional framework must guide innovators and entrepreneurs to understand where 
they should focus their most scarce resources - time and energy – in the right activities 
and towards the correct outputs and outcomes. In addition to general competencies, 
accelerators and startups must have specific competiences: different water technology 
clusters have specific areas of expertise. Accelerators and incubators must be capable of 
supporting startups based on their areas of technological focus to best leverage the 
expertise of the cluster and increase the survival rate of the startup. Each of the six 
clusters considered in the study have somewhat different areas of focus or expertise based 
on their unique water challenges and the public policy priorities which have shaped their 
respective water economies.  
The strategy of nurturing technology startups supports the assertion by Porter 
(1998) in the Diamond Model about the importance of upgrading basic to advanced 
factors, and of the role of related and supporting industries in stimulating innovation and 
upgrading because of close working relationships with suppliers and customers for 
testing, perfecting and scaling up technologies, the quick and constant flow of market 
information, and an ongoing exchange of ideas that can accelerate the pace of innovation. 
North (1990) recognized that stimulating economic growth, in this case facilitating the 
entry of new firms into the market, requires institutional arrangements that reduce 
barriers to entry such as transaction and agency costs, and incomplete and asymmetric 
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information. This strategy also supports the assertion by Rodgers (2003) that there are 
several attributes that need to be fostered that reduce the uncertainty around the 
innovation process, namely triability and observability. Incubators and accelerators 
increase the visibility of an innovation (observability) and offer more opportunities for 
experimentation with an innovation (triability), which increase the speed and likelihood 
of adoption. 
In the United States the nurturing of startups is considered critical to the 
development and deployment of technologies to support and address water challenges. At 
the federal level the nurturing of startups in clusters is a key pillar of regional economic 
development in general and the clean technology program in particular. The EPA Office 
of Water, for example, supports early stage companies through grants, particularly its 
own Small Business Innovation Research program. The support for startups is also 
evident at the local level. Confluence also has access to 4 networked business incubators 
and accelerators, including The Hamilton Mill, and beta-site testing facilities to include 
the EPA's facilities in Cincinnati, local universities, and local public utilities. Pipeline 
H2O is a business incubator in Hamilton, Ohio which is managed by and based at The 
Hamilton Mill. Pipeline H2O a public-partnership initiative specializing in advanced 
manufacturing and clean technologies whose mission is to identify the world’s leading 
water-based startups and commercialize their technologies. The Water Council supports 
startups at the World Water Hub through an initiative called The BREW Accelerator 
(Business, Research, Entrepreneurship in Wisconsin). This accelerator is designed to 
support water innovators and entrepreneurs with wide ranging business and technical 
support, to integrate them into a collaborative network of technologists, innovators, and 
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entrepreneurs, and to fund those with commercialization potential through various public 
and private resources which are channeled through the The Water Council. In Tacoma 
neither the Center for Urban Waters and the Tacoma Urban Clean Water IPZ explicitly 
focus on supporting startups: the former is focused on research while the latter is focused 
on local economic development by building a water technology cluster. In 2017, the Pure 
Blue non-profit water accelerator, Aqualyst, was launched in Tacoma with six startups. 
In The Netherlands the overarching national framework for innovation places a 
high priority on supporting startups with both local and foreign entrepreneurs. Dutch 
immigration law was liberalized in 2015 to make the country more attractive to foreign 
startup entrepreneurs. To support entrepreneurship, innovation, R&D, and the 
commercialization of technology, many Dutch cities are becoming actively involved in 
cluster programs and provide incubators for startups. WaterCampus Leeuwarden offers 
starting and existing companies a comprehensive set of business support and networking 
services to develop and market innovative ideas in the field of water technology. These 
services include coaching, access to facilities, such as laboratories, as well as an 
international network and funding, and the selection process is competitive and tends to 
focus on themes. The Water Campus also hosts a networking event called Water Tech 
Fest for startups, investors, professionals and decision makers working in the water 
technology sector.  
In Israel innovation and entrepreneurship are key drivers of the country’s high 
technology sectors and of its economic growth. The government, beginning in 1992, 
began to play an active role in supporting high technology start-ups where previously it 
had primarily focused it resources on public sector projects. In the 1990s there was an 
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absence of a private venture capital market and the government filled the void with 
capital, through a fund called Yozma, and through the establishment of incubators, both 
of which have now been transferred to the private sector. Starting in 2000 the incubators 
and Yozma were 'privatized' because venture capital funds became more willing to invest 
in technology start-ups - although the government continues to provide financial support 
for start-up R&D in key economic sectors and maintains shares in many of the 
incubators, so they are essentially public-private partnerships. 
The strategy of government creating the institutional framework for accelerators 
and incubators to assist water technology innovators and entrepreneurs develop, 
commercialize and diffuse innovations answers research questions four and six: (1) 
governments are increasingly strategic about the allocation of roles and responsibilities – 
or the division of labor – between public and private partners in developing or expanding 
water technology innovation clusters, and (2) the institutional setting of a jurisdiction 
does affect the development and diffusion of innovative water-related technologies. Table 
11.8 below provides a sample of the sources of sponsorship for accelerators and 
incubators in water technology clusters; and this validates the eighth of the EPA’s nine 
strategies. Incubators and accelerators were present in all six clusters; however, there was 
a strong division of labor as to who sponsors them. They were more likely to be 
sponsored by the public sector and public-private partnerships than by the private sector 
and universities. In some jurisdictions, like Israel, they evolved from public sponsorship 







Table 11.8. Source and Level of Sponsorship of Incubators & Accelerators in Water Technology Clusters  
Country   Public   Private   University Public-Private  
Cincinnati  Negligable Low  Low  Medium 
Milwaukee  Negligable  Low  Low  Medium 
Tacoma   Medium  Low  Low  Low 
Netherlands  High  Low  Low  Medium  
Singapore  High  Low  Low  Low 
Israel   High  High  Medium  High 
 
I. Partnerships with Established Businesses & Universities. 
Clusters foster collaboration between many different groups to include 
interconnected firms, supporting institutions, local governments, business chambers, 
universities, investors and many others to promote economic growth and technological 
innovation. The synergies from a wide cross section of interconnected stakeholders in a 
cluster also produce important public goods and positive externalities for its members. 
The various stakeholders in a cluster have common interests and concerns that affect 
competitiveness and productivity that make them have an interest in cooperation, 
coordination and mutual improvement without conflicting with their competitive needs. 
While large firms often have the financial resources to support the commercialization or 
deployment of new technologies, they often face various sorts of constraints or 
impediments to R&D, innovation, diffusion, or serving specific niche markets which can 
be overcome by building partnerships with smaller firms, startups and universities. 
Larger firms often acquire smaller firms with specialized skills and technologies, or spin 
these off if their skills and technologies to not fit well with their business portfolio or 
business model. Small firms on the other hand benefit considerably from the opportunity 
to participate in robust networks where they learn about the industry and acquire the 
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business and management skills to become more productive and competitive; and small 
firms benefit from university R&D and graduate programs which multiply the reach of 
their own limited research capabilities. Learning-through-interacting is increasingly vital 
in the emerging knowledge economy. Positive social capital among cluster members 
facilitates access to important resources and information while minimizing the risk to 
intellectual property that could arise with predatory firms. Private industry associations 
within clusters serve a number of important functions: they institutionalize cluster 
linkages; provide a neutral forum for identifying common needs, constraints, and 
opportunities and provide a focal point for efforts to address them; and they help ensure 
that cluster development is led by the private sector rather than controlled by government. 
Water technology clusters are ecosystems and they cannot function competitively if 
important elements, like financial intermediaries or trade associations, are absent (Moore, 
1993, 1996).   
The strategy of partnering with universities and established companies supports 
the assertion by Porter (1998) of the importance to innovation of related and supporting 
industries in the Diamond Model. Close working relationships between innovators and 
entrepreneurs and partners in industry and academia will strengthen R&D systems and 
support an ongoing exchange of ideas, skills, and practices that can accelerate the pace of 
innovation. North (1990) see economies engaged in the process of dynamic evolution that 
is fostered by the human learning, the acquisition of skills, and development of tacit 
knowledge, an adaptive process that improves decision-making and maximizes efficiency 
and is facilitated by cooperative interaction between stakeholders. Partenrships between 
established universities and business and small firms and startups helps to overcome the 
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information asymmetries and information deficits that increase transaction and agency 
costs. This final strategy also supports the assertion by Rodgers (2003) that the 
innovation-adoption process can be improved in increasing the observability and triability 
of an innovation, especially by connecting entrepreneurs with the adopter categories of 
innovators and early adopters. Building relationships with universities and established 
firms is likely to increase the speed and likelihood of adoption of new innovations. 
In the United States all the clusters in the case study consist of partnerships 
between the private sector, local, state and federal governments, public utilities, non-
profits, economic development agencies, universities, and public and private research 
facilities. Confluence already has relationships with several regional universities and has 
set a membership target of around 250 companies and about 90 utilities to participate in 
the program. Examples of these kinds of relationships include Stantec, one of the largest 
water consultancies in the world, which provides Confluence critical resources of 
technological knowledge and industry connections; and Procter and Gamble which put up 
the seed money to get Confluence an office and is providing international connections. 
Wisconsin is still home to more than 200 companies that depend on water as a key input 
and a similar number that produce technologies to support water-intensive and water-
enabled industries. Many of these are members of The Water Council. Public and private 
universities in the state have been willing to align their training and research to support 
the council and the state has helped with the resources to make this a reality, most 
notably the $53 million investment in the University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee's School 
of Freshwater Sciences. The Tacoma Urban Clean Water Technology IPZ is a partnership 
that involves two universities, research laboratories, public economic development 
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organizations, local governments, workforce training organizations, and the Center for 
Urban Waters. Relationships between small water firms and startups and established 
firms and universities will be even more important in the future if government grant 
money declines or public R&D priorities shift. 
In The Netherlands the water economy has had a long history of cooperation 
between the public sector, private actors, and universities and considerable attention is 
given to the appropriate roles and spheres of responsibilities of each. This pattern of 
cooperation with the private sector continues through outsourcing and public-private 
partnerships which are encouraged along many parts of the water chain to keep prices for 
water services affordable and to best leverage the strengths of both sectors.  
Singapore’s two major public universities, Nanyang Technology University and 
Singapore National University, have a strong global reputation in relations to water R&D 
and for graduating competent water scientists, technologists, and engineers. University 
faculty have begun to use their research to spin-off water technology startups and 
graduates are employed throughout the water economy. Singapore has managed to build 
several local water technology companies, like Hyflux, but its success at attracting 
international companies to its HydroHub means that about 200 private companies and 26 
private research centers across the value chain of the water industry are based out of 
Singapore. These private companies and research centers, when combined with public 
utilities and universities, have boosted Singapore’s internal water management 
capabilities and positioned Singapore as a competitive exporter of water technologies to 
countries in Asia, the Middle East, Latin America, and Africa. 
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Israel has a well-developed water technology ecosystem with about 600 water 
technology firms in several fields, to include about 100 startups, and a large number of 
universities and research centers that make the capabilities of the country’s water cluster 
both deep and broad. The partnering of universities and water technology firms is an 
embedded practice in Israel with the water research center at Sde Boker in the Negev 
being an excellent example. Sde-Boker acts to promote R&D projects in collaboration 
with universities, research institutes and industry partners as well as offering services as a 
development and test site for industrial companies. 
The strategy of government creating the institutional framework for partnering 
with established businesses, universities and other organizations to support cluster 
development and promote the development and diffusion of water-related technologies 
answers research questions one, two, four and six: (1) governments do intervene to 
promote the development of industrial clusters for water technology firms, (2) they 
employ a suite of public policies and strategies to support the development or expansion 
of water technology innovation clusters, (3) governments are increasingly strategic about 
the allocation of roles and responsibilities – or the division of labor – between public and 
private partners in developing or expanding water technology innovation clusters, and (4) 
the institutional setting of a jurisdiction does affect the development and diffusion of 
innovative water-related technologies.  
Table 11.9 below shows the degree of success by clusters in partnering with  
established firms and universities in supporting cluster development and the development 
and diffusion of water-related technologies; and this validates the EPA’s ninth and final 
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strategy. Partnerships existed in all six clusters but was particularly strong and universal 
for universities, and for innovative utilities seeking greater efficiencies.  
Table 11.9. Degree of Success by Clusters in Partnering with Universities and Established Firms  
Country   University Water-intensive  Water-enabled  Utilities 
Cincinnati  High  Low  Low  High 
Milwaukee  High   Medium  Medium  High 
Tacoma   High  Low  Low  High 
Netherlands  High  Medium  Medium  High  
Singapore  High  Medium  Medium  High 



















 The six regions examined in this study all contained a collection of interrelated 
organizations focused on applying technology to solving water-related issues. In all cases 
these organizations emerged to address local social, economic, and environmental issues 
connected to water quality and quantity. The degree to which these clusters were 
hindered or facilitated in their move from being nascent clusters to either emerging, 
growing or mature clusters is a reflection of public policy priorities and strategies. For 
Singapore and Israel, the driver was a primarily a severe local deficit which the 
respective governments had to address as a matter of national security and to support 
rapid economic development. Over time Singapore and Israel developed technical 
capabilities which led to the emergence of water technology innovation clusters: for 
Singapore the decision to upgrade their technologically sophisticated emerging water 
sector into a ‘Hydrohub’ was a conscious matter of public policy; while for Israel the 
emergence of a mature traded cluster has been more organic given the critical mass of 
technology firms and supporting organizations. For Israel, the policy and strategy focus 
now needs to be on enabling international competitiveness to sustain a mature industry. 
Both countries, having largely solved their local problems and possessing significant 
technical and managerial capacity in water, can now be reallocate some of these 
resources and move from being primarily local clusters to being primarily traded clusters.   
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For The Netherlands, the Leeuwarden cluster in the north is the newest Dutch 
water technology cluster, with mature clusters specializing in maritime and delta 
technology already well-established in the south of the country. The primary driver for 
delta technology was the historic threats of flooding from both rivers and the sea and this 
is a mature traded cluster; the contemporary driver for emerging Leeuwarden cluster is 
water-use efficiency and water quality especially from the intrusion of salt, brackish or 
polluted water into fresh water reserves. The eventual goal is to make this a traded 
cluster. Delta technologies emerged to solve issues that were an ongoing threat to human 
life; while issues of the quantity and quality of freshwater address risks to the agricultural 
and industrial base of the Dutch economy and the Dutch natural enviornment. For 
Cincinnati and Tacoma, the primary driver was pollution: point pollution from industry, 
non-point pollution from agriculture, and stormwater pollution from urbanization which 
threatened human and environmental health. For Milwaukee, the divers were pollution, 
flood control, and supporting many local water-intensive and water-enabled firms with a 
traditional demand for water technologies. Milwaukee’s local cluster predates the clean 
technology cluster initiatives of the EPA and the SBA; however, Leeuwarden, 
Milwaukee, Cincinnati and Tacoma are all now the target of focused and proactive public 
policies and strategies to upgrade these clusters until they too become internationally 
competitive traded clusters.   
In all six clusters public intervention was necessary to upgrade them from nascent 
and emerging stages to growing and mature because the water economy in general, and 
the water technology sector in particular, suffer from both government and market 
failure. In addition, the public good nature of water and sanitation inhibited the process 
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for the development, commercialization and diffusion of water-related technologies 
needed to address increasingly complex challenges in the water economy. Unlike some 
other technology sectors where market demand drives innovation and entrepreneurship, 
the water technology sector has a different industry structure which affects the product 
development and diffusion cycle and lowers the appetite for risk among investors and 
financiers. Overcoming these complex problems requires policies and strategies that 
create the correct institutional framework to improve the rate at which new water 
technologies are developed and commercialized. The best institutional framework is a 
water technology innovation cluster or ecosystem and to nuture them where they arise.  
 Table 12.1 below shows the relationship between the nine cluster development 
strategies identified by the EPA and the key theories in the conceptual framework. The 
table offers two key insights: (1) that the strategy framework for cluster development 
developed by the US EPA to support the development of water technology innovation 
clusters can be shown to be strongly grounded in well-developed and widely used 
theories related to clustering and competitiveness (Porter), institutions and economic 
performance (North), and the diffusion of institutional and technological innovations 
(Rogers); and (2) that in each of the nine strategies government was empirically found to 
play a key role in the development of water technology clusters. The discussion in the 








Table 12.1. Linking Cluster Development Strategy to the Conceptual Framework  
Strategy      Porter’s   North’s    Roger’s Innovation- 
                   Diamond Model       Institutional Change      Diffusion Model   
1 Government   Formal economic &   How-to-knowledge 
social rules   Principles-Knowledge 
Institutions & Governance 
 
2 Government     Institutions & Governance  Awareness-Knowledge 




3 Government   Entrepreneurs   Awareness-Knowledge 
 Upgraded & Advanced Factors Formal skills & knowledge  How-to-Knowledge 






4 Government   Institutions & Governance  Awareness-Knowledge  
Industry Structure & Strategy Cooperation/Coordination  How-to-Knowledge 
Related & Supporting Industries Information sharing  Principles-Knowledge 
    Trialability/Observability 
 
5 Government   Entrepreneurs   Entrepreneurs  
 Leadership (public & private) Change Agents   Gatekeepers 
 
6 Government   Institutions & Governance  How-to-Knowledge 
 Industry Structure & Strategy Cooperation/Coordination  Principles-Knowledge 
 
7 Government   Incomplete/Asymmetric Info  
 Upgraded & Advanced Factors Institutions & Governance 
     3rd party contractual enforcement 
 
8 Government   Incomplete/Asymmetric Info Trialability/Observability 
 Upgraded & Advanced Factors Institutions & Governance     
 Related & Supporting Industries Formal skills & knowledge 
Developing tacit knowledge    
     Cooperation/Coordination 
 
9 Government   Institutions & Governance  Observability  
Related & Supporting Industries  Formal skills & knowledge Trialability 
Developing tacit knowledge  Innovators 
     Cooperation/Coordination  Early adopters 
 
In the case of Singapore and Israel, the identification of the nine strategy steps 
was primarily retrospective. The nine strategies were not employed as part of a proactive, 
overarching, formal water technology cluster strategy; but the were still to be found 
among the successful policies and strategies that these two countries employed. 
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Singapore’s government comprehensively developed a highly integrated water sector but 
only recently began to organize it as a cluster or ecosystem as it desires to move from an 
adaptor of foreign technologies to an exporter of water technologies that leverages the 
city-state’s unique knowledge and experiences in stormwater management, water 
treatment, desalination, and closed-loop water cycle management. The other four newer 
clusters have adopted a formal, proactive approach to cluster development: The 
Netherlands by naming water one of its ‘Top Sectors’ and a priority for economic 
development; and the United States which identified 14 nascent clusters and developed 
the Clean Technology Cluster Initiative. Although the US is the global leader in water 
technology because of its overall industrial and research leadership, its water technology 
industry was, and remains, highly fragmented. The nascent and emerging US water 
technology clusters are therefore ideally positioned to benefit from the proactive 
deployment of the nine strategies for cluster development developed by the US EPA, 
which represents a well-articulated approach to public intervention in the water economy 
to support cluster development and drive the development and diffusion of innovative 
water-related technologies. 
This dissertation sought to answer six research questions. The case studies suggest 
that all the research questions can be answered in the affirmative: 
1. Governments do intervene to promote the development of industrial clusters for 
water technology firms.   
2. Governments do employ a suite of public policies and strategies to support the 
development or expansion of water technology innovation clusters? 
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3. The six case studies provide examples of successful clusters in which specific 
strategies of government intervention can be used as good practices.  
4. Successful development or expansion of water technology innovation clusters 
requires a clear allocation of roles and responsibilities – or division of labor – 
between public and private partners. 
5. Individual or organizational champions do facilitate the development and 
diffusion of water-related technologies and enhance the competitiveness of water 
technology innovation clusters. 
6. The institutional setting of a jurisdiction does affect the development and 
diffusion of innovative water-related technologies. 
Table 12.2 below shows the relationship between the nine cluster development 
strategies identified by the EPA and the research questions selected for this study. 
 
Table 12.2. Linking the Cluster Development Strategies with the Research Questions  
Strategy          Research Question 
                   1  2  3  4  5  6 
1   Yes          Yes          Yes 
2   Yes          Yes          Yes              Yes 
3   Yes             Yes          Yes              Yes 
4   Yes          Yes          Yes              Yes 
5   Yes          Yes              Yes 
6   Yes          Yes          Yes          Yes            Yes 
7   Yes          Yes          Yes              Yes 
8             Yes          Yes            Yes 
9   Yes          Yes          Yes          Yes            Yes 
 
The empirical findings from these six case studies and the ensuing analysis 
therefore suggests the following:  
a. Governments can and should intervene to promote the development of 
industrial clusters for water technology firms. The water economy is 
 
603 
highly fragmented, lacks strong institutional arrangements, and often take 
long periods to develop and commercialize technologies required to 
protect the quantity and quality of fresh water and the efficiency with 
which it is collected, treated, transported and stored. 
b. The nine strategies for cluster support developed by the US EPA have all 
been employed, whether knowingly or unknowingly, in the six case 
studies developed for this study. They seem to offer a robust, empirically 
tested framework to justify and guide public intervention in the water 
technology sector. 
c. The more advanced water technology clusters in The Netherlands, Israel 
and Singapore all offer evidence of the importance of targeted government 
intervention. The scale and scope of the intervention depends on the local 
context, and the type of intervention necessarily changes as social, 
economic and environmental circumstances change. Government 
intervention is necessary, but policies must be adaptive and be guided by 
sound economic, financial, technological, and environmental logic. 
d. Public intervention in the six case studies was both direct and indirect; 
however, effective and targeted government intervention requires that 
roles and responsibilities between the various public and private 
stakeholders be carefully thought-out, appropriately allocated, and clearly 
communicated to everyone.   
As was stated earlier, water technology innovation clusters are significantly 
shaped by social, economic, and environmental processes which drive institutional and 
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technological change and constantly reinvent water and wastewater regimes; and both 
institutions and technology act as either constraints or enablers on the development of 
water economies as they attempt to meet society’s current and future water and 
wastewater needs. Government intervention is necessary in this fragmented sector with 
its significant role as a producer of public good and an enabler of desirable spill-over 
effects. Public intervention in the water economy through desirable, even necessary, must 
however be guided by the realities and constraints of the sector and the limitations of 
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